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Personality and the cultural
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Personality and the Cultural Pattern

PERSONALITY AND THE CULTURAL PATTERN

By James S. Plant, M.D.

DIRECTOR, ESSEX COUNTY JUVENILE CLINIC

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BY THE COMMONWEALTH FUND

SECOND PRINTING, NOVEMBER, 1937

THIRD PRINTING, APRIL, 1939

THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, 41 EAST 57TH STREET, NEW YORK

PRINTED BY E. L. HILDRETH & CO., BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT, U.S.A.

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To the memory of
EDWIN BALL
Chosen Freeholder
of the County of Essex

Preface

THEORETICALLY this volume is an outgrowth and expansion of a short series of lectures before the Seminar on the Impact of Culture on Personality assembled at Yale University during the academic year 1933-1934. Nor would it be complete without an expression of profound gratitude to the Director of that Seminar—Professor Edward Sapir of the Department of Anthropology. Not only has he given me an enormous amount of help in this present work; back of that, for some years I have owed much both to his sound scholarship and to that sensitive intuition with which he looks upon the problems of life.

Actually the book recapitulates a developing point of view over the last fourteen years. Some thousands of children, and their parents, have talked over their problems with us, and practically every late afternoon for nine months of each year there have been discussions with groups of social workers, teachers, physicians, nurses, employers, and parents as to our findings. If I seem to wander far afield—it is because the child's mind leads me there. If the book raises many questions and answers none—again, it is only a true picture of years of work with those who look out upon life. The only real excuse for the volume is that my work over these years has convinced me that the usual psychiatric formulations for the problems of children are inadequate and that in *some* way the forces of the pattern in which we live are of great dynamic value to the personality.

Since the book is thus an expression of individual thinking and development, I as author of course assume sole responsibility for the statements of fact and for the views set forth.

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Acknowledgment to that group of friends and counsellors who, as Chosen Freeholders of the County of Essex, have made this work possible, I have tried to make in the dedication. Acknowledgment is also due to those many hundreds from every walk of life who in discussion and class groups have patiently worked over these theories. My greatest debt is to those "stones which have been rejected" whose ideas and dreams this book seeks to translate. The drama of their struggles and conflicts throws its beam upon the usual. Thus those who stumble light our way, those who fall teach us our next steps. Enmeshed in the censure of Society, the price they pay is dear; can we who ask that price justify it in using what we learn from them to make a better world for those who come?

J. S. P.

January, 1937.

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PART ONE

A New Approach to the
Understanding of the
Personality

CHAPTER ONE

Changing Concepts of the Personality

THE WORLD has so long pondered the personality—whence it comes, how and how much it is molded, whither it is bent—that perhaps only myopia makes us think we see new approaches to an understanding of it. Nevertheless, there are new meanings. For the first time we are querying what our social institutions contribute to the personality rather than what it contributes to them. This has led to new techniques in gathering data, and to new interpretations for the data that existed. These in turn raise new implications and responsibilities in social institutions, which compel changes both in their structures and in their goals. In this way we reach the conception of an individual-centered culture.

In Chapters I–III of this volume we shall suggest a new source for data on the personality—what can be learned from an individual at the moment of his first and perhaps temporary break with his environment; and shall describe an effective set-up for tapping this source—a mental hygiene clinic in special functional relation to an organized section of the environment.

Illustrations of the type of material that we have been able to gather by this method follow (Chapters IV–VIII). Though we call what the casual breakdown tells us of his feelings “data,” and our tentative conclusions based on the material “findings,” none of this has the precision that these two words usually connote. The data and the findings that we offer are in reality “hunch material” which only suggest hypotheses which then demand rigorous testing by other methods.

Chapters IX–XVII trace the implications of our hypothesis for each of a number of sectors of the environment, and in Chapter XVIII we attempt to bring the whole into focus in terms of education for life.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSONALITY

Personality as the acts committed

The social philosophy of a people is a sort of Joseph's coat in its variegation of pattern and hue. Each parochial situation has its own needs as well as its historic background. Thus any clear picture of a general trend over the last fifty years demands a simplicity of presentation that is artificial. Such a schematization can be justified only as the following of a chance thread, to be blended, softened, and re-patterned to meet each local situation. Another thread might as well have been chosen. Inadequate as any schematization is, we yet are forced to use one in reviewing those definitions of personality which have dominated our social philosophy over the last fifty years.

When the period began, the personality was defined as those things which it did. People were largely measured, praised or punished, taught, given employment or aid on the basis of accomplishments. There are still wide sectors in our thinking where this is the prevalent—even exclusive—view.

The law, for instance, has traditionally defined the criminal as the crime which he committed. Behaviorists with a vengeance, officers of the law recognize the existence of a personality only if the individual's acts intrude themselves into the measured symmetry of the statute books. I remember the desk sergeant's satisfied finality in response to a query as to a threatened suicide: "We can't send anyone around until he tries it." Theory as to intent spreads its magnificent wings,

but practically in the eyes of the law one's actual existence depends upon the commitment of certain acts which affect others.

Until recently there has been the same situation in the schools. Teachers and those in control of education were interested in what children learned. Indeed it is still true that to a large extent "education" is measured by marks, grades, and curriculum content. A promising personality is possessed if one gets A's; the "best student we have ever graduated" is invariably one with high marks.

Within the memory of any adult, social work was a matter of giving material relief. One remembers campaign pledges that money given to agencies would go practically one hundred per cent to those who needed it. Actually we are still far from realizing that the important thing in social work is the interaction of personality with personality. Despite the recent growth of the philosophy of social workers themselves away from the sufficiency of food and shelter, even they have rather readily yielded to the demands of the Depression that "relief" tasks be separated from "service" tasks. (The giving of a dime to a person involves "service" and the social worker's stand that there are families which "only need relief" represents retreat from hard-won ground.)

In the present era of specialization the medical profession has been as preoccupied with symptoms as the lawyer has been with crimes. The stomach specialist was quite as confounded by the vagaries of the attached patient as was the judge by the criminal. A review of the indexes of pediatric journals of thirty years ago discloses that the pediatrician was much more interested in the diseases of children than in children.

And in psychiatry the same point of view prevailed. In the entire Kraepelinian view patients were congeries of symptom-complexes. Delusions, hallucinations, and similar im-

pediments were expertly balanced in the book, audited—and there before one's eyes was not only the patient but his irrevocable future. With a glow one remembers those who were perhaps the last survivors of the American tradition of rugged individualism—those who dared to live differently from the way their balanced books had shown that they could.

That is, this period was one of preoccupation with the acts of people and their material resources, what they had and what they did. This was not because teachers, lawyers, and social workers lacked interest in the personality but rather because they thought of it in terms of its externalized actions and appearances.

Personality as the person behaving

The first step away from this point of view did not occur overnight—in large areas of our thinking it has not as yet been taken. Conversely, there were undoubtedly heralds of the new orientation in earlier years. In general the present generation has seen its consummation. This step involved the integration of acts into the persons who commit these acts. The personality was thought of as someone performing deeds, instead of the deeds themselves. Again certain illustrations come to mind.

One of the outstanding changes occurring in the field of law has been the transfer of emphasis from the crime to the person committing the crime. Certainly among the important reasons for the development of the Juvenile Court was the growing belief that we could not understand the delinquency unless we understood the delinquent. In the interpretation of the common law, too, a shift can be noted from preoccupation with the rather abstract rights of man to the consideration of the interests of society. This step is bringing

those who interpret and apply the common law face to face with people as people. (The apparent paradox here arises in this, that those interested in the "rights" of man had no more interest in men than had the curriculum-bound teachers in the children who studied, whereas there is now growing recognition that the interests of society are a function of the hungers and satisfactions of its component members.)

No less startling has been the change in the school. Everywhere one hears of "an interest shifting from what is learned to how it is learned," or "an interest moving from the content to the method of learning." Educators have begun to interest themselves in living rather than in academic subjects. The act of learning is being integrated into the person acting. This new concept rather naturally has led the school into new fields. It has been found that there are a number of physical and mental defects which act to modify the child's ability to learn accurately and easily. So the amazing development of tests and measurements, of ectomies and extractions, of milk and orange juice—in short, for each child a glistening refurbishing. One may accept the fundamental importance of the physical and mental renovation of persons at the same time that one likens it to the activities of the museum attendant repairing here, altering the light there, scrubbing and brushing that his specimens shall appear to best advantage. This, for all of social engineering, has been a sort of "dusting-off" period.

The social worker began looking beyond the giving of relief to the attitudes and mental trends that had necessitated her intervention. The change in personality which was her goal was no longer represented by mere money and a solid roof but by the healthy and wholesome use of such resources. In high condensation, all that this implies has been called the "case work method."

Admittedly there are many physicians who are still thinking in terms of symptoms but there is a growing group who realize that the patient must be their main interest. Here and there instructors in medical schools are thinking of the various specialties not as independent entities but as the patient in relation, for instance, to his heart or to his eyesight.

In this change psychiatrists have played an important role. The stress they have laid upon mental mechanisms, and what things *mean* to a person rather than what they *are*, has been one of the best examples of the acceptance of the personality as being not only what one does but as also the aim, the drive, the reason, the ideational content back of what one does.

Personality as the integration of the individual into his life

Here and there steps are being taken towards a third definition of the personality. If we speak of integrating the act into the person, so may we speak of integrating the person into his whole life. If, in the second phase, it was recognized that the act could be understood only as a part of the person acting, so now could the person be understood only as a part of his whole life. The personality is here seen as a river and at any point its currents, its débris, its power are known only as one understands the sources from which these spring. It is as though our friends at the museum now understood that, no matter how good the lighting, repair, or polishing, a statue could be really known only if the hands that chiseled it and the spirit that conceived it were known. Such a step has been taken by many, but chiefly it has been the contribution of the psychoanalytic group. There has been so much permeation of their philosophy into other disciplines that it is difficult to say how much of the change is due to the tutor and how much to the learner.

The Juvenile Court, already cited as illustrating the recog-

nition of the delinquent behind the delinquency, also shows something of this newer point of view. Though judges show but the slightest interest in the results of their decisions in criminal cases, and though the work of the Gluecks has demonstrated the Law's terrible blindness to the ineffectiveness of its measures,¹ this court is based on the idea that the understanding treatment of children would show its effects in their adult lives. This is at least lip-service to the notion that life is a continuous river.

In the schools, too, this integrating process has begun. In certain systems, cumulative records for each child are kept and used, and there is a slowly growing tendency to integrate the twelve grades into a single meaningful process. This development is not to be confused with the earlier (and continuing) acceptance on the part of the school of a right to mortgage the child's adult years through stressing its task as "preparing for life" instead of realizing that the school experience is life itself. Admittedly all education tacitly presumes the continuity of the personality. What is involved in the step under discussion (and what the school has not widely recognized) is that each life experience in totality is dynamically interwoven into every subsequent one. This notion so far fails to permeate the school philosophy that even where a visiting teacher is employed as earnest of a realization that the child's life flows into and out from the schoolroom, she does not follow the children during the longer summer and holiday vacations.

It has, of course, been in the field of psychiatry itself that

¹ Sheldon Glueck and E. T. Glueck: *Five Hundred Criminal Careers*, New York, Knopf, 1930; *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934.

While these two careful and excellent studies were not directed primarily to this point, no one can escape their demonstration that the Law's majestic use of court procedure, punishment, probation, clinic diagnosis, and clinic assistance is ineffective in controlling recidivism.

the new development has been most striking. In the two preceding stages of our thinking about personality, we could satisfy our curiosity by "immediate" studies, that is, studies of the individual at a single moment. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the psychoanalytic group is the growing realization that the personality is understood only as its source and tributaries and their crosscurrents are understood. Is it not safe today to say that modern psychiatry demands a conception of the personality which is what it does, what it is, and what it has been; that this is all one blended, interlocking, operating mechanism?

Almost within our own generation have we seen these three phases of a changing social philosophy. Evidences of each are all about us. We will, later in the volume, attempt to indicate somewhat more in detail at which stages in this development various institutions are now to be found. To recapitulate, there was first the belief that the personality was to be defined in terms of deeds, expressions as such, things that happened. This "personality" was then conceived of as being integrated into the actor—the person who acted. This, as a practical matter, shifted the whole emphasis. The moment that we began to ask "Who and what is this person who learns, this one who asks charity, this other who is delinquent, or sick?" we started on a quest which stretches far. Already we are engaged in pretty complete and widespread "static" studies of these individuals. We have gone farther. We fairly well recognize that this individual can be understood only as we know all those currents out of his earlier life which color and control his present picture.

*Personality as the integration of the individual
into the total milieu*

It is the essential purpose of the present volume to inquire whether this last statement is a sufficient definition of the per-

sonality. As the act has been integrated into the actor and as he has been integrated into his whole life, is there the possibility that this life can be understood only as it is integrated into the cultural pattern present and past? As the currents of the past swirl in the present, do currents from the world about also merge with those within us? As I am today but a named part of my whole life, is it possible that I am here only a named part of the total cultural pattern? Has our quest led us to an acceptance of the words of Walt Whitman:²

There was a child went forth every day,
And the first object he looked up and received with wonder, pity,
love, or dread, that object he became,
And that object became part of him for the day, or a certain part
of the day, or for many years, or stretching cycles of years. . . .

His own parents,
He that had fathered him, and she that conceived him in her
womb, and birthed him,
They gave this child more of themselves than that,
They gave him afterward every day—they and of them became
part of him.

The mother at home, quietly placing the dishes on the supper
table,
The mother with mild words—clean her cap and gown, a whole
some odor falling off her person and clothes as she walks by:

The father, strong, self-sufficient, manly, mean, angered, unjust,
The blow, the quick loud word, the tight bargain, the crafty lure,
The family usages, the language, the company, the furniture—the
yearning and swelling heart,
Affection that will not be gainsayed—the sense of what is real—
the thought if, after all, it should prove unreal . . .

Men and women crowding fast in the streets—if they are not
flashes and specks, what are they?

² There Was a Child Went Forth, *Leaves of Grass*, Boston, Thayer and Eldridge, 1860-1861 (Doubleday Doran, Copyright, 1926).

The streets themselves, and the façades of houses, and goods in the windows . . .

These became part of that child who went forth every day, and who now goes, and will always go forth every day.

Whether this next integration is a possibility is a question—one which must remain unanswered for the reader (just as for the author) at the end of this volume. For the present we intend to outline the methods by which such an hypothesis could be tested; then to set forth data which seem to indicate the probability of the correctness of the hypothesis; to follow this with some discussion of the necessary consequences of a general acceptance of the hypothesis.

It must be evident at the outset that the whole matter belongs in that shell-torn no-man's land in which there has been no ordered progress. The social scientists in the one line of trenches and the psychiatrists and psychologists in the other hurl noisy and brilliantly exploding bombs. The casualty list is, as yet, astonishingly low. Not that the social scientist has failed of saying much of individuals. But in general he has pictured the individual rather more as he ought to be—by inference from averages—than as he is. Nor have the excursions of the other group into the realms of the social sciences been any the less productive of monstrosities. Social psychology and social psychiatry have been pretty anthropomorphic—involving a naïve sort of inflation of the individual to the size of village, city, race, or nation. Each of these approaches has lacked realism, being a rather labored effort at using familiar methods and tools in soil demanding new approaches. The concepts and techniques of each group must be modified for this common task. The suggestion has been made³ that essentially a new discipline will be set up to

³ E. Sapir, *Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry*, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 27, p. 229, October–December 1932.

cover this field—the individual in relation to his environment. We have suspected that this would only confuse the warfare, and attempt in Chapter III to outline a feasible set-up which involves rather a fusion of available resources and attacks.

However difficult the task of investigation on this borderline between the individual and social disciplines, it yet challenges our keenest effort. It is at this point that the impingements of the cultural pattern upon the individual can best be measured. Studied, as it were, within the individual these impingements are lost in the maze of all the other factors that the individual brings to the situation. Studied as discrete from the individual they are seen only as what theoretically they ought to do or might do to him. As for the individual, it is at his point of contact with the institutions about him that he actually operates as a working unit—rather than where he wishes or hopes or expects to operate. Behavior, of itself, involves a synthesis which is not of the psychiatrist's or sociologist's making, but rather is inherent in any situation of operation or action.

We are challenged then to discover the extent to which the forces of the environment become an integral part of the personality, and our present study is limited to that ill-known part of the field at which the individual makes his contacts with the cultural pattern.

RELATION OF THE PERSONALITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Psychiatric schools of thought have already made certain assumptions as to the relationship of the personality to its environment.⁴

⁴ The terms environment, milieu, and cultural pattern are used interchangeably in this volume. With better sociological sensitization on my part, undoubtedly this vagueness of terminology should clear.

The self-sufficient personality

First, and commonest, is the picture of the self-sufficing personality in solitary majesty outriding the forces and drives of the environment. Events are of no import—only one's *attitude* about them counts. Accidents and luck are misnomers—the all-seeing eye of the unconscious directing one in such a way that events but *seem* to the conscious to be accidental. A man may take himself thousands of miles from his customary milieu to be changed, to be cured, to be made able to re-face that milieu—because his personality is but his attitude about the events of life. Conversely, efforts at ameliorating the environment, at altering in some way the cultural pattern, are but superficial and evanescent—because the distorted personality will continue to measure its milieu as crooked until its own frame has been straightened. Tuberculosis might mean black disaster to one, yet light the clear flame of literary genius in another. Masturbation ceases to be of importance, and one's attitude about masturbation becomes of enormous importance. There are many historical and clinical data to support this assumption.

The interaction of the personality with the environment

A second assumption has been best depicted by Sapir.⁵ Emphasis falls not on a flowing, changing, growing set of attitudes but rather on the possible existence of a relatively inflexible personality-pattern with which one comes into life. One grows as does a mosaic pattern on a floor, able only to take from the environment those events and influences which can fit the pattern.

⁵ This is hinted at in his article on Personality in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. It also appears in Professor Sapir's parts of the discussion given in the *Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1930 (first printed in *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 9, p. 879, March 1930). In neither reference is there as complete a picture as he has given in conversations.

Again there is much support in history and clinic. Any judge, probation officer, parent, teacher, or social worker sees here immediately the most reasonable explanation of the inability of certain individuals to assimilate the tried and useful influences of training. W. I. Thomas draws attention to the high rates of maladjustment and instability that occur when an individual with one "pattern" finds himself in a totally foreign "pattern."⁶ Thomas beautifully points out that it is not the character of the configuration that produces the maladjustment but rather the inability of that pattern to find any of its own "growing blocks" in the environment about it. The American Indian still shows a picture of confusion and bewilderment as he is faced with a cultural pattern that is so utterly foreign to that of his own background.

It must be obvious that whether one talks in terms of attitudes or in terms of earlier-laid-down patterns, the assumption is that the personality is relatively untouched by the environment which is about it. Neither group has very frankly faced the part that the environment might have played in the earlier formation of these attitudes and patterns. Each group accepts the theory that the environment raises very definite tensions but does not admit that it can materially alter the personality.

Psycho-osmosis

Another assumption is possible, one which attempts in its own way to allow for some exploration of the relationship existing at any time between the content of the environment and the content of the personality. It is that the "wall" about the personality is highly permeable and that there flow into the personality currents of environmental influence which

⁶ This idea has been developed in a number of places by this author. The reader is referred particularly to William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1923.

continuously affect the existing content. This is the working hypothesis of the present book.⁷ An analogy from anatomy will clear the point. Not so long ago the cells of the body were considered as self-contained and self-sufficient entities. Organs were built of cells "as houses are built of bricks." Now cell walls are seen as little more than lines marking off portions of the total organ. In this more modern view it is as though one were to cut up this page into small squares. Each piece would be an entity, would have boundaries, but each would have meaning for itself and for the others only if it were fitted into the total pattern.

This assumption pushed to its logical conclusion would be quite as bizarre as the others. Realism demands that one recognize some integration, some wholeness, of what one calls "oneself." Individuals seem dramatic and unitary. There is much to indicate that the wall about each person is a selective sort of membrane, constantly altering in one way or another—as they pass through it—such influences as come to the personality.⁸ Moreover, we will plentifully see that, where the currents of the environment sweep too freely and too drastically through the personality, it uses the mechanism of "negativism" to shut out these devastating influences. However, certain individual factors can be thought of as being constantly altered by the influences of the cultural pattern to make a new personality picture, which now may be con-

⁷ The idea will be developed further in discussing the structure of the personality (Chapter IV).

⁸ May this be a false inference from our previous preoccupation with individuals as such? Perhaps with increased knowledge we can accept the free permeability or even the disappearance of the wall between the personality and the environment as we have been accepting the disappearance of the walls between the physical and the mental, between the present and the past, between the conscious and unconscious. Still, man thinks in dichotomies and clings to them, and in spite of our feeling that possibly the terms environment and personality are little more than general and specific modes of speaking of the same thing, we will continue to use them with the ordinarily accepted distinctions.

sidered as the individual and again, in turn, is to be blended with new environmental forces.

Our hypothesis rests upon the possibility that environmental forces can change the personality. Two distinct ways in which this may occur have been recognized.

The first of these is a flow of action, force, and molding power into and out of the individual. There is nothing necessarily metaphysical in this conception, though the measurement and description of such forces involve techniques about which we as yet know very little, and even the data we should need to test their existence are largely beyond our present reach. The man coming to his daily task brings his family with him—his wavering hands may owe their uncertainty no more to physical fatigue than to the tension of a son's delinquency. If it is true that we must know a man's earlier years to understand his present personality, we must also know his whole cultural milieu because this, too, is part of him.

There is a second, more mechanical, way in which the environment affects the personality. The discovery of steam as a motive power has "mechanically" forced the close packing of abodes, the dispersion of the functions of the family, the odd phenomenon of persons working and living in close proximity without the development of intimacy ties. Indeed—without too much sophistry—one may follow Ogburn to a tracing of all the far-reaching changes of the industrial era back to our inability economically to transmit steam as power.⁹ Another example is closer at hand—the dual set of forces that operate upon individuals living in or near New York City. There is the centralization on Manhattan Island

⁹ William F. Ogburn, editor, *Social Changes in 1929*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929. There is as good an exposition, or better, of this point of view in Ogburn's part of *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933.

of an enormous agglomeration of socio-economic interests—these operating as a centripetal force of great power. There is a centrifugal force impelling these same persons towards more comfortable living conditions. Steam, electricity, the automobile—in ruthless succession these throw their power towards one or the other side of this tug-of-war. Individuals are impelled in one or the other direction, giving for the whole area that queer stability of the beehive built upon the ceaseless restlessness of each individual.

Such forces have previously been recognized but that they actually color and alter the personality has been little more than asserted by the sociologists—and ignored by the psychiatrists. The exploration which we propose, has, therefore, two important goals. It seeks to cover that part of the field of knowledge where the social and individual disciplines must commingle. It also envisages the beginning of a form of social planning based upon the real and discovered needs of the individual. Society is, and has been, aroused over its misfits and the mass of human breakdown that is in the wake of its progress. It has erected every conceivable type of agency to study, salvage, or merely sweep up this *débris*. As the wreckage mounts, new agencies are demanded or “better standards of service” asked of those existing. The folly of believing that happiness and goodness can be fabricated by machinery (agencies) will be exposed only when we understand that the ills, corruptions, and hypocrisies of a cultural pattern flow into the child and man and “become a part of him for the day, for the year, or for stretching cycles of years.” If it is true that the triumphs and tragedies of the street flow into and become a part of the child, then all programs of personality change must manage somehow to change the street. In other words, we need an individual-centered culture—a social pattern in which the components, good or bad, will be

evaluated on the basis of the changes they produce in, and the goals they offer to, the personality.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE PERSONALITY

The personality's modes of expression

Before discussing the mechanics of the environment's effect upon the personality, we must consider those methods by which the personality makes itself known to the groups which surround it.

Obviously the best recognized mode of personality expression is by the spoken or written word. With the increasing complication of human relations, generalizations become necessary. The level of a cultural development is measured largely by the extent of its ability to generalize and symbolize its experience. This is most easily done by words. Thus intelligence is frequently measured in terms of the ability to deal with symbols, words. Emotional experiences, on the other hand, are discrete and idiomatic. They do not lend themselves to generalization in words without distortion. It would seem impossible to discuss the science of forecasting the weather without the use of words. Yet through the ages large groups of people have expressed what they *wished* that the weather might be through body movements and music. That is, verbal modes of expression lend themselves to the intellectual processes whereas what one calls the psycho-motor tensions are the mode of emotional expression, and these are quite impossible of generalization through words. To the objection that in the emotional field the use of symbols is almost universal the obvious answer is in one's own life—that symbols are used but are "never quite satisfactory."

These considerations are of basic importance to our thesis. Relatively few expressions of intellectual processes are free

from emotional tones. One result of this is that efforts are made to carry over the use of words and other symbols to the expression of phenomena of the emotional field. The other result is to make a fetish out of verbal, or intellectual, expression to the attempted exclusion of any recognition of the emotional factors which are actually involved in practically every experience. An example shows this. In general the school has developed in this country as an intellectual, word-centered experience. Indeed, it still largely measures success in terms of the amount of curriculum covered—the mastery of the printed word is the goal. Then came the so-called progressive schools, the child-centered schools. They saw the school experience as an experience in living; they sought the emotional development of the child and utilized activities rather than mere words. But as this movement grew books were written of it, words told how it was done, so that today the greatest danger apparent in “progressive education” is that it crystallizes, generalizes, verbalizes again the life of the child. The new schools will be brighter, pleasanter places than the old but a *system* of progressive education is in danger of again missing the emotional development of the child which must always be individual, idiomatic.

Our formalized schooling has so assiduously emphasized the purely verbal modes of communication that we have forgotten or largely repressed the fact that the non-verbal modes are much more archaic and widespread. Modern psychiatry and psychology have dipped a bit into the subject though it is still true that non-technical developments remain far ahead of the accomplishments of these disciplines. We refer here to that great host of mind readers, character-determinists, high-powered salesmen, and all that myriad of persons who remain sensitized to the language of the muscle tensions. We use the word “remain” as we are referring to a mode of communica-

tion which is largely understood and used by children and from which they are slowly but inexorably pushed by the word-centered school and the book-centered cultural pattern into which they grow. It is only fair to mention Downey's will-temperament test¹⁰ and certain efforts that have been made to study expression of the personality through motion pictures of the movements and tensions about the eye and mouth. Yet, though any psychiatrist is far more dependent on how a thing is said than on what is said, this has scarcely appeared in any formal setting forth of psychiatric theory.

So little is known of this field that we can do little more than indicate its vague outlines. We refer here to what might be variously termed the body movements, the body tensions, the psycho-motor tensions, or the muscle tensions of the body. These refer to the way that words are said rather than to what is said.

Not only is practically all communication between animals of this nature but so is our communication with them. Who has not had the experience of observing a dog who could read his master's mood, often when the master was scarcely aware of it himself? The horse, Clever Hans,¹¹ could give the correct answer to mathematical problems if he could see someone who knew the answer, even if that person was making every effort to refrain from any movement or change when the horse had arrived at the correct answer.

Our rich and adequate contacts with very young children are through the psycho-motor tensions. Levy has apparently shown that satisfactory breast-feeding (cuddling) experiences do more than whole dictionaries of later words in the establishment of security in the family group.¹²

¹⁰ June E. Downey, *The Will Temperament and Its Testing*, Yonkers-on-Hudson, World Book Company, 1923.

¹¹ Oskar Pfungst, *Clever Hans*, New York, Holt, 1911.

¹² The author is amazed to find that David M. Levy has never published

The physical sexual relationships are critical examples of the use of psycho-motor tensions as a language. Individuals have various things to say to each other that demand this form of expression, where any other form of expression seems inadequate.

Deaf children serve as another example. These individuals watch you very carefully in conversation. This is not merely a matter of lip reading, for it is seen in children who know little or nothing of that. They touch and rub up against you, gathering in this way information that oddly enough you are not conscious of giving because of long and thorough training in verbal modes of expression. Possibly a day will come when we will learn to talk from the deaf, rather than so vigorously trying to teach them how. There is further the testimony of the deaf that the "talkies" are much less satisfactory to them than the movies—as the actors with words at their command are not showing or emphasizing the psycho-motor tensions as they consciously attempted to do in the earlier films in order to carry their message.

These, then, are the two ways in which the personality communicates with its enviroing group. Perhaps due to the discovery of the printing press, we have given overweaning importance to verbal modes of communication—so much so that the more facile and more accurate mode has been well-nigh forgotten in spite of its pervasive omnipresence in all of our relationships. Part of this is undoubtedly a defense; there will perhaps always be a sizable group who cannot "afford" to live in a world of feeling. Certainly, for instance, one sees teachers who are so poorly balanced in their emotional lives that they could not be expected to live with rooms full of

this statement as it seems so integral a part of the findings in the extensive and painstaking work which he has done. Dr. Levy, in a personal communication of September 1936, writes that he endorses the statement as here made. The matter is more fully discussed in Chapter VII.

children did they not have the armor of "academic" knowledge and verbalized expression to put between themselves and their charges.

The impress of the environment

There are then the means by which the environment influences the personality. Any time that an individual or group uses either form of language (verbal or muscle tension), there is being impressed upon another person something of the cultural pattern. Obviously we consider the psycho-motor tensions as far more important (though less easily measured) than the spoken or printed word. There is also a group of facilitators of communication—the newspapers, the radio, all means of travel, things that increase the number and length of personal contacts. These, in turn, must be measured on the basis of their relative use of verbal and muscle-tension modes of communication.

That personalities differ in their susceptibility to all these environmental forces seems to be common sense. Observation of this phenomenon would suggest that the difference is due to variations in the inherent structure of the personality which will be considered in a later chapter.

The student of the personality, then, finds that his subject stretches out beyond the limits of the present into all of the past and that the here is nothing but a marked-off portion of the there. To understand the personality, it is not enough to be a psychiatrist; one must be historian and sociologist as well. If the ever-present, ever-growing, ever-controlling unconscious makes the individual one with his past, so do the psycho-motor tensions and the "mechanical" forces of sociological influences make him one with his total environment.

CHAPTER TWO

The Personality-Culture Balance

BEFORE WE are ready to explore specific areas of interaction between the personality and the environment, there is need of a clearer picture of the general relations between them, so far as we know them today. We may speak of these relations as the personality-culture balance, referring here to the relative pliability of these two as change occurs and the relative power of one to control the other. If change, development, and growth are to occur (and these *do* constantly occur) where may they be most effectively controlled—if they are indeed subject to control? Obviously there is great practical importance in the question whether it is simpler and easier to bring about changes in the personality by direct attack or by modifying the cultural pattern surrounding the personality.

THE PLIABILITY OF THE PERSONALITY

Is the personality to all intents and purposes implastic? If so, either the individual must be free to move about until he finds an environment that fits his own goals, interests, and patterns, or he must be in danger of considerable tension—"unhappiness"—in the environment in which he happens to be present. It is to be admitted that there is a very considerable amount of observation to support—or at least indicate the possibility of supporting—this point of view.

There is, first of all, the admittedly high mobility of the population. As means of communication and travel have become more accessible, people have migrated more—as though

the search for new environmental patterns occurred as soon as feasible instruments were available.

If the matter were as simple as this, statistics of runaways would be of value. For in the self-contained nomadic tribe or small rural community the misfitted personality could escape only in this way. The greater variegation in pattern offered by metropolitan areas should mean that complete running away is not so necessary and frequent a step. "Complete" since police statistics as to runaways include a large fraction of missing persons who are in search of no more than a day's adventure. We do not have accurate data. We need to know accurately about runaways from the monochrome and polychrome cultural patterns both of the past and present.

This, however, oversimplifies the problem. Actually facile means of communication, the radio and the newspaper, operate in two different ways. They are show-cases of life, presenting ever-wider selections of milieus for the shopper who comes "looking for just a certain sort of thing." On the other hand, they may serve rather to allow the personality to remain in a distasteful pattern through richly feeding a life of compensatory phantasy. If personality is implastic, the shepherd boy of an earlier age had no means of easing his tension, but the country boy today (because of the railroad and the post) may "go to the city" and yet retain a very satisfactory contact with his earlier milieu. Thus moving may be here rather an enriching process than one of escape. To the extent that increased means of travel and communication have led to increased migration of persons, and to the extent that this seems to have reduced intrapersonal tensions (as shown in unhappiness and brusque escape through elopement), the implications are in favor of the hypothesis that the personality does not undergo modification by its environment.

We have gathered data as to this mobility in Essex County, New Jersey.¹ In the least advantaged social classes there is undoubtedly high mobility; indeed, this is one of the common tragic symptoms of the helplessness of the individual in the face of the rising tide of social complexity with which he has to contend. We therefore confined our Essex County studies to the considerably better advantaged groups largely in suburban areas of the county, and measured the changes during the twenties, thus keeping away from the effects of the Depression. Large sampling of directories five years apart shows that 68 per cent of the population changed their addresses at least once in that time.² This percentage holds up even for areas where four out of five of the families held title to the houses in which they lived. Annual school turnover (exclusive of those graduating from the eighth grade) ran as high as 25 per cent in areas occupied by high-grade clerks and small executives and was not below 15 per cent in the most advantaged suburban areas. There were at least 111,700 new people moving into the county between the census of 1920 and that of 1930. The actual figure is higher than this because the census gain (corrected for births and deaths) does not show how many "replacements" there were for those who moved out of the county in that period.

If the personality is not molded by the environment but rather remains in clash with the pattern about it, not only will there be restless wandering of families in search of compatible patterns; there will also be marked unhappiness or tension on the part of the individual who must remain in the pattern because of any one of a number of reasons making it difficult to move. There is much to indicate that such unhappiness and tension exist. Advertising addresses itself

¹ The character of this population is described on page 64.

² This investigation is described in detail in Chapter V, page 106.

largely to the dissatisfactions of people. The vogue of vocational guidance has had many of its roots in the assumed implasticity of the individual, with the consequent necessity of discovering that part of the variegated pattern into which he might fit. The high rates of overt mental and social maladjustment are in favor of such an hypothesis. It is even open to suspicion that such homely products as mouth washes and a certain kind of soap have been purchased by individuals who are certain only that in *some* way the configurations of their personalities and the cultural pattern do not fit.

Such observations may be interpreted as supporting the theory that the personality is relatively implastic, and that when it is in discord with the cultural pattern it must either seek other cultural patterns or continue to suffer serious internal tensions. Frequent shifts in population, however, are susceptible of other interpretations than that of the implasticity of the personality. Individuals in changing to new patterns may be subject to factors other than that of seeking the pattern they wish. For instance, in such an area as Essex County, one of the reasons for change is the invasion into a residential district of an industrial development. Due to cheap and easy transportation these developments do not cluster workers about them but tend to disperse them in search of congenial living conditions. This dispersion is to areas of equal rental value and frequently forces the family to "jump over" the suburban area into an entirely different rural area where the cost of living is more nearly comparable to that of the area which it has been forced to leave.

For those who work in New York (almost four out of five of the fathers in the more advantaged suburbs in Essex County) the cost and time of commuting offer a second reason for change that rather ruthlessly cuts through other pattern-determinants. It might even be said that they construct their

own pattern so that in concentric areas about Manhattan Island may be found patterns that are similarly fixed by time and money. This explanation, like the preceding one, has to do with the immobility of money.

Finally, there are those interesting areas of small size where, due quite as much to cultural lag as to the immobility of money, the families of earlier days or their descendants remain as they were many years ago despite the close encroachment of markedly dissimilar patterns. It is often true that through phantasy the inhabitants of these areas maintain a fiction of the persistence of the pattern for which they care.

That is, while the rapid shifting of the population may mean that individuals are seeking patterns which fit their own needs, it is also possible that these movements are to a large extent actuated and controlled by so impersonal a factor as the cost of things. Certainly as one lives in this area and sees some thousands of families, one forms the opinion that a large part of this actual change is "against the will" of those moving. Individual and family status are dependent very much upon such impersonal matters as where a person lives and what he has.

Admittedly, the financial factors in any situation are themselves part of the cultural pattern. This answer is of theoretical but not very real importance. Actually there is the search for as large an income as possible and there is the control exercised by employers over the general area in which their employees shall live. It is possibly these commercial and non-personal factors that force the changes rather than the personality's free choice of pattern.

The evidence is not conclusive. The similarities of people living in a certain pattern may be due either to the moving about of various implastic personalities until a fitting pattern

is found, or to the molding effects of certain patterns upon plastic and malleable personalities.

THE PLIABILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT

There remains the question whether it is easier to modify the personality "artificially" or to change the environment to meet the needs of the individual. The earlier interest which those engaged in social work had in altering the environment has been largely lost, in the last generation, in the development of psychiatric theory. This is of grave importance in the whole program of social reform. It is not easy to build attitudes that in themselves have strength. If it were it would make little difference to people what the conditions of social living might be. It is possible, as the psychiatrist claims, that the Kingdom of God is within each individual. But it may be easier to alter the stresses about people than to try to build up the Kingdom of God within them regardless of the stresses about them.

Because the psychiatrists' training involves a minimum knowledge of sociology and because the outstanding schools of psychiatry have been intensely individualistic in their formulations, psychiatrists have generally and somewhat boldly announced that they are little interested in altering the environment. Yet the very psychiatric venture by which the change or cure is brought about itself represents an alteration in the patient's milieu. A few psychoanalysts have with some frankness recognized that the analytic experience is itself the setting up of a new environmental situation in which there is a reciprocal flow of interest and influence. However, in large part authors of psychiatric literature attempt to give the picture of an individual changing through the alteration of mechanisms within him. They seem blind to

the fact that the psychiatrist finds himself in every situation fulfilling or failing to fulfill the patient's quest for new parent, mate, friend, or sibling! There is nowhere more bizarre reading than the lengthy, profound discussions of mechanism changes within children, for instance, in sublime indifference to the fact that the new contact has itself set up an entirely new environment for the child.

It is clear at least that the psychiatrist has attempted to study and then cure his patient outside of his natural environment. The reason, in part at least, is historical. Classically, psychiatry dealt almost entirely with hospitalized patients. As the more modern dynamic approach developed and as, along with this, the psychiatrist emerged from the hospital to handle the patient in the general social stream, he brought with him his earlier parochial point of view. This has been reinforced by the fact that the Kraepelinian approach which so long and so thoroughly held sway gave overwhelming importance to the various purely physical factors within the patient. Those chemical factors which we found, we were sure about; those we didn't find, we were sure awaited but finer analysis. Thus the psychiatrist has removed the patient many (even thousands) of miles from his ordinary milieu to bring about the changes which he felt to be necessary. This appeal to a new environmental set-up is due either to assurance that the odds against the patient in his natural environment are too great (though the patient has to return to this same situation later) or to the feeling that the psychiatrist does not care to tilt his lance against the problems of the patient's usual milieu. In defense against this last the psychiatrist has pleaded the irrepressible power of the individual. To the Kraepelinian and his ilk this determinism was that of chemistry and other less known developmental forces; to the analyst and the dynamic group this magnificent sweep

through good and evil was the omnipotence of attitudes. Perhaps, however, the psychiatrist's interest in carrying through his treatment in his office is rather akin to the layman's interest in seeing the lion caged at the zoo. In both instances there is a certain safety—a certain wholeness to one's skin—that is far from being insured in the natural habitat.

Not that the psychiatrist has failed to have his say about the environment of his patient. One of the fundamentals of the psychiatric point of view is that it should not contain attitudes of blame. But instead of eschewing faultfinding entirely the psychiatrist has found the patient's environment a most useful scapegoat. Thus for children's problems it is the parents who are "at fault"; psychiatrists for adults find that their patients' earlier lives were thwarted, ill-fed, or dwarfed by their sires. How could we clinic men ever face our expectant supporters could we not point to courts, agencies, and parents, who were "uncooperative," "bound by tradition," "lacking in understanding," or "lashed to the mast of curriculum"? The psychiatrist has not forgotten the environmental influences about his patients—they serve well to shoulder the "blame."

In another way the psychiatrist has a bit timorously entered this field—through the psychiatric social worker. It is true that today she is, in a growing number of situations, developing as a sort of dilution of the psychiatrist—seeing no more of the home, the schoolroom, or the court than does he. Earlier, however, she was much more simply an individual actually viewing the patient in his natural habitat. His historical setting being what it was, perhaps it was necessary that the psychiatrist should be shy about consorting too openly with those who make up the usual and natural environment of the patient. The psychiatric social worker then appeared a natural step to the time when the psychiatrist

would learn from the parent, the teacher, the scout leader, the doctor—all those who naturally are the environment of his patients—and help them change themselves and their pressures in such a way that he would no longer have patients. Apparently the psychiatric social worker is today but strengthening the individualistic philosophy of the psychiatrist. Whether this is a permanent trend is impossible to predict in so new and fluid a professional group.

This lack of interest in environment seems particularly odd in view of the fact that there is much evidence that it is easier to modify the patient's natural milieu than it is to alter the personality.

Examples of this naturally divide themselves into two groups—those in which the environment in which the child is found is changed and those in which the individual, usually a child, is transported to a new environment.³

The simplest situation in which the environment is changed presents problems of the following sort within the family. A girl of nine gave an uneasy picture of tension. She was not sleeping well, was restless and inattentive in school, fussed over every bit of food, continued enuresis, and with some frequency soiled herself. There were other children in the family, but the one important to us was her eleven-year-old sister with whom our patient, Catherine, played constantly. The older sister, Beatrice, and her companions found Catherine for the most part a satisfactory playmate, but certainly her time at home and in school away from these playmates was far from a placid experience. This is so common a picture that one dares disregard all the inviting mechanisms of retaliation, hatred, and anal-eroticism that offer themselves for exposition to the worried parents. While it is ap-

³ These examples are drawn from the experience of the Essex County Juvenile Clinic, described in Chapter III, pages 63 ff.

parently quite as excellent for children as for adults to have to "reach up" to better integrated situations, the picture of the child who constantly is in competition with those of longer spans of attention and more maturity is one close to that of fatigue. True, there are varying symptoms since there is little to indicate the point at which the nervous system will break under the load. Suffice it to say that with Catherine, as with others, the development of a group of companions of her own age cleared up all these symptoms almost at once. Nor have they returned during the intervening eight years.

In an effort to maintain unity it is rather common for families where there are two children rather close in age to attempt to maintain similar companions, interests, and games for both. Because this is of frequent occurrence and because there are relatively few children who exhibit as marked symptoms as did Catherine, it may be claimed, with good basis, that she presented in some way a special hazard—that there are physical or psychic reasons why she reacted so seriously to what we found. That is a valid assumption and we would accept the statement that even in view of eight years now of apparently "normal" adjustment, she may always be more vulnerable to the crises of life than might some other person be. An imposing series of explanations of this situation have passed in review as various psychiatric schools have had their day. Their various assumptions are beyond debate. It does seem, however, valid to point out that any intelligent parent can recognize in a moment the child who has been playing for the day with children who are "ahead of him." We somewhat labor this point because it so sincerely enters the whole problem of the placement of children with unusually high IQ's in grades that fit their intellectual ability but which represent in physical and emotional maturity a much advanced integration.

Certainly a very fair share of the so-called "habit problems" of children can be handled, and are handled, by an alteration in the environment. The whole gamut of situations from enuresis to failure to stick at "homework" is seriously affected by acute parental stress on the bad performance and complacent disregard of the good performance. Just why people so stress the faults of others again has been the subject of a vivid display of theories. The fact that the situation can be cleared so quickly leads to the possibility that the difficulty may be so prosaic a matter as ignorance. A great number of these problems have been dealt with, apparently with success, through the rather simple procedure of "calling off the dogs."

Negativism in children is a common and nettling difficulty. The child who has a "no" for everything and who shows even in the psycho-motor tensions a physical withdrawal from others, comes to the clinic often and usually with the parental statement that he "needs to learn to obey." (These children present interesting pictures in the kindergarten group where, as the other children crowd in the circle around the teacher like so many sardines, they may be seen to put a few inches between themselves and their neighbors.) Some time ago, a five-year-old boy came to the Essex County Clinic, the only child of an intelligent, finger-in-everybody's-pie sort of mother. For one of his age he could stand for unbelievably long periods without apparent movement of any sort. He once stood in this catatonic fashion for over twenty minutes following his mother's pleasant but rather urgent insistence that he "take his coat off" (precisely the activity in which he was busily engaged at the time that she spoke). Today this symptom has entirely disappeared, the boy does well at school and in dancing-class; reports come of his freedom of movement at home, on the playground, and in school. This has

come about with a minimum of contact, on our part, with the patient. Indeed, such contact as we had, produced only what was described above—complete negativism—as we were but another group of interfering adults.

We shall discuss later this mechanism of the preservation of the inviolability of the ego. Suffice it to say here that early in childhood a “wall” forms about the personality which protects it from intrusion. Where parents are too intrusive, make too many rules, meddle too much, this wall thickens to one of negativism and this may be treated only by the construction of a more “friendly” environment. We have found that most parents are more than ready to reduce their pressure upon the child when they are shown that it is this which is producing the wall of fear and self-protection which the child has built.

Not only is it possible in a great variety of these problems to bring about a complete disappearance of the symptoms by altering the pressures which the parents and siblings are placing upon the child, but, further, there are many of these situations in which the entry of the clinic in any way directly into the child's life is to him but the introduction of a new pressure and, to the situation, but the addition of a new hazard. So much of the problem of the child lies in the demands of the role that it is asked to fill! We “hope it will be a boy” or “hope it will be a girl,” lacking the courtesy to await the child's arrival before we begin to pick the part that it is to play. We all play in character, picking our own roles when they are not picked for us. All sorts of apparently even serious symptoms clear up in children with a realization on the part of parents that they have been answering their own needs rather than those of the child in the assigning of the part it is to take.

The situation is not different in institutions which are less

intimate. There are, for instance, a great many school problems which not only are much more easily handled by altering the child's environment but which can, in many instances, be handled only in that way.

Here again the "pressures" upon a child of rather less ability than his siblings or playmates lead to every form of expression of dissatisfaction with what life is offering. These children come to us as lazy, indifferent, blasé, snobbish, rebellious, defiant, incorrigible, panicky, "beaten before the start," only to retell the tawdry story that they know so well and know that everyone else knows so well—the overbearing pressure of school demands. Why are we so interested in having a child face reality when the variegation of our life means that we can so readily make (within reasonable limits) reality face the child? School people are today in a natural way changing curricular demands to fit the needs of certain children. When this can be done without singling out the child, of what value is the child's recounting to the psychiatrist of his failure, a failure all too well known to the child, already faced and already somewhat planfully dealt with in his "problem"?

Compare all those persistent though somewhat obscure conduct and personality disorders that come to the clinics because of school difficulties with left-hand and right-hand conflicts, with the much simpler task of sensitizing school systems to the findings and therapeutic work of Orton.⁴ In each of two schools in Essex County, there was a class in which one

⁴ There is now a fairly extended literature concerning this theory as to the relationship of confusion between the two cranial hemispheres and language difficulties. The first reference is to articles by S. T. Orton appearing in the *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*: "Word-blindness" in School Children, vol. 14, p. 581, November 1925; *Studies in Stuttering*, Introduction, vol. 18, p. 671, November 1927. The reader is referred to Anna Gillingham and Besie W. Stillman, *Remedial Work for Reading, Spelling and Penmanship*, New York, Sackett & Wilhelms, 1936. This book has a good bibliography.

quarter of the pupils were left-handed. The progress of these classes has been followed through the grades and not a single notable "problem" has developed. In both schools the child was allowed to develop the use of either hand—and more recently the program was definitely sensitized to Orton's work. We can but compare these results with a small but steady stream of problems (in reading, spelling, and stammering) which come to us from schools requiring right-handed writing from all children.

Anyone who knows school situations at all recognizes the extent to which "sex problems" congregate in certain situations. These are the dirty notes and pictures, "immoral" remarks, and all those suggestive activities which thrive so on the soil of repression and absence of happy ways of sublimation. Often the teacher or parent is so preoccupied with unhealthy attitudes about sex as to make efforts at the clearing of the child's environment a Herculean task. However, these problems cluster about the children who have been retarded in school. At the time that the school ceases to push down the child's throat year after year that he is a failure, there will not be the necessity of attaining success in these somewhat disturbing ways. This is not to brush aside the problem of sex, but rather to record that it is not a pressing, bothering, irritating problem to the child (even an adolescent) who is happily placed in the proper school grade and who has a comfortable and full play life. Here, again, we feel that between making the school aware that children have countless ways of being normal other than possessing an IQ of 100, and individually clearing up the endless stream of those who are putting themselves into the limelight through their sexual activities, the former is by far the simpler task.

Some time ago there came to our attention a rebellious, truculent lad—the second of two boys in a professional family

of insistent ambition. This boy, Charles, was two years younger than his brother, both in age and school grade. He had much less innate intellectual ability and was having a rough time of it in school. This was, of course, reflected at home where he was constantly the subject of invidious comparison. Many paths lay before the clinic—not the least winding and inviting being a complete psychiatric assay of each of these four people. Actually no one of them was seen enough to allow him or her to guess that here was a “problem.” True, the children were “tested” but in this particular system that is a measure pretty well routinized. Charles, along with four others who also were reaching their academic ceiling, was given special work involving geography through reporting on boats docking at the port, civics through visiting the city hall, and the three R’s through various similar ventures. Rebellion disappeared. Soon it was Charles who had the interesting stories to tell at the family meals; soon it was Charles who was the subject of the father’s anecdotes. Frequently, as in this situation, a whole constellation of family and personal problems melt in the presence of some adequate and interesting outlet in school. One is tempted to compare this sort of therapy where the psychiatrist did not see the boy until he was gaily moving along both at home and in school a year later, with the approach which would have crystallized all his defeat and resentments in order that he and the psychiatrist might laboriously, but finally in triumph, erode away the last vestige of the difficulty.

In view of the very large number of children failing to pass in the first three grades and in view of the fact that the armies of the maladjusted and the delinquent are largely recruited from those who are retarded in school, the school system of the City of Newark set out two years ago to do away with failure and repeating in the lower grades. The school

took the refreshingly logical stand that the first three grades represent a period in which the primary task is for the school to learn what it can of the child, rather than for the child to learn what it can in school. An enormous number of complicated adjustments of all sorts are ahead of this program. We are not raising here even the question whether this will prove to be a wise change. The important point is that, in meeting the needs of individual personalities, planned changes on a large-scale basis may be made in the environments in which they must operate.

It is unfortunate that the psychiatrist has so largely used his material merely as a means of criticizing the institutions which are the natural milieux of the child. Maladjustment, delinquency, "problems"—these are only dramatizations of the sore points in our problems of human relations. Where the psychiatrist (as Robinson in Newark⁶) uses this material for enlightening the institution—or pattern if you please—and where he has accepted this as his responsibility, the stone that was rejected is truly being built in as the cornerstone of planned social change. Where the psychiatrist does not accept this responsibility his activity is pleasant, even brilliant, but socially ineffectual.

The change in many cities from curriculum-centered physical education to child-centered recreation represents another example of an institution meeting the problems of the personality development of the child. To all these points we will return in later chapters, but we pause here to point out that the possibility of sensitizing institutional set-ups to the needs of the child and of making them child-centered in their goals is an "easy" task in comparison to the endless job of clearing the individual débris in the train of institutions not so sensi-

⁶ B. B. Robinson, Place of the Child Guidance Clinic in Mental Hygiene, *Educational Methods*, vol. 14, p. 180, January 1935.

tized. Why need we forever be developing only healthy attitudes about reality when we know that reality has changed in the past, that it is changing now, and that certain of these changes are even today being made in an effort at meeting the needs and goals of the growing personality?

Finally, why has psychiatry had nothing to offer to the challenging steps of city planning and change that are now going on? Close crowding of people does something to personalities. If many living in one room see each other's bodies, so do they see each other's minds in all their nakedness. This has in it much of good and bad, much of insight and dreary disillusionment. The point is that today huge housing schemes are being launched and tomorrow there will be more. Yet the psychiatrists have nothing to offer beyond a few glittering generalities, the more cogent of which the sociologists had themselves earlier guessed.

We believe that the environment is artificially modifiable; that this sort of modification is a simpler process than that of attempting to modify the great number of individuals involved; and that there are situations in which the modification of the environment is apparently the only safe (or indeed possible) mode of procedure.

We have considered thus far only those situations in which the child is living and operating. Alterations of the environment through transporting the child to a new set of surroundings is an even simpler procedure and one more subject to control.

An outstanding illustration is the use of foster homes for children. Admittedly many children are placed in foster homes on a "negative" basis—to get them away from something rather than to situate them planfully in a needed pattern. Many foster-home placements fail miserably, perhaps because we have not yet learned to assay those less tangible

drives of human relationship which are so sincere a part of family life. Yet Healy and others have shown that changes in children can be brought about with relatively little expense through careful selection of foster families that provide those things which the child has lacked.⁶

We are tempted to one further statement as to foster-home placement and its results. The somewhat miraculous changes which Healy has reported as seeing upon placement in foster homes—and which others, including ourselves, have also seen—should not be too blithely attributed in every instance to new human-relationship constellations. What might be called the “geography of habits,” the fact that new physical surroundings of themselves assist in new habit patterns, the shock of change, the shock of a break in routine—often in a horribly prosaic manner these produce a new habit pattern. We confess to feeling the importance of this not only in the matter of foster-home placement but also in that of attendance upon a child guidance clinic where it is far more comforting to ascribe the somewhat astonishing changes to the intricate manipulations of the psychiatrist, but where, we are convinced, on occasion the factor is no more than the shock of a new and somewhat awe-inspiring experience.

If it shall be said that foster-home placement is still in that initial stage that demands a number of different placements before the correct one is found, it may also be said that even so thorough a renovation of the personality as is implied in a psychoanalytic experience on occasion requires, if the money

⁶ Examples appear frequently in all the writings of Dr. Healy between 1917 (William Healy, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1917) and 1929 (William Healy and others, *Reconstructing Behavior in Youth*, New York, Knopf, 1929). The latter reference is perhaps the best, though much more detailed material is to be found in a series of case studies published in 1923 by the Judge Baker Foundation, Boston, and called *The Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*. See also *Substitute Parents*, by Mary Buell Sayles, New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1936.

holds out, more than one trial before successful change is achieved.

Another type of altering the environment through physically moving the child is illustrated in changing him from an urban to a rural setting. This does not necessarily solve the child's specific problem. For instance, many children develop important and pervasive feelings of guilt out of their problems and the sense of guilt can never be evaded in the country. To each place that the child goes (even for miles) he finds already there the knowledge of his difficulties. In the city one or two city blocks suffice for complete anonymity. Truancy of the escape sort, frequently found in cities, is relatively unknown in rural districts. Swimming-hole truancy and circus truancy are common, but truancy as a rebellion against school conditions is rare. "There is no place to go," the children say. So one may go through the entire gamut of childhood situations—finding that neighborhood enters to bolster or condemn in the most pressing fashion. Beyond this, the very singleness of the rural pattern, in comparison with the multiplicity of the city patterns, may hold the child enthralled or break his morale. (This "singleness" is admittedly an artefact because every family, everywhere, is a distinct unit having its own cultural pattern. Indeed, the rural situation actually would permit each family to "expand" its culture to include many phases of life, whereas in the city the very disjointedness of the whole complex of cultural factors prevents such rounding out of any family's cultural pattern. But, again, the child does not see this—nor does the adult with any frequency.) Supposing the child could be changed, these impinging influences are far more easy to "produce" than the direct alteration of attitudes (without change in environment).

Problems are not swept away through the changes described in the latter half of this chapter. All life involves adjustment

to new problems. In spite of a recent rather florid literature to the contrary, we are certain that there is no "correct" way to live, no "correct" way to bring up children. There are "best" ways to do these things in the sense that there are ways in which the harsher problems are less often met and that the problems encountered are of a type that, for any particular individual, does not strike some particularly vulnerable point. To change a child's environment serves only to alter the constellation of problems and adjustments in which he is to live. The wisdom of this procedure arises from the fact that it is possible (if one sufficiently understands the stresses of the child's new environment) to provide adjustment-possibilities and influences which he has some fair chance of meeting without disaster.

We have accepted the hypothesis that personality and environment are mutually impinging sets of forces and that there is a constant stream of action and interaction in which each new pattern reacts in turn on its determinants. We have questioned the possibility of obtaining a clear picture of the relative modifiability of the personality and the environment. We suppose that the personality is modifiable. We have, however, hinted that it is not easy to change it "directly." We have considered the therapeutic possibilities of certain very effective and rather easily produced changes in the environment. In what might be termed the personality-culture balance the desired changes in the total picture can, we assume on this basis, be more simply and more effectively initiated at the cultural than at the individual level.

CHAPTER THREE

A Method of Study: The Casual Breakdown

ANY HYPOTHESIS as to the relationship of the personality to the cultural pattern must be tested by actual data, and to select and assemble these data demands certain special technical procedures adequate to the task. We therefore turn now to a general consideration of these procedures (I); and later on in the chapter to a more detailed description of the Essex County Juvenile Clinic in relation to them (II).

I

THE NON-CASE STUDY METHOD

The methods for the study of the personality in relation to the cultural pattern may be roughly divided into non-case and case study methods.

By non-case study method we mean the study of the average individual deduced from a study of the group with a reference of all findings to certain sociological constellations or trends. Among the non-case study methods are a great number of psychological and sociological studies. As stated earlier, the authors of these studies have been much more interested in what the personality ought to be, given the facts of group experience, than in what it is. One excepts Ogburn's group¹—and much more specifically Shaw, in whose work on delinquency areas some sensitization to people as adjusting units

¹ The Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago has for a number of years presented to the psychiatrist a number of persons who have looked upon statistical and mass information as having a meaning for individuals and as being derived from the needs of real individuals. It is perhaps naïve to pick one name from this group, though the part that William F. Og-

is evident.² The Lynds' work in Middletown shows this same later trend.³ However, the emphasis even in these latter approaches seems to be on the ways in which people are contributing to social changes rather than on the effect of these changes upon the hungers, needs, and goals of each individual.

Social engineering in this country has become so interested in one or another case study method that it has been increasingly difficult to accept the advantages of an approach to the study of personality through the study of the group or the environment. This is due in part to the tendency of such an approach to depersonalize its findings through generalization and in part to its failure to consider in any way what the findings mean in terms of human problems. For instance, studies as to the relative distances between the producer and consumer of pork in 1850 and 1936 are quite lifeless. However, if we ask the child today, "Where does pork come from?" he answers, "The butcher." One guesses that if the same question had been put in 1850, the child would have answered, "The pig." In other words, sociological study is arid unless it helps to answer the question of what pattern changes mean to those who, after all, largely shape the pattern. The specialization, the taking apart, of life implied in the bit of sociological information just cited has deep and real meaning to the personality's relationship with reality. Another illustration: the fact that rents in a certain area have dropped from an average of \$50 to an average of \$30 seems to us to gain meaning only when it is added, for example,

burn took in the report of the President's Committee on Social Trends makes of him at least a safe symbol for the group.

² Clifford R. Shaw. As, for instance, in his editing of *The Jack-Roller*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930.

³ R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929.

that the change is due to the disappearance of the sitting-room. If the change means that there are no longer quiet and comfortable nooks where young people may converse in their various ways, we are face to face with operational or functional data. Obviously there must be certain further steps in the inquiry: do these young people move to the street where there are few limitations on their behavior, or to the bedroom where perhaps equally distressing invitations are present? Or, after all, has such a change meant a decrease in the number and extent of those periods of relationship that stretch between acquaintance and intimacy? When material is gathered on the basis of what it might mean to the lives of actual persons, the sociological approach has value in the study of the personality.

We can here point out certain fundamental faults of any method involving case study and, having offered that negative argument in favor of non-case study sociological approaches, we are disposed to leave their support to abler protagonists.

The first difficulty with case studies is that they always involve something to be done and usually involve a point of view to be upheld—that is, they must be contentious. If they are to be realistic they must have something to do with real life itself. We are aware of certain efforts to escape this difficulty through studying all of a certain group of persons—and, indeed, have tried this ourselves (e.g., by studying all children in a certain sixth-grade room). As far as we are concerned, it remains to be proved that any individual will discuss his life and development with any frankness until he is urged to do so by some tension (or “problem”). Up to the present the case studies of “normal” people have had the faults inherent in the questionnaire method. We would suspect this to be true of the studies now being made of numbers of “normal” small

children in preschool groups—that any valid material would deal only with rather superficial phenomena.

The second difficulty with the case study method is that because it is contentional it involves always the entry of the observer into the situation described. One of the most striking bits of naïveté in the whole field of personality study is the “objective” case record of the X family made in contented disregard of the fact that the X family now contains the observer. It is but fair to point out that there has been a growing appreciation of the participation of the observer in the picture which he is describing. These portraits of oneself remain what they always have been, elusive goals.

The third difficulty is the impelling drive to make “good pictures.” The case study method has crucified its patients on the cross of “good pictures.” Good case histories (that is, those that make clear pictures of the situation) mean that the observer doesn’t know his clients at all well or that an extremely arbitrary choice of certain materials from their lives has been made. It is also notable that the choice of material in this latter process is dependent upon the observer’s own previous history rather than upon that of the client.

THE CASE STUDY METHOD

In spite of the limitations cited above, the case study mode of approach to problems of personality (which has been more recently so much influenced by psychiatric formulations) has grown in importance and comprehension over the last thirty years. Even during the Depression, with mounting case loads and problems that seem unprecedented, the search has everywhere been for a mode of getting back to “adequate case study procedures.” Whether or not one wishes to see this as a regressive phenomenon, it does indicate the importance of the case study method in the social worker’s armamentarium.

And there are certain very definite advantages in such an approach. It is an intensive method, to whatever degree the observer wishes. Even if one accepts the strictures of the previous section it still remains a method more accurate than the sociological for an assay of what events might *mean* to people. It involves direct contact with personalities and on this basis offers a somewhat pressing invitation to be realistic.

The effort to be realistic can be carried to an extreme. Under the influence of psychoanalytic formulation the modern advanced case worker can construct a "case study" concerning the person who refuses to cooperate that is longer and more replete, because it discusses interesting mechanisms of inhibition and repression, than is the document about the person who does cooperate. Unfortunately, it is precisely the group that doesn't wish to be studied that we need the most to study. The case study method must admit failure at this point or follow the bizarre method here described—that of magnificently filling in its own explanations where it cannot find them in the client.

Which leads us to the outstanding problem facing any case study method—that of generalization. Oddly enough, so highly individualistic an approach as psychoanalysis has been forced to the same difficulty as that which characterizes the sociological approach—that of describing people as they ought theoretically to be rather than as they are. The crisp formulae of the Oedipus complex and its resolutions, of the birth trauma, or of the castration complex have been projected upon a person quite as grotesquely "average" as anything which the sociologist's tables ever pictured. So much can be said for any procedure that generalizes widely upon a small number of persons. In defense of this sort of generalization it must, however, be said that the physical and mental activities of different individuals seem disturbingly similar.

The psychiatrist, in his use of the case study method, has emphasized its individual aspects. He makes his bow to those who surround the child but if they will not "cooperate" he merely announces that he will not work with them. He thinks that there is little virtue in going to work in a certain area until the major agencies there are prepared to cooperate with him. Almost entirely he observes individuals outside their natural surroundings, for knowledge of which he depends upon the psychiatric social worker, with scant realization of the projection of his own point of view (through teaching and direction) into the farthest reaches of her contacts.

THE METHOD OF THE CASUAL BREAKDOWN

We turn now to a method still involving case study but with a much more definitely sociological approach. Its important overt characteristics are almost entirely administrative but its implications are of considerably wider import. This method involves the setting up of a small psychiatric unit within a social institution, with the latter carrying the financial responsibility and the director of the clinic ranking with certain of the administrative officers. Individuals referred to such a clinic are drawn exclusively from the institution supporting it. Thus all data is referable to a single sociological ordinate (truancy in relation to school adjustment, stealing in relation to school adjustment, etc.). All data from any one such clinic tends thus to throw light upon what the particular institution which sponsors it *means* to the individuals in it (a clinic so set up, for instance, in connection with the church could scarcely escape the recognition of what the church means to each patient). Thus the case study method becomes also a non-case study method through the reference of all its findings to certain sociological constella-

tions. The psychiatrist in such a clinic has no institutional responsibility because his is a clinical and not an executive task. However, he has very definite social responsibility in that he must be constantly giving back to the institution what it so much needs—knowledge of what its procedures and demands mean to individuals. It must be evident that the type of clinic described here is a useful tool for the development of what we have called an individual-centered culture.

*Administrative and theoretical importance of the
special clinic set-up*

The child guidance department of the school system of the city of Newark may be cited as an example of this type of organization. The psychiatrist and his colleagues are here in a situation in which the predominating philosophy is sociological. The clinic is not a separate agency to be turned to for certain special problems but an integral member of the larger institutional organization. Obviously the clinic's philosophy is forever being checked by the school's needs and the school's point of view. Of equal importance is the growing indoctrination of the school with the realization that it is fundamentally and in the last analysis dealing with children who are actually alive. The psychiatrist and his associates become, from their special point of view, advisers in education—and in their work with individuals they cannot get very far away from the recognition that individual needs and goals lie within the framework of a powerful and pressing agency of the cultural pattern.

Such an arrangement is to be recognized as lying between two extremes from each of which it is to be clearly separated. One of these, variously tried, places the psychiatric agency and social institutions on a par with each other, with the altogether laudable hope that this will increase for each disci-

pline its knowledge rather than its defense mechanisms. The other makes the psychiatric unit so small as to lose its influence. Obviously, escape from this latter situation is a problem of administration. The important point to us, in the arrangement under discussion, is that the psychiatrist is forced into seeing the children referred to the clinic as individuals actually operating in—being controlled by and controlling—a social institution; while at the same time, *on the basis of material so seen*, he takes an important part in the revision of the attitudes, curriculum, goals, and aims of the whole school system.

We shall attempt to show later the feasibility of similar setups in other sectors of the cultural pattern, such as the church and the court. The point is that in each instance there must be the large and influential group that carries the institutional responsibility of actual production-accomplishment. In working as an integral part of this group it seems imperative that the psychiatrist's work should be realistic—realistic at least in the sense that he views the individuals he studies as persons actually operating in their accustomed milieu. In this situation, the psychiatrist cannot be overpowered by the needs and development of the institution because what the institution faces in the way of social responsibility he meets with his high specialization. We would theoretically expect at least some of these same advantages to accrue when the roles are reversed, as when a sociologist's work is embedded in a much larger psychiatric matrix. This has been true in both Chicago and Worcester where it has been tried.⁴

⁴ At the Worcester State Hospital the Superintendent, Dr. William A. Bryan, has for a number of years been bringing in members from other disciplines to work with the staff. Dr. Bryan writes me that this has never been written up, that they have had to be satisfied with relatively short periods of residence on the part of sociologists, and that they live in the hope of being able at some time to make a permanent addition of a sociologist.

Dr. Schroeder, the present director of the Institute for Juvenile Research,

The idea, expressed here, of studying relatively large groups of individuals exposed to the same environmental stimuli is not a new one. One thinks of Hamilton's study of marriage.⁵ As a social institution (whatever may be true of the individual family) the Family is so lacking in cohesive integration that it does not present the terrific social compulsions that are seen in the School. In other words, in this study of Hamilton's we are again very close to the needs of the component individuals and relatively free from what might be termed needs of the Family as such. Thomas and Znaniecki did something of the same sort in their work with the Polish peasant.⁶ Here was not the psychiatrist working in a sociological setting but rather the sociologist turning to a case study method. For both these studies, as for others of their sort, there is yet lacking that higher degree of realism that comes from the necessary orientation of all individual data to immediate and serious problems of social adjustment. Through the medium of themes in English, we have ourselves used all the seniors in a certain high school or all the sixth-grade children in a municipality. We have as yet failed to develop a technique of "theme subject" sufficiently cold to hide what we were really searching for and at the same time warm enough to quicken the vibrations of those emotional

Chicago, writes: "The first reference in our Annual Reports of sociological studies here in the children's clinic is made in the *Tenth Annual Report* covering the period July 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927. I refer you to page 98. This was done under Dr. Herman Adler's direction. The activities of the sociologist in our prison work, however, did not begin until 1930 after I took charge of the program. The first reference to this appears in the *Thirteenth Annual Report* ending June 30, 1930. You are referred to page 2." Also page 9 of the *Fourteenth Annual Report*. The most comprehensive picture is given on ten pages of the *Fifteenth-Sixteenth Annual Report* of the Institute for Juvenile Research. This last has not been published.

⁵ G. V. Hamilton and K. MacGowan, *What Is Wrong with Marriage?* New York, Boni, 1929.

⁶ William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1918.

reactions which we wished to study. We have thus had to use the themes merely as a preliminary process for deciding upon the material for further study.

If this type of set-up (the relatively small psychiatric unit as an integral, responsible part of the larger social institution) is of high practical value, it also has research and theoretical implications of even greater importance.

Certain disciplines have from their inception had as their ultimate goal the exploration of the personality, and in this there has recently been a markedly increasing interest. The *Arbeit* (nibbling) type of research which long held sway can never answer the questions now being raised—what the personality is, how it operates, and how it is molded. Various discrete attributes of the personality can be and have been carved out (by this type of research) for minute and “accurate” analysis, but this accuracy is only an accuracy of parts. The whole personality must be the object of the endeavors of many different disciplines. The answer is not solely in anatomy, in psychology, physiology, sociology, or anthropology. As these disciplines merge with imperceptible lines of demarcation, the problem is very largely one of discovering the point at which to take hold of the study. To a certain extent we must be done with a situation that encourages each of a number of such disciplines to widen the limits of its study. This has so far led to overlapping and consequently to the expected mechanisms of defense on both sides—mechanisms that utterly destroy the continuity which is so necessary.

If one has a series of dots (representing data about people) upon a field, these dots can be joined by a line and, if one sets up an ordinate and an abscissa, this line can be expressed algebraically as an equation. Whether the ordinate and abscissa are those of neural anatomy, or of physiology, or of sociology,

an equation can still be made, though obviously the equations for different disciplines will differ from each other. To press the analogy for a moment, we are today, in the study of the personality, not so much in need of new dots as in need of deciding what ordinate and abscissa to choose so that we may draw a curve that will give meaning to each dot in terms of the others as well as in terms of the reference lines. If this is true are there adequate reasons for placing lines of reference in the type of clinic described above, where the data on the personality may be, as it were, graphed in relation to sociology as the ordinate and to psychiatry as the abscissa? We believe that there are, and set out our reasons in the following five paragraphs.

Assuming that the problem of the personality may be approached from any point of a continuum of disciplines, from anatomy at the one end to anthropology at the other, it seems reasonable to choose a point of departure somewhere in the middle, so that reinforcement may come from both directions. A psychiatric clinic in a sociological setting seems to occupy such a middle position.

Another criterion in deciding upon the placement of the lines of reference in the study of the personality is the relative complexity of the units of data collected. If the anatomist states that no mental life (of whatever complexity) can go on without neurons, so can the anthropologist say that the highly complicated cultural patterns governing the lives of individuals are every whit as real as neurons and to all appearances quite as determinative of good and bad and of life and death. Facts do not lose reality just because they are complex—as indeed the anatomist himself knows full well. If in the smallest units of which physical science has knowledge there is inconceivable complexity, then it is with poor grace that we dis-

card, on this same basis of complexity, some other approach than that of anatomy to the study of the personality.

An important factor in the selection of a discipline as the point of departure for the study of the personality is the level of integration that may be imposed upon the data. This integration is claimed by each discipline for its own field. The anatomist speaks of the "nervous system as an integral whole"—and the sociologist as glibly speaks of the Family or the "whole financial structure." The psychiatrist has, then, only a different level of integration—nor, perhaps, can he claim any priority for his own use of the word. Because he sees people as people, doing, acting, being moved, and moving, he is led to a feeling that here is a level of more realistic integration than appears at any other point. He is suspicious of the brain because it is at the mercy of changes in body chemistry; he is suspicious of the tribe because it is at the mercy of its individual members. He is caught up by the engaging notion that he can, as a personality, make choices. That is, the psychiatrist feels that at the level of the personality operating in life situations he has an integration as real and tangible as that involved in any discipline, with at least the possibility that it is even more life-like and realistic than others.

Another factor influencing this choice of approach to "scientific study of the personality" is the objectivity of attack. That is, at what point (in what discipline) does one find objective rather than subjective data? This involves one of the most engaging dilemmas of the entire scientific field—namely, that within any discipline the data of other disciplines are those which are considered to be objective or "accurate." The psychologist looks to the physiologist for "really reliable" data; the latter looks to organic or physiological chemistry. Nor, oddly, is this merely because of the belief that the disci-

plines involving less complexity of organization are more "accurate" in mensuration (more cold-blooded); on the contrary, the physiologist regards with similar assurance the tabulations of the economist and the psychologist so accepts the data of the anthropologist. For each, the findings of disciplines below or above (in complexity) are endowed with that cold certainty which he knows he does not have. (For a long time this generalization did not apply to the physicist or chemist but now they, too, are comprehending the subjectiveness of their own "data.") Objectivity, then, tends to disappear as a determining factor due to the failure of any discipline to meet its demands.

In setting up the scientific framework of a piece of research, the lines of reference should be so placed that they may reasonably be thought of as linked to both limits of the available data. If the referral lines are anatomical it is hard to work into the equation the data about money as a symbol of desired goods in relationship to money as a thing to be sought in itself. In similar fashion it is difficult to find place for richness of cortical cellular structure if the lines of reference are those of anthropology. It seems to the psychiatrist that conceptions of the operating, living individual are not far removed from the possible data from any field. The data of anatomy (or anthropology) may be beyond present assimilation but at least they are not alien to the psychiatrist—they *seem* at least to be something that he could employ in his own field.

These considerations commend as the place to "take hold" in a study of personality that point at which the individual may be observed operating alone or in relation to one other person (the so-called one-to-one relationship⁷) and for this the

⁷ The one-to-one relationship is the simplest of the sociological constellations. Thus the husband-wife relationship is the one-to-one relationship plus the Family; the grocer-housewife is the one-to-one relationship plus marketing; the teacher-pupil relationship is the one-to-one plus the School. All one-

best theoretical set-up seems to be the special clinic we have described in which the sociologically conditioned observer is studying the person alone and the psychologically or psychiatrically conditioned observer is studying the one-to-one constellation. In the latter situation we seem, particularly, to be seeing the individual interacting with the cultural pattern that is about him—and of him, for that matter. Behavior of the individual seems so imperiously to depict both the individual (to the soles of his feet) and the environment to the most remote of its reverberations.

One corollary demands statement. In such a laboratory as this special clinic set-up provides there is a peculiar opportunity for experimental alteration of either the individual or his social surroundings. The claim that we are not dealing with unresolvable integers—that both the individual and the environment are too complex to allow controlled alterations—applies to any point of attack upon the personality. It is easy to think of a child in a schoolroom being subjected to attitude changes by the psychiatrist or to curriculum changes by the school, each therapist being aware of the presence of the other, checked by the other, illuminated by the other. It is easy to think of the worker at automatic machinery being subjected to alteration in attitudes by the psychiatrist or in opportunities for expression by the administrative (social) set-up. This mutual illumination can occur where the psychiatric clinic is operated by and at the expense of the social institution involved (church, school, or factory).

The material offered by the casual breakdown

The administrative set-up just described provides opportunity for a further elaboration of the case study method which

to-one relationships thus carry heavy loads of institutional meaning. For further discussion, see Chapter XV, page 366.

we call "the method of the casual breakdown." It is to be understood that this is no more than an orienting device, that it may be necessary to follow it for ten years or thirty, and that, in every instance, it has value only in getting "hunch" material and in turning up problems that will require other approaches for solution.

We use the term "casual breakdown" to describe the individual who is presenting a short and dramatic dislocation of his usual relationships with any given social institution or social pattern. Truancy, for instance, is usually but an expected happening in a train of events and attitudes of fairly long antecedence. On the other hand, it is dramatic and, because it is dramatic, it lights up the child-school relationship as nothing else does. The habitual truant is not, in our sense, a casual breakdown. It is a widespread clinical experience that most children can remember the first day that they were truants. Only rarely can they remember the first time that they developed resentment against school. The important thing is that while it is easy for the expert to see the truancy as a superficial, almost accidentally chosen point in a long series of events, *it in no way seems so to the child* who invests it with high emotional content and who here first asks "What does school mean to me?" The crisis gives the individual his first real drive to assay his relation to the environment.

Frequently the man who deserts his family presents a striking example of the casual breakdown. Married couples living along in comparative peace and comfort can dispense well-rounded platitudes as to the blessings and pitfalls that attend marital adjustment (indeed it is just this vapid material which the questionnaire method obtains). It is, however, the angry husband slamming the door, "never to return," who assays in heightened lights and shades what marriage has meant to him. His appraisal is not necessarily by any means a true one; it

represents only what the individual in his moment of anger *thinks* that family life means to him. Such material is full of artefacts but the problems it raises may later be checked by even so cold a procedure as that involved in questionnaires because they have once been illuminated by an emotional crisis.

But this much must be insisted upon: that this material is not necessarily abnormal material. The casual breakdown may be abnormal or out of the mode, but usually he is simply one who dramatizes life. Dramatization implies a certain distortion but the "problem" material is not for that reason abnormal. On the contrary, the casual breakdown is one who, because of special stress, reveals problems which exist in ordinary life and which, in ordinary life, do not carry sufficient emotional reaction to lift them into the field of awareness.

An example of the way the casual breakdown may show what the environment means to him is to be found in the experience of the church-goer. One who is a regular Sunday school or church attendant answers all questioners (including himself) as to what the religious life means to him, in platitudes which sound well but have scarcely been tried in the fire of the issues of life. (Admittedly many individuals who seriously question leaving the church answer these queries in such a way as not to appear overtly as casual breakdowns. Our experience on a parallel situation suggests, however, that when the psychiatric clinic is organically attached to an institution the "pre-breakdowns" of that institution are soon at its doors.) A considerable amount of psychological investigation as to the relationship of the individual to the church has been already carried out on older people who have not been for a long time attending church or who as church members have various other problems. Such material, we have found, fails to throw into relief what we are looking for, namely, the contri-

bution which a given sector of the environment makes to the personality and the consequent emotional reverberations. But when the individual first begins to break his formal contacts he does so because he has come to some decision—and the reasons for that decision are available at just that time if they ever are to be. While the actual overt break is relatively incidental in relation to his total mental life, we have become so institutionalized that it seems to the individual a very critical step.

The minister or (in the school) the teacher is not the one to handle the problem at this point. He has too much at stake. The man can no more tell him that his sermons are stringy than can an adolescent boy discuss his interest in pictures of nude women with his parents. The observer of the casual breakdown can never be the individual carrying the social responsibility within the institution involved. The latter never learns more than the "delinquent" thinks he ought to know. The specialized observer must be close to the institution to be worked with, but his lack of institutional responsibility gives him in the eyes of the casual breakdown the objectivity that encourages frankness. We say "lack of institutional responsibility" because there must be adequate social responsibility—the observer who merely champions the individual in some new-found freedom is as useless as one who would but tie him back again into some particular institutional form.

In industry again we encounter the casual breakdown. We think of the sort of thing that has been done in beginning to study the regular worker who has had to take a few days off, or whose production record has suddenly somewhat fallen.⁸ In such a case it is possible for the worker to discuss with the

⁸ Such a piece of work, undertaken in the late twenties for some three years, was carried on at the Kearny plant of the Western Electric Company. The author had some contacts with it during its progress. There are the usual intra-company reports but there are no published accounts.

observer (such as we have suggested) what the work, its automatic character, its stratification, its monotony, mean to him. He cannot discuss this sort of thing with his superior—he might lose his job. The observer in the clinic is, however, in the position to suggest (out of what he thus individually learns) certain changes to the management. If we are to preserve our institutions through inertia (and the vast majority of people subscribe to this method), then the study of the casual breakdown is of no value; if we are to preserve our institutions through such adjustments in them as will answer the basic cravings and needs of human beings, then the study of the casual breakdown represents the first step to be taken.

The delinquent in large measure is a casual breakdown. Healy has always, with great insight, stressed the child's first delinquency.⁹ Even the child who has taken fairly large amounts of money can usually recount in great detail the first purloining, if it involved but a nickel. Healy has made the error of believing that the clarity of this first causation shows it to be the true one for the subsequent delinquencies. This clarity does not come from repetition (though it may in some instances) but from the crisis involved in a first break with established institutionalized behavior.

So one may go to many fields and, indeed, come back to one's own life, to realize that in our own pattern a break with the formalized set-up about us intensifies the emotional values involved to a point not attained at any other time. The resulting evaluations are false but they are incisive and ready for further study which may indicate real value. The idea is not new. W. I. Thomas particularly has noted the strength of the

⁹ In all his writings up through 1929. Perhaps the best examples are in *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct* (William Healy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1917) but the idea appears first in *The Individual Delinquent* (William Healy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1915).

tensions developed when individuals are in conflict over two different patterns of conduct.¹⁰ We only are seeking to find specifically that first (or early) point at which there happens to be an overt break with the usual demands of a social institution.

We recapitulate the three conditions for the study of the casual breakdown: (1) one must seek to study the individual as close to his "usual" environment as possible; (2) one must study the situation at a time when the individual's "relations" with that environment are thrown into high relief; (3) one must accept the certainty of artefacts in the material collected. Because of the third condition, certain precautions must be taken. A large number of cases must be studied. Due to the close relationship between the observer and the institution, "experimental" changes must be introduced to allow for a re-checking of the leads obtained. And the data finally obtained must be considered only as hunch material to be checked later, probably by statistical methods.

Unlike the prevalent procedure in a child guidance clinic which aims to reach a problem at its earliest phase, the study of the casual breakdown approaches a problem at the point where the overt break is sufficient to illuminate intensely the issues involved and yet small enough to minimize as far as possible the distortion that serious emotional reaction always imposes upon judgment and review. For any observer in any given institutional set-up this point of optimum efficiency has to be discovered by experiment and is forever being altered in one direction or the other in dependence upon factors of greater knowledge, better techniques, types of personality and institutional set-ups, experimental institutional changes, and the posing of new, freshly important problems.

¹⁰ William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1923.

Suppose that a worker who has had a long and satisfactory record shows a few days of unusually poor production or of absence. His supervisor, in such a situation as we have outlined, suggests his talking the matter over with the clinic director. There are persons who refuse to do so, but where the consultant carries the member-role of physician, the workers soon develop faith; and where the consultant has an integral and responsible part in the organization, the various administrative officers soon develop a realization that he is trying to help them in their task. The psychiatrist who looks upon all institutional structures as merely thwarting the individual's development has no place in such a plan. Nor should the industrialist or minister or school superintendent who seeks only a new way to support some magnificent social edifice attempt to trick people with such a scheme. Such a clinic set-up is the only agency we have seen which, alone, is equipped to interpret the social institution to the individual, the individual to those who naturally surround him, and the meaning of the personality-culture relationship to society.

II

THE ESSEX COUNTY JUVENILE CLINIC

While the Essex County Juvenile Clinic does not provide the administrative set-up most desirable for the study of the casual breakdown, it does meet in certain fundamental ways the criteria set up in the preceding pages for the fruitful study of the personality-culture relationship, and since the chapters which follow, particularly Chapters V-VIII, are drawn largely from its experience, it demands description here.

The clinic was established in 1923 by the Board of Chosen Freeholders as separate from any of the other county agencies except that its director technically reports to the superintendent-

ent of the County Mental Hospital. About half the clinic patients are from the county Juvenile Court or the probation office. One-fourth of the referrals are from the schools of the twenty-two municipalities of the county. Total patients have been 5,000 children and 400 adults.

The county of Essex is roughly a rectangle of 120 square miles lying eight miles west of Manhattan Island. Its 900,000 inhabitants live in three areas of distinct pattern. In the southeast corner of the county is the close-packed industrial city of Newark. Contiguous to this is a band including some of America's wealthiest suburban areas (Montclair, Glen Ridge, the Oranges, and other towns). Beyond this is a rural area with fairly large farms, dairies, hunting, and trapping. The various political subdivisions offer wide variation in their provisions for children.

In certain respects the clinic might be thought of as rather more sociological than psychiatric in its "interests." In the first place, its patients are all "lay referred." We accept whatever type of patient the teacher, judge, or minister wishes to send. The shift in the referrals of any district from the intellectually retarded child or the bouncy extravert to the quiet, "model" introvert we accept as the measure of success in our work. We use this criterion rather than that of any complicated measure of apparent change in the children actually seen because it means that through lectures, discussions, and the clinic reports the referring agencies are beginning to recognize that the troublesome child is trying in some way to solve the problem of the pressures of the social institution. We use our referrals to indicate at what points the adults are interested in, rather than still irritated by, the activities of problem children. By giving this free rein to referrals the clinic has a living, changing chart of the development of the various agents of our social institutions.

Secondly, so far as is feasible the study of the child is in his natural, usual setting. This is in part to see the patient as he really is and also, we must admit, to learn from the teacher, the recreation leader, the officer of the law, the parent, some of the very best bits of psychiatric technique that we have. How can the psychiatrist understand the child and all the rich means there are of helping him if he does not actually see in operation the places and people with whom the child spends most of his day?

In our therapy, again, we are interested not only in "straightening out the child" but in showing those responsible for institutions surrounding him that his conduct was an understandable and natural (if childishly inadequate) response to the pressures placed upon him. The therapy tends to rearrange institutional pressures and lies entirely in the hands of those who originally made the referral (with every invitation for a fresh conference if there are troubles and frequent informal inquiries from the clinic as to progress). The goal of the clinic is the molding of institutions on the basis of an individual-centered philosophy—the child being used to show the institution what problems its program is raising for all children.

Finally, our research realigns psychiatric data to sociological ordinates. We would find it difficult to think of "all of our children who steal" or who lie or who run away. We would not tabulate sixty causes of truancy but rather sixty results of the eternal need that every parent has of living his life in that of the child—or sixty results of the fact that in practically every school district in this country 26 per cent of the children are over age for their grades.¹¹ Facts are correlated to institutional pressures rather than to individual results.

¹¹ Carleton Washburne, Mabel Vogel, and William S. Gray, *A Survey of the Winnetka Public Schools*, Bloomington, Public School Publishing Com-

It is with this point of view that we proceed in Part Two of this book to a more detailed consideration of the material which such a clinic as we have described presents. First considering the structure of the personality (Chapter V), we then examine its apparent needs in relation to environmental pressures, restating the classical psychiatric formulations and illustrating from the data presented by the casual breakdown the complications which beset these formulations when the personality is oriented to a general urban pattern. Then follow two chapters which discuss the personality in relation first to a typical social institution (we chose the Family as our example but could have taken the Church or School) and then to a certain type of physical environment (we chose a crowded industrial area but the method would have been the same had we dealt with a rural or suburban area).

We have frequently spoken of the "data" which will be discussed in the following chapters. This is not data in the usual, present sense of the word. The casual breakdown does not build tables of statistics. The present craze for auditing parts of people falsely masquerades as having sociological interest. The clinic has never attempted to add up its "foreign born" or its "Catholics" or its "Protestants" or its "children with one parent living"—indeed, it is very much our opinion that no such things as these exist. There is probably somewhere a person who is an Italian, who is a Catholic, whose parents are separated, who is poor, who is eighteen years old and two or three hundred other things—but to add him into a group of one hundred other persons who are between fifteen and twenty years of age or who are Italians, in order to exhibit oneself as sociologically minded is quite absurd. To the

pany, 1926. Superintendent Washburne writes me that while there are no nation-wide statistics on retardation he has attempted to keep somewhat of a check upon his statement of 1926 and sees no reason to change it.

reader who has become enamored of a statistical approach to these problems there will be little but disappointment in the chapters which follow and our use of the word "findings" will be blasphemy. We use the word because of a naïve notion that what someone tells us is a "finding," that what a child tells us about what things mean to him is more realistic and more a "finding" than is, for instance, the crassly artificial matter of extracting from him his foreign-born parentage in order that he may be put into a statistical table.¹²

Neither psychiatry nor sociology will make itself respectable merely by donning the outworn clothes of the physical sciences.

¹²Support for this view is strikingly presented in *Can Delinquency Be Measured*, by Sophia Moses Robison (New York, Columbia University Press, 1936). Using the statistical approach this volume extracts attributes (religious affiliations, type of family, area of domicile, and the like) from a large number of New York City delinquents. Results thus obtained are so grotesque as to seem to force the conclusion that an attribute or part of a person's life has meaning or validity only within that person's life. One rather wistfully but not too hopefully wonders whether this use of statistics to exhibit the fallacy of the statistical approach to these problems might not be the war to end wars.

PART TWO

Examples of the Interaction of the Personality and the Environment, Drawn from Studies of the Casual Breakdown

CHAPTER FOUR

The Structure of the Personality

THE WORD "personality," through the previous chapters, has been freely used with no clear definition. We therefore turn aside (for this chapter) in an effort at defining the term—at least for its use in this volume. The term as we use it has nothing to do with the vast, complicated philosophical question as to what the personality or the ego is—"personality" in this chapter (and indeed in this volume) is meant to include no more than "personality in contact with environment" or "personality functioning in environment." Our definition is descriptive and should be considered merely as illustrative of the sort of material that research should produce for a more precise formulation.

Apparently there is the widest possible variation in the use of the word "personality." The two Colloquia on Personality¹ seemed rather brilliantly to support this statement—the various members coming to the conferences with widely divergent views and leaving without appreciable modification of them. We shall attempt to show that the situation is not quite so hopeless as this.

There is universal acceptance of the idea that the individual grows from day to day. It follows that the word "personality" covers a developing, changing phenomenon which is "all" of the mental life of the individual at any given moment. (The reader will find that those who reserve "person-

¹ American Psychiatric Association Committee on Relations with the Social Sciences, *Proceedings of the First Colloquium on Personality Investigation*, Baltimore, Lord Baltimore Press, 1928; *Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.

ality" for some fraction of this total picture accept the necessity of there being some other term for the phenomenon above described.)

It is, then, not the reality of this total picture which is in question, but rather the character and proportions of its component parts. As to this there are apparently no two who agree. However, the differences fall essentially into two groups. There is, in the first place, the widest variance in opinion (the data for exact statement not being available) as to what fraction of the personality is inherent and thus permanent. There is equally wide variance in opinion (again without data) as to what are the laws governing its daily accretions and changes.

Obviously, one may assume a personality structure which includes a large share of immobile elements and which (in meeting various environmental situations) only seems to change, since it is found upon analysis that the individual is not, under these conditions, really changing at all. This view receives support from the stubborn difficulty that many individuals present to those efforts at "therapy" which are so successful with others. Or one may assume that the personality is almost altogether molded by its environment—following the child guidance group in its stress on the earliest months of life as the critical period or the sociologists in their stress upon the impact of various cultural patterns with their imperatives. Those who see the child clinically at very tender years (the child development groups) have tended to accept a larger part of the personality as being inherent and probably little subject to modification. In opposing this last theory, the psychiatrist is well within his rights in assuming that very fundamental traits may be formed by the earliest of nursing experiences.

When, however, one goes to the next question—that of the

laws governing the apparent or real changes in the personality—truly chaos reigns. There is no one who doubts the older dictum that we “perceive that to which we choose to attend.” But on what basis do we choose? Are the “fundamentalists” in education right that we choose to attend to anything that is socially of value? Or are those who experiment with the guinea pigs and rabbits right in saying that we choose to attend to things that are repeated often, given simultaneously to many senses, or charged with “interest”—in short, that we follow correctly the “laws of learning”? Or are the progressive education group right that there are no laws (or at least that we can’t find them) and that in the pleasant atmosphere of the schoolroom one can but wait until the child does “choose” to attend? Or are the psychoanalysts right that we are forever within ourselves working out basic emotional problems and difficulties and that we can choose to attend only to those materials which aid us in understanding and solving those problems.

These are the present issues. There is little or no agreement on these two points. If we set up our own formulation it is not to answer the questions raised but rather to construct a workable definition of the personality for this volume. It is this definition which is presented in this chapter. Research into the matter of what the personality is, is here considered only on the level of its reaction to its environment.

We make three rather definite divisions of the personality: (1) the inherent, basic, permanent structural elements, (2) the mental attitudes or “habits” which in general are formed rather early in life and which have a high degree of elasticity²

² We use this word in its original sense to denote the capacity to resume normal shape or character after external pressure is withdrawn—as a rubber ball is elastic—not in its secondary sense of general adaptability.

(resistance to change), and (3) "the rest of the personality"—those day-by-day changes which go through rather wide swings even though they are reined in considerably by the basic elements and the early attitudes. In this threefold division we have some confidence. As to which of the three bins shall receive any particular trait or phenomenon we are in doubt. The allocation which we make in this chapter is on the basis of the hypothesis upon which we are now working. A different allocation might be made next year—or after that as further data come to us.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PERSONALITY

If an expert shoots one hundred times at a bull's eye there may be relatively few bullets that find the mark, yet the distribution of all the hits will unmistakably show the author's purpose. If one studies the cardiac structure of a number of embryos one can predict, not the exact adult heart that will come from each, but rather that "at which each will aim." Similarly the description of a "fixed element" of the personality should be in terms of a normal curve of distribution which will, over a considerable period of time, represent what one actually sees from day to day.

From a practical point of view this means that into the category of inherent elements go those things which time and circumstance show to be most resistive to change. Where we see in a child the persistence of a certain trait through a number of dissimilar adjustments and where this same trait shows similar elasticity in many other children, the criteria for placing the trait in this first category are present. We have felt that we have found four of these traits. There obviously may be a great many more—and, equally, it is possible that experience with more children will indicate variations in any one of

these four which would force us to place it in the group of less fixed characters. With these strictures the four inherent traits may be outlined as follows.

Alertness

The first, in shorthand terms, is the degree of alertness of the individual. This is, in reality, the level of the sensory threshold if we agree that at each of the sensory platforms there are thresholds.³ Our interest has been chiefly in the threshold at the cortical level—a level perhaps beyond laboratory experiment and, to date, defying exact terminology. However, if we use the term “stolid” to describe children who seem to be peculiarly closed to new stimuli, we may also speak of a “weather-vane” personality to connote those who seem unable to protect themselves from the barrage of stimuli which are constantly urging them hither and yon. For these descriptive terms there are two difficulties. They already have rather definite connotations (thus “stolid” for most persons means something quite as definitely on the motor as on the sensory side of the personality). Also it is difficult to feel safe about ascribing some reaction to a specific mechanism. However, we see children who show a low sensory threshold to every sort of new social situation and those who show every gradation from this all the way to a high wall of exclusion against every new way of looking at problems, against each expression of “how the other person feels about it.” We have felt that children do not change this characteristic much, if any, in the different situations in which we see them. We be-

³ For the total sensory mechanism there are at least three critical points (the endings of the sensory nerves at the periphery, the thalamus, and the cortical structure in the post-Rolandic area) the last two of which are ordinarily termed “platforms.” The terms sensory or motor “thresholds” are used to denote the extent to which the mechanisms are resistant to or “oblivious of” stimuli.

lieve that there is little, if any, correlation between this trait and intelligence (using this term in the sense that the testing groups employ it). We have not had enough experience with adults to venture an opinion whether these statements hold true for them.

Complexity

The second of these basic traits in shorthand terms is degree of complexity.⁴ This is perhaps the best phrase for a phenomenon which, despite its reality, rather defies a single-worded label. Sir Roger de Coverly was described as "a man of many parts." The number of "parts" of an older child or adult is a pretty constant factor—at least, this seems true for those with a small number. What we term the simple or naïve mind does not look at itself. There are children who seem unable to be objective—they cannot look at themselves in one or another difficulty; at the clinic in describing an experience they actually live through it again in quite the vivid way they did before. One sees this, too, in adults; what we term "the peasant type of mind" has this outstanding simplicity that does not permit the individual to look at himself in going through a certain situation (admittedly we in Essex County are without experience of peasants in their own milieu; we see only the peasant who has come to live in an urban area). At the other end of this is the child who, in looking forward to some experience, sees himself in that experience and is able to describe the whole affair afterwards as though talking about a third person. If a person has objectivity concerning himself there is no guarantee that accurate evaluation will result; indeed, he is perhaps a more fallible witness to his own personality than to any other event.

⁴ See in this connection, the discussion of "integration" as a need of the personality, Chapter V, pages 127 ff.

That is not the point here. "Simple-minded" persons possess no complexity of personality, no "parts" of the personality looking at other parts, and cannot "hold themselves off at arm's length."

With one exception,⁵ we have not yet seen this simple type of personality develop into one with an ability to look at itself. Whether an individual with five of these federated units can add a sixth or shrink to having but four we do not know. We see children with single personalities, with two or three, with "several" or "many," and our experience is that the child in one of these categories does not go over into another (an occasional exception may mean faulty observation or may mean that our statement is incorrect).

The question here is not solely one of the number of federated elements. Children with very complex personalities and also with a high degree of objectivity may either show an ability to allow one of these units to rule at some given moment or may give so evenly balanced a value to each that no decision on some matter is possible. It is our experience that wherever there is more than one "personality," there is objectivity—a looking at one by the other. Notice that if the essentially peasant type of mind is presented with conflicting issues it externalizes part of itself "talking the thing out" with a tree or a finger or any other object that protects it from having to divide itself. In the matter of the first inherent factor we indicated that too much alertness (too open a mind) is probably as much a handicap as too much stolidity. So here one finds the simple mind and the very complex mind equally in danger of losing efficient singleness of purpose.

Whatever it is which is measured by the intelligence tests

⁵ This particular fifteen-year-old girl made the change noted during three years in a most exceptional foster home. The foster father (an unusually able

seems part of one's innate equipment. We are dutifully aware of the attacks upon the constancy of the Intelligence Quotient. Nor would we claim that it has been perfected—nor necessarily that it ever could be, to the point of getting for the same individual always exactly the same rating. The fact remains that for the great mass of children it measures something that is permanent enough to give a surprisingly proximate result at subsequent testings. (Those who claim its variability will find that in large measure one of the criticized ratings was made at a time when the patient should not have been tested. Children with bad tonsils, other infections, marked fatigue, or similarly incapacitated give no fairer results on intelligence tests than they will on school examinations, marathon races, or any other effort at finding the best that is in them. Nor should children in the midst of emotional crises be tested. The quaint custom that social agencies and courts have of asking that children be tested at a time that they are in the midst of serious delinquency of course should lead to incorrect results.)

We think that this "intelligence" is closely associated with the factor of "federation" because of our experience with the high correlation between the two. There are two items which place this statement on probation. Many "peasant" minds show a high degree of shrewdness, cuteness, or cunning. These last are close to intelligence though admittedly the "intelligence tests" do not test them. On the other hand there is plenteous folk-lore as to the simple-mindedness of the typical college professor. His single-mindedness, his lack of perspective as to his work, his naïve vulnerability to those practical jokes which are difficult of achievement on more objective individuals—all these are odd in the presence of the high in-

professional man) set himself the task of building objectivity in the girl. In the seven years since she left that home the youngster has beautifully maintained the progress made there.

telligence quotient. We can only record that in the children whom we have seen there has seemed to be a close relationship between these two phenomena.

Pliability

The third inherent factor in personality, described in shorthand terms, is the degree of pliability in the individual. This has to do with the extent to which children are habit formers, the ease they have in adjusting to new situations. It is difficult to separate this from the first factor, that of alertness. However, it seems valid to do so. One thinks of the fanatic as a person who receives at the cortical platform quite easily all of the stimuli, but who "clings to his purpose." It is as though, once certain pathways were laid down, individuals showed a varying degree of difficulty in establishing new ones. In any individual we think that this is a constant trait. Certain children in school learn new material of any sort very easily. Others learn it slowly "but once they've learned it, they never forget it." One sees children who do well in school as long as they are in situations where they have the same teacher all day for several months and do poorly under the departmental system because apparently they lack the pliability to "get into new grooves of adjustment" as quickly as that set-up demands. Our vernacular for individuals with these very set habit patterns is that they are "bull-headed." We see marked individual differences and we believe that the degree of the trait is very little altered, if at all, in any given individual as he adjusts in various environments.

We are rather certain that there is no appreciable correlation between this pliability and what we test as intelligence. (This is not true where the test places a high premium on time—here the less pliable individual is definitely handicapped.)

Temperament

The fourth inherent factor in personality is, in shorthand terms, the temperament of the individual. By temperament we mean the freedom to develop one's orientation to the outer world—the element underlying the appearance of the factors often described as introversion or extraversion. This will be more fully discussed when we come to examine the classic psychiatric formulations as to the needs of the personality (Chapter V, pages 109 and following). We feel that differences in temperament are mainly differences in the facility of motor expression. We have not been able to follow the behavior of "normal" adults for any length of time nor to see many of our clinic children grow into adult years. Within the limits of watching children over fourteen years we are willing to make the following statements. All babies are extraverted. During the first four or five years of life the individual moves to that "band" of temperament which he will occupy without much change. By "band" is meant an area of tendency towards one or the other temperament with swings back and forth within that area. That is, temperament leads to an habitual attitude (of introversion or extraversion), and at times one breaks from this habit just as from any other habit. Adolescence often emphasizes the temperament, extraverted children becoming more extraverted and introverts pushing their band further towards introversion. Whatever force brings this about is overcome at the close of adolescence in most individuals, the "band" moving back to approximately what it was earlier. In some children this adjustive ability to right the ship is lacking and we have the major disturbances in temperament occurring typically during or soon after adolescence. All the above statements are complicated by the traumatic form of introversion which simulates true intro-

version in its symptoms.⁶ With this exception of the intrusion of traumatic introversion (which is usually social in origin and is definitely an intercurrent or chance phenomenon) we have felt that there was not for any individual any marked change in the temperament.

Cadence

There is a fifth trait concerning which we are still in much doubt: it begins to appear to us as one resistive to change but we do not feel as certain about it as we do about the other four. This in shorthand terms is the cadence of the individual, the rate with which he ripens, with which he goes through situations, with which he works his way through to some goal. Some stumble their way through life, struggling along through this or that venture always well in the rear. Others run or skip their way. For each individual we have a growing impression that this speed of maturation is a constant affair.

Cadence seems no more than an extension of a quality that underlies the development of whatever we test in the intelligence tests. Two matters still make this statement doubtful. The first is that one suspects a certain "tinkering" with the intelligence tests so that for the majority of children they will show no change in acceleration in rate of growth as the individual grows chronologically. The other is that in a piece of work which we have been carrying over a number of years involving (for 1,600 children) the solving of certain problems in concrete material (what are known as the Ferguson Boards) there appears to be a discontinuous series of accomplishments—spurts of growth followed by plateaus of latency in which some sort of "solidifying of gains" seems to be tak-

⁶ See Chapter V, pages 111 ff.

ing place. However, for those who rush their way to one goal there seems to be the same impetuosity to other goals.

It is with trepidation that one "neurologizes" so inviolate a concept as the personality. However, there seems to be the possibility of linking what we have described with well-recognized physical patterns. The degree of alertness is perhaps dependent upon the facility of the sensory system. That one inherits a specific facility seems possible; that chemical changes within the body affect this seems possible. The matter of temperament we similarly have for some time felt to be tied in to the facility of the motor mechanism. Both (temperament and the facility of the motor system) may be described, and are here thought of, in terms of the entire distance between the periphery and the cortex and not merely in terms of the respective peripheral nerves. The complexity of the personality one thinks of as tied in some way into the richness of the association tracts. The point of which Sherrington⁷ made so much—the permeability of the synaptic membranes, the facility of establishing pathways through them, and the facility of establishing new pathways and pathways partially new—is certainly in some way tied into the matter of the relative facility of habit formation. "Neurologizing" is dangerous only if taken too seriously. It will be long before the gap between what the brain is and what it does, is closed.

To take what has been written above as comprising all that is basic or permanent in the personality structure would be grotesque. We are convinced that certain parts of the structure are highly resistive to change, and in eleven years of watching children at least those things catalogued in the foregoing paragraphs have seemed to meet this specification.

⁷ C. S. Sherrington, *Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1926.

ACQUIRED MENTAL ATTITUDES

We turn now to those matters apparently established early in life (as the child meets the demands and opportunities of the cultural pattern) which tend with the growing years to become more resistive to change but never to reach the characteristics of permanency that belong to the part just pictured. These are the analogues of the physical habits and it is our custom to call them mental habits or attitudes.

There are, first of all, mental concomitants of all the so-called physical habits. There are different levels here, the habits of excretion, for instance, being more fundamental and less under power of the will. Sleep and fatigue are considerably less automatic in character. Similarly, upon this framework, could be set up a whole hierarchy of physical habits ranging from so automatic and fundamental (and early established) a one as the heart-beat and going up to the last established and (therefore?) most easily disturbed by personality difficulties—the highly patterned and highly complicated reflexes involved in sexual intercourse. All these physical habits seem to find, all ready for them, certain facilitated neurological patterns for their establishment and if we but manage to keep their establishment free of emotional entanglement they become quite comfortably automatic.

Turning to what are more properly spoken of as attitudes or mental habits, three somewhat definite groupings appear. These are the attitudes towards security, reality, and authority. Reality and authority are but two facets of the same thing. To separate them is about as reasonable as it would be, in physical science, to consider separately matter and energy. However, to the child (and to the adult for that matter) they are two different things. The child thinks of a baseball as one thing and the fact that he must strike it if it comes

towards him as another. The child thinks of "school" as one thing and the fact that the teacher makes him sit quietly for some hours as another.

Attitude towards security

The attitude towards security is the most basic of the three and is established or not in the very early months of life. If, due to the early mothering, the child is given a certain emancipation, a certain feeling that he has an unquestionably safe haven (a sort of "well, that's off my mind"), it is apparently difficult to shake him from this solid base. That the equally satisfactory reassurances of various religious patterns minister to the same end seems probable. Thus certain children early build the feeling that they are wanted, that they have a place-in-the-world, that there is a pathway home to which in their ventures they can turn when rigors press too hard upon them. This develops a certain attitude which colors everything they do. In similar fashion the anxious states of those who have no such security—to whom it has never been given or who lose it through severe trauma—color every activity. These fundamental attitudes run from a basic at-ease-ness to panicky anxiety states which enter every activity. These attitudes may be changed—as one may change one's eating habits—but they resist this change and are considered as attitudes precisely because of this resistance. They are determined by the cultural pattern, but only in the sense of the way that that pattern (and its components) answers certain questions which the child asks of it. (For a much more complete discussion of security see Chapter V, pages 95 and following.)

Attitudes about reality: the outer world

The attitudes about reality are deeply involved in the problem of introversion and extraversion—indeed, they might be

defined as "what one does" because of his discovery that he makes contacts with the world about him through a certain temperament. One of the difficulties in Jung's formulation is that there is not a clear distinction between the temperament itself and "what one does about it." The friendliness with reality or aversion to it, all that varied set of attitudes about one's relationship with reality, is of the nature of habits built *in view of* the facility of expression and the various damping pressures which a hostile environment may impose on the motor mechanisms. These habits change as do other habits and thus perhaps offer their own explanation for the difficulty that investigators have had (through falsely studying these attitudes rather than the temperament itself) in delimiting clearly the categories extraversion and introversion. (For fuller discussion see Chapter V, pages 109 and following.)

Attitudes about authority

The attitudes about authority are the habitual expressions in answer to the realization that there are forces which can control one. Not that they always do—or even ever—exert all their power. We recognize an authority of power (or might) and an authority of difference (or strangeness). A government can awe me through what it might do to my income, a violet can awe me through my recognition of how little I understand it. A parent can control me by brute force, a baby through the fact that I cannot fathom its purpose or wish. (Discipline is a tool of the authority of power and we employ discipline—we "discipline ourselves"—to adjust ourselves to the fact that all about us there are forces greater than ourselves. Mystery attends the authority of difference, and the arts since the beginning of history have been man's insistent effort to break his bondage to difference, by word or song or brush showing that he can fathom its secret.)

The authority of power appears to us at four levels—of our bodies, of persons, of social groups, and of extra-human phenomena.

Our attitudes about the power our bodies have over us run the gamut from rebellious resentment to resigned acceptance, and we have no real data as to when these attitudes begin to crystallize. The fact that sleep presses itself upon one, that pain answers various acts (apparently innocuous or really pleasant in themselves), that maiming is attendant upon other phenomena—from all of this comes complicated ritualistic propitiation, or a comfortable acceptance of this benevolent despotism, or any shade of attitude between these two extremes. In the formation of these attitudes the teachings and conduct (these are the same thing, of course) of those about us in early years are of great importance. Also physical crises play a real part, whenever in life they occur.

The authority of persons is validated by age, possession, and idiomatic relationships. Our attitudes about those of the older generation, about those to whom we belong, towards those with whom we have the idiomatic “who” relationship which we will discuss in Chapter V—these without question are well crystallized during our early relationships with our parents. There is certainly very considerable evidence that every personal relationship in life is seen *in the light of* the crystallized, habitual attitude which the child developed in early years to “I am older than you,” “you are *my* child,” and “you will do this if you love me.” What these attitudes are, how they are developed, and how they are changed belong in a volume very different from this.

The authority of society comes to some children in their own families (if these are large), to many others in their early childhood excursions to the street or playground, while some

have little taste of it before their school experiences. Social groups control through numbers, bidding one do "what everybody does." Social authority lays its pattern also through those who are much acclaimed, but this is no more than the personification—the symbolization—of numbers (how many great and rich lives have had little control over others merely because the group has seen fit not to praise!). The attitudes about this form of authority are crystallized apparently during the first few years of school (which is a reason for considering these grades as the most important of all school years). Many children have previously had much group experience on the street but it has in general been our experience that, even with these, the school can bring about the formation of new attitudes towards the group if it cares to do so. Here, once more, appear a wide variety of habitual ways-of-looking-at-situations. Here is the child who must always be alone and the one who molds every word and action to the majority; the one who gets comforting security from numbers and the one who is with everyone because he is afraid to be singular. A culture may efficiently plan to indoctrinate its ideals but—no matter their worth—it will have its bitter rebels until it makes the early school contacts of children contacts that give mothering and protection from the group. And the obverse is that perhaps the greatest contribution of a school system that cares only whether the child can read or add, is the development of just those crusaders who will bitterly fight for better things.

Some time in the child's earlier years he begins to comprehend extra-human authority. The time of meeting this seems to depend upon the extent to which the fulness and satisfaction of the parents' meeting of his security needs prevent him from recognizing that there are forces beyond and above the protecting arms of the parents. At some time comes the inevi-

tability of death, of time, of earthquakes, of this or that natural disaster or blessing. The child develops an attitude about all these things which are so pressing upon him and which are, in his eyes, so far beyond control. What these attitudes are in any given child is a problem extremely difficult of solution; because the cultural pattern either through the parents (who have found this the most difficult of their adjustments and are thus unable to keep their hands off) or through the Church (which presents all the other authority problems to the child, through the person of the minister or through the social pressure of the child's own group) so befogs the issue. We shall attempt in Chapter XVI to outline the field for further exploration here.

"THE REST OF THE PERSONALITY"

There is then some sort of structure which arrives in the world—in the making. It has the drive and basis to develop into something which is its own and which seems to resist change. This structure meets, frequently and from a very early age, certain reiterating problems and because these problems are always much the same, it begins to form stereotyped responses to them. These responses gradually become more stereotyped and can then be thought of as attitudes or mental habits. These in general are built about what the child feels he cannot ever escape—that there is a real world, that it beats upon him for good or ill, and that some segment of it offers to him (or does not) a haven of safety or refuge in which the mere fact of his being who he is represents the important consideration.

From the first this sort of structure (undoubtedly far more extensive than that which has been pictured above, where we have attempted to limit ourselves to our own relative certain-

ties) meets situations within reality and authority that are not so repetitive and that thus call for various reactions. A child's attitudes about authority or security affect very definitely his reaction to a specific problem in sibling rivalry, but the fact that on a particular occasion he lost out, that this increased his guilt feeling because of the hatred thus engendered, that this led to an overcompensating show of affection, and so on, all this does not go into a habit pattern because its repetition is scarcely sufficiently stereotyped. It nevertheless markedly affects the development of the personality. In other words, our practical task is that of setting apart what is apparently a sort of fixed structural basis, and what are relatively fixed patterns of thinking or feeling concerning fundamental and recurring problems. Then there remains the whole mass of mental processes which grows like a rolling snowball—with this extra factor, that each accretion is accepted in the light of the problems which the personality is trying to work out, that it thus has dynamic, problem-provoking qualities of its own, and that of course it finds that each preceding accretion has this same tendency to affect every other part of the mass. Each accretion is loaded with cultural meaning, is loaded with meaning to the individual in the light of the understanding he has arrived at in working out certain problems, and is changed and molded as it enters the personality on the basis of precisely these problems. Thus, for instance, the child in going to school sees the teacher in the light of the whole complex of his relations to his mother and he takes from that teacher (what she means and is to him) that which in one or another way illuminates or works out or confirms what he has at the time arrived at so far as his relationship to his mother is concerned. Each person or each event of life is accepted as it has meaning to the child in the light of "where he has got to today." This is an ever changing, ever adjusting agglomeration

out of which emerge patterns of different definition. Some of these reiterate themselves with such frequency as to become attitudes. Others come and go, leaving in each case their mark but never attaining the strength to make them final common pathways to which a great variety of stimuli would lead.

Of what one sees at any time as the personality of an individual this third part is by far the biggest fraction. It so alters itself from moment to moment (and is indeed so definitely affected by the mere person-to-person operation of studying it) that analysis is extremely difficult. Sections of it will be found to have degrees of resistance to change which will place them in the categories of the basic or acquired habitual elements outlined in this chapter. Concerning this third part of the personality we can say the following: The individual in coming into the world soon finds that he has certain problems to solve—though they are never “solved” in the sense that new constellations of issues do not appear at the moment that previous ones are at rest. (That is, “adjustment” is *to* problems, not *of* problems—to the fact that one is in the midst of unstable and dynamic issues, not to an issue-free situation.) Further than that, it appears that the fundamental issues to be worked out through life are essentially the same for each person. The trauma of birth belongs to each and its reverberations echo through life—though no two persons ever work it through in quite the same way. The problems which these issues present are probably not so very different for individuals; how they are met shows the widest possible variation. Unfortunately most of the study of the personality (except psychoanalysis) has addressed itself to the latter problem. “Good” and “bad” we probably cannot rid ourselves of, but a tremendous step will be taken when we see these values in terms of the resolution of those deeply imbedded issues which are presented to the child in the first months of its adjustment

to a certain kind of mother, a certain kind of father, and certain kinds of siblings.

This part of the personality seeks to (chooses to) take out of the environment what it "needs" to help itself in these problems. A more classical school system tried to force upon the personality what it thought it should have. The individual's answer to this form of cultural attack was the building of an impressive front of social conformity—and Society looked upon this and was well pleased. A newer group of educators—more polite—has thought that it could do nothing beyond what the personality invited it to do. Actually, however, indoctrination of any sort can be successful only as we know more of the problems which the personality (every personality) has to solve and as we then conceive of our formal and informal cultural approaches primarily in terms of what they *mean* to the working out of these problems. Here again is our concept of the individual-centered world. What enters the personality is culture, but as it enters it is partially translated into what that personality can afford (or will choose) to feel that culture is.⁸ If the pressure of culture is too great we get every sort of intra-personality maladjustment; if the splendid individualism of the personality is too splendid, the working out of its problems "spills over" the walls and the pattern round about becomes inundated with hatred or love, murder or martyrdom. Of all who live we suspect that only the rare few can manage to protect their problems from the pressing interference of the environment, and protect their environments from their own perturbations. Perhaps death brings this to everyone—certainly persons in such a state, if living, would seem quite lifeless.

Not the least of our recent blessings has been the growing realization of the oneness—the continuity—of the conscious

⁸ See section on psycho-osmosis, Chapter I, page 15.

and unconscious. Gone are the neat diagrams with the heaviest line between these two parts of the same thing. The problems of each day and our modes of solving them are apparent or hidden as the case may be for the sake of convenience and safety. Those matters beyond our strength to face in full view must, for the sake of peace, be out of conscious view. In the unconscious they similarly seek resolution, similarly affect other parts of the psyche. Because they are further from "reality" their swings are greater, their symbols somewhat more bizarre, the leash that holds them to the cultural pattern less compelling.

For the unwary there is one more word about the "unconscious." The philosophy of determinism took tremendous strides in the middle of the last century. It was but natural that psychology should join its motley group of adherents. But psychological determinism soon ran amuck; there were an enormously large number of matters which could not be so neatly accounted for. By the assumption of the unconscious and by the later assumption that it, too, worked with symbols, transference of emotional charges, and ambivalence, everything could be comfortably given a deterministic basis. To this no one can object. But this much we have to watch—we must remember the role of the unconscious. The triumphant cry of one who has "explained" a certain phenomenon through the use of this assumption (of the unconscious) is often the cry of one who builds a road from A to B and then celebrates his surprised victory that the road leads from A to B. If the unconscious which we erect to meet the demands of psychological determinism fails to "explain" completely what we otherwise could not explain, then we have pretty poverty-stricken imaginations.

This chapter has attempted two things. The first is to give some picture of what we use in this volume as our definition

of the personality—that is, a definition for a specific piece of work. The other is to illustrate what we conceive to be the basic issues in this problem: (1) the necessity of defining a growing fraction of the personality which shall answer the criterion of a high degree of resistance to change under varied conditions and (2) the necessity of recognizing that the “rest of the personality” is in the closest of interflowing relationships with its environment, the material of which, however, it makes every attempt to select and alter on the basis of each moment’s situation in the solution of the problems which it is trying to work out. What these problems are we have been attempting to formulate and the psychoanalytic group has been doing the same thing for a much longer time and in a more painstaking way. The exposition of these various efforts does not belong here.

CHAPTER FIVE

Some Concepts of Classical Psychiatry in Relation to the Pressures of the Environment

THIS CHAPTER considers the relationship of what might be termed the "classical psychiatric approach" to such problems of personality adjustment as are found by the Essex County Juvenile Clinic. We have criticized this approach as too individualistic to compass the problems of the personality actually operating in a real social situation. In testing this criticism we must first do what every child guidance clinic has had to do—attempt to translate certain classical psychiatric concepts into terms consonant with the special demands of children's work.

Not so long ago the more forward-looking psychiatrists were dominated by the work and philosophy of Kraepelin. As a dynamic psychology developed under the brilliant urge of the psychoanalytic group, an interesting but thoroughly muddled eclecticism has appeared among all that large group that recognized the sterility of earlier descriptions but were not ready to follow any particular dynamic formulation. Thus it is with considerable temerity that one today speaks of any five matters which might be agreed upon by all psychiatric groups as being important to mental health. The elements discussed here are, therefore, those upon which there seems to be as general accord as is possible at the present time. For each we have undertaken to formulate a definition—in no effort at setting up our own views, but rather to bring out of the confusion those essentials upon which a large group of psychiatrists apparently agree.

SECURITY IN RELATION TO A SHIFTING POPULATION

Because the psychiatrist has found extensive elements of insecurity in a large number of maladjusted individuals he has pretty generally stated that a feeling of security is necessary to mental health. But there has been no adequate statement as to what this security or belongingness is, how the individual comes to possess it, and how it can be maintained. In formulating answers to these questions we shall attempt at every point to keep from violating the views of any large group. (It is typical of the classical psychiatric approach that its description of mental health is in negatives—in terms of those elements of maladjustment which should be absent. Thus there are many adequate descriptions of insecurity and its effects. But, we think, security is not simply absence of insecurity.)

It is written that God made a covenant with Abraham in which He stated that every person born a Jew would be an especial treasure in His eyes. This is an interesting agreement because it involved the position of an individual on the basis of who he was rather than on the basis of what he was. The covenant did not stipulate color of hair, stature, strength—or even high IQ! The mere fact of arrival in a certain family settled the matter. Nor did the covenant deal only with those Jews who were then alive. It predicted that those arriving two hundred or two thousand years later would have this place just because of their birth. This interesting situation is being re-enacted in every family (or should be!) today. In a jocular way we say that “we can’t send the baby back”—signifying our recognition that it has some assured place just because of who it is.¹

¹ The frequent phenomenon of rejection is on the basis of what a child is, what it has, what it has done to certain other family relationships (illustrated below). The rejection picture in which the parent forever complains of all the bad and wrong things which the child does or in which the parent (compensates)

The child is quickly made to realize his position of security. (Parental love or "mother love" is precisely this attitude that the adult has towards a relationship that quite defies *what* the child is or does.) We are rather sure that the earliest transmissions of this sentiment are through the psycho-motor tensions. All of the cuddling, clasp-to-the-bosom activities of the infant's early days are unquestionably carrying to the child some deeply imbedded realization that he "belongs." Indeed, the word "belongingness" would be better than "security" were its negative as easy of expression as "insecurity."

The child's position in his own family is based very much upon this matter of who he is. His position in society in general, on the other hand, is based upon his various attributes. Thus the school, the social worker, and the judge assay Johnny on the basis of his repeated delinquencies, his mediocre intelligence, his poverty-stricken and dirt-ridden family, and have only dazed resentment for the mother's insistent cry that "He's my Johnny." In a great deal of our whole program of social engineering, we have failed to realize that the essential strength of family life lies in the tying together of its members on the basis of who they are. And this is natural because these family ties are so defiant of rational or reasonable analysis—indeed a large factor in their strength lies precisely in this inability of reasonable considerations to destroy or materially change them.

Not that this always occurs, by any means. One need but sating for the sense of guilt about this rejection) oversolicitously is constantly hoping that the child will not get sick, not fail in school, not be injured, not grow up to be just worthless, and so on, has a great number of sources. Four situations we often see are these: (1) the child comes soon enough after marriage to break in upon what the couple had looked upon as a happy, care-free time together; (2) one of the parents is so preoccupied with the child that the other feels jealous; (3) the child presents patently some attribute which allows its identification with a similarly distasteful attribute in one of the parents; (4) the pregnancy and rearing crystallize the mother's life-long resentment over being a girl instead of a boy.

watch the daily paper (or his acquaintances) to realize that many people marry because of what the partner has or what he is. We are attempting here only to say that this belongingness is given by family life (in our own cultural pattern) and that every individual should have the realization that he has some relationship which is dependent upon who he is. So frequently we who deal with people fail to realize that it is only the healthiest of family situations that can allow a woman to talk about her husband's financial failure, puny build, and social ill graces, at the same time that she so comfortably and securely shows in her entire manner that he is "her husband."

As the child grows out of first infancy he still clings to this something in the family relationship that gives to him a place in the whole scheme of things. He returns the same sentiments—not being interested in the father's business vicissitudes or intellectual achievements but in the idiomatic relationship that the father has towards him. Obviously another criterion of relationship—that of adequacy or superiority which will be discussed later in this chapter—almost from the first begins to creep in. The parents begin to compare the child with his siblings or with other children or with what they had hoped he would be. By the time of adolescence this placement by adequacy rather than by belongingness has almost entirely been attained although there are even at this time those bursts of explosive affection which signal the child's spasmodic return to the earlier criterion of relationship. We pause here only to note the tenacity with which children cling in reality or phantasy to "their own" parents even though these individuals may be, by every standard of what a person should be, complete failures and worse. And until there comes that time when clinic, court, and agency recognize the strength and importance of that tie, we shall continue to bring to the life of the child the deepest of tragedies

—all in the name of social efficiency. Institutions and foster homes are a present necessity but social engineering must squarely set its face to the goal of preserving and strengthening the child's own family. A dramatic expression of this was given us by a twelve-year-old girl who had been early adopted by a pair who gave her everything that money and love could provide. Efficient neighbors had long since told her that her own parents were a bad lot who had deserted her. She said that she never thought of them. Later when we were talking about her going to sleep, it appeared that she often lay awake for some time. "I keep wondering what they used to call me." Here is the insatiable desire (in the midst of plenty) to know who she really is—to have some answer to an unreasonable demand for a place in the world.

There comes a time in the usual child's life when he can rather easily transfer this need for a feeling of belongingness to his relationships in his religious life. Here again God is given the role of parent, and again He cares for us because of who we are—and still cares for us regardless of what we are or what we do. Great stress is placed on belongingness in all religious patterns—they give this realization of one's place in the whole scheme of things. Note also that in those cultural patterns in which the caste of the person gives him his security or tells him who he is (in contrast to those in which the family fulfills this function), the religious pattern is much less a family pattern. We have had no doubt, from our work, that individuals can (and do) get just as satisfactory and lasting a security from this religious pattern of the family as others do from their actual family life.

Havelock Ellis long since illuminated this point in his discussion of acquaintanceship and intimacy.² In the former we

² Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Philadelphia, F. A. Davis, 1929. Vol. V, page 12.

are interested in the traits of persons (what they are or have). Thus a disfiguring characteristic is a deterrent to acquaintanceship. When the stage of intimacy is reached this same characteristic now becomes a cementing factor. "I love John because he is John. The disfiguring characteristic proves that I care for him because of *who* he is. If our relationship had the slightest tinge of *what* we have or are, you see I would not care for him." In the same way differences in religion or social background discourage acquaintanceship but are factors of great importance in the strengthening of the intimacy tie.

From what has been said it must be evident that the child has this feeling of belongingness in his early years, that he continues it in his religious life or quite entirely loses it during adolescence only to rebuild it again in his mating and family life, in which (regardless of what may be the buffets of a life that asks only what one is or what one can do) the individual has a haven where the mere fact of who he or she is gives adequate position or security.

As briefly as possible we now consider such aspects of insecurity or lack of belongingness as might throw light upon this concept of security. Security is arrived at in an "unreasonable" way—using this adjective because it seems to the individual that his placement in a certain family is so largely a matter of chance—something, as he says, that you "can't do anything about." It is for this reason that the insecure child gives so much the picture of being at sea, of being panicky, of being anxious, of fearing disaster at every turn without being at all sure as to what will be the character of the disaster. We stress the quality of the reaction because the same type of reaction appears in certain situations that one might call "marginal" to that of the family's inability to provide enough belongingness or security to the individual. For instance, one gets the same thing in a child of four, five, or six who for the

first time flatly meets the situation of belonging to a minority race. Here again the child meets a problem which he "can't do anything about" and again he responds with the same anxious lack of sure-footedness.⁸

As far as words allow, we are attempting here to differentiate between the quality of insecurity and the quality of inadequacy (or inferiority which we use as a synonymous term). This negative approach is here used simply as one of the ways of arriving at a clarification of the difference between security on the one hand and, on the other, adequacy or superiority. The original difference lies in the fact that security comes to the individual because of who he is whereas adequacy is attained through what he is and what he can do. However, as one clinically sees the reactions to insecurity and inadequacy a new set of criteria appear. Insecurity and inadequacy in this light appear to be not a dichotomy but rather as the emphasized ends of a continuous series. It follows that security and adequacy are probably not a dichotomy. Problems of security are met before those of adequacy, and security is the more basic, pervasive, "necessary," of the two. Similarly an individual may be comfortably secure as to his part in the scheme of things though hopelessly inadequate in every standard of attainment which either he or society might erect. (The example that comes to mind is the child who is a failure in school because he is intellectually slow and a failure on the street because he is awkward and clumsy but who shows his fundamental feeling that sometime "everything will be all

⁸ This confrontation with the problem of belonging to a minority race is to be distinguished from the second confrontation, perhaps about the time of adolescence, when the individual recognizes the definite economic and social disadvantages of his race and now responds in an entirely different way. This second confrontation breeds bully reactions, noisy or hard-boiled shells of overcompensation, and that sort of thing. It is something which one can understand, can fight about, can see as an understandable, even if horribly unfair, discrimination.

right" because he is unassailably accepted as a necessary and cared-for member of his family group.) On the other hand, an individual may have achieved in finance or scholarship the very highest degree of adequacy and yet have his every act and attainment pervaded by a restless ill-at-ease-ness if he does not have security.

Just as security is more basic than is adequacy, so is insecurity a more body-embracing phenomenon than is inadequacy. Insecurity shows itself far more definitely in the psycho-motor tensions so that in watching a kindergarten group one finds himself soon attracted by a tense, restless, "nervous" type of reaction that is difficult to differentiate by words from the happy grasshopper activity of five-year-olds but certainly is within the early experience of anyone who has dealt much with children. In the presence of tasks which are too hard, the insecure child becomes panicky, gives up quickly, doesn't know what to do.

One sees this difference in the child's meeting of the psychological tests. The insecure child tells you that he "can't answer that." He won't attempt anything that seems on its surface too difficult. Or the insecure child will watch your marking of results as a cat watches a mouse—and there is always "Was that right?" or "I don't suppose that was the correct way to do it, was it?" He insatiably seeks the reassurance of praise, of marks, of success—never apparently finding that what you give him is enough. The inadequate child is more the bull in the china-closet—with blundering, ill-thought stabs he tries any task you give him. The actual final accomplishments (marked in success or failure) are frequently the same for both children. The one in headlong fashion blunders his way to defeat, the other with anxious panic won't even try. The insecure child in anxiety runs away from every situation that involves competition and frequently covers the matter by

again "becoming a baby"—turning to infantile speech, enuresis, thumb-sucking, as means of demanding adult protection. The inadequate child, on the other hand, with sure rebellions and revenge becomes the bully or in some other fashion compensates for his failure.

Despite many clear descriptive pictures of all that we have discussed, psychiatrists in general have failed to see the issues involved. Thus we have seen case histories of children who know that they are illegitimate (insecure children) where the claim is made of successful treatment through captaincies of teams or high grades in school! (The reason for this is apparent. Insecurity is something which defies "cure" in the ordinary medical sense of the word. It arises out of situations that are beyond logical control and is combated through all those mental processes which we subsume under the term "faith." This being the case, psychiatry and social work could have little to do with the matter as these two disciplines have been interested only in what *can* be done for patients. We must more frankly face the things which we *can't* do for patients.) Psychiatrists have often failed to recognize that a large number of children show a mingled reaction of insecurity and inadequacy and that clear treatment of their problems involves a separation of the two components.

The reader recognizes that we set up a specific situation (the chance of birth) which gives to the child a feeling of belongingness or security through telling him who he is. In attempting to study the symptoms that appear when the child has not this feeling of security we find that they appear in other situations where it seems, in talking with children, that they have this same feeling of the "unreasonableness" of the problem in the sense that "nothing can be done about it." Thus one sets up a number of sets of interactions that appear to be in a sort of series in which the security and adequacy

| I SAMPLE SOURCES | II CATEGORY | III GENERAL REACTION | IV EXPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p><i>"Who am I?"</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No parents } Genealogical 2. "Bad" parents } questions 3. Erratic discipline 4. Discontent and constant complaining in the home 5. Frequent moving | <p>Unreasonable situations involving "faith"</p> | <p>Panic</p> | <p>Anxiety Uncertainty "Nervousness" Restlessness Furtive reactions Chronic pessimism</p> |
| <p><i>"What am I?"</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Too high standards for the child 7. Frequent playing with older children 8. Realization of inferiority or difference | <p>Reasonable situations involving "mobilization of available resources"</p> | <p>Rebellion</p> | <p>Defiance "Bully" reactions Certain rebellion Fear</p> |

issues are variously fractionated. These are set up very frankly on the empirical basis of those situations in which there appear to be corresponding fractions of the pictures of insecurity and inadequacy (or inferiority) in the child.

These considerations give rise to the scheme on page 103, which remains highly tentative and which still contains many disturbing and serious questions. It has certain clinical values—indeed its construction is on the basis of what we have seen in clinical practice rather than upon theoretical formulation.

The table might be changed with further data but with fourteen years' experience we have come to feel that its critical factors are fairly solid and substantial. Column I contains eight headings arranged, so far as our material at present shows it, from that sort of situation (illegitimacy or early desertion) that is the greatest threat to security over to those situations of being poor in school work, failing in athletics, and so on, which seem to strike entirely at the child's sense of adequacy or superiority. The arrangement of Column I was slowly arrived at through the symptoms in the child which the tabulated condition aroused. Thus, with us, children seem to show more of the restless, anxious type of reaction where there has been frequent moving than where school grading holds them to standards that are too high for their ability. Obviously, further study might change these about.

Column II attempts a generalization of Column I and Column III in a similarly schematic way attempts to generalize Column IV. Column IV itself is a list just as is Column I—tending to move in a fairly ordered way from the anxious, panicky states through to the more certain fear and rebellion states. Column IV cannot be superimposed on Column I although the trends in both are in the same direction. The difference is that in Column I discrete, separate situations may be presented to the child whereas his reaction is in terms, let

us say, of the top five of Column IV, or the bottom five or any intermediary three, four, or five sets of symptoms.

One further question intrudes itself—a question for which we have only a tentative answer. If a person is secure—if he seems by all available measurements comfortably to sense his place in his family and the general scheme of things, can repeated and serious blows at his adequacy (or superiority) bring about the panicky feeling of insecurity of which we have spoken? We have felt that the answer is “yes.” (See Chapter VIII for further consideration of this point.)

This discussion of security and adequacy is relevant because, though psychiatrists agree that the individual has need for security (even if there would be some slight disagreements over terminology), it seems that a large share of the population of Essex County is being subjected to social factors which seriously threaten security. Moreover if we are correct in our formulation, we are dealing with a matter that is definitely beyond psychiatric amelioration (“psychiatric” in its usual, individualistic sense). If it is true that a fair number of our children (one doubts that our own district differs in any material way from many other sections in the metropolitan areas of this country) are being made insecure through certain cultural factors, and if it is true not only that these children fail to show evidences of psychosis but that they give every appearance of being quite “normal,” then we need something further than the classical psychiatric formulations to understand what is happening.

A restless spirit of change characterizes our population in Essex County. At least this was true up through 1929; the question of the effect of the Depression on the frequent moving of people will be left open here. To arrive at some statistical statement of this tendency to move we sampled large sec-

tions of our suburban areas.⁴ This was done by taking directories at five-year periods and sampling, under each letter, the first 100 names (we took 1922 and 1927, with much briefer sampling of other five-year periods as a check). We counted as having moved not only those people who had disappeared from the 1927 directory, for instance, but also those who were obviously in different addresses. A number of names appeared in addresses that were near enough to the previous ones to raise the question of typographical error, of street renumbering, or of a change in address so slight as probably not to involve the necessity of a radical "neighborhood adjustment" for the members of the family. These we counted as not having moved. Thus our final figures give us those who had made an appreciable move at least once in this five-year period. Some or many of these families may have moved more often. We confined our sampling to the suburban areas because with that type of population and with their relatively high percentage of individuals who are the owners of the homes in which they live we were dealing with relatively stable groups. There would be little question that the marginal groups (much more highly represented in the city of Newark) would move much more. On the other hand, a small group of more wealthy families living on estates farther from Manhattan Island would probably show higher stability.

Within the group studied 68 per cent of the families had moved within the five-year period. This is a figure that certain statistical refinements might alter (as, for instance, correction for the relationship between the numbers of single adults as compared with married adults with children who were involved). These corrections we did not make because we felt that even with fairly high degree of error the percentage of families moving was staggering. We had picked areas with a

⁴ Briefly described in Chapter II, page 26.

high number of single-family houses with the assumption that this probably largely involved families with one or more children; and Miss Weill's study (as yet unpublished) of moving in this area in which she approached the whole subject through taking classrooms of children gave quite as high a percentage of change.⁵

As we see the situation in clinical practice, constant moving may affect the child in at least two ways. The demands of new adjustments are hard for many youngsters. Each one must find a new place for himself, must establish a new vantage-point of struggle for acceptance and importance, usually in a milieu in which the child culture pattern is already considerably crystallized. There is a difference between this moving and the placement of a child in camp or private school, where the child recognizes that a large share of the others are quite as new to the affair as is he. There is the added difficulty in our area that often the racial or cultural background of the immigrant family is not relished by its new neighbors. As a means of establishing the family, the child is exhorted at home to play with the neighboring children, who in turn show with a consistent and open cruelty that they do not care for the interloper. Caught between two fires the child finds his struggle to establish himself all the more intensified. We have seen evidences in children that one such change in address involves inadequacy (or inferiority) very much more than insecurity, but that repeated situations of this sort very definitely begin to give the picture of insecurity in the child (pages 203 ff.).

There was another factor in the situation previous to the Depression. Many of the children lived in families which had recently moved and which looked forward to moving again—

⁵ The study of Miss Irma Weill was made at the Essex County Juvenile Clinic as part of the requirement for a master's degree at the Smith College School for Social Work. It has never been published in full but is to appear in abbreviated form in one of the technical journals.

all in the social milieu of other families who presented the same picture. The contagion of this instability (previous to the Depression) was strengthened by the fact that moving meant a change in furniture. Storage companies were rapidly going over into the furniture business as moving meant furniture sold to be replaced by that more fitting to the new surroundings. Thus the child found that even those cumbersome, heavy anchors of security to his own and his family's past were disappearing.

So many factors play into the problems of life that one scarcely dares to speak of a child's coming to the clinic because of any one problem. We have seen the problems just discussed often and have felt them to be of major importance in half our patients from one municipality of 15,000 and in something less than one-third of those of another area of 50,000 inhabitants. Miss Weill's study, in which she attempted to get at the problem through using all sixth-grade or all twelfth-grade children in a certain area, showed that the problem is not so simple as this. Her data indicated that while the number and frequency of removals do seem to play a role in producing these pictures of insecurity, there seems to be a fairly wide variation in personal vulnerability to such problems. (This only again goes to show that a clinic tends rather more to make contacts with children who have problems than with the problems which children have. The hunch material from the casual breakdown must always be checked over for "the problems which children have" by use of other methods of study.)

Ambition, change, and development belong to all healthy individuals, and one cannot be blind to whatever fraction in this moving is due to these drives. However, in this large metropolitan area there is a vast amount of changing of neighborhood, altering of local social levels, commercialized struc-

tures, and so on, dependent solely upon the centripetal and centrifugal forces involved.⁶ Here factors of crowding and communication, factors which transcend the power or arena of any one individual, are the important matters. It is such as these that we term "social forces" because their motivation and direction so far transcend any individual's control. Perhaps the psychiatrists are in error in maintaining that security is essential to mental health. But if they are right and if social forces are definitely jeopardizing security, we are presented with a serious problem, predicting early and serious human breakdown unless compensating ways of attaining this necessity are found. We suspect that to the classical psychiatric formulation must be added a recognition and exploration of these compensatory mechanisms.

EXTRAVERSION IN RELATION TO A CROWDED AREA

Temperament⁷ has classically been associated with chemical elements in the body. The ancients tied it to fire, water, and the rest, and later it was linked with the chemical constituents of the blood. The endocrinologists of today would tie up the whole subject with the glands of internal secretion. Jung has given a more definitely psychological slant to his descriptions of the temperaments. Very serious objections to Jung's theory have been raised. In view of the great practical value of his concepts in our work with children we attempt here to clear the difficulties which have been pressed.

Jung's theory relied upon a dichotomy. For the extravert he assumed a certain interest "flowing out" from the individual. With keen insight he pictured the "friendliness" which the extravert has with his environment. For the introvert an

⁶ See Chapter I, page 17.

⁷ See Chapter IV, pages 80 and 84.

interest "flows in" towards the patient—a conception extremely difficult of comprehension. Efforts at measuring any such two distinct types of temperament have indicated that no such dualism actually exists.⁸ The second outstanding hazard which this theory has had to face has been its limitation to the problems of adults. The original temperament long before adulthood has become so overlain with various compensatory mechanisms that one is forced either to deny the theory in its simplicity or to construct (as has been done) such a galaxy of subtypes that the original formulation loses any practical value.

Our own material seems to indicate that these difficulties may be resolved, if, at least for the present, the division into types is limited to children. Here there is brilliant support for something that approximates the original formulation as long as one does not stress a dualism in temperament. The whole matter seems to be essentially one of the facility of the whole motor mechanism—an experience in expression. For instance, children desire some sort of leadership—in short-hand terms, to be heroes. The extravert sets out in bold shape to be a hero. He marshals his companions and with waving sword captures the enemy's fort. With the introvert we feel that we have found some lack of facility in the motor mechanisms that means that exactly the same drive is inhibited in expression and thus reverberates within, giving us the well-known pictures of phantasy and wishful thinking. There is nothing unduly fanciful in this formulation as varying thresholds of the sensory mechanism have long been recognized and we are here merely suggesting that the same situation exists for the expressive mechanisms. Symbolic expressions and the unexpected temper outbursts of the introvert seem, again, to

⁸ E. R. Guthrie, Measuring Extraversion and Introversion, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 22, p. 82, April-June, 1927.

be understandable on the basis of the breaking through of summated stimuli. If this picture has virtue then we might expect in introverted children some definitely shown motor difficulty in coordination and speed of contacts with concrete reality. We know of no published experimental work at this level.

This view of the situation sets up a somewhat new formulation of the original concepts. Instead of two "interests" flowing in opposite directions we have but one such drive which meets with varying resistance in its natural effort at expression. While we accept some general constancy in the degree of resistance offered, it must be evident that this formulation need not assume two distinct types of personality structures. If in each instance some chemical factor determines the extent to which there could be expression, the temperament might be described as denoting the rather narrow range within which a person might operate. In each instance, however, one would be dealing with but one phase of a phenomenon which could be subdivided only on the basis of a definite swing towards one of its poles.

Inheritance, as we have shown in Chapter IV, seems to us the primary determinant of temperament, whether introvert or extravert. The fact that certain races seem to be more definitely extraverted than others gives perhaps some support to this. However, in addition there is an introversion induced by environmental factors which we will from now on term "traumatic introversion." The reader understands the high probability that the inherited temperament in every instance is altered by environmental experiences. This means that the traumatic form of introversion is only the more frankly and directly a result of cultural impingement. In traumatic introversion we are thinking of the result of any or all of the multitudinous environmental influences towards a blocking of

motor expression. In our own experience traumatic introversion is more common and more pronounced than is inherited introversion. So far as we have seen it, traumatic introversion presents exactly the same behavior picture as inherited introversion: the difference is made clear by therapeutic efforts towards extraversion which more easily and more effectively clear up the traumatic type.

To illustrate. A somewhat common picture is that of two children (girls, let us say) about two years apart in age in which one is possessed of far more winning ways and appearance than the other. Mary is more intelligent than Margaret, has more attractive hair and eyes—in short, wherever the two go, Mary is forever the one who attracts the “Oh, isn’t she a darling?” comment from friend and stranger alike. At the clinic we see Margaret after some three or four years of this, withdrawn, shy, compensating with a rich phantasy life, breaking out in bits of symbolic or irritable behavior, building a world quite within herself and bending all of her surroundings to this. We have here a very typical picture of the introverted youngster, but in this case the introversion might be called traumatic, because it seems to be not so much inherited as the result of environmental pressure. One sees much the same thing in a child who on beginning his play life outside the home finds all the available playmates older or better integrated than he, so that there is not the opportunity for free expression of leadership, or even companionship. One can only assume the mechanisms involved (although, obviously, a conception of a blocking of normal expression is at least a reasonable assumption). The resulting picture is, at least at the level of observation, similar to what is seen in the classical pictures of the introvert—a rich phantasy life, a detachment from reality and occasional outbursts of symbolic or “boiling over” reactions which are not allied

in any reasonable or proportional way to the stimulus at the moment. Of course, it may be said that no one can know how much of the final picture is the product of an inherent introversion. It has seemed to us more realistic and to involve simpler hypotheses to accept as the explanation of many personality problems the notion of a traumatic introversion.

The trauma may occur at any point of the expressive mechanism. Thus there may be accidents to the actual motor mechanisms, so that children with a long, debilitating illness build up a world within themselves—a complete world of satisfied desires and exciting adventure—as the illness cuts in on facile mechanisms of play and expression. Similarly, those events in the environment which persistently block adequate and healthy outlets force this same sort of reverberation within the mental life of the child. There are probably inherent differences in the motor facility of individuals (that is, varying degrees of inherited introversion or extraversion) and these by all means play a part in overcoming or failing to overcome the results of trauma.

As a practical matter the therapeutic implications are markedly different in the two forms of introversion. At the Essex County Juvenile Clinic we have produced, as has every other clinic, a marked shift towards living in reality rather than in daydream life through “removing the barrier” against expression. Indeed, it has been our custom to consider, somewhat opportunistically, that that part of the introverted picture which can be easily cleared up (through congenial play life or more easily accomplished tasks in school work or more “standable” adjustments such as better foster-home placement) is the part that is of traumatic origin. The successful treatment of introversion, leading individuals from too much preoccupation with phantastic life, as reported in many cases, we would suppose to be dependent upon the traumatic origin of

that life. The high percentages of "cures" of early pictures of schizophrenia claimed in various startling announcements also seem to be dependent, perhaps, upon the existence of traumatic sources of the original "disease." (Schizophrenia is considered here as a striking example of marked introversion.) Certainly the person dealing with adolescents has the impression that certain schizophrenic processes just go on to a more and more clearly defined state of autistic thinking (regardless of every sort of "extraverting" effort), while others with relative ease halt or reverse the process. Here again we have a fairly common phenomenon which seems to agree with our theory of the two sources of introversion.

Introversion and extraversion, then, present two distinguishable pictures to the clinician but are really simply different degrees of facility of expression of the interests and drives of the individual. The blocking of this facility may arise from inherited factors, from acquired bodily conditions producing those same physical conditions as are involved in the inherent factors, from environmental factors making expression unpleasant, or from any combination of these situations. While the resulting clinical pictures seem indistinguishable, therapeutic efforts are apparently successful in proportion to the extent to which the picture has been produced by environmental factors of blocking. The therapy is addressed to a removal of those factors.

Psychiatrists very generally have felt that a mild degree of extraversion represents the most healthy type of temperament (though this is obviously not the whole story since the concept of mental health involves not only individual adjustment but social adjustment as well and this latter demands a certain amount of introversion). There are a number of considerations supporting this view. All babies (even in New England!) are extraverted. If you stick a pin into a baby, it immediately

sets up a howl. Similarly, the waving of some toy immediately stops this weeping. Here is again that "friendliness" with the environment, that easy facility of expression. It is also true that most of the higher animals are extraverted. The more malignant psychoses are allied to introversion rather than to extraversion. This is no more than the statement that it is more healthy to live in the world as it is than in the world only as one wishes it to be. This is one of the important factors involved in the basic necessity of "facing reality"—every factor towards introversion making this the more difficult of consummation.

In the area under observation, we see in two rather distinct ways the pressure of sociological forces producing situations which cannot fail to cause traumatic introversion in its inhabitants.

The first of these is the marked reduction in the opportunity for physical expansion of the play life of children. This is illustrated in the game of baseball. In the rural area the game is played as we ordinarily know it with a diamond of regulation size and an expansive if somewhat bumpy outfield. As one moves in towards the crowded areas the space for running and moving about is progressively limited until in the most crowded areas one finds the game still with all of its ideational content (outs, innings, bases) but with the ball thrown against a wall and the playing individual not moving. All the wide-flung games of running are barred to a large extent in these city areas.

We have long since convinced ourselves that one of the more serious problems raised by the movies is of the same order. It has seemed to us that here the disturbing factor is not dependent directly upon the "exciting" content of the picture; indeed, long contact with many delinquents has failed

in more than a half-dozen instances to establish any relationship between the content of the movie and the content of the delinquency. (I am aware of the findings of the Committee working under the Payne Fund—and that this more carefully done and extensive piece of work throws its doubt on this statement.⁹) The difficulty seems, more precisely, just the one that is being considered here—the fact that the ideational content of the child has no adequate physical outlet. Those who are adults today were forced as children, to a large extent, to “make” their own play—to run, to move about in satisfaction of their recreational needs. The child or adult at the movies goes through all the ideational content of even more exciting activity but the actual physical expression is carried through by the person on the screen.

There is much the same thing to be said of the radio. For instance, in the late afternoon and early evening a number of hair-raising programs for children have been provided partly as “bedtime stories” and partly with the laudable purpose of keeping the younger elements of the family out from under the feet of tired and frayed adults. For a time these affairs vied with each other in excitement, until definite representations were made by various parent organizations as to their disturbing content. Here again one doubts that the content of the programs made much difference—being no more blood-curdling than the usual play life of children where it is unsupervised. Here again the difficulty is rather that there is a rich mental content without physical concomitants which are by any stretch of the imagination adequate. “Playing Indian” in one’s own childhood contained just as lurid material as the radio or movie program of today can boast—but an essential

⁹ H. Blumer, *Movies and Conduct*, New York, Macmillan, 1933; H. Blumer and P. M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency and Crime*, New York, Macmillan, 1933.

element was the accompanying rushing about with its exhilarating yells.

There is in Elton Mayo's work indication that the matter does not stop here.¹⁰ The automatic processes of modern factory work, where a premium is placed upon a complete split between what the hands do and what preoccupies the mind, are another example of social pressure directed towards the removal or delay of physical expression of the mental content.

In any advancing civilization there is this displacement of the physical expression of the mental life. As this belongs so definitely to the development of every western civilization, we have stressed it little in depicting those factors which stand as somewhat peculiar to our own area. All our western civilizations have in their infancy been extraverted in character. When individuals hated, they killed. When they loved, they captured—even if this meant a war of epic proportions. Each of these civilizations has progressed towards its golden age—a period which has, in each instance, preceded its decay. This is perhaps but another expression of what we have attempted to picture above. The movement of a people from making heroes of men to making heroes of marble is a movement towards a split between the mental content and the direct physical expression of this. More and more do delayed and symbolic expressions appear—which, as we see it, means more and more introversion. This is further borne out, at least in the case of Greece and Rome, by the appearance, at the close of the so-called golden era, of a period of the highest form of symbolism in bizarre and exotic cults. There is no implication here that this is "wrong." Perhaps this is merely the necessary progress of "civilizing" people—this substitution for direct action and expression of delayed and symbolic activity. A vigorous

¹⁰ Elton Mayo, *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1933.

and young civilization is extraverted. As it develops it blocks and delays direct expression until that time comes when this rising tide of introverted temperament overcomes the more healthy extraversion and the structure is ready to fall of its own weight.

What part inherited and what part traumatic introversion play in this process we don't know. Probably both are at play somewhat in this fashion—that there are forces which are definitely traumatic to extraverted temperaments and which progressively operate as a civilization progresses, and that the hazards of life would be such as to favor those who are inherently introverted—thus operating towards a selective heredity in this direction. Tigger we may recognize with some envy as the picture of mental health, but even Christopher Robin's little world knew that he was somewhat too sudden about the house for a cooperative scheme. It would seem that here is one of the artistries of life—the creation of some sort of healthy balance between the blocking of the “raw” human drives involved in “group” mental health, as opposed to the expression of or simple redirection of “raw” human drives. For countless generations the world has sought a balance that would include the best of both. In the area which we are studying the swing is definitely towards a rather marked introversion and this is probably typical of metropolitan areas throughout this country.

There is a second, less persistent way in which sociological forces are urging upon us the characteristics of traumatic introversion. In this situation the individual seems partly free to choose his role in the process but at best he finds himself caught in a situation from which escape is not easy. The marked increase in the speed of communication and in the impingements which the world outside may make upon the individual has developed a situation in which one sort of

emotional content may impress itself upon the individual preoccupied at the moment with another sort. Even in the days of the town crier individuals were subjected to "shock" when, for instance, tragedy broke in upon the peaceful calm of comfortable humdrum. However, the telephone, the newspaper, and finally the radio have markedly intensified this situation. This is not merely a question of rapidly changing emotional content—but rather the brusque appearance, in heightened form, of one sort of emotional context at the time that the mind is preoccupied with an entirely different one. Here again, so far as one knows it, is a situation characteristic of the schizophrenic process in which there is apparently an inability to mobilize the mental processes under one dominating and continuing emotional drive. True, a man can arrange that the telephone shall not intrude, and can limit his newspaper contacts to his trips to the bulletin board when he may be "prepared" for whatever he is to find, or he may "turn off" his radio. This is not the way we usually live. It may be "our own fault" that the happy gaiety of some social affair is mingled with a stark tragedy which comes by way of the radio. It may be our own fault that the telephone makes our emotional life vulnerable to the comedies and tragedies of countless others, our own fault that at the quiet of our breakfast tables we sit in on the bitter struggles of the entire world. But this is the way in which we live, nor could we well afford to reside in our metropolitan area unless we were ready to accept these situations as normal and expected hazards.

This is of importance to our conceptions of extraversion—not because the situation directly blocks emotional expression but because it seriously clouds the issue of what to express. We have made reference to the schizophrenic process at times because it seems to be allied to marked introversion. The schizophrenic seems to have at least two difficulties—that some

factor blocks and delays the actual and natural physical expression of his emotional drives, and that some factor shatters the integrity and continuity of definite emotional drives so that they now seem fragmentary and kaleidoscopic. On this basis, one feels disturbed over those social forces which produce just these same fragmentary, clashing bits of diverse emotional content. Here, again, our psychiatric dictum that extraversion conduces to health may be in error. If not, if extraversion is as individually necessary as has seemed, and if social forces are definitely jeopardizing it, we are presented with a grave problem, predicting early and serious human breakdown, unless compensating ways of attaining this necessity are found.

THE INVIOABILITY OF THE SELF IN RELATION TO POPULATION CONCENTRATION

At birth there is apparently no differentiation, on the baby's part, of itself from its environment. Following this, however, as we have already suggested in our theory of the interrelation of the personality and the environment (Chapter II, page 24), there is a constantly moving wall which is the limiting line between the ego and "everything else." We project ourselves into every sort of situation and the phenomenon of introjection (the intrusion of the milieu into the personality) is also common. Yet the fact remains that during the first two to five years of life there is a definite process in each individual of separating off (or delimiting out) from the environment that which is recognized as the self or the ego.

Apparently the extent of the ego is thought by the child to have something to do with his bodily limitations. What he, at any time, calls "I" is made up of his physical body and what he calls his mind (which, to a large extent, he identifies with

his body). He does not recognize that he is perhaps a bundle of warring egos nor does he particularly bother about how much of his "mind" was summarily manufactured by those about him. He is convinced that (rid of the rules of adults) he is free to think and do as he pleases—and just so much of himself as he thinks of as possessing that freedom, he calls his self. As persons grow older there occur and develop quite new concepts as to what make the limits of the self.

The interesting wall or integument at the limits of this "self" may be pictured as a kind of condensation that is not materially different from the rest of the ego but which manages to mark it off from its environment. This outer wall preserves the inviolability of the ego.¹¹ Despite the fact that the word "status" has a very definite meaning in the disciplines of the social sciences we use it here because this wall is so largely used by the individual to preserve his position in the community, to protect himself from the constant threats of the environment, and to hide from those about him the turmoils and conflicts which are going on within. This wall, then, we call a status-preserving mechanism. It is a phenomenon that we find so constantly in our work that we would assume that it is a universal human mechanism, though there are probably many variations in its resistive powers and the extent of the area which it protects.

During the formation (or separation from the environment) of the self, if the parents do not allow the child to go comfortably on with his delimiting process, there develops a thick and irritable wall. This we see in the negativism of the child

¹¹ Until I understand better the mechanics of inviolability, I shall not attempt to relate it to other aspects of the personality and have therefore purposely left it out of the structure of the personality (Chapter IV). One of the great difficulties with psychiatry has been its yen to complete its descriptions. My own view has been just to leave blank the parts I can't understand. This is hard on the reader but not half so hard as trying to untangle a lot of

with bossy and dominating parents who constantly are interfering with his effort at accomplishing a separate and distinct self. The child defends himself with a "no" for every request and soon shows in his physical reactions a withdrawal that defies cuddling. Seen at the clinic these children exhibit an apparently unconscious and involuntary drawing away when approached and a parallel shrinking if touched. Seen in a kindergarten group they soon single themselves out as they constantly manage to have a bit of space between themselves and others—they do not "melt into" the other children as do the rest. These psycho-motor withdrawals, the ever present "no" for everything that is suggested, and a liberal supply of naïve, childish, defensive lies comprise the material of defense in the young child. As he grows older the falsifications become more intricate, and there is added a series of "fending off" mechanisms running all the way from blasé indifference to braggadocio. In every case the mechanism is a structure which protects the inner mental life of the individual from the gaze or meddlesomeness of others.

This wall (of status-preservation) is probably to a considerable degree a wall of fear. It is for this reason that its strength is increased if too many others in too insistent a way press upon it (dominating, executive types of teachers can produce the same result as can meddling or overpowering parents). It is also strengthened if the person is preoccupied with many unsolved problems. It is as though his anxiety to keep his disordered house closed to intruders impelled him to a step somewhere between the irritable "don't bother me" and the baffling inaccessibility of the schizophrenic. While this wall is not that of introversion, it must be obvious that the two mechanisms are at times hard to distinguish.

wrong statements. I have rather purposely left untouched the things that he and I must work out in the future.

The psychoanalysts have very much interested themselves in this delimitation of the individual, but have thought that in this process the primary step was the removal of the environment from the child rather than, as in our conception, the child's separation of himself from all that surrounds him. Thus to them "primary narcissism" is a growing preoccupation with oneself because mother, food, objects of one sort or another show themselves as detachable from what to begin with is an ego that comprises everything in the child's world. We think that if the analysts were not so complacently oblivious to the mechanics of the "latent period" they would have seen in the bristling strength of this wall of fear the result of a much more active process from the child's point of view than anything which they postulate in their conception of primary narcissism.

If this wall is built by fear it should largely disappear in certain situations and this is precisely what it does. The best example is what occurs in chance meeting (as on train or boat) with persons whom one has never seen and will not see again. On such occasions one tells stories, confidences, such as cannot be told to those who will continue in one's life. One of the important reasons for the psychiatrist's ability to assist in situations is that individuals can afford to talk with an "outsider." One may make the generalization that (within the limits of variation in the ability of people to elicit confidences) the "melting" of this protective wall is in direct proportion to the extent to which its owner feels that the confidences so divulged "cannot be used against him."

One of the most interesting and important questions raised by this phenomenon relates to the characteristics of those individuals who "invite confidences." What manner of person seems so naturally to show that it is "safe to talk with him"? Almost every small community has one or two such persons,

and there is no worthy study of their general characteristics. At least they combine a certain taciturnity that implies that information will not be passed on to others with an indefinable implied assurance that no information will be sought beyond that freely given. Let one of these persons but once press his interest to a point of seeking the hidden corners and the wall of protection immediately forms again.

There are certain other conditions under which this status-preserving mechanism disappears. We illustrated above "voluntary" changes in the wall as the individual feels himself safe in relaxing its vigilance. But there are situations in which the ego as a limited, defined affair seems to disappear. Literature contains many references to individuals as feeling (in certain situations) in "perfect communion" with others. This is often followed by "though not a word was said," though we would suspect that the more correct statement is "because not a word was said."¹² These situations involve practically complete muscular relaxation or vigorous, intense activity. In both instances the individuals are lost in an enveloping situation. One gets the same melting of the walls of individuality in large groups in the presence of great music. If speech is introduced into any of these situations, individuality immediately reappears. The soldier marching with large groups similarly clad feels these walls of individuality disappear. They also disappear for a short period in a mutually satisfactory sexual experience and one is tempted to guess that one of the principal factors of satisfaction in this experience is precisely the recognition that here, for at least a period, the eternal vigilance in the protection of the inviolability of the self may be relaxed. (The entire question of the necessary construction of a status-preserving mechanism by both partners of a suc-

¹² The reader may find our discussion of communication through the psycho-motor tensions (Chapter I, pages 19 ff.) enlightening here.

cessful marriage, its disappearance at these periods of intimacy, and the method and speed of its rebuilding remains an unknown field in spite of its high importance in the whole matter of the success of marital ventures.)

But in most situations we pass through life protecting our every side against the unwarranted intruder. We strengthen our defenses as the pressure becomes menacing or as we face inner problems and perplexities which threaten to make us more vulnerable. As a child's problem is unfolded at the clinic the parent or teacher so frequently exclaims, "Why, she's never said a word about that!" Obviously, we say the least about those things which worry us the most. We say the least to those whom we see the most.

These walls, which are everything from the first shy reserve of the child to the rigid catatonic negativism of schizophrenia, are necessary and only become abnormal when they are too high, too thick, and too inflexible. Here it is not the wall which so troubles the psychiatrist as it is the fear that it so clearly connotes.

In rural areas where people live far apart, one's income, the cost of one's house, who holds the mortgage, when the interest is due, every sort of problem of family relationship—all these affairs are matters of common knowledge and interest. The mere factor of distance between people seems to make this diffusion of knowledge possible. As we come through the small town (where gossip, riding high, serves as an intermediary step) to a typical suburban area the whole picture changes. Between the best of friends there are large sectors of life which are forever guarded. Either one asks no questions or he expects incorrect answers. As though this load were too great, an intricate impersonal symbolic system has been developed whereby one's position is established. The make of one's car,

the number of servants, the house number and street—all these announce what the family itself wishes to be known, and he is indeed naïve who would ask what real happiness or success lies behind these bold signs of mental and physical affluence. The world has long known large cities, but never before probably has an essentially rural people been so rapidly transferred on so large a scale to an urban situation in which proximity invites the development of friendship at the moment that it demands the walls that fear must build.

In apartment life one sees the situation even more markedly. Here families live, separated by a few inches of wall, with an intimacy tie that does not go beyond a casual greeting. It is as though, if people are practically on top of you, not the slightest of opportunities for exploitation can be allowed. These denizens of apartments have circles of friends, but to a large extent these are not chosen from among the persons who live in close proximity. The complete isolation and loneliness of an individual in a city such as New York is well known in literature and case history, but in the city there is no necessity of hiding the situation, no shame-faced wonderment as to why one cannot be more openly intimate with the nearby family. The walls are, as it were, taken for granted and while they are more defining and limiting than in the suburban area, it is this very emphasis which leads to a general, tacit acceptance of the situation by all. Thus, though the walls are more complete in the large city, they are perhaps most noticeable in suburban areas.

Urbanization unquestionably implies the close proximity of persons with the thickening and strengthening of the barriers against intimacy ties, and office and factory employment seem (on the basis of our material) to intensify this situation. Perhaps the psychiatric assumption that the fear that these walls connote is individually an unhealthy trait or character

is an error. But if it is correct, and if these social forces of rapid urbanization are forever increasing it, we are presented with a grave problem leading to an early and serious human breakdown unless compensating ways of avoiding the traumatic consequences can be found.

PROCESS OF INTEGRATION AND THE TREND TO SPECIALIZATION

Earlier (Chapter IV) we discussed the existence of parts of the personality and the degree to which it was possible for the individual to differentiate these parts. This ability we called objectivity and we recognized it as a function or trait of the personality which varied in degree from individual to individual. In this chapter we shall not discuss this recognition by the individual of his own complexity and of the relation of the parts of his personality to each other, which seems to us a matter of intrapersonal adjustment, but the integration of the personality in the sense of its relation to society. There are two ways in which integration in this sense may be considered.

First, one may consider the need to develop the wholeness, as it were, of the personality—such a completeness that though the structure is built among others it is so strong that the disappearance of other structures will not mean its downfall. This may be called emotional maturity and the process by which it is attained is one of weaning. There are a large number of adults who have never achieved it—in fact, the prevalence of emotional immaturity has been said to be one of our outstanding national problems. In our work in Essex County we have *not* come to feel that this immaturity is in any appreciable way affected by population-concentration. Life so interweaves its forces that some relationship between the two tendencies might be constructed, but at present this would re-

quire too carefully balanced a sophistry. During the rest of this section on integration we are not considering integration as this development of wholeness in the sense of maturity. (We will return to a special phase of this question in Chapter VIII where the effect of crowding on integration—mental strain—is discussed. We do not feel that the considerations of that chapter markedly affect the generalization made here as to metropolitan areas.)

The second approach to the problem of integrating the personality to the environment focuses on the task of evolving a workable bundling of one's "different personalities." The matter under discussion here is one of an identification of various parts of the individual's whole experience with divergent social experiences and groupings of experiences. Thus even what we have termed the single mind (the peasant type) we have often seen split up into parts in this social sense.

As a preliminary to this social living, there is a series of definite intrapersonal experiences which have for the person the picture of being social in origin. These are important because they give a preparation for the split which will take place as the individual adjusts to the social pattern. For example, there comes a time when a person recognizes himself as a number of rather loosely federated selves. Just when or how this occurs is open to question, though there is a theory that the child is quite young when he begins to recognize within himself a "good boy" and a "bad boy." Certainly by adolescence there is a definite recognition of oneself as a composite. Thus, in surprise, the adolescent says "But I seem to be such different people when I'm in different groups." (Younger delinquents frequently say "I couldn't help doing it—something seemed to make me" but we have become sure that this has the same wobbly factual basis and the same appeal to sympathy as the earlier criminals' plea that "drink did

it.") At least from adolescence on the individual has the problem of striking a balance between too rigid a federation of a number of sources of enrichment and a looseness that means that he "never knows what to do" about a problem. There must be enough separation of the personalities to mean that he can say "When I made such and such a decision, I was a fool" without meaning any more than that a penitent, subordinate "I" was foolish; yet he must be able to address himself to some new task in full assurance that the "I" who is to do this contains no traitors or laggards. It is difficult to assume an "I" that overlords the other and lesser "I's," without bringing in a metaphysical concept quite beyond the area of careful check. Yet such a postulation has been made—and it gives a picture that for one's own life seems to have reality.

Perhaps nothing has so claimed the psychiatrist's interest as the integration of the personality. His most hopeless psychoses involve a disintegration and, down to the least deviation from the accepted forms of conduct and adjustment, he feels that the first necessity is to deal with a patient as an entity rather than in parts. This interest he has urged on at least three different levels.

The first is that of professional attention. The psychiatrist has taken a leading part in urging such training for those who deal with individuals as will insure that they look upon their clients and patients as total, integrated, operating persons. Perhaps because we really know very little about him, we point with pride to the old family doctor who, we assure others, saw people as individuals. We decry the specialization that has so completely taken people apart that it has lost the ability to reassemble them. The interest of psychiatry in modern medical training has not been to make available more information as to mental disorders but to emphasize that the patient is an individual with this or that organ which is affect-

ing (and being affected by) the total individual. Similarly in the field of social work the interest of psychiatry has been to display the client as a total personality trying to solve certain problems. One thinks of Stevenson's finding that as high as 50 per cent of those whose "principal complaint" at an outpatient clinic was some gastro-intestinal difficulty were really showing only the expected, natural, superficial symptoms of failure to work out some deeper personality disorder.¹³ The psychiatrist has long claimed that among those chronically ill who wander from doctor to doctor a large fraction are in reality searching for the solution of some problem in life adjustment. And he has decried the specialist's crude infliction of scars of fear, dread, and inferiority in his interest in carrying through some dazzling bit of surgery or other magnificent technical procedure upon merely a part of the body.

At the second level, with similar persistence, the psychiatrist has pressed his interest in the integration of the patient. He speaks of the whole personality and of the damaging effect when parts war one on the other. In such a process as schizophrenia there is a splitting; we are not quite sure where the split occurs but are ready to insist upon the malignancy of the fact of the split. The child guidance clinics have taken the child pretty well apart as their staff members have followed their own specialties but the process always ends with the psychiatrist's magical integration of the whole picture. In dealing with the patient the psychiatrist addresses himself to a sort of master ego who is to bring the others into effective collaboration.

And finally the psychiatrist stresses integration of the patient's goals and aims. The more recent psychoanalytic pro-

¹³ George S. Stevenson, Why Patients Consult the Gastro-Enterologist; Motive and Attitude of One Hundred and Fifty Patients, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 94, p. 333, February 1, 1930.

cedures analyze only to synthesize, to enable the patient to integrate about more effective goals, or to bring some part of his personality into better consonance with the goal already established. In child guidance work one of the important problems with the adolescent is that of helping him bring his tumbling, tossing "parts" into some sort of effective consonance.

In view of this very definite goal of modern psychiatry (a goal built on the assumption that well people should be those who do not have what sick people have) the developments in a modern metropolitan area are of special interest.

One goes back for comparison to the period preceding the industrial revolution, when the child's life was centered about one social institution and was markedly circumscribed geographically. Growing up in a clan rather than in our present "small" family, he found his emotional needs of belongingness or security cared for by his group. As he grew to the point at which the role of his parents in certain respects was taken over by the Church, he scarcely left the family. Family prayers, the saying of grace at the table, the fact that the family as a group went to church—all these managed to tie his religious life into what he already knew. His schooling was brief and was entirely a family matter—being an apprenticeship under his father, under some other relative, or with some friend of the family. His schooling completed, his earning life to a great extent did not take him out of the family group. It is true that this was not the case with the relatively small commercial and professional groups. However, earning, learning, and *feeling* (for the great army of producers) were confined within the physical and mental boundaries of the family group. The moral training of the child was cared for either by the family or—if by the church—again in the closest of ties with the family group. The play life of the child was nec-

essarily either with the family group or with those it knew well. Not only did the Family as an institution accept and claim these functions of representing the strongly magnetic core of the individual's life but, too, the very difficulty and slowness of transportation forced a definite geographical limitation upon the child's roaming range. And the same things could be said for the adult.

Due to lack of refrigeration and transportation the child saw the major part of his food from the earliest point of its production until it came upon the table. His clothes, under his very eye, moved from the growing of the raw product to his back. Because steam had not yet forced urbanization and because urbanization had not yet demanded specialization, he saw the whole circle of life. Even birth and death occurred at his home. What all this meant to people, what it did to them for good or for evil, we will never know—but at least the milieu in which they lived was an integrated one, one in which each of the parts of life worked to its solution on common ground with all the rest of life.

And what was true of the environment was apparently also true of the individual. His daydreams may have carried him to the ends of the earth but in actual life he could scarcely escape the pressure of a neighborhood situation that looked upon him as a unit operating mechanism. Moreover each individual acquired at birth the outstanding traits and attributes of his family group. The son of the village ne'er-do-well might as well play the part as he could change it only by escape; the child of the village factotum—here again was a member-role that wove itself into his integer and would not be shaken off.

The situation in which child or adult finds himself today is, at each of these levels, distinctly different. The psychiatrist may continue to stress integration and synthesis but how easy

of accomplishment is this when every social force seems to be towards analysis of the personality?

The family has altered both its mental and physical aspects. It still apparently meets the belongingness needs of the child—giving him that place-in-the-scheme-of-things which he so basically craves. However, it has largely lost its earlier tie with the Church. Family prayers have well-nigh disappeared and studies that have been made indicate that other informal ceremonies, such as the saying of grace at mealtime, are rapidly diminishing. The automobile has apparently increased the ability of the country family to attend church as a family group but in the city this same ease of transportation and the high specialization into which the churches have gone¹⁴ have operated towards breaking the family group in church-going. Play life has been separated by a number of factors from the family. Special playgrounds with able instructors draw the child and, as he grows older, the automobile beckons him to points beyond family knowledge or control of what he does. Commercialized recreation even if it happens to be physically near the child's home presents a content which is beyond the control of (and perhaps even foreign to) the family goals or aims. Everywhere character-building agencies have sprung up and to them is parceled another aspect of the child's life. The school has taken over the learning aspects—and with passing years claims more of the child's time and a larger share of those fields of training which were earlier the family's. Earning, of course, was practically the first activity to leave the family arena so that now with the exception of the small-farm group the family is entirely split apart for its earning life.

Two factors have played their part in this process of disintegration; they interlock but should be seen as distinct. One of these was the discovery of the possibilities of steam as a mo-

¹⁴ See page 136.

tive power. This brought about the dispersion of the functions of the family—a revolutionary change in what had been the geographical as well as the spiritual nucleus of the child's life. The other (obviously related) was the marked increase in speed and ease of transportation—a factor without which it would have been extremely difficult for this dispersion to take place. We separate the two factors because (in Chapter VI) we shall see the possibility that one of them may soon be reversed while the other will apparently continue to operate.

We were first struck with this phenomenon of disintegration in dealing with late adolescent children who seemed to us to be in various difficulties (this we thought peculiarly true in the sexual field) because of inadequate emotional outlets in their work adjustments. Since that time there has seemed to be adequate evidence that our girls and boys in factory jobs are spending hours in monotonous efforts at good production, with a compensatory rush during the few free hours of recreation "to make up for lost time." Everything seems to point towards the workers' freedom to engage in phantasy during the work period and we have made a few attempts to get at its nature. We haven't enough data to report though obviously it is a matter of the highest importance that industrial executives know whether this phantasy life by any chance whips up incentive for sexual activities of various sorts during off-work hours, to what extent and how it is affected by free conversation during work, and in what way it is affected by mingling the sexes during the working period.

The best picture we have of this terrific specialization in industry came one day from a feeble-minded girl of eighteen. Despite her having just finished six months' employment at a punch press, all her ten fingers were intact. "Edna," I said, "I see that you have all your fingers. I can't believe that you put in six months on a punch press." "Yes, I did, Doctor, it's only

them that thinks that loses their fingers." Satisfaction in the actual work at hand is reduced to a minimum. The incentive to a task well done is not the beauty of the product nor its operation but rather that it pass the check of the inspector. This phenomenon of the use of work to earn money so that one may buy satisfaction is apparently new over the last one hundred years—necessitating, and being necessitated by, the almost exclusive emphasis upon production during the working hours.

Nor is specialization in play any the less organized and intense. Every modern school is organized to get the very best out of each play moment. Local directors are backed by national organizations. The playgrounds are similarly organized in the more "socially minded" communities. Public and private finance both have huge stakes in the recreation programs and vie with each other to make the time spent in play as intensely organized and zealously guarded against intrusion as the time spent in work.

If those who steward the earning activities of the great mass of producers have squeezed man's work dry of emotional satisfaction, they have done an even more efficient job in reducing learning needs to a minimum. Machinery has well-nigh destroyed the security which the producer earlier had because of his specialized knowledge. This has placed a new task upon the School, which knew its job well when it was preparing largely for the professions. Then the School could give just the academic training which was wanted but now it is hard put to it to handle the great group that will be producers in factories where the processes are rapidly learned and imply no special skill. Not that the School has any the less avidly tried to specialize its own function. It has set out with missionary zeal to save the child from the blandishments of any of the other groups. It fears that the Church will indoctrinate, that

Industry will exploit, that the zealous overprotection of the parent will make him the child's worst and subtlest enemy.

One speaks less certainly as to the Church. Specialization within its own ranks has undoubtedly occurred (so that pastoral, preaching, and educational branches are more and more in the hands of specialists): there has also been a definite withdrawal from formal control in the School and the Family. Our own impression is that this specialization has not been followed by the citizenry—that in the sense that Industry, the School, organized Recreation, and the Family are ministering all too effectively in a limited field, the Church is apparently not filling a specialized need for a large fraction of persons. Whether this is a correct view or whether the clinic comes in contact only with those who depend to a minor degree upon the ministrations of the Church is an important question for which we do not have the answer.

The psychiatrist seeks synthesis in an analytical world. He preaches integration when his social workers are making three distinct and separate adjustments for each client, that is, three beyond the fundamental family adjustment at home—one to earning some money, one to learning more things, and one to having some fun. Why must we go on advertising the benefits of an integrated ego when the whole social experience of the individual is of disintegration? Edna wasn't a very prepossessing bit of humanity as far as the psychiatrist in his own field could see her. To his theory it is a bit jostling to realize that a normal Edna, one who felt and thought through her full day, would be an Edna with crippled fingers.

There is another way in which this analyzing process with its high specialization is going on. In the development of the movies and radio we have been taking people apart with a vengeance. Until the introduction of the talkies, the movies were doing an outstanding piece of analysis by extracting out

of the lives of people only that part which could be seen. In similar fashion we are specializing over the radio in what can be heard. This form of specialization (that is, that considered in this paragraph) cuts through the "material" in a different way from the specialization involved in the various institutional adjustments. In the movies there was not so much the narrowing of life to one sensory approach as there was the effort to widen that one sensory approach to include all of life. Similarly there are the interesting efforts over the radio to widen the scope of the single sensory approach to take in the whole of life. One thinks here perhaps particularly of some outstanding description of athletic events or of great and solemn spectacles.

There is further the specialization in athletics and probably in certain vocational pursuits. Machinery has managed, as mentioned above, to reduce the need for special technical training so that in the industrial field there are fewer examples than there are in the field of recreation. In the latter, however, all the way from the preparatory school to the most highly organized athletic events there is this tendency to specialize the parts of the individual. Swimming, rowing, baseball, and track events seek, and develop, types to meet their special needs. To what extent job analysis and vocational guidance can enforce this same specialization in industry no one knows but it is significant that the trend is strongly along analytical and high-specialization lines.

In one other way the need of, the effort towards, integration is threatened in the pattern in which our patients live. The radio and other agencies to a less degree manage to bring to individuals two different and clashing patterns with an insistent demand for loyalty to each.¹⁵ What happens as the housewife in cheery fashion sets about the duties of the day

¹⁵ See page 119 for a fuller discussion of this point.

and, continuing these, "turns on" the radio to hear the majestic, awe-inspiring funeral ceremonies for King Albert? Is there now unity through adding solemnity to the flicking of the dust rag, a stately cadence as the vacuum cleaner moves across the floor; or is there unity through the development of just a sort of symbolic reverence which but plays at the majestic reality of those things which for centuries have been the deepest of human experiences; or is there, indeed, an unabated struggle which never clearly claims the opportunistic loyalty of the individual?

Perhaps the psychiatric assumption that integration is needful is in error. If not, these various threats to the integration of the personality represent individually an unhealthy trait or tendency, and if these social forces of increasing urbanization are forever fostering them, we are presented with a grave problem, predicting early and serious human breakdown, unless compensating ways of attaining this necessity can be found.

THE FAMILY PATTERN IN RELATION TO SOCIAL FORCES OF DISINTEGRATION

In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed four needs of the personality, the satisfaction of which all psychiatric groups today seem to agree are important to mental health, and have shown how each is threatened by the pressure of certain social forces in the environment. This would seem either to present a serious problem or to point to a reconsideration of current psychiatric theory with regard to mental health. The apparent trend to disintegration which is today present in the family is a further challenge to psychiatric theory, since nearly all modern psychiatric formulations derive significance from the existence of the family pattern. Those

who still follow the Kraepelinian approach are intensely interested in it for what it means of physical heredity. Family histories are admittedly pretty largely on an actuarial basis, that is, they provide the material regarding sicknesses and length of life that life insurance companies want. But they are religiously taken and squeezed for what they mean (and more). And those who have to any degree been touched by psychoanalytic formulations are equally interested in the family pattern. What small fraction of dynamic psychology would today survive the disappearance of all that it has built upon parent-child relationships, regressions to earlier comfortable family situations, and sibling rivalry? These experiences are so fundamentally a part of the individual's make-up according to modern psychiatric theory that every later adjustment is seen as but the working out of the elements of the early family drama. The teacher is seen as a mother-substitute and the problems of school adjustment are seen in terms of the patterns which the child has established in his own family group. The religious patterns are seen in the same light—the concepts of God as the Father and of the brotherhood of man beautifully fitting themselves into his formulation. Similarly the psychiatrist sees in the industrial problems of individuals the trouble that they are having in finding analogues in industry for the family pattern.

So one might go on, seeing in every aspect of adjustment an attempt to work through those problems engendered in the early family years—and this the psychiatrist has done. Moreover, because he has dealt largely with pathology he has stressed the inhibiting, confining, hampering aspects of these family adjustments. Life, says he, is forever a struggle to rid oneself of the fetters of this earlier comfortable dependence—fetters that will not be loosed no matter how hard we try.

In the face of this simple if somewhat parochial interpreta-

tion of all the problems of life adjustment, the situation presenting itself in our area has considerably confused the issues of psychiatric theory. Because here, we think, certain apparently mechanical social forces are operating to destroy the family pattern as it is classically known. And we are unable to accept the theory that the actual disintegration of the family pattern can be seen only as the result of the individual's desire to break that pattern.

The "absentee" father first drew our attention. He is offered a wide variety of possibilities as to character of dwelling but if he is interested (for his family) in living conditions that have trees and some space about a single house or attractive apartment he is forced to settle at best at a point requiring an hour and a quarter of travel each way to work in New York City. When this is added to the father's working hours in the city, evidently he must be out of the home for the major part of the day. The morning hours before going to work are no time for the development of the intimacy ties which are so peculiarly the family's. At the time of the father's return the children under six are in bed or should be there. In neither of these latter situations is the father in a strategic position for the development of friendship or influence. We are stressing the point that the mechanical factor of distance is affecting the family pattern—not only to give implications which differ from those so stressed in the formulations of dynamic psychology but also to show these changes as being brought about by factors quite beyond the individual's control. We sampled two large suburban sections of our area (using the fathers of all of the children in different schools) and found that slightly over 78 per cent of these men worked in New York City. The problem is thus of some magnitude.

This leaves the week-ends and the summer vacations for the father's integration (for good or for evil) into the lives of

his children. It has been difficult to gather exact data as to these periods but our experience at the clinic has long since taught us that office and traveling hours far from complete the demands of business affairs upon the father. We recall, with some rather uncomfortable twinges, our earlier naïveté in asking that Saturday and Sunday be given over to getting acquainted with the family. Golf and other forms of "recreation" appeared under this pressure to be really necessary to business contacts and developments.

It has been suggested that this situation is sought by the family in a wilful effort at bringing about just the break that is produced—that if the father's work keeps him out of the home, it is because only by such a brusque escape can he deal with the problems he finds there—but we have found it increasingly difficult to see the matter in this way. We would find it difficult, as we discuss these problems with them, to accept the thesis that the fathers "plan" to be out of the home. We get the very sincere impression that, had they their own way, they would see considerably more of their families than they do—but that they feel themselves presented with the problem of balancing advantages in which the income (present and future) and healthy living conditions must play their part. During the Depression (which has much increased the father's time in the home—and in a frame of mind hardly conducive to calm training of children) there has been throughout Essex County a decrease in delinquency, truancy, and school misdemeanors—a decrease in all the social indices we have of the upset child. Certainly these indices of family maladjustment would have sharply risen if, in addition to the other problems of the Depression, the father had been so unwillingly the companion of his family.

The growing extent to which the mother is out of the home seems at present to be based upon different considerations.

There is increasing employment of women but the number of employed women over twenty-five years of age is relatively small. That is, there appear not to be the same mechanical factors of necessity that play their part in the father's adjustment. We should like some measure of the extent to which the mother's extramural activities are necessitated by social contacts demanded by the father's business relationships. It is, however, our general impression (from our own cases, that is) that up to the present time the mother's time out of the home has been dependent quite largely upon choice. With less time required for the mechanics of living, and with easy transportation, she is seeking to widen the interests and vision of her group (a problem all the more impressed upon her by the father's narrowing vision in his specialized task).

Nor are the encroachments of other institutions on family life any less urgent so far as the children are concerned. Through extramural programs the schools can occupy the child's time until well on into the evening—and character-building organizations and recreational groups press their claims as soon as the school's time is over. Formal and informal groups which earlier claimed the six-year-old now universally take the child at five and are, in many instances, ready for him at four. Meantime preschool groups are steadily pressing their claims for those still younger.

And what of the psychiatrist? Is he to build an even more impressive structure upon something which is vanishing into thin air? As the family in the sense in which we have known it is rapidly disappearing, is he to go on stressing its importance in the determination of all the adjustments of individuals?

If the formulations of modern psychiatry are dependent upon the theory that the child's adjustment is the response to the interplay of family relationships and if these social forces

of increasing urbanization are increasingly dismembering the family, we are presented with the serious problem that the most intimate and fundamental of the child's needs cannot be satisfied or that the psychiatric formulation as to the importance of the family pattern is in error.

The classical psychiatric approach—preoccupied with the structure of the individual *in vacuo*—thus seems to us inadequate to a situation facing frankly the sociological forces (as illustrated in this chapter in the problems in an urban area). This approach, rigidly adhered to, would predict nothing but rapid and widespread mental breakdown throughout our area. Possibly this will occur but our experience to date does not indicate that. We are suspicious that psychiatric theory demands considerable reformulation after it has had a much more extensive experience with individuals actually adjusting in a certain milieu. As long as we center our interest in hospitals—and will study our patients at ten, twenty, or hundreds of miles away from their actual homes, psychiatric theory must suffer from a certain parochial sort of individualism that quite lacks in realism.

CHAPTER SIX

Results of the Conflict between Personality Needs and Environmental Pressures

WE HAVE seen that security, extraversion, the inviolability of the self, personal integration, and the family matrix—all thought to be essential to healthy individual development, according to current psychiatric theory—are threatened by the cultural pattern which we have observed in Essex County. There are three ways of interpreting these findings. First, that the formulations of the psychiatrist are in essence correct and that, barring some accidental change, we are to be caught in a rising tide of mental disease and maladjustment. Second, that the psychiatric generalizations are as yet insufficiently correlated with the total life situations of individuals, so that a lugubrious prognosis is not valid. Third, that the data and the generalizations are correct but that certain compensatory mechanisms are being developed. The consideration of these possibilities occupies the three sections of this chapter.

INCREASING MALADJUSTMENT

If the psychiatric principles presented in the last chapter are correct, it has seemed that with the further development of metropolitan areas we might look for a rapid rise in the number of maladjusted individuals. Many hold this view—indeed, before our present preoccupation with financial matters there was a widespread belief that the pace at which we were living and the increasing complexity of our social problems were causing a rapid increase in the number of the in-

sane. Though there is always the problem whether the increase is actual or only a reflection of our increasing awareness, Pollock's New York State figures, at least, indicate a slight actual increase.¹ The problem is complicated by the fact that the number of insane in any area has an odd way of closely approximating the available beds for mental patients in that area. As to an increase in the neuroses there is even more difficulty in separating actual increase from increasing awareness on our part.

Even if there has been an actual increase in mental disorder over the last generation it has not been so great as would have been expected if the disintegrating factors were as devastating as they seem. There is an answer ready for this—that the eroding effects of the difficulties discussed in Chapter V are “delayed” in producing results so that we are not to expect the full force of this wave until later. There are two reasons for guessing, at least, that this is not a valid answer. As there is no sharp line of demarcation between those who are “insane” and those who are not, any community normally contains a group of individuals who are “almost over the line,” and any increased difficulty (even one with theoretically “delayed” results) ought to show an increase in the psychotics in this group. The second is our suspicion that the postulation of “delay” in action of forces is an *ad hoc* explanation of dubious sincerity. Among those of us who are involved in social engineering there is a rather dangerous tendency towards a routine sequence: positive prediction, then a failure of the data to meet that prediction, and then a retreat to the assurance that (far from our being wrong) the situation we predicted will arrive in due course of time.

There is a definite history of rhythms in cultural patterns

¹ Horatio M. Pollock, *The Future of Mental Disease from a Statistical Viewpoint*, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 3, p. 423, January 1924; also in *State Hospital Quarterly*, vol. 9, p. 197, February 1924.

and those who predict that we are to be overcome by the increasing weight of our maladjusted groups have that much historical justification for their apprehensions. They may also claim that the non-appearance of final decay may be due to two compensating forces of real significance.

There are first those discoveries of modern science which are meant to counterbalance the possible detrimental effects of metropolitan or urban living. The Milbank Fund study demonstrated that the health of city children is better than that of their rural cousins—not because there are inherent advantages in city air or city crowding but because services in preventive medicine are constantly at work to care for the slightest danger signals of ill health.² This and similar studies, however, have dealt with physical factors. It would seem to the psychiatrist that (without in any sense denying the importance of good physique) persons could be quite free from diphtheria, rickets, malnourishment, and so on, and yet not be healthy from the point of view of effective citizenship.

The second explanation of the delay in our crumbling is based on the steady influx of rural individuals to our metropolitan areas. Such a migration is still in progress (except for a slight reversal during the Depression). It should represent a stream of mental health for two reasons. The first is that rural living—as the last chapter implies—does apparently provide for us a more complete and satisfactory meeting of our mental needs than does city living. The second is that the stream coming from rural areas into our metropolitan districts represents a group highly selected as to ability and general stability. There are, it is true, other factors at work but a persistent tendency for the more venturesome, the more

² *Ten Years at Bellevue-Yorkville*, New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1934; John A. Kingsbury, Cattaraugus County and our Rural Health, *The American Review of Reviews*, vol. 75, p. 415, April 1927.

able, to move towards city life is an outstanding characteristic of this movement. (Similarly in the immigrant groups there are factors of strength in the decision to transplant oneself and one's family thousands of miles for a new venture—factors which again represent a steady stream of invigoration into our urban population.)

At this point we leave the matter. We personally do not look upon the data of the previous chapter with any alarm. Still in this section we have stated what cannot today be disproven, namely: (1) that there is evidence of increasing maladjustment in our cultural pattern and (2) that, assuming that the present trends towards specialization and population-concentration persist, this maladjustment will increase by leaps and bounds at such a time as there fails us (a) the ability through invention and discovery to erect compensating protectors of health and (b) the present essentially "healthy" stream of individuals moving into the city from rural areas and from abroad.

REVALUATION OF PSYCHIATRIC FINDINGS

The discussion in the previous chapter was oriented to a classically psychiatric approach. Without impugning the generalizations there set forth, one may suggest the possibility that they are inadequate because of the psychiatrist's lack of sensitization to the major problems involved. The individual in the general social stream and the individual in a mental hospital are admittedly the same to the extent that each is at any moment the product of the interaction between his environment and his personality up to that moment. There are, however, two important differences between them. In the mental hospital the environment is to a great extent con-

trolled by the psychiatrist. A second difference (less understood in its extent and implications) is that in the mental patient the customary balance between the cultural pattern and the personality is distorted by the insistence and driving power of the elements of the psychosis.

If these factors make it difficult for the psychiatrist to orient his observations to the problems of persons in the general social stream so does also his entire training. Only recently has even the slightest importance been attached to sociological content in psychiatric training. Perhaps the physician can never really afford to see his patient with anything other than individual attention. As long as the psychiatrist remained within the mental hospital he could comfortably carry this view over into the mental needs of his clientèle. As he moved out he held, in many instances, the same view—changing the home, changing the school, finding the teacher, demanding the curriculum that in each case would fit the needs of the patient. Where communities were unready to meet this philosophy he announced that they were not cooperating to the extent that permitted him to work satisfactorily. This view was impractical because few complex urban set-ups are ready or able to fit their pressing needs to so rampant an individualism. And this view was theoretically wrong because individuals live in, form, and are formed by the environments about them. In this light alone can they be seen with any realism.

An intriguing analogy seems to carry through its parallel to many of the problems involved here. Dean Pound has shown the extent to which the legal problems of today are dependent upon something of this same difficulty.³ The administrative structure of the law under which we operate was rather

³ Roscoe Pound, *Science and Legal Procedure*, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 8, p. 33, July 1928.

admirably fitted to the problems of pioneer (highly individualistic) conditions. It had, it is true, been brought from the parent countries but there were efficient adaptations. In meeting new conditions the law has been slow to change—always attempting to stretch and patch the old pioneer pattern as new conditions arose. Apparently precisely this thing has occurred in the psychiatric field. We, too, have been a group developing our theory largely on material severely individualized. Most of us, going into community work, have had this training—a training that failed to teach us about the social stream and its forces, a training which prevented our seeing individuals actually operating in a natural milieu.

We are in no position to say that the highly individualistic philosophy of the psychiatrist is in error; we cannot controvert the magnificent psychiatric claims to a new light and a new road to the solution of social problems; even the statement of psychiatrists to jurists that there has now risen a discipline that will sweep away the ignorance and inefficiency of legal modes of dealing with individuals, may be correct. It has been our own experience (which in a brief way we are recapitulating in this volume) that the individual operating in the general social stream presents a problem entirely different from that of the individual in the mental hospital or even that of the individual in the psychiatric clinic. But this volume does not pretend to go beyond the statement that when psychiatric study is carried on at the playground, in the home, and in the schoolroom, there is real likelihood that revision of psychiatric theory will be begun.

COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS

It is possible, finally, to believe that the psychiatrist is right in the assumptions reviewed in the previous chapter, but that

in the light of actual social living the final meanings and importance of these considerations will undergo revision. In the rest of this chapter we shall try to suggest the direction of these possible revisions—purely by way of illustration, since the limitations of our training and approach operate to curtail the validity of our conclusions.

There is then a possible third answer to the questions raised in Chapter V. This is not offered in contradiction of the first two answers, already given—in fact, the psychiatrist may be correct in the direst of his predictions and perhaps it has been only the limitations of his discipline that have prevented his recognizing that (in answer to present difficulties) certain compensatory mechanisms are developing.

New bases for security

Accepting the statement that each individual must have a feeling of belongingness—a security which gives him a place because of who he is—and assuming that this feeling has been very largely provided by the Family for countless generations, one may at least question whether some other social institution might not assume the burden. Nor is this an idle speculation in view of the fact that the Family in our culture is going through more rapid and fundamental changes than has perhaps ever been its lot before.

The psychoanalytic groups have addressed themselves in considerable measure precisely to this question. Through a growing realization of the vastness and importance of one's unconscious there may develop an entirely new concept of one's place in the scheme of things. Instead now of depending for place on an institution or even on a personal relationship, the individual gets an ever clearer picture of the parade of his own past and of his part in that pageant. Security now does not depend upon the extent to which one can fit into the

existing social institutions but is the matter of the degree of serenity and confidence with which one can rid oneself of a fettering dependence upon that which is the environment.

Nor is this sort of security to be tied merely to the past. It may be argued, in all good reason, that one of the main reasons for man's search for this security has been his feeling of helplessness in the face of the forces of social conservatism or change. This feeling has, if anything, been intensified in our own generation as the schools have sedulously indoctrinated the child with the sacredness and immutability of our established social institutions. If an education were to appear that taught the child that the future is in his own hands, that he by his own life molds quite as much as he accepts molding—then, again, there would come a security in the living out of one's dreams and goals that would withstand every buffet of apparent defeat at the hands of mere institutional shells that now seem so immune to change.⁴ Perhaps the fact that the Christian philosophy after two thousand years still finds a great number unable to see this challenge and obtain security in it, means that the picture here of security in the rightness, sincerity, and wholeness of one's own life is not a practical goal—but it remains a theoretical possibility.

To the development of this individual sort of security there seem to be two objections of more than passing validity. The integrated and dynamic formulation of this philosophy can scarcely be thought of as occurring in those tender years when we suspect that the cuddling of the mother does what words would quite fail to do. One questions whether any institution other than the Family (in our western cultural patterns) can give during the first two years the fundamental physical feeling of belongingness and safety which the mother

⁴ See Chapter XVIII for further development of the idea of education for change.

now gives to the child. True, many mothers fail in this duty today and where they do give security there is mounting evidence that the child carries through life the image of the problems of the giver even more than he does the thing given—in short, that the hazards involved in entrusting the satisfaction of the basic emotional needs of the child to personal agents are at entirely too great a price. The second objection rests on the fact that we are social beings and that a security which rests solely on the assurance that one is living out one's own destiny as it determines itself is too individualistic for a society as complex as our own. This objection would have validity were it not for precisely the assumption with which it starts. We are social beings, and have been so for a long time. Indeed, from way beyond the limits of history there has been going on a selective heredity for socialization. Individualism of the sort set forth in these paragraphs would in no sense be chaos. The need to live with others is, by now, too much rooted in us—and the need to have from our service to others an answer to our everlasting search for belongingness in the general scheme of things.

Another answer to the problem of the attainment of security is in marked distinction to that of the psychoanalytic group. Cannot the security-giving function be transferred over to other institutions, perhaps more "stable" than the Family?

This possibility cannot be denied. In a caste system the place of the individual is much more definitely given by his caste than it is by his own "small family." Nor does one need to go to India to find this situation. The same sort of thing, to a much smaller degree, can be seen here and there in the South where family name carries a very real "security load." It is at least possible for individuals to build up a belonging-

ness device which transcends the confines of the immediate family.

In rather groping ways precisely this thing has been developing in this country. If the illustrative material seems vague it is perhaps because of the tentative character of the trends so far. We are referring to the widespread tendency during the last generation towards paternalism in our industrial and political institutions. "Rugged individualism" may struggle stubbornly but can scarcely deny the socialization of security first in Industry and then, as Industry more recently has shown its inability (or lack of desire) to accept the full responsibility thus placed upon it, in government either directly or through its control of Industry. In the light of the definition of security that was given in Chapter V, it will seem that we are discussing adequacy rather than security here. To some extent this is true. However, what else is meant in all our so-called social legislation if not that these large institutions are going to stand by one rather regardless of what one does? Now we have government reaching everywhere with its hand of power to make sure that the necessities of life shall go to each person within its borders. Admittedly the activities of public and private welfare agencies are as yet very much on the level of caring for the adequacy needs of people. Yet programs assuring (and demanding) the physical health and education of all, the right to work and to a living wage, sickness and accident insurance, pensions for old age, adequate support for widows and for fatherless children, adequate play life, and the rest, are no longer mere dreams—and they have the ring of the part that in the past the Family has played in the life of the individual. Institutions other than the Family are definitely promising permanent and sufficient care for the individual more and more because he is an indi-

vidual living within a political or geographical area and less and less because of what he has happened to do and what traits he happens to have.

To summarize. In the sense in which the world has for centuries accepted the meaning of security, we are in our metropolitan areas apparently losing it. It would be hard to believe that we do not need this feeling of belongingness. We feel rather that in some such way as outlined in these last paragraphs there may be a tendency towards its establishment through other mechanisms—either through an altered conception of the individual, or through the establishment of protection by other social institutions than the Family.

Substitutes for extravert activities

It is more difficult to envisage a compensatory mechanism as replacing the introverting tendencies discussed in Chapter V. The crux of the question here is the extent to which traumatic introversion is an unhealthy phenomenon. Theoretically it is of more serious import to the individual than is the same degree of inherent introversion in which a certain "at-homeness" may be thought of as existing between the trait and the remainder of the personality.

One somewhat novel and bizarre angle of the problem has been dealt with by W. A. White. If we recognize that there are in all of us the drives to hate, to envy, to kill—that these basic urges of aggression are but veneered by a civilization that commands suppression or hidden compensation—then it is possible that the movies could be used as a "draining off" of these socially unacceptable drives. The sadistic elements in us without question raise their quota of internal problems as they are inhibited by an ever alert censorship, and White⁵

⁵ Dr. William A. White writes: "I have made this remark in discussion but I don't remember just where and I don't believe that it has ever been put down in print. I still believe that it is one of the functions of the movies."

suggests that the portrayal of this material on the screen may serve as a rather innocuous "expression" of all this. On this basis the movies should portray the worst that is in us; an all-wise and all-powerful government would order, at certain intervals, attendance upon the "worst" movies. If we have only just finished an attempt at showing the ill effects of the inability to express physically the emotions within us, then it may be pointed out that in the past the symbolic element has been essentially in still life—writing, painting, and the arts—while we now for the first time see this externalized symbol as an active vivifier of our own impulses (perhaps in this way representing a somewhat satisfactory "compromise" between the unconscious life and the needs of the cultural pattern).

Can a civilization through vicarious activities set up a series of socially acceptable and safe means of "draining off" those of our traits that are of danger to others? If the drives of an aggressive sort are incompatible with a high degree of complicated civilized life (and at least this has always been true in the past), can we turn advantageously to even such apparently introverting experiences as the movies to relieve the individual of the tensions arising from mere repression of these drives?

Perhaps the work of the world may be carried through by introverts as has never been the case in the past. Perhaps the highly automatic character of present-day factory work implies that high productivity can come from those who are carrying through complicated repetitive manipulations at the same time that they are engaged in phantasy life which is quite completely blocked of expression. It is difficult to think of this as a healthy trend from the individual's point of view, but there is at least this to reckon with: that a growing fraction of the world's work can be carried on satisfactorily in a

situation which makes the fertile daydreaming of the introvert possible—and indeed makes any more active mental participation in the work at hand distinctly hazardous.

Depersonalizing mechanisms

If urbanization is raising ever more serious questions as to the walls of defense that protect our status, are there again compensating mechanisms that can be and are being built? A frequent mode of escape is presented by the depersonalization of this wall of protection which in one form or another is found in widely varied patterns.

For instance, in many primitive tribes fairly large groups of individuals live close together, apparently without building high walls of status-preservation. The rigid rules of attaining a certain status through living in a certain house, attaining a certain age, wearing certain colors, being the child in a certain family, manage to relieve the individual of the “personal” responsibility for maintaining position. Do these formulae cover every act of life, does some of the ever present “magic” do for these individuals what so and so many stars on the uniform so effectively do for an officer in the army? If these symbols are effective do they lighten the load for the individual? If so, we have an interesting situation developing in our metropolitan areas, since, more rapidly than we are crowding together, we are building these impersonal walls between ourselves and others. Street number, make of automobile—these and countless other matters tell others who and what we are and silence many an embarrassing question. The whole mechanism of the depersonalization of these walls of status-preservation is one that is known to all peoples and our question here is not so much whether it exists as whether, as a means of relief, it is not ripening more rapidly than population-concentration is raising the fears that are engen-

dered by living too close to other people. If so, we need not be greatly disturbed by the phenomenon which we discussed in Chapter V.

There comes a point in population-concentration when anonymity of itself cares for the problems engendered. In a few of the largest cities of the world this point has been reached. The vastness of the agglomeration itself allows the individual to move with complete freedom, secure from threat. Thus the problem of status-preservation apparently grows as we crowd together, until we come to a point at which the size of the group itself frees us (see page 126). In the meantime it appears (note the extent to which the advertiser has recognized this) that we are rapidly building impersonal means of carrying the load. (Is this one of the more distressing mental problems of the Depression—that it has so devastatingly struck at the construction and support of these impersonal modes of protecting one's position from too many questions, modes that are largely dependent upon purchasing power?)

Integration through social continuity and individual self-consciousness

Are we possibly moving to new levels of that integration of the bundle of egos which in each of us seems to be so seriously threatened in our developing cultural pattern?

Possibly the rude intrusion of the radio and the telephone disturb us only in their newness. Man is apparently not so vulnerable to change as to the rate of acceleration of change. In the early dawn when man first learned "action at a distance" he was perhaps troubled by the same questions as we are today. When man first found that by throwing a stone he could control his environment thirty yards away his neat, compact little personality, bounded by the limits of stretch of

arms, legs, and teeth, he must have faced something the same problem that is ours when the toll of Big Ben comes to our ears before those on the streets of London hear it. If man took countless generations to develop a shoulder girdle to meet the problem of the enlargement of his personality by the radius of one hundred feet, there is little wonder that the space of half a generation finds him still gasping at his new stupendous enlargement. In the meantime, the fourth estate will violently and futilely exhort us to be internationally minded and the politicians will attempt colossal combinations which are developing too rapidly for an organism that took many centuries to adjust to its first puny action at a distance. The irresistible inroad of all that is about us, and far away, now seems to do no more than threaten the integration of the personality, but it is typical of the history of man that such pathways of incursion have become well integrated and useful roads of extension. That this will again occur is within possibility.

Is it not also possible that the threats at "taking us apart" may, in time, be quite as adequately met? Disintegration of the personality in the end means loss of efficiency, but in its earlier phases it is chiefly a threat to safety. If (see Chapter V) one parcels out his life to many highly specialized sectors, the most immediate danger is that one of these sectors may play him false. A man would not be much afraid of exchanging a situation in which he found his joy in his work for one in which he worked to earn money so that he might buy his pleasure elsewhere, if he could be sure of finding what he was looking for in both quarters. This can be assured in one or both of two ways. Probably our pattern will more and more be modeled to assure this integrity (now on a social rather than a personal basis) of a community sort. Here there would be lost the unit of the individual in the integration of the

pattern about him. At every hand in social ventures is the growing interest in what the personality is and what it needs. Where else can this lead than towards the perfection of a community organization that provides for all the needs and characteristics of the personality?

Or the answer to this problem of safety may lie in the other direction pointed out earlier in this chapter. If the sort of personal security that is involved in the aims of the psychoanalytic movement is attained by any sizable number of persons, the disintegrating factors in our present social trends offer little danger. One hesitates to invoke a concept that, taken too literally, seems completely to lack realism, but for the moment let us assume the existence of a federating ego that holds sway over the bundle of different personalities that each person seems to contain. If through some psychoanalytic experience this federating agent attains integration and security in recognizing its relation to its past and to its goals, then the other personalities cease merely to unravel and become strengthening and enriching elements no matter how they seem to be blown about by external pressures.

One can then recognize the disintegrating character of a large metropolitan area and at the same time see that the problem is one largely of time and holds the possibility of an integration on a wider and "higher" social level, or may be solved through a sort of personal security that reckes little of the forces that would pull apart the merely surface elements of the personality.

Permanence and change in the family relation

Turning now to the rapid change that is going on in the American family one shudders at the plight of the psychiatrist but in considering the effect of these changes upon those persons involved in them, the picture seems less dreary.

The Family (or any other social institution) must be considered in terms of what it means or provides to the individuals within it. We shall discuss the Family more fully in Chapter VII, referring now only to those elements which it has hitherto provided for the child and which are being rather rapidly taken over by other institutions. Except for the answer to the need of "belongingness" this substitution has already occurred to a remarkable degree. What the constellations of personal relationships might be if moral questions and character training were to be handled by the School (for instance) instead of being involved in the resolution of relationships with the parents, no one can say. However, at least so far as present trends show themselves, there are ready—and perhaps abler—hands to take up whatever the Family as a group is laying down. (On the basis of the definition which we have used, we should have definite reservations in the matter of belongingness. This seems so fundamentally an infant need, pointing so irrevocably to the parent for its satisfaction, that it is extremely difficult to envisage its satisfactory resolution under any other group. However, one is the product of one's own life, one's thinking is markedly colored by one's cultural pattern, and we are acutely aware that what seems impossible to us may be even comfortably accomplished by others. Perhaps it is just the inflexibility of our own conditioning that makes us think this impossible.)

There is another and somewhat more practical aspect of the matter. So long as motive power was found efficiently in one's home the Family could comfortably remain the social unit. But individuals have to cluster about steam. The discovery of steam as motive power took the father out of the home and rapidly dissociated and specialized the family functions. Weakened in personnel and with its functions separately

tied in neat bundles, the Family soon seemed in retreat before the inroads of the other institutions.

What is perhaps a reverse process has set in. The development of electricity as a source of power is distinctly decentralizing to industry; it may act correspondingly to integrate the family pattern. Already vigorous efforts are being made to stop the human flow into the city through the provision of electricity to the farmer. Even more than this, the development of chemical sources of energy should strengthen these decentralizing tendencies. Admittedly, the automobile has done far more to disperse the elements of the Family and of family life than almost any other agent. This is perhaps because this Frankenstein has appeared so suddenly. But the truck has also brought about startling examples of the decentralization of industry (notably the development of small, local packing centers in the Middle West), which indicate newer possibilities. We do not foresee a return to the cultural pattern of the late eighteenth century. Nor are we appearing as protagonists of the family pattern. It can fairly be said, however, that the family pattern (even the small family) has so long served our needs that cultural lag will bring it back into its former integrating position if any new sources of power and production permit.

In the last chapter we tried to express the dilemma into which our work in Essex County has seemed to force us. We began with what we termed the classical psychiatric approach to the definition of personality needs. We termed it psychiatric because it seemed to be a method which applied the information gathered in the mental hospital to the problems of persons living in the general social stream. Seen through these glasses the picture was gloomy in the extreme—predict-

ing, indeed, early serious decay of our entire social structure due to the mental breakdown of its individual members. We have attempted in this chapter to review the data as to this impending ruin, then to show that they have been viewed through unclear or even untrustworthy lenses, and then to illustrate ways in which the use of much more socialized concepts of personality needs might allow us to view the present picture with greater peace of mind. Individuals are tremendously facile in adaptation. Until there is strong evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the group will find a way to adjust to new cultural patterns—a way that will not seriously thwart the basic needs of individuals.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Personality and the Family Pattern

IN CHAPTERS V and VI we oriented our observations in Essex County to a psychiatric interpretation of the personality and tried to demonstrate that such an approach without further sociological illuminations was inadequate for an understanding of the issues involved. We shall now attempt a more sociological approach to the same or similar data. We shall never be far from the needs and problems of individuals but the road to these is through what institutions and their changes mean to them.

Through using the casual breakdown as a means of getting material and approaching the problem through such an institution as the Family, we arrive at a rather different set-up of conclusions and data. Thinking of the individual as growing through new experiences and his reactions to them, we now ask, "What of the total growth of the personality is contributed by these experiences which he has had with family life?" In such an approach the emphasis is removed from the traits or characteristics of the personality to be placed upon the problems which it has to solve. There is no certain goal in those resolutions—no place where with a contented sigh the individual may say, "Well, that's settled." The terms of our equation become operational rather than static and as each adjustment occurs it sets up new constellations of tensions.

This discussion of the Family, then, is an illustration of how the individual may be studied operating in the pattern about him. If we were to cover every other institutional ex-

perience in the same way, an approximation to the total group of problems presented by the environment would be made; and while we conceivably might not know much more about the inherent traits of the personality, we would have a fairly complete picture of how it behaves in its natural environment, with all the drives and thwartings that are forever going into its structure as life experiences develop.

In terms of an individual-centered culture we are viewing a social institution—a certain relationship presented to practically all people—in the light of what that experience means to and contributes to the personality. The Family is taken as illustrative—the School, Industry, the Church, or any other organized group might have been similarly used. An institutional approach involves (as a practical matter) the possibility of experimental alteration of one of the variables. Admittedly from this point of view the Family is poorly chosen since it seems to be less amenable (as an institution) to planned change than is, for example, the School or Church. We chose the Family because our experience with the casual breakdown has given us opportunity to observe an unusually wide number of problems in this setting.

For what is said in this and the following chapter, no finality can be claimed. The data are merely that set of hunch material which the casual breakdown has given us over the last few years. The accuracy of the data needs much further checking from the casual breakdown and then checking by other methods of approach. However, in the adequacy of the method of approach we have considerable faith.

In this and the following chapter we will consider both the problems which the Family seems always to have presented to its members, and also the new problems that have been raised by the changes which it is undergoing. Stated another way, we shall first examine problems which families have had for

perhaps one, two, or three hundred years—or even longer; and then problems which have more specifically appeared during this last generation.

PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE FAMILY

The concept of the family

We must first ask whether there is any such thing as the Family. Or are there only an interminable number of families? Statistically this latter is probably a correct view of the situation. There is, however, a dynamic, impelling concept of the Family in every person's mind—so real that one of the common sources of referrals to the child guidance clinic is precisely the recognition of the difference between what the adult thinks the Family to be and what he knows his family to be. This concept of the Family is present in orphans who have never experienced family life. This is admittedly an illusion but illusions are dynamic—they drive, implore, and punish with a power that is all the more impetuous for not being fettered by the bonds of reality.

This "Family" must have a certain statistical sociological reality. After all, books are written about it, the newspapers discuss it, even our sociological friends who deny its existence have a section or two in their national organization devoted to its study. It is, however, not this sort of Family which particularly interests us here. Rather is it the Family of each of the individuals within each family. And because of the dynamic power of this concept we turn aside for a moment to consider its origin.

We have found that when a parent comes to the clinic it is with the feeling that in some certain ways his or her family is living life differently from any other similar group. The children are less polite, fight more, are more selfish, sometimes

better but usually worse than those of any other family. All of this seems to be a part of that haunting feeling that is in each of us, that others are living life more richly, that there are secrets known to everyone else and not to us. One of the aims of therapy at the clinic is to show the parent that his or her family is essentially no different from any other family—that the problem presented occurs in some form in every family group. The only difficulty is that actually this therapy is not successful. Marshal your data as you will—that time never comes when the parent will or can afford to accept his family as like every other. The real element involved here is the individual's feeling of difference from others—as fundamental a necessity as any there is. All that gamut of inciters to conduct disturbance and delinquency which starts with "There isn't another child on the block who sucks his thumb" and goes through "She's the very worst child one can imagine" may be but the expression of this basic fear—and assurance—that one's family is different from any other family.

By all means there is such a thing as the Family. For every family it is a goal, a standard of comparison, an expression of the way other families solve the problems of life—for orphans, for those of broken families, for "normal" family groups it is a vibrant concept because in it lies in part the answer to the craving that I may consider myself and those who are mine as different from other people. Husbands, wives, children, fathers, and mothers are amended and corrected, exhorted to addition or deletion—all in the name of the Family, a goal never reached because with its attainment individuality, in whose name this mechanism of the development of feelings of guilt was from the start developed, disappears. Every child or adult has a clear and concise picture of the Family, and it has a striking resemblance to the sociologist's statistical Family. The difference is that as the soci-

ologist seeks to grasp the concept it shatters into a million bits; as the individual seeks to make his family into the ideal Family, he draws away the hand, for the goal he set up has value, reality, driving power as long as he cannot reach it.

This is the first of those problems which the Family "has always had." It is the source of a great amount of discord, friction, endless nagging, and all that tawdry dissatisfaction that is the attitude of forever knowing what is wrong with life. In the ponderous abstractions of worded researches social institutions may not exist. But for so long as the personality must be certain of its idiom—of its individuality—for just so long must it endure the sense of guilt and the pressure of the social institutions. They are the measure of our distance from the cherished goals which we never can afford to reach.

The principle of growth

A second problem that "has always belonged" to family life and which is as seriously resented and misunderstood today as ever, lies in the fact that growth and change and development are involved. One knows many people, it is true, who "settle down" long before marriage—but apparently the socially accepted inflection point beyond which one doesn't need to worry about growing and adjusting is the date of marriage. What the source of this dictum is we have no idea. We do know that the vision of marriage as a second childhood with problems of adjustment, of growth in relation to a new constellation, of weaning oneself from one's children as one earlier had to from one's parents, is distasteful and resented. Growth we accept for childhood, but a new complexity in development, a different level of problems of adjustment, does not by some magic finish these problems of growth.

One sees this attitude in many naïve statements. One of the commonest is the expression of surprise that two children of

the same parents can be so different. But have there ever been two children of the same parents? The family of one child bears little resemblance to that of none. As the second child is planned, expected, or arrives, all sorts of changes—gross and subtle—occur. Identical twins probably have the same environment; so too the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth additions may come to a group not seriously changed by a new arrival. The same problem appears in the sexual adjustments of the family. Particularly in the case of the man, who traditionally carries the responsibility of assuring an adequate and satisfactory physical sexual adjustment, there is this impatient resentment of the fact that, as one has to learn to add or read, so must persons learn to express through the sexual life those communions that are beyond words. Are we but indolent, are we unwilling to grow, does the libido in truth seek that tensionless dead-level where adjustment may cease—or has a subtle folklore that found man “complete” when he was grown enough to wage wars for the state or earn profits for industry or breed new soldiers, placed the veil of ignorance before the challenge and the joy of new problems to be solved as life goes on?

(If it is true that life presents to the end new complexities to be adjusted, old age comes now to have new meaning for us. We have been a people who must work. Where we have not been preoccupied with conquering nature we have turned to conquering men. In such a culture old people are but in the way. If in reality we move to new levels—if we must work less because persistent toil and insistent production will become heavy millstones instead of assets¹—then old age may mean growth and life and new problems. Life cannot “begin

¹ I appreciate that many would not agree with this idea. It is one of several places in the book where I have refrained from defending a point that would involve going into a myriad of technicalities.

at forty" in a cultural pattern that demands armies and industrial profits. We are not thinking here of a pattern which specifically gives honor and prestige to old age as do the Eastern civilizations, rather that as this age has "discovered the child" so may a culture that does not need to rest unduly upon the period of physical production "discover old age.")

One more example may be given of the problems arising in the resistance of adults to the challenge of growth in family life. The physical weaning of children is fairly well understood by a large number of persons. Due to a violent bombardment from the psychiatric and psychoanalytic group, the emotional weaning of children is rapidly becoming an accepted part of the armamentarium of parents. Indeed, so anxious are many today for rapid and complete independence of the child that the problems of the more basic physical weaning are with some frequency brusquely set aside for this new goal. But we find in few parents the realization that as the child must become independent of them so must they become independent of the child. Parents struggle against weaning even more insistently than do children.

Conflicting drives

Another problem which the Family "has always had" arises from a peculiar clash in drives. There is a great deal of data, ranging from the careful analyses of research to the insight of the novelist, to the effect that in marriage one searches for a person answering to certain earlier dreams, identified with earlier experiences, embodying certain goals. Well enough—until one is presented with the rather prosaic data of marriage license bureaus showing that an alarmingly large fraction of individuals marry those who live nearby. We marry not real persons—but rather what we think or wish persons to be. This projection of our goals and desires is without se-

rious consequences until family life begins to disclose that not only is the person one has married a real person but that this surprising new individual is at the same time making an identical discovery concerning oneself. One meets the same problem in miniature in "reading" books through their titles. Here is a book that "must be marvelous" that turns out to be disappointing in the reading. The "disappointment" is merely the tension set up between what the book really is and what the book would have been had the reader of the title written it.

Thus there enters into every family situation (into every situation of human relations) the problem of the development of tolerance—an acceptance of the right of another person to be himself. This is obviously no more than a subheading under the problem of family life as a process of adjustment, of growth and learning.

Differences in age

One more series of problems inherent in all family life rises from the fundamental differences between the young and old.

These problems are used (as are the previous ones) to show that "adjustment" is adjustment to problems rather than of problems. This idea requires emphasis because of present widespread propaganda implying that if one but follow the wise, problems will disappear. We would instead hope that the reader would recognize that there is no "right" way to bring up children—or wives or husbands or parents, for that matter—but rather merely changing constellations of problems that grow with life.

First, a difference which melts in theory but actually is a very poignant affair: Adults conduct themselves on the basis of generalizations (moral or legal principles), whereas chil-

dren live very largely on a rather crude and specific pleasure-pain principle. A child steals so long as he has an immediate pleasurable result from the stealing, basing his conduct on the fact that a certain act brings pleasure. Similarly, he stops because he receives some very definite punishment (or deprivation, if, in modern fashion, we must use sugar-coated words) for certain definite acts of stealing. The older person follows (or should) the principle that it is wrong to steal. Obviously this "principle" is a summation of an enormous number of racial and personal experiences of the effect of specific acts of stealing. The principle of conduct in both parent and child is thus a pleasure-pain principle—but unfortunately every child guidance clinic can testify that people in no sense see this clear relationship. The child of six who stole a dime and was treated with large doses of generalities on the sinfulness of stealing will steal again—if he procured candy with the dime and if he is intelligent. The youngster demanding to be carried who is picked up by his mother when he promises that if carried for a block he will cease crying, recommences his howling when put down—if he is intelligent. He is brought to the psychiatrist because he has "no sense of fairness." Or see the problem in the adolescent girl who finds in the all too urgent attentions and desires of boys perhaps her first experience of being really wanted. Her failure to respond to heroic doses of moralizing is not a sign that she is a "bad girl"—but rather that we adults fail to recognize that the psychology of childhood strengthens and reinforces those activities which bring an immediate pleasurable return.

The second of these problems lies in the basic struggle between satiety and curiosity. One of the keenest of our adult realizations is that of the mistakes there have been in our lives—the most insistent of our adult hopes, that our children shall be spared these errors. One of the commonest statements

made by children at the clinic is "Well, I'll say, Doctor, no child of *mine* will ever go through anything like this." That which is a dream, a desired goal at adolescence, strengthens and crystallizes itself until in parenthood it becomes an insistent demand. Children, on the other hand—"normal," likable, appealing children—have a stubborn way of wanting to make their own mistakes. The inevitable conflict begins when the mother must insist that the child shall not climb on the chair and when the child must climb on the chair. It goes its grim way to when the parent must warn of the pitfalls of sexual interest and when the child must explore these. The hand of help must be extended—every adult *has* to do that out of his own life. The help of the hand must be refused—that is because children are children. And as the hand was refused so all the more insistently must this child, now grown adult, urge his assistance upon those who come after. (The school teacher asks us "Why is Mrs. X so upset about Mary's selfishness? She is herself about the most selfish person I know," not realizing that it is precisely this failing of the mother that so insistently urges that it must not exist in the child.)

A third problem in this series appears in the conflict between the parents' desire to exercise authority and the child's desire to exercise independence. We distinguish this from the problem just discussed because we are not certain whether it is merely the control of the adult which the child resents, or the fact that this control is so often used by the adult to salve his own mistakes. One gets the impression that children desire independence—desire to make their own decisions. We are however quite lacking in material from families where the adults exercise control but do so without impressing children with their own problems and their own resolutions of those problems. We doubt that such material exists. What person is there who can betray his own life? If, then, parents

begin with complete possession of the child—feeding it, keeping it warm, bundling it about as though it were the family dog, having all the symptoms of possession—and if parents find it difficult beyond words to relinquish this dependence of the child, and if the child starts soon after birth to integrate his more and more complex reflexes, always seeking freedom of expression for an ever growing mechanism, must there be conflict between just these two drives? Theoretically, “yes”; actually, the problem is so inextricably interwoven into that of the previous paragraph that an answer is probably not now possible.

The last problem we shall discuss in this connection is really a summation of the other three. As one lives, one more and more symbolizes or makes short-cuts. What is involved is the ability to get away from a cumbersome reality—a hampering attention to infinite and tortuous detail. The most obvious development here is that of language where words come to symbolize things, activities, whole congeries of adjustments. The infant in grabbing someone else's possession suffers physical harm and recognizes that it hurts to steal. The adult says that it is an immutable law that one should not steal. For both the child and the adult there is a short-cutting, a generalization, a symbolization of a series of real experiences, but at different levels. At any step in the process the individual can look upon the world only in the light of the experience up to that point. Family life has this peculiarity—that it places in intimate relationship persons who are at different stages of the development of this learning process. It is theoretically possible to see these different stages of symbolization acting as educative agents to the younger children. Actually, it must also be realized that a frequent source of family friction lies precisely in this inability of one level to understand the thinking processes of the other. Folklore pic-

tures the attainment of family life as a goal—as the arrival at a level of comfortable happiness with others; modern psychiatry (impatient of folklore) has promised that through following its dictates families could be properly “brought up”—and this we take to mean the same thing. Actually, however, there are continuing problems of adjustment in family life and the nature of these problems would seem to indicate that the family grouping is a situation offering rather strong hazards against solution.

PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE CURRENT MILIEU

What now are the new problems of the Family—if the problems just discussed belonged to our parents and grandparents as definitely as they belong to us, what are the problems which we have that they saw little or nothing of?

Decentralization and specialization

The first of these problems centers about all those changes which have come in the Family's adjustment to decentralization with the consequent specialization of its functions. We discussed earlier (Chapter V, pages 131 and following) the dispersion of the family functions throughout the last century, and attempt nothing but the briefest of recapitulations here. At the beginning of the industrial revolution the intellectual and emotional life of its individuals was almost entirely satisfied within the confines of the family circle. Women were forced to marry because thus alone did they obtain social position, financial support, and security. Men were forced to marry because it was only in this way that their meals could be cooked, their clothes kept in repair. Each of these factors similarly operated towards the continuance of the marriage tie—supported by ample and reverberant admonition from Church and State as to penalties incurred through failure.

Over the last one hundred years these activities—these functions of the family, the cooking, the sewing, the recreational life of the child, the earning of money, the care of relatives, the attendance upon birth and sickness and death—have moved out of the home to find shelter at the willing doors of various other social institutions.

What, from the point of view of the personality, has this left to the Family itself? There seems to be rather general agreement that the Family still is the locus of the satisfaction of the affectional ties. There is indeed a sizable group that assures us that the dispersion of the functions of the Family has meant that the affectional ties are being more richly developed than before. In somewhat mundane terms this means that if one earlier lived with his wife because only in this way could he have his meals cooked, now the fact that there are apartment hotels and delicatessen shops means that he lives with his wife only because he really cares for her.

This is indeed an idyllic picture and one towards which we are probably moving. It is, however, our own observation that the dispersion of the family functions has meant a weakening of the affectional ties. We are aware of the limitations and the peculiar skew of our material. Obviously those families in which there has been a strengthening of the affectional ties tend not to come to the clinic. Yet the process involved here is so fundamental a personality problem that it has seemed that the "clinic families" have dramatized rather than created it.

The fundamental difficulty seems to be in differentiating between love and dependence. It is relatively easy to "love" those who need us, who depend upon us. This appears in the development of the mother's love for the newly arrived infant. The obstetrician is well acquainted with the queer dismay with which the mother views the newborn babe. It is as

the mother recognizes the dependence of this individual upon her that she rapidly develops what we call "love." It is more accurate to say that the dependence of the child "loosens" (makes available or mobilizes) the sentiment. (There is an interesting support of this view in our experiences with some mothers of illegitimate children. In the case of certain illegitimate children the baby was placed away from the mother very soon after birth. The mother showed but the least concern for the baby as long as she was assured of its being well cared for. This "coldness" remained until the birth of another child who, this time, was kept by the mother through this period in which it shows its complete dependence. Now there appeared insistent "love" for the first as well as for the second child—it must be found, it must be returned, how was it faring?)

Does one reconcile this with the unassailable position which the child has in his family just because of his arrival in that family? There is no intention here to confuse love (belongingness) and dependence. However, because the overt acts in answer to these two sentiments are the same and because dependence is so much more the objective, easily recognized, and tangible, we find a great many families in which the one is mistaken for the other. Again we recognize that it is precisely such families that would tend to come to our door.

Probably for no one of us is there ever final and clear-cut distinction between love and dependence. Certainly in husband-wife and parent-child relationships the two are inextricably mingled. One of the familiar problems in clinic work is that involved in the weaning activities of adolescents. The parent comes with the statement that the child no longer confides, no longer listens, no longer chums—and ends, "He doesn't love me any more." Obviously the parent means, "He doesn't depend upon me any more." That the matter of the

continuance of love where dependence is gone, where need does not exist, has been handled by many novelists is some indication that this problem is not confined to those who visit the psychiatrist.

Our own material indicates, as we have said, that as the dispersion of the family functions has lessened the necessity for persons to live together it has loosened the affectional ties, and we have suggested that this is because of the inability to differentiate love from dependence. There is another possible explanation of the situation. Perhaps the clinic material is not made up of family groups in which there has been a weakening of the affectional ties but rather of those in which there never were affectional ties worthy of the name. We don't know how large a group enter family life just because this represents the prevailing cultural pattern. There are perhaps a great many who can say every last word of the whole ritual of life with never a notion of what any of it means. Certainly when trouble of some sort comes, this is the group that will tend in one way or another to find its way to our doors.

We leave it then that in our own observation we have seen a weakening of the affectional ties. How much this is a general process of disintegration and how much it derives from those who have never been more than the poll-parrots of life, we don't know.

There is no reason to doubt that in due time the dispersion of the family functions will lead to a strengthening of the affectional ties—or, more correctly, to a franker facing of these ties as the essential element of family life. It seems entirely possible that people will some time marry only because they wish to—and will remain married only because they wish to live with those with whom they started the venture. The rearing of children during their younger years remains almost the only function still largely carried by the family and rapid

inroads are being made even at this point by various formal and informal school groups. It seems altogether possible that a very long time ago the origin of family life was that people began to live together in such groups because they wanted to. Then, as the ages marched, there gathered about the solidarity of this emotional tie all sorts of functions—as barnacles incrust a rock until the rock itself is completely hidden. The specialization of life that has so suddenly and ruthlessly stripped off these barnacles has, as it were, torn bits of the rock off in the process. Yet, for all this, one cannot fail to foresee a “better” Family, a franker acceptance of the strength of the affectional ties freed of the weight of dependence which so long has masqueraded as a support of the family structure.

There is a second problem of importance in the adjustment of the Family to its decentralization—of importance to the mental attitudes of the family members. Not only have many of the functions of the Family been taken over by other institutions, but the Family is also exercising a lessened control over the content and procedure of these functions. It is not only that the child has his recreation at the movies but that the content of the movies is controlled at Hollywood. The housewife not only gets her bread at the bakery but is assured that some hundreds or thousands of women whom she has never seen have collaborated in the recipe. Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, all the character-building agencies with their nationalized formulae, associations of libraries, federal councils of this and that, national conferences and societies—all assure not only that the Family will be relieved of its functions but that the character of these functions will be beyond the control of the Family and neighborhood spirit. That this disappearance of neighborhood sanctions and tabus has raised serious problems for the Family and its members cannot be doubted. How much of the result is from the

change itself and how much from the speed with which it has occurred, we have no idea.

In all this there has been something of that brusque invasion of the Family's integrity that is analogous to the impertinent invasion of the individual by the telephone. Standards of dress, speech, and action for each individual must now be set by distant arbiters rather than by the needs and tastes of the family group itself.

The sociologist objects to the expression "personality and culture," claiming that this should be "personality in culture"—that the individual forms as well as is formed. The psychiatrist would go further and say that one of the basic cravings of each person is to have some part in forming the cultural pattern. It is not only that we are the cultural pattern, but that each of us has some shy, half-hidden belief that this matters. Life thwarts and numbs, but the desire that the world shall somehow be different because of one's own life belongs to everyone. Of what use is it that we teach children their responsibility and opportunity in the face of nationalized recreation, education, religion, attire, and customs? The autonomy of the Family and of the neighborhood may disappear, but probably something must be supplied to the individual to the end that he shall not only be the cultural pattern but that he shall feel that he is so and that by his life he can change the pattern, if ever so little. We are in no sense decrying the change that is occurring—but rather attempting to show that this change *means* something to the personality and that for what the latter has lost it will feverishly seek a substitute.

Changing bases of authority

The second of the new problems of the Family centers about the changing bases of authority. The world has long

bowed to the authority of position and most of the adult generation of today were brought up under its rule. The father was obeyed because he was the father—the mother, because of her position. It was but the most venturesome soul who dared to see the man Ichabod Crane behind the teacher.

So have we always invested life with symbols. The power that is from people themselves has been supported by code, by emblem, by position.

The change that is occurring is illustrated over and over at the clinic. Parents in coming to talk with us about problems sooner or later say, "John says things to us which we would never have dared to say to our own parents." Our response is, "Yes, you obeyed your parents and respected them—but I wonder if you did not also somewhat fear them." Then the reply comes that the parents had themselves recognized this and had planned that they would build a different relationship with their children than that which their parents had had with them. In other words, there is a conscious, "wilful" change (one could only guess at origins) in adult attitudes about authority. The old authority of position is being given up. Parents express their wish for some sort of companionship in its place—some sort of person-to-person relationship rather than symbol-to-symbol relationship.

Nor is this by any means confined to the Family. Quite widely through our school systems the teacher is not depending on her position as such. She is a person—one, it is true, with a contribution to the classroom activities that is different from that made by the children—but yet a person. In many classrooms she has put her desk in the corner so that its impersonal symbol of authority shall not stand between her and the pupils. One needs but watch the newspaper to see that judge, minister, and official have all been made to shed the

mantle of authority that lay in their positions. All these we see as people—albeit persons with special abilities and powers.

This has not failed to raise a large number of problems for the members of families. Suffice it to say here (the matter was discussed more fully in Chapter IV, pages 85 and following) that the adjustment to authority is one of the child's most difficult problems. When, over a period of but one generation, those bases of authority which have been relied on for centuries are thrown away, the child scarcely knows where he stands. It would all be glib and easy could authority be dispensed with. But there is no point in one's life when one is beyond the possible control of forces that are greater than one's own. These forces may not "choose" to exert themselves but they are there and they are sensed by the child (or adult). If the symbol of position is discarded as a validator of this authority, some other symbol must be erected. Without that we fail to prepare the child for a life that is real.

It is precisely at this point of transition that we see the Family today. We have felt that adults have not to any marked degree recognized that new validators for authority must be set up in place of those so nobly cast aside. Here and there is the beginning of a realization that if one discards the authority of position one must turn to the authority of life itself—and we have guessed that in stumbling fashion this is the step which the Family will slowly take. This is to say that if a man discards his power to command obedience through his position as a father, then he must build a power to command obedience through the way in which he actually lives.

In earlier discussions of the role of the affectional ties in the Family we saw the development of a franker, more forthright, family group for the future. Here, once more, we make free to guess that authority relationships will leave their

present chaos to enter a stage that must have in it more of an eye-to-eye meeting of life than is involved in the hypocrisy of being free to live any sort of a life behind the glistening and imperious splendor of a position, an office, a place. Children are inordinate copyists. One sees for the future the demand upon parents that they actually live as they wish their children to live.

Perhaps, too, there was an earlier time when people lived in this way. Certainly every great religious leader has seen this as man's most serious problem and has asked that a man's life be what he wanted others' to be. But symbolization forever presses its claim—nor can one forget that the very process of life is to substitute symbols for reality. Now, during our generation, everywhere throughout the world there has been this sudden tearing away at the authority of position—at the long crystallized symbols of authority—and there are no more important psychiatric problems today than those involved in the question what new bases we can and will build. (Is it fair to ask whether the resurgence of the most arbitrary forms of this authority of position, such as is appearing in various European countries, is but the response of persons lost in chaos for lack of a new basis of authority to replace the old bases that are gone?)

Interest in relationships

The third of these new problems of the Family centers about the changing focus of interest of its members. This is a period of interest in the relationships rather than the mechanics of living.

Over the last two generations, as we have seen, the amount of time occupied with the mechanics of living in the home has definitely decreased. The falling birth rate and the tend-

ency towards smaller families could not but decrease the more or less disturbing and engrossing periods of pregnancy even were some statistical magic to find that the total hours of nursing care for young children had not been lessened. Even the responsibilities for the slightly older children have been reduced by the nursery school and its various colleagues. For the man have come shorter working hours, not to mention the oil burner, the automobile, etc., to lighten similarly the burden of the mechanics of living. In our own area the net change for the father is less certain, as he has increased commuting time where there has been saving elsewhere. These developments must mean both that less time is spent on the actual mechanics of living and that as a result the term "mechanics of living" now includes many of those amenities which very largely contribute to the improvement or enrichment of the relationships of people.

Interest in the relationships rather than the mechanics of life has included the "discovery of the child." And in hailing the dawn of the new era we have not been mindful of the plight of the child. From a theoretical point of view the understanding of any relationship can scarcely fail of improving it—but without question this overweening interest in the child has for the present raised certain rather difficult problems for him.

The first of these comes from the tendency to crystallize and emphasize problems through the mere mechanics of being interested in them. What does it mean that feeding difficulties have suddenly become one of the pediatrician's real problems? The answer cannot be entirely that four out of five of today's adults were quietly allowed to enjoy their picky appetites. In the field of habit-training we create problems in our anxious and meticulous attendance upon the

training process. Thom has given many examples of this² but one need go no further than one's neighborhood kindergarten teacher who is forever "wondering why Mrs. X has so much trouble with Alice who behaves beautifully here, puts on her rubbers herself, and is so helpful." It is when the child is lost in the group that habits, good and bad, so frequently care for themselves—freed from the distortion of the small family group's preoccupation with relationships. Bed-wetting, thumb-sucking, and masturbation are all frequently maintained and strengthened by parents' talking ways, coaxing ways, iterating ways of never letting the child forget the habit. Nor has the psychiatrist helped the situation in his insistence that these habits are but the surface phenomena of dark and devious family interrelationships. (One admits that in the play of the family drama there are on occasion times in which the child must use these props to force himself into the circle of the family's interest but in the majority of instances which we see the therapy lies in giving him some chance to forget the habit.)

Or, in going to the problems of older children, one looks with some dismay upon the growing machinery for studying and assaying various delinquencies. The child is combed over by principal, visiting teacher, investigator, court, and psychiatric clinic who come lumberingly (but quite scientifically) to the conclusion that the delinquency in question is best forgotten. The machinery involved in "good case work" seems indeed ponderous in contrast to the lightness of the child's touch upon life. Frankfurter has well said that we will make little headway against crime until we take the drama out of it.³ Perhaps this is impossible. The children whom we see

² D. A. Thom, *Everyday Problems of the Everyday Child*, New York, Appleton, 1927.

³ Statement made in an address (unpublished) to the New Jersey Conference of Social Work, December 4, 1927, in East Orange, New Jersey.

seem rather doubtful about there being anything very dramatic in being good. Yet it is not the crime in which we are interested but rather the human relations of which in one way or another it is the expression. It seems to be precisely our preoccupation with the relationships of life that makes it impossible to lessen the present interest in crime as a dramatic event.

Another stress has been placed upon the child now that we have discovered him—the undue emphasis that we are placing upon his rapid maturing, upon getting him to grow up as rapidly as possible. There may be two causes for this. One is that if the adult “discovers the child” he obviously does so through adult eyes and tends to see him as no more than a little adult. The other lies in the recent psychoanalytic preoccupation with the problem of emotional growing-up—with a persistent effort to hang most of our social and personal ills on to the peg of emotional immaturity. The widespread interest in these theories has unquestionably played its part in setting up emotional development as the measuring rod by which to gauge all conduct. Parents vie in their testimonials of the emotional weaning of offspring, nursery schools with missionary zeal snatch ever younger children from the sapping experiences of parental protection, teachers are warned that their single blessedness raises the danger that they will seek vicarious motherhood through schoolroom experience, and adolescents are hustled to heterosexual associations.

But childhood is life—it best prepares for adulthood when it is lived to the fullest in its own right. There are a great many flower gardens where weeds grow in a distinctly more rugged and healthy way than do the flowers. One suspects that the hopeful gardener in planting a seed thinks of the flower he is to have, in watching for the sprout is interested in but the final result, for each tender nursling has only the

goal of the magnificent bloom. One suspects that the weed is busy each day with the fulfilment of that day's life. This is not meant as but a play of words. We would be the last ones to lose sight of the continuity of life; but we are certain that the richest, fullest preparation for emotional maturity lies in meeting in a healthy way the needs of emotional immaturity at its appointed periods. (We would go further in suggestion without being so sure of our ground. As the plant grows only when the seed has fulfilled its own cycle, and must grow then, so the complete satisfaction of the needs of emotional immaturity in its own period is perhaps the most potent propelling force towards the next step in emotional development.)

This has implications of interest in education for parenthood. Evidently, if our view is correct, there would be considerable question as to the value of courses in high school or even college dealing with the minutiae of problems of family life from the parents' point of view. Admittedly, of all the professions that of being a parent is the commonest, and of all the professions it is accorded the least amount of factual preparation. The other side of the matter is that the task of preparation for parenthood is that of living through a series of personal relations in which emotional attitudes are of far greater importance than factual data. We seriously doubt that successful parents may be made through simply telling persons what successful parents do. Some of our most unsuccessful parents have been those who know by heart the last dotting of the i and crossing of the t of modern child guidance. Certainly the history of all the clinic work in this country so far has been that the difficulties that parents have, come out of the unsatisfactory personal experiences of their own earlier lives.

The "discovery of the child" has placed one further stress upon him—the overregulation of his life. It is not unusual to

find children whose lives are completely "booked up" for every waking hour. The schools have stretched improving hands into homework hours and afternoon play regulation. Where they leave off, various recreational and character-building agencies vie with parental plans in claim for the remainder.

Perhaps reflective thinking spontaneously develops in certain individuals even in spite of an everlasting regimentation of life. But a cultural pattern which provides from early life a situation in which people are always doing something, always busy, always running to keep up with the routine of activities, may be destroying the roots of reflective thinking and of individual independence. What happens to children when they sit under a tree, what happens in lazy hours of dreaming, we haven't the slightest idea—nor have the children themselves. We do know that the child who is persistently pushed up to the limit of his ability, and never allowed to "waste his time dreaming," soon shows a tense, restless ill-at-easeness which, if continued for long, goes over into the picture of insecurity.

The lessening demands of the mechanics of living have allowed an increasing preoccupation with the relationships of living and we have attempted to indicate three problems of deep psychiatric import which this has raised for the child in the parent-child relationships.

Is the shift of emphasis from the mechanics of living to relationship a factor of importance in other family situations? Our scattering data yield no answer but do raise interesting questions. Might the old adage that the way to a man's heart is through his stomach fail to survive this changed emphasis? What unfailing subjects of praise does the husband find now that the delicatessen and the dress shop have substituted financial competence for workmanship? What do grandmothers do

—and what is their place in the home—if there is no sewing to be done? Have we seen in social work a rather magnificent professionalization of the maiden aunt who took care of the older five children while the mother bore the next five—or what has happened to her? These and countless other questions are in the hands of the sociologist to tell us what is happening and of the psychiatrist to tell us what this means to people. We have no really valid data.

This whole interest in the relationships of life points towards the measurement of all social phenomena in terms of what they *mean* to people. Good must come eventually from seeing life in terms of what it contributes to the personality. With awkward hands we now break what we would nurture. This is not that we should give up the venture. We move towards an individual-centered world and what we see today are but the grotesque and uncertain first steps.

But it is a little hard on the children.

The small family

An outgrowth of the trend to decentralization and specialization (page 174) is the problem presented to the child by the series of new adjustments demanded by the rapid disappearance of the “extended family” (the large or clan family). In our area we have had only meager experiences of the effect of this change. Perhaps increasing loads are being placed upon individuals—perhaps helping hands are being rapidly withdrawn. (This is an odd remark in view of our experience that the members of the extended family furnish the sharpest and most devastating points of comparison for children’s progress. Keeping up with the Joneses never held a candle to keeping up with the relatives. But a clinic like ours must get a false view of the situation due to the selection which characterizes its case material. The burdens of grief must lose something

of their personal poignancy in the well-knit extended family. The intensification of all personal experiences, personal responsibility for good or evil, personal responsibility for marching orders, for a philosophy of what it's all about, has unquestionably set up new constellations of problems for us.)

Here we leave this point. Towards what we are going, what—if you please—the personality is going to mold for its own enrichment in the new order, we have no idea. We imagine that the casual-breakdown situations for the extended family are occurring in Europe or in peasant-culture areas in this country. The migration of individuals or small families to our area shows that the break has already occurred.

Population concentration

We have already discussed the inviolability of the personality. A like problem appears on this level of integration, that of family life—the wall now investing the family group. This is a new difficulty for the individual who, obviously, still has his own problems of self-protection within as well as beyond the family group. Two procedures are involved for the family as for the individual—the construction of the wall of reserve or subtle deceit that fends off the impertinent inquirer and the use of symbols to announce status and obviate queries—but the use of symbols for status-giving and status-preservation is far more marked in the family than in the individual. This use is reflected in the rapid development of luxury goods in this country. Nor has the advertiser failed to recognize the increasing importance of being able to announce, through these impersonal symbols, who and what you wish people to think you are. The problems this raises for the adult are probably not markedly different from those which we see in the child. In our own area the increasing tendency to announce what you are through what you have has

brought many delinquents to our door. The adolescent is at best in an insecure and vulnerable position. In an area in which the crowding of families has made necessary the announcement of status through impersonal symbols, his problem is fairly easily solved. He, too, must have access to an automobile. So, endlessly, automobiles are stolen, and the theft is solemnly punished by Society. Nor does one see the end. If an economic cycle cuts in upon the consumption of luxury goods, the resources of a nation, in a profit-centered culture, are mobilized against this latter disaster.

While one recognizes population-concentration as the principal factor in this building of walls of protection there are two others that particularly play their part in an area such as ours. These walls are of unusual importance where new families move into established districts. The X family soon realizes that a wide range of embarrassing questions is quieted through the establishment of an address or through joining a certain church. Much the same factors are involved in another common phenomenon—the rapid change by a family from one social stratum to another. Here again, the more disturbing questions are aborted through impersonal means of proclaiming who one would like to be.

It has been widely held that the Depression has rather markedly changed these walls of protection. People seem to talk more freely. As in army comradeships, common experiences of real importance, insistence, and catholicity seem to have erased these walls of personal fear. At first we agreed with this view but we think now that despite the fact that it is now stylish to talk about certain things which were earlier not discussed, the walls remain as before. Persons now parade how little rather than how much they have paid for something, but the truth may be, and apparently is, quite as elusive at one extreme as at the other. If the structure of these

walls is dependent upon the crowding together of families, this is what we would have expected (and, may it be said, psychiatric data so ingenuously mold themselves to one's theory that perchance precisely this expectation plays its part in the "data").

There is, however, one phenomenon of the Depression which has raised new problems as to these "walls of status protection." This is an intra-family problem which affects the already established member-roles. The best example is that of the father's position as the bread-winner of the family. There can be little doubt that this place, of itself and in an impersonal way, provided him a position in the family which "freed" him of a certain personal responsibility of holding his place. What have the millions of men who for several recent years have not been the bread-winners done in the way of preserving status? We have seen statements that this has broken their morale. From our own view of these protective mechanisms we would rather have expected such men to show some of the same irritable contra-suggestibility that the small child shows who so intimately carries this whole load of status-preservation as a personal load. Here again we are without data to do more than raise the question.

What will these problems of the wall about the family mean to its individual members? In discussing new bases of union, new bases of authority, new preoccupations, we thought that we saw an emerging Family of a really thrilling sort, a grouping more forthright than anything the world has for some time known. Is the same to be said here as the individual finds his own standards and goals sharply clashing with the necessarily impersonal modes of announcing and preserving status that population-concentration demands? We have guessed not. Unless this forces him more and more clearly to define for himself what is life in distinction to what are

but the symbols of life, he is probably forced to adjust himself to new and serious complexities.

*Lack of facilities for getting to know well the person
one is to marry*

Another new problem of the Family might be termed the increasing difficulty in finding the person one is to marry. It is our experience that girls (it is the same for boys) seem to meet a great many more boys than girls used to meet but know fewer of them on a basis adequate for judging their availability as husbands.

It has long since been pointed out that there are two distinct stages in the development of intimacy ties. The first of these, acquaintance, is a scarcely differentiated stage in which there is practically no consideration of qualities or attributes in reference to marriage. When this goes over into a deeper friendship a marked change occurs. We have no intention of discussing this particular subject—simply giving one illustration to indicate the depth of the change. In the stage of acquaintance a personal oddity is a deterrent to friendship; during the stage of intimacy this same oddity becomes a cementing tie of greater strength than any other. We discussed this in Chapter V where it was pointed out that the peculiarity becomes (in the stage of intimacy) the symbol of the idiomatic character of the relationship (see page 99).

The cultural pattern in our area has been very definitely increasing the facilities for acquaintance at the same time that it is quite as insistently decreasing those for deeper friendship. The data point in various directions and are not easy to summarize. The relationships of the factory seem to be largely those of acquaintance, as are those of going to and from work. We do not know how many couples working in the same factory seek marriage licenses—though if we did we

would not stress its importance, as the children we see are anxious to have their "steady" friends move to their own working places. There has been unquestionably a disappearance of the sitting room. It is possible that the possession of a place to entertain in quiet seclusion brought more potential suitors than is now the case. Over against this is the development of the automobile and the public park to answer the same purposes. Certainly the lessening frequency of the family car in favor of one for couples is strong indication that the sitting room is not entirely missed. Frank⁴ has pointed out that it would be interesting to know what differences in these tentative approaches to intimacy are involved in the fact that the girl earlier entertained in her sitting room whereas now the boy entertains in his car. It is distinctly our impression that all the commercialized forms of recreation—the amusement park, the movie, the dance hall—increase acquaintance and decrease friendship facilities. Back of these observations (for which we have so little valid support) is the data that our clinic young men and women seem to be marrying their first or at least second "steady." There is no comparative data for an earlier period. Perhaps it has always been true that a somewhat serious shopping around has been denied to young people. If so, the social problem would still be real, though not new.

Important in this problem is the "roaming range" of individuals. Increased means of transportation mean an increased range—but is this one of acquaintance or one of friendship? Our clinic children come into contact with an unbelievable number of individuals from all over the city. However it has seemed that there has been a decrease—and certainly no in-

⁴ In a personal communication to the author. The subject is also touched upon in *Middletown*, by R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929.

crease—in the meetings on the level of friendship. For the stage of acquaintance our pattern has provided facilities far in advance of anything which was earlier available for young people. Whether the very richness and fullness of this first stage of itself deters the entry into the second is a question which might very easily be answered in the affirmative.

Has the growing economic independence of women affected the width of the field from which a prospective husband or wife might be chosen? The number of working women declines rapidly at twenty-five years, indicating that while the work of women may delay the period of marriage, it has removed very few from that venture. On the face of it, a working girl should have a wider choice in the selection of a husband, but we have found that only the field of acquaintance is increased.

Limitation in the field of apparently eligible persons for choice should show itself either in a decrease in the marriage rate or in an extension of the psychological mechanism mentioned earlier—the projection of traits molded by the earlier experiences of the searcher upon a person of the opposite sex. The adolescent's description of the "sort of person I'm going to marry" is patently determined by identifications with persons who have been close to his or her life (this is equally true of the persons whom they are *not* going to marry). Any such limitation in the field of choice must tend to increase the adjustments necessary in marriage. We have wondered to what extent this factor has played its part in the increasing divorce rate. That is, if one recognizes the large number of divorced persons who remarry and the extent to which the person to be married is already selected when the divorce proceedings are instituted, he may see divorce as the desire to preserve family life with the feeling that the person first chosen represented an unsatisfactory mate for such a venture.

The next set of data necessary for this point (upon which Dell has already elaborated⁵) is a comparative study as to the success of first and second marriage in the case of divorcing individuals. "Success" probably would have to be measured in terms of years married. We understand that such material is being now collected.

Unisexual control of child training

A final problem that is essentially new in family life is the unisexual control of the rearing and education of children. One is not considering here the actual labor involved, as apparently this side of family life has been delegated to the mother by nearly all peoples at all times. The point at issue is the entry of the father into the determination of methods of rearing the children. Until the time of the industrial revolution both the father and mother were in and about the home for the major part of the day. In parts of our own suburban sections, some three-quarters of the fathers are almost entirely out of touch with the actual problems of rearing young children. The feminine control of the younger children is continued in the school where the child meets few men teachers until high school is reached.

One sees the same situation at a higher level of integration, namely, in those organizations of national scope which are furthering the study of the child's development. These are largely under feminine control. Comparatively few men are interested in meetings concerning the problems of children. The various ventures in preparing individuals for parenthood have been largely directed towards prospective mothers.

Is this an unhealthy tendency? A unisexual control of child training in the hands of men would probably be a rather hor-

⁵ Floyd Dell, *Love in the Machine Age*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1930.

rible mess. As was earlier pointed out the Depression has to a considerable extent put the father back into the home—and under rather stressful conditions due to his natural worry over lack of employment. Contrary to expectation, those indices of disturbance—truancy and minor school delinquencies such as tardiness—have very generally decreased in amount over this period. Without being able to say that this decrease is dependent on the father's presence in the home, we can at least say that our expectation of increasing stress in the home because of conflict between the two parents' methods was apparently incorrect.

This monopolistic control of the child by women has been the subject of dire prognostication. While it seems reasonable to suppose that in a venture in which both sexes have so much at stake, a unisexual determination of developing principles is unrealistic, there is no evidence at present of the sort of impending disaster that has been predicted.

In recapitulation, throughout Chapter VII we have often crossed the path of Chapter V, but instead of a rather static set of individual needs which, as such, seemed thwarted in the changing configuration of the pattern, we now see the individual in terms of his attempting to mold his needs and the changing pattern into an integrated and meaningful whole. Adjustment loses its quality of a static satisfaction, of something attained, to become at once an acceptance of the complexity of the problems ahead with a certain confidence that they can be met.

A study of the individual operating in the pattern about him, made purely from the point of view of the individual, such as we have made in Chapters V and VI, may fail to give this continuity of the adjustment process; made purely from the point of view of the institution, it fails to measure the

varied tensions set up in each individual—tensions that quite control what of the environment can ever really be absorbed by the personality. In approaching the subject as in Chapter VII we have attempted to see the personality operating within the changing framework of a social institution. This must be considered in the light of the theory that at the “outer edge” of the personality there exists a selective membrane or envelope which accepts or refuses the offerings of the milieu on the basis of the ripening and changing needs of the individual. We now begin to see that the personality can accept, can “understand” only what it can afford to accept and understand and that the whole problem of education changes from one in which the focus is on the data to be taught over to one in which it is clear that data cannot be taught—that life cannot be taught—until we know what it *means* to each learner.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Personality and an Urban Area

WITHIN THE area served by the Essex County Juvenile Clinic is a close-packed triangle bounded by three railroads and containing a high percentage of foreign-born and second-generation individuals, ranging from skilled artisans down to unskilled laborers. The families are large and there is much crowding. The lines between various racial groups are not clearly marked off though there is somewhat of a tendency to cluster.

In this chapter we list what we have seen of the cross-currents between the pattern of living conditions found in such an area and the personality. We have chosen this sort of illustration in distinction to that of the previous chapter because social institutions, such as the Family, grow and change in themselves through the growth and change of their members. On the other hand, areas within a city are changed rather by forces outside of the personality—industrial spread or new means of transportation—the inhabitants usually moving to other areas when the distinction between what they wish to be and what the area makes them becomes too great. In the case of the Family, we were able to speak realistically of integrated and purposeful changes, as we could in dealing with the Church, Industry, or the School. It is hard for people to move into or out of the Family or the School; people stay in them and change them. It is relatively easy to move into or out of a geographical area; the sociological factors within the area seem to the individual to be distinctly more static.

However, the fundamental issues are the same. Study of the casual breakdown shows us that the personality can be understood only if the cultural pattern in which it has grown, and from which it has taken its coloring, is understood; that it can be molded, "cured" if you please, only in the light of these cultural factors and perhaps only by altering them. Nor is this alteration merely to "better the surroundings of the individual" but also to better the individual. Social work of any sort is only forging its own fetters so long as it accepts the ancient dichotomy of personality and culture. The recent trend towards building a personal security, towards mending attitudes, towards a preoccupation with individual mechanisms is important; but it may be a comfortable escape from reality unless one keeps in mind that the personality is in the cultural pattern; to phantasy that one may be changed without altering the other ranks with much of the magnificent but futile daydreaming of our various patients.

While we shall fail to see in this example the working through of a problem because the individual moves away from the area instead of enduring the growing tensions between what he wishes to be and what the pattern would make of him, we feel that our data from other areas indicate the probability that here too we are dealing with the individual's adjustment to problems rather than his adjustment of problems.

There are certain limitations in the material for Chapter VIII. We have selected an area of the City of Newark in which children come to us almost entirely through the Juvenile Court (the schools of this city operate their own clinic). This may skew our material somewhat to the side of those less able to adjust to the pattern about them. However, scattered material from other crowded areas which provide contact with children not referred by the courts seems to indi-

cate that this factor of selection does not materially distort the fundamental issues.

We chose this in preference to other possible samples as perhaps throwing some light upon a prevalent theory of the economic causes of maladjustment. Whether this be expressed in the social worker's finality in declaring the home a "bad one" (intending thus to characterize its poverty and crowding), or in statements from judges or officers of the law who assure the public that poverty is a large factor in crime, the implication is that certain economic conditions are the source of our social ills. It is simple to show that only poor people appear in our criminal courts, that the incidence of school retardation is much higher in the crowded areas, that mortality statistics and disease show here a most unfavorable comparison with those of advantaged areas—in short, that every form of social ill is increased in those areas of marked poverty.

If poverty were the cause of delinquency instead of the cause of being haled into court, if crowding rather than carelessness were the source of disease, if wealth meant the absence of problems instead of ability to care for them without recourse to formal social agencies—a better day would be but around the corner. Actually poverty and crowding seem to develop attitudes which in turn play into the hands of economic disadvantage—and any theory as to the economic sources of social ills must consider what these disadvantages mean to the personality and what meaning the proposed changes will have in terms of personality values and attitudes. It is the people themselves who are caught in the dragnet of sickness and death and no mere reallocation of the goods of the world—no resharing without consideration of what it will mean to those whom it affects—will accomplish anything more than show. The two (the person and the pattern) interact and

(as we may have reiterated too frequently) those who would merely alter attitudes show the same blindness and the same parochial satisfaction as those who would merely alter dollars or houses.

POVERTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

"Hardening"

The first phenomenon that we have observed is what might be termed the hardening or brutalizing effect of constant financial menace. The psychological and physiological factors in "hardening" are difficult to assay though the process has definite reality and seriously affects much of our work with the dependent and delinquent. Every experience has a certain emotional value, a certain affect content. As we pointed out in Chapter III, page 58, we turn to the casual breakdown for material in order to take advantage of the heightened emotional value of that situation. As an experience is repeated its emotional value or affect content is lessened so far as the individual is concerned. Possibly the mechanism is one of a more rapid and facile "draining off" of the disturbances and tensions set up by the event. Thus the criminal can with ease recall his first break with established law—though that break was really a minor one in relation to many later offenses. This is possibly because the visceral disturbances occurring at the time of the first break, through their very newness and strangeness, had not set those patterned modes of arrangement and draining off which would be developed by repeated experience. Thus the hardening process would be not a decreased emotional reaction but a sort of ordering of reactions into something like habitual patterns which obviate those disturbing reverberations appearing in the first "casual" act. This may be measured in many ways—one of the more dramatic being that given us by a nineteen-year-old "beginner."

In holding up a store he realized that his trembling voice would betray his emotional excitement and therefore, in self-defense, he wrote out his demands in advance. After his sixth successful effort he was able to use his voice calmly.

Similarly, occasional poverty affects individuals in a very different way from persistent threats to shelter and food. Occasional and relatively short periods of financial stress are met as a disturbing challenge, are not lacking in thrill. One "didn't think he could do it" or "didn't know he had it in him"—so he expresses something of the pleasure of a challenge met or of a sharp crisis escaped. Where the problem is met every day and perhaps to an even more serious extent, a new quality of response sets in. We believe that this is not a mechanism of resignation, but the development of patterns of response (or draining off) that prevent each experience of want (it matters little how drastic!) from resulting in the emotional reverberations which accompanied the first such experience. This hardening or brutalizing process has certain practical implications.

There are many situations which the children of the area we are discussing seem to be able to meet with relatively little emotional disturbance—situations which would seriously disturb children of advantaged areas. (An example appears in their reactions to bullies and to losing out in competition and games even though they have a strongly competitive spirit.) It is as though the process of hardening could be used to advantage in meeting problems other than poverty. The social worker meets the relative equanimity of the child with "Well, he *ought* to be disturbed about it." A somewhat wide-flung belief that the children of the poor are lacking in the finer sensibilities is perhaps correct only in the sense that out of self-protection accustomed or habituated pathways of emotional reaction to crises are formed. The disturbance that the poor little rich child shows over what his hard-boiled cousin

takes so nonchalantly is not then so much a matter of degree of feeling as that the former has not learned what to *do* with his feelings. Thus these two individuals in the presence of a crisis which is absolutely new to each frequently show the same reaction. A boy of sixteen who since seven had roamed the country with his father, experiencing the direst poverty, was entirely "taken off his guard" by the plight of a small youngster who had lost her parents. Joe knew and accepted every form of social evil but it was weeks before he could forget that experience, during which he had shown the tenderest regard for the child's feelings.

Corollary to this is the question as to the reaction a child who has long been hungry and cold has to a sunset or a painting in which there are nicely blended touches of color. Such different answers come from those who see much of these children (and our own findings are so various) that the answer must be a highly individualized one. The whole problem needs illumination and is of great educational value.

Finally one looks for a moment at this "hardened" person when a change of fortune occurs. If the essential element in continued and insistent poverty is the attitudes which it arouses, then some evidence of this should occur with the release of this pressure of stress and difficulty. And this is what actually happens. The individual now surrounds himself with gaudy symbols of a new day. The world knowingly shakes its head, confirmed in its assurance that here is "poor taste." If one "pinches himself to be sure that he is awake," he is simply stimulating a reaction which will not in empty fashion drain off along habituated and patterned pathways.

Feeling of insecurity

Continued poverty of an insistent sort seems to produce a vague and generalized picture of insecurity. The repeated, particularized reactions of hunger and cold may develop an

habituation that means that each day's lack does not arouse those reverberations that appear in any serious emotional crisis, but an underlying pervasive sense of insecurity nevertheless develops.

The development of security (see Chapter V, pages 95 ff.) is to a great extent a family affair—some sense of belongingness that the psycho-motor tensions of the parents transmit to the child. The resulting satisfaction is so basic a sentiment that it is only the most serious or prolonged series of threats that disturb it. The child who has not achieved this sense of security, the child who has not ever had a feeling that he has an unassailable place because of who he is regardless of what he is or what he does, shows a rather typical picture of anxiety and panic. However, this same picture appears in children who have suffered continued and serious blows at their sense of adequacy. It has been this that has led us to accept provisionally the conclusion that it is possible to produce a destruction of the feeling of security where the blows at adequacy are of sufficient strength and frequency. We recently saw a ten-year-old boy who unmistakably in his school and family history gives the picture of earlier security. For three years he has been living at places to which he is ashamed to take his companions, he has had clothes which practically preclude his going to school, and he has been without money to meet the small needs of boys of his age. He now gives the typical picture of not wishing to undertake the difficult task and of meeting every situation in rather panicky fear.

Children in families that have long had marginal or even lower status do show the picture of insecurity. It is without question affected by other security-giving mechanisms so that in well-knit family groups the picture does not appear as soon as in others, if at all. The data are not entirely clear, in

the sense that one can never be sure whether long-continued financial reverses of themselves bring about the insecurity or whether they simply accentuate a condition previously existent in such mild degree as not to be recognizable in the sort of retrospective analyses which clinic procedure often has to use.

In either case it must be apparent that the poverty itself is vitalized and made important only as it touches upon and is given meaning by the personality. In this new setting of its meaning to the individual it undergoes enough transformation so that the mere removal of poverty and need does not solve the problem.

Feeling of inferiority

Perhaps the outstanding problem from the point of view of conduct disorders is that of the feeling of inferiority arising from the specific things which the less advantaged child lacks and desires. The matter is of course a relative one. One's feeling of insecurity comes from a long-continued, real fear of cold and hunger; the hardening effects of poverty are the hardening effects of real need; but the feeling of inferiority is one that is in relation to other persons. The inferiority reactions of children appear in many situations considerably removed from the brink of actual need. When children of the poor steal, it is usually to obtain those things which they themselves actually want—those things which give them that satisfaction of possession which they dream that children of other strata have. On the other hand, children equally deprived but in contact with more advantaged children come to us involved in stealing those objects which more directly compare with what the others have or those things with which they may buy favor. In areas of Essex County where patterns

of the sort that we are discussing are contiguous to those of greater advantage, so that the children from the two groups are thrown together in school, we often deal with the latter phenomenon. Thus one finds the stealing of money which is used to buy candy which is used to buy social favor. (Our best examples of this last have been a handful of the children of the janitors who live in the apartment houses occupied by the well-to-do. These children did not steal what looked good to them but what looked good to the children of the tenants.) The group described here represent only a fraction of those to whom stealing *means* something else than merely the possession of a prized object.

One meets the distinction in the effectiveness of treatment. It is very difficult to provide any satisfactory therapy for the insecure child—the various attempts at answering his needs by giving him preference in the schoolroom or athletic team are tawdry and bedraggled answers to his deep distress. However, answers to the feeling of inferiority are relatively simple and easy. Teacher and social worker have long recognized this in handling a wide range of conduct disorders through giving to such children a feeling of success through any one of a host of resourceful ways. This type of treatment does not relieve the situation where it has progressed to the point of meaning insecurity to the child.

Because the narcissism of adolescence so much emphasizes whatever may be the child's problems, the feelings of inferiority from poverty are more acutely seen than at other times. The problem of clothing families under the Emergency Relief program, for instance, has had its peculiar difficulties with the adolescent children. Where the adults and younger children were pressed enough by need to go for clothes thus provided, the more acutely sensitive adolescents have rebelled against this sort of regimentation. Similarly in

another less-advantaged area of the county we have found that the teachers of the primary schools (up through sixth grade) knew much of the struggle of poverty-stricken families whereas in the junior and senior high schools in these same areas the teachers had no such data though their children came from the same families. "Well, we know they are having an awful time but they never say anything to us about it." "We can never get them to admit they are having any troubles at home." This is affected undoubtedly by the fact that high school teachers know their pupils less well than do grade teachers. However, in clinic or elsewhere the typical reaction to inferiority, the able and relatively sure-footed ability to cover over the matter that really disturbs the child, is much more frequently seen in the adolescent members of needy families than in their younger siblings.

STREET PLAY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The meaning of play

The play life of the children of the area under consideration is very largely confined to street play and we have, again, been making an effort over these years to determine what street play means to the personality.

Play life—at least for children—is very largely emotional in its connotations. Even such intelligence as is required is of a highly contentional sort, demanding more of shrewdness or "cuteness" than that sort which is measured by the formal intelligence tests. This is amply supported by frequent lack of correlation between "intelligence" (in the sense used by the psychometrists) and success in ordinary street play. The school teacher marvels—and is often irritated—over children's preferences in their play life and games for those who far from shine in the classroom. (This has been perhaps the most

persistent and jarring challenge that she has met to her faith in the relationship of what she teaches to the real problems of life.)

Those parts of the nervous system which are involved—and their order of appearance—in an “emotional reaction” are still the subject of dispute. Yet somewhere in the emotional experience the body enters, as is not the case in purely intellectual operations. Thus when one is ashamed he is ashamed in his face. When one fears, the roots of the hair and the whole gastro-intestinal tract are involved. When one is happy or gay there is a certain feeling of the lightness of the whole body. And depression equally seems to load the entire body with a weight of lead. In other words, the completion of an emotional reaction involves expression through the visceral or sympathetic system. (One has to use the word “completion” here due to the present uncertainty of the exact relationship in time and stimulus between the visceral and the cerebro-spinal elements of the nervous system.) We take it that the ability of the higher animals, who are quite as well equipped in this visceral system as are we to express—and apparently to experience—emotions, is some support of this. Certainly the dog, the anthropoids, and to some extent the horse, seem quite as competent to enjoy, to hate, to show loyalty or jealousy, as we are.

Accepting this, accepting the concept of the maturation of the visceral system, accepting the hypothesis that the cultural pattern coerces and molds these visceral expressions in quite as autocratic (though, obviously, less direct) a manner as it imposes its wishes upon the intellectual life, a vast field of training and education opens before us. The early activities of the parents play their part—just as they sincerely affect the child’s approach to the field of symbolic thinking—but the major “education” of the visceral system at least through

childhood probably occurs through the play life. In play, more than in any other adjustment, the conditions surrounding emotional expression can be varied to meet the child's needs. The cultural pattern of any civilization delays and thwarts emotional expression and through this sets up appetite for expression—which appetite it seeks to train to be satisfied with reactions acceptable to the pattern. Anger which is aroused in early experiences in football is thus restrained (at least in its expression) and the individual is taught to satisfy the appetite aroused in this way by controlled acts of playing valor. The football coach will even deliberately attempt to anger his players that they may execute a better game. We earlier (Chapter V, pages 115 ff.) questioned the value of thwarting the emotions from the point of view of the individual's mental health but of course any other practice would lead to so sudden and complete a disintegration of our entire pattern that individual as well as social destruction would occur. Love, hatred, jealousy, joy, and sorrow receive the same treatment. And while there are many tools at the hand of society, it is, for the child, in the field of play that the outstanding mode of this control and substitution presents itself. (The ramifying implications of this fundamental task seem so clear that one marvels that the school has let itself be so completely monopolized by the intellectual field—only recently entering the field of play and still insisting upon the "coldness" of knowledge. Why has a cultural pattern so definitely committed to the policy of indoctrination through the schools neglected this richest of all fields?) These considerations lead us to the field of play with much more than relaxation at stake, interested in something besides taking the child out from under the mother's feet. The implications of such an approach are dealt with in Chapter XII and only this need be said here: that a program of "exercises"

and drills (the ordinary school program of physical education) is entirely inadequate to the needs and promise of the whole field of the education and training of the emotions or expression of the emotions, and that the mere provision of a place to play is equally lacking in vision. A program of molding the entire individual to the efficiency of the cultural pattern is at best questionable business—but it is a program to which our civilization is committed and in its present blindness to the importance of play it is doing itself poor justice.

Effect of street play on mental health

From this point of view the street play of children becomes of increasing interest and importance. One asks what its characteristics mean to the development of the emotions. In this inquiry one is forced to take the indirect approach of seeing the problem in the light of the bodily expressions involved.

Street play is artificially confining in two ways. Few games requiring extensive running are possible. "Cops and robbers" and similar games are played within confined limits and the exciting phantasy content is of more importance to the child than is the physical activity of capture or escape. Such games as baseball maintain their ideational content at the same time that they are materially limited in physical expression. Children of the streets in their first days at camp show an unbelievable bursting forth of physical and vocal expression. To what extent the limitation in actual physical activity and in the type of game that can be played is actually, day by day, affecting the child, we do not know. From what we see there seems to be set up a mechanism of protection—a way of draining off the dammed-up tensions—that at least allows the child for each day of city living to be free of the feeling of the lack of healthy outlet. Thus we are quite unaware of what

this all means to the child until we take him into a rural situation where his sudden uncontrollable exuberance gives us a picture of the previous confinement.

Street play lacks continuity. Of course, a great deal of the unsupervised play life of children lacks continuity. (One of the disasters dependent upon adult supervision of children's play comes in our effort to lengthen the span of attention beyond what is normal for the age involved. "They never stick at anything" is the disgusted formula which the adult brings to the clinic.) However, in street play there are other factors of disruption which rather brusquely break into the picture. The first is the needs of other groups. In crowded areas the opportunity of a group to play out its own game without interference from another group which wishes more space, or merely shows the normal desire to be in the midst of anything that is "going on," is relatively limited. There is, of course, also the breaking in of street traffic. Not only do these factors break the continuity of the game itself but they imply fear and defense as constant concomitants of the play process.

Street play involves a heterogeneity of collaborators which is of questionable hazard. What does it mean that the wealth of available players brings into any game a wide variety of ages and abilities? In talking with children of the street about their playmates one is amazed at the wide range of age (this excludes the "pal" or inner circle of special friends where there is rather marked homogeneity of age or ability). However, one's disturbance over this is unquestionably affected by the tradition of age distinction which the school stratification of children has built in us all. Perhaps the heterogeneity in maturity of emotional life and in span of attention which the play of the street provides is salutary relief from the regimentation of school grading. We are also, perhaps,

unduly affected by our experience with youngsters who play habitually with older children and show a tense, uneasy restlessness which seems to be the result of the child's having forever to "reach up" to an integration and length of span of attention which is beyond his ability. In other words, we are at present without adequate data as to the effect of the age variation of play groups—and our natural distrust is perhaps dependent entirely on considerations which are not pertinent here.

We are not implying a disparagement of street play in comparison to what is available to children of more advantaged families. We find the latter frequently quite without adequate physical outlets in play—the fact that a family owns a lawn unfortunately does not guarantee that the children are allowed to romp upon it. Here, as elsewhere, we have simply used a certain area to illustrate an approach to the problem that asks what a certain social situation means to the development of the child—means in terms of certain rather well-defined needs in growth.

In the area which we are discussing some playgrounds have been developed. These alter in certain ways the matters discussed above. Crowding and confinement still exist, though not so markedly. There is a distinct difference in the factor of disturbance—the children are free from fear of automobiles and the crushing of their game by rival groups. To what extent adult supervision is going to control and regiment the child's activities rather than make way for their free expression remains for time to tell. For those interested in conduct disorders perhaps the most interesting question is whether the children who most need the playground will go there. In company with many similar ventures the playground is still viewed with suspicion by the type of child who fears the loss of freedom that is threatened when adults enter his life.

CROWDING AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The area under discussion has a large number of industrial plants interspersed in a general housing pattern of low rentals, large families, and few rooms for each. In the working out of the problems of life what does this pattern mean to the individuals living within it?

Lack of self-sufficiency

Crowding seems very definitely to affect the self-sufficiency of children—their ability to be alone. This is a matter entirely different from that of the close-drawn walls about the ego which are built when others threaten (Chapter V). Here we are dealing with a certain uncomfortable ill-at-ease-ness when there are not many others about. The search is for games, for work, where many others are close by. Also we have found difficulty in placing girls of this area in house-servant positions, a difficulty made up of many elements apparently, one of which at least is revealed by the girls' statement that "the work is too lonely." Every social engineer has had the experience of the loneliness of these children of crowded areas when placed in the country. It is as though they felt incomplete—without the necessary supports to the personality. It seems that persistent and constant crowding from early life destroys the sense of individuality—which without doubt is fostered by opportunities for privacy. (McDougall in discussing this same phenomenon uses the term "incomplete personality."¹)

These children seek in all their activities situations in which there are others—the movies, the factory. Their panic over country placement is not due merely to the strangeness of the surroundings, as many do not show this when placed

¹ William McDougall, *Character and the Conduct of Life*, New York, Putnam's, 1927.

in equally new situations where there are plenty of people about—in other cities or in other parts of the same city. (Country children brought to the city similarly complain of “loneliness”—but this is a different matter. Here the child feels that he is no factor in all that goes on about him—that persons do not nod a “good morning”—that his place of importance in the community is lost.) Our work in suburban and rural districts has convinced us that periods of being alone, of playing alone, of having the privacy of one’s own room, are important fostering agents in a feeling of individuality, of self-sufficiency.

The other side of the picture is that there is a certain sensing of the needs of others, a certain understanding of others that comes from always living with them, not provided otherwise. Those who have periods of privacy, of being alone, have the opportunity to arrange their clothes before they appear in public. One often hears the complaint that the ward leader, the “typical politician,” represents the crowded, less advantaged area, but at the same time the admission that he has a certain understanding of people that seems to come only from close contact with people in all their moods.

(The United States is rapidly being urbanized and, if we see the effects of crowding correctly, its results should appear in our cultural pattern. Is our growing reputation as a nation of joiners in any sense dependent upon this same factor? Here seems again to be this feeling of incompleteness if there are not many around.)

Destruction of illusions

Crowding serves to destroy the illusions which children build about other people. The word “illusion” is perhaps unwisely chosen. These images we build of others are of the material of our dreams and goals. They are of great dynamic

power—leading us to the best we can attain. Indeed the hero we thus invest is little more than the dramatizer, the personalization of what is perhaps otherwise too intangible a goal. We nevertheless use “illusion” here because its opposite has such a fixed and real meaning. When we speak of “disillusionment” we recognize the breaking of that which has been of tremendous worth.

There seems to be a certain optimum amount of contact for the construction of illusions. This differs for different individuals. At times chance meeting serves for the building of a complete hero picture. This phenomenon is not common, and depends entirely upon the extent to which some presenting symbol has been previously associated with an acceptable ideal image (“I *always* like people with that sort of hand”). Most of the children we see build much more definitely upon persons whom they know better—with whom they have carried through a number of conversations or projects. We have become quite certain that there is a point of contact beyond which these illusions stand the hazard of complete destruction. In this mechanism the child puts into the individual what he would like to be there rather than accepting what actually is there. This means that with rare exceptions the process of disillusionment must come with better acquaintance and more frequent contact.

Crowding, as we have said, destroys these illusions. People are seen when not on dress parade, they are seen often—they must be seen as they are rather than as they would wish to be or as one would wish to see them. For instance, the boys of this area do not want to follow in their fathers’ footsteps. Of course, these families represent the least advantaged groups so that the children would naturally look to some other lines of work than those which seem so patently to have brought this lowly result. We have felt however that there is, too, the

factor that the child knows his father too well. One idealizes out of dream material—the clatter and push of crowded living conditions too easily wake him up.

Does crowding prevent the formation of these illusions or break them down soon after they are formed? Our present feeling (without adequate data) is that the latter is the case. The discovery that these children continue the construction of these illusions (though now about new persons) would, in part, constitute such data. Would individuals show an insistent urge to form these idealized goals if they had never done so at least in embryo form? One may add, for what it is worth, the observation that the descriptions of persons which these children give carry that certain sort of crispness that comes from something broken ("Everybody is a gyp," "There isn't a one I'd really trust"). Admittedly our data for this area only cover the delinquent group, which perhaps considerably skews the findings. The child describes his lack of goal images in the people about him with a certain attitude of rebuff. It is not alone that these children of crowded families are much more realistic about other people than are the children of well-to-do families. They are realistic on the negative or discouraging side—that they know that you cannot trust people, that people are fundamentally selfish and looking for the attainment only of their own ends. They are much more on the defensive as to other people.

If crowding actually prevented the formation of ideal images then we should find hero worship absent in these groups. But if, as we believe, crowding merely served to break the images which are formed, then in some form or other hero worship should be found quite as much as at other levels of social stratification. The latter is what we find in our group. The older children have their highly idealized heroes and follow their lead as best they can. But these heroes are

now peculiarly depersonalized. Thus, if one talks about some baseball hero he finds that nothing is known of the person. The hero is one of power and numbers. A home run is not a crisis met by a person but "his forty-first." Is this just the short-cut symbol for the more personal image? We think not—we have not been successful in getting back of batting averages and home-run accomplishments to the personality involved. This same "emptying" of the personality makes their description of the movies amusing. These children use the true names of the actors in describing their activities on the screen—again "protecting themselves" from the true personality of the movie hero or heroine. ("Clark Gable almost lost his life saving her.") Watching the face of the child through this gives ample evidence that the star is separated entirely from his or her own personality. If one now turns the child to the actual life of her favorite actress there is either a quick "Oh, I don't know anything about that" or a projection from a film that again leaves the star without much that she could really call her own.

Such observations led us to the following formulation: that the crowding of individuals does not prevent the development of image goals or hero worship; that the crowding of individuals repeatedly disillusion children, breaks the images that are formed; that what is left open to the child is an interesting form of depersonalized hero in which the name of an individual stands for such abstractions as numbers, high averages, power, or victory; that, in other words, the child learns that he cannot "afford" to worship a person *as such*.

This realism, this clearness of vision as to people, works peculiarly in another way, so that children seem to see more clearly what is "good" in people just as they see what is, for them, "bad." How else can one understand the ability of children to see the love that lies behind the harsh hand and

voice? For often love is there—often it is precisely this force that impels the harshness. (One is tempted to amusement at a naïveté that fails to see that it is the errors only of those for whom we care that stir our deepest feelings. How often must we strive for calmness, plan for objectivity, scheme for a certain coldness in the feeding of the child—all to gain victory over a dish of spinach! How often the child senses in the parent's disturbance the tie of belongingness it craves! Well can we afford to be cold and objective about those things which do not touch us and about those for whom we do not care! We have had some rather rude jolts from children in families where statistics as to tempests ran high—only to find ties of loyalty and love that seemed incomprehensible. "Sure the old man beat me up—lots of times—but it was because he loved me. He wouldn't a done it if he didn't care a lot.") The child of the crowded home senses motives—sees what really lies behind conduct—and if this breaks his brittle idols it often too gives him strength and the sense of belongingness in the face of what seems to the objective outsider to be unreasonable and cruel treatment.

(We earlier essayed a parenthesis as to cultural drifts and here we raise another general question. In the light of growing urban concentration, and the disruption of the drive to the idealization of others which it seems to imply, we have been interested in the recent development of "realism" in our biographical literature. People turn out to be only real people after all—national heroes of just the same ordinary clay as the rest of us. This form of biography would be no more "realistic" than the earlier romantic types if we continued to live as far away from others as we earlier did. The important factor in our illusions about others is their intense realism and power. Their disappearance from our lives is not so much a matter of their weakness and lack of substan-

tiality as it is of our having destroyed them through the way in which we live.)

Sexual maladjustment

Crowding also prevents the building of illusions about sex. (Again we impute a realism and dynamic power to "illusions" that is scarcely connoted in the word itself.) This demands that something be said of the meaning of sexual adjustments.

In any of the biological sciences it is difficult to set up a true dichotomy. If one sets up a dichotomy in the field of what sexual expression means to people, it is done only for the sake of clearer exposition; one accepts the premise that each of the two elements runs into the other, with indistinct borders between them. On this basis sexual expression can be said to play two quite distinct roles which are in large measure separable though both have a part in most sexual acts.

Sexual phenomena, on the one hand, serve the individual in high degree as the source of direct pleasurable experiences. It is uncertain at how early an age this appears though certainly, from birth, the genital region is provided with a greater concentration of sensory nerves than practically any other part of the body. The individual comes into the world already equipped to receive through this region satisfying responses which are not of a sexual nature as the adult knows it but rather of something merely more marked and striking than are other body reactions. However, the sexual connotations (in an adult sense) of these reactions rapidly grow, being aided by the biological process of the specialization of sensation and by the social process which hastens to give meaning to all life experiences. Thus occasionally one finds children up to ten years old, let us say, who turn to stimulation of the genital region as a means of attaining a direct

satisfying physical response (in distinction to those who use these activities for their social value—a group discussed in a moment). From ten years on the opportunity for this direct satisfaction develops and is worked out largely in the problem of masturbation. We have seen both girls and boys who, we are convinced, have no phantasy life during masturbation beyond the contemplation of the pleasure of the act itself. Here one finds the establishment of various sorts of so-called perverted sexual acts because the individual is primarily interested in any procedure which will develop actual physical expression of the sexual hunger. Such an individual very soon loses all compunctions (as to following what Society is pleased to call “normal” heterosexual procedures) and is quite ready to find expression in the homosexual or heterosexual, in the normal or perverted field, wherever gratification can be found.

Sexual phenomena on the other hand serve a high symbolic or language-value purpose for the individual. Just how early this begins is again unknown although perhaps some of the rudimentary patterns are set down in late infancy when the child discovers that masturbation has a high social value in the temper tantrums his act causes in the nearby adults. Soon children learn that certain words serve the same purpose of attracting attention. By six the boy learns that there are sexual acts which connote that one is grown up, and children of both sexes at this time, or before, use sexual information as valuable coin—buying respect and admiration from other children through particular bits of information. Most masturbation (at least this is true of our group) carries a high degree of heterosexual phantasy. By far the larger fraction of the “perversions” which we see at this period (sodomy and the like) are rich in heterosexual phantasy, are undertaken as a means of showing that one is “grown up” and spontane-

ously disappear just as soon as social sanctions allow of true ("normal") heterosexual experiences. The sexual phenomena through this whole adolescent period run rampant as the symbols of having grown up. One sees something of this as one listens to the tale of many a boy or girl who defies social condemnation in an effort to show through these fabrications that full growth has by now been attained. Similarly one talks with many of these children who actually dread definite heterosexual experience but who try to drive themselves to it because it is their best established symbol of maturity. The boy who has attempted but failed to consummate the heterosexual act never comes to us with a story of physical thwarting or unpleasantness, but with the shame that he is not yet grown up. So for the adolescent one could multiply by hundreds the examples of the use of the sexual life to attain in one's own eyes and the eyes of others, age, maturity, social prestige, victory in sibling rivalry, and the like.

Interwoven with the above and developing rapidly in adolescence is the use of the sexual life as a means of expressing relationships which are beyond the power of words. It is at this level that the sexual aspects of the marital relationships work themselves out. The intimacy ties involved in marriage are idiomatic for the individual (see Chapter V); the partners labor to develop a feeling that here exists a relationship that could exist between no two others. The sexual act is of the highest importance here—entered upon only by "agreement" of both partners and turned to by them as a means of expressing some sort of idiomatic tie that seems to defy any other form of expression. So-called "perversions" (as Havelock Ellis long ago pointed out so well)² have frequently

² In various places; particularly see Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Philadelphia, F. A. Davis, 1927. Volume VI, pages 523, 531 (footnote), 544, and 554.

now a particular value as they represent to the partners symbols of "what other people wouldn't do."

Physical gratification of course plays a part in practically all the sexual phenomena. Equally, the symbolic values of the sexual life appear to some degree in most of its manifestations. The matter is one, then, of the relative degree to which each is present. We have dealt with boys and men who in fear and actual physical discomfort attempt to carry through various forms of sexual expression as symbolizing maturity. (This is apparently more common in girls and women—many of whom go through the entire sexual life with nothing beyond the experience of the sexual activities as the "proper thing to do" or what is "expected of one in marriage.") Of the existence of the various onanistic, homosexual, and heterosexual acts as no other than means of physical gratification, we are decidedly more certain.

What now are the "illusions" about sex? We think that they are the realistic, dynamic images that are set up in a vague way about this use of sex as a symbol of relationship. And what now does crowding do to these illusions, which ordinarily begin to appear at seven, eight, or nine years of age? If our observations are correct then an individual can understand the use to which those who love each other put the sexual life only when he or she has had that experience. It is precisely the idiom of the relationship which defies teaching it to others. Yet our clinic records of crowded families quite abound in instances of children surreptitiously or more openly viewing those sexual activities to which they can give no other connotation than that of physical gratification. In other words, the "illusions" about sex are not formed because the child views the whole gamut of sex activities for those years during which he can give them practically no other connotation than that of direct physical gratification.

What meaning do such views give to "sexual perversion"? Evidently the important matter is whether or not the act leads towards a better heterosexual adjustment. Sexual acts carried out upon individuals of the same sex or of a masturbatory nature where the phantasy is entirely heterosexual and where the deterrence to heterosexual approach is social tabu, can hardly be called perversions—indeed, these individuals turn to "correct" heterosexual outlets as soon as the social sanctions allow. Similarly the most eminently "proper" relations of the marital state may be carried through with so overwhelming a drive on the part of one of the partners for physical gratification and so complete a disregard for the language values of the sexual act in the expression of the affectional ties, as to constitute definitely a perversion. In other words, a perversion in sexual expression has nothing at all to do with the form of the act but only with its purpose (which, of course, has been already recognized by a number of writers).

Does crowding prevent the development of illusions about sex or does it break them down after they have been formed? We get the impression from our clinic children that these illusions are never formed. In talking with us they do not manifest the elements of disappointment—the sharpness as of something broken—that appears in the discussion of broken idols. It has been this in part that has built our theory that the symbolic language values of sexual phenomena appear later in childhood and are prevented from appearing where the child has first seen so much of what is to him meaningless ("meaningless" beyond their prevision of physical satisfaction) physical expression.

We are aware that a large and voluble group of psychoanalytic persuasion have felt that it has been precisely the illusions about sex that have led to most of our difficulties.

They would have us realize that hiding from children the strength and undaunted drive of the sexual urge has been really what has led to neuroses and conflicts when the child actually meets the overpowering character of his or her own sexual hunger. This may be a correct view of the situation. If it is, then the various interesting (not to say exotic) mechanisms which this school has uncovered should be quite lacking in crowded families where children from tender years are accustomed to see a rather florid display of the sexual urge. Up to the present time certain quite impelling urges have almost entirely prevented the psychoanalysts from investigations among the poor. Our experience is that among the poor these difficulties are at least as frequent as among their more advantaged cousins. We are still persuaded that any arrangement which brings to the child an important and insistent urge at a time when he is utterly unable to understand its perspective in the total life situation of the adults involved must color the child's whole future attitude.

We are also aware of the arresting nature of the facts supplied by the divorce courts. In the Los Angeles courts, for instance, it is reported that "the primary cause of discord was . . . mostly based on complaints of sexual maladjustments."³ Data such as these have strengthened the present fervid group who seek to cure the ills of family life through sexual education. We would be willing to accept the validity of these findings. We have ourselves every indication that a difficulty in the affectional ties first shows itself in sexual expression. How can people talk if they have nothing to say? The most subtle rift in the affectional ties is quite obviously magnified and dramatized in the sexual act which is no less than a highly complicated mutual act of expression. The analogy from the

³ J. E. Wallace Wallin, *Personality Maladjustments and Mental Hygiene*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935.

field of speech seems fair. Because speech difficulties such as stammering are so very dramatic and noticeable, generations have been busily engaged in attempting to cure these through various exercises directed to the speech trouble itself. If those interested in speech trouble now see that their point of attack is the fundamental emotional adjustment of the individual, may we not hope that in time there will be similar recognition that the sexual act is a mode of expressing certain deeper relationships?

There is an interesting type of document developing with some rapidity at this time—the volumes devoted to the technique of the sexual act. These Emily Posts of the sexual field have convinced themselves that one can make people happily married by telling them what happily married people do. Nor would one too quickly turn from this approach—writers are aided by a larger vocabulary, artists by better colors, carpenters by a wider range of tools. But first there must be something to be expressed.

Similar considerations threaten any movement which is directed at merely a symptom of a relationship. The pleasure factors in the sexual relations—in distinction to the language factors—are indeed persistent. However, propaganda which stresses solely these pleasure factors and their enhancement through freedom from fear of consequences runs the danger of emphasizing what we would consider the least constructive and most rapidly disintegrating factor of the marital relationship. It would be difficult not to support the dissemination of sane and correct information concerning a matter which is very widely practiced at the present time—namely, birth control—so long as there continued through the whole procedure the proper primary emphasis of the part that the sexual life plays in the preservation and enrichment of the love relationship.

What does all this mean in the matter of sexual education for children and young adults? There is nothing to be gained in a program that keeps the nature of the physical acts of sex in the realm of mystery and tabu. It is equally fatuous to feel that we are covering the sexual education of youngsters by describing in detail the overt sexual phenomena. If children are to be given an insight into a vocabulary they must recognize that it is a vocabulary. The child eight or nine years old cannot understand why "people do such things." They have for him value only as objective phenomena. Admittedly, this is the only value which they have for many adults. This is not, however, the point here. Perhaps with children we can never go beyond the matter of teaching them that sex is "all right," that their questions about it are not tabu, that their interest is not evil. In other words, the important aspect of sexual education for young children is not the so-called "facts" which are taught them but the attitude with which these are taught. We have become rather certain that many parents have done more harm in blushing and blundering their way through a detailed and exact account of affairs than have others who have dispensed such old favorites as the magnanimity of the stork in a way that has made the child feel that it was all right to have asked the question.

But, frankly, we have felt that up to the present we could not answer the question of sexual education of the adolescent. The physical manifestations of the sexual life are not only highly individual but they attain, for any pair of persons who are what one calls "happily married," validity precisely on the basis of their individuality—or at least on the basis of their supposed individuality. Perhaps it is only this setting forth of principles that could ever be given to adolescents. The high degree of individuality in the sexual relationship of itself seems to defy further "teaching."

(Again we return to our parenthetical statements. If population-concentration grows and if it indeed skews the interest of the child towards the physical-gratification side of sexual phenomena, is there any general cultural trend which might be thought of as developing from this? In this light we have been interested in the development in our literature, as well as in psychiatric theory itself, of a marked increase in preoccupation with the sexual acts themselves rather than with them as an expression of the affectional ties.)

Mental strain: Negativism and irritability

A fourth effect of crowding we have called—for lack of a better term—"mental strain." It is that which arises from always having to "hold on to oneself." In Chapter V we discussed the walls that are built about the ego to preserve its sanctity from prying eyes. That these are walls of fear seems certain—nor can watchful guardianship over them be relaxed as long as many others are about. So one meets many adults—and some children—who "want to get away from everybody" they know, who feel the need of some surcease from this eternal vigilance. The results, when these periods of freedom are lacking, are either those of a somewhat forbidding negativism or of irritable outbursts of temper which belong definitely to the phenomena of fatigue. We see much of the latter either alone or associated with the former. The fatigue phenomenon seems to come from failure ever to be free from the task of guarding the status-preserving walls.

Or the matter may be expressed in another way—amounting, we guess, to the same thing. Earlier we pictured our children's inability to integrate the ego into a whole unit. Perhaps the walls of protection for the integrated ego are, in crowded families, never really completely formed. Perhaps this "mental strain," the fatigue phenomenon which we see,

arises from the never-ending effort to integrate the ego under conditions which do not allow of this integration.

However this may be, one sees a constantly recurring picture of "touchy" reactions and irritability as the personality is pressed. Often one sees it covered, for protection, by an assumed nonchalance or braggadocio. When we realize that for many of these individuals from one year's end to the other, there is never a time that they are alone, we begin to get some picture of what this tension must be. Even the nights conspire to the same end; three to five children sleeping in the same bed means that even during the periods of relaxation and for the deeper levels of the unconscious there must always be this awareness of the imminence of others and the compromises and surrenders which this entails.

The reader recognizes that it is not alone the phenomenon of crowding that leads to this picture of mental strain. Nor, unfortunately, are touchy, irritable reactions confined to those of these less advantaged groups.

Lack of objectivity

Finally, among these individuals of crowded areas and crowded families there is what one describes as the phenomenon of being so much in the world that there is no chance to look at it. We have already discussed objectivity (Chapter IV, page 76) and attempted to show its basic importance to the developing personality. We believe that the degree of one's objectivity is largely if not entirely an inherent matter. However, even for individuals with a high degree of this objectivity this characteristic is in abeyance where the hurly-burly of life forever presses upon them. This is not a difficult matter to measure, our conclusions being based upon the relative ability of children from different areas to describe themselves and the situations in which they have been as onlookers rather than as participants.

PART THREE

Towards an Individual-
Centered Culture

CHAPTER NINE

The Road to an Individual-Centered Culture

BY PRESENTING illustrative examples of the personality operating within the changing framework of a social institution, drawn from our experience at the Essex County Juvenile Clinic over the past fourteen years, we have tried to show that the hypothesis set up in Chapters I and II has possibility of high validity. Before considering the implications of such an hypothesis, we recapitulate it.

It is possible to look at the problem of the constitution of the personality in terms of the individual's arriving in the world with certain inherent drives, urges, equipment, what-not, that might all be subsumed under the term "biological equipment." One might even say that here are the problems which the individual presents to his environment. Similarly one may map out the structure of the cultural pattern, its demands, the enforcement of its own peculiar needs in all formal and informal ways. These might be called the problems which the cultural pattern presents to the individual. Obviously, continuous change is involved as these two elements interact, because the result of the clash between two "problems" immediately means a new individual and a new cultural pattern to be involved in the subsequent adjustments. Because the pattern forever changes and because the personality equally grows, the problem is never completed; the answer at any moment is simply a new constellation of the factors involved.

A large group accepts the growth of the individual as being the result of a series of situations arising from the impinge-

ment of the cultural pattern upon the biological equipment as described above. But this is not an accurate or adequate picture of what is involved. Actually in addition to the above there is for each individual a selective process involved in the absorption of the cultural pattern. Whether, somewhat classically, one says that one perceives that to which he *chooses* to attend, or in more up-to-date fashion follows Piéron's conception of a selective membrane or "envelope" about the personality—a wall which serves as an osmotic mechanism allowing only certain material to enter and, probably, altering that material as it enters—the concept is really the same.¹ The nature of this "envelope" is the outstanding question in the study of the personality today, and it is precisely this question to which the various schools of dynamic psychology have addressed themselves. In considering the Family in relation to the personality, for instance, one may be unwilling to accept the all-importance of the Oedipus complex or of the problems of the birth trauma, but still clearly recognize that of all the material in the family environment we select some and reject some, and that this process is based upon the presence of an osmotic type of mechanism in which the determination of what valences are free for the acceptance of new material is a matter of that point to which one has arrived in working through some such problems as the analysts postulate or as we have illustrated in Chapter VII. Another way, it seems, of saying the same thing is to employ the concept of valence as Frank has done. Any chemical cluster can grow in but certain ways—can accept out of many choices only those elements or groups which at any given time satisfy its unfulfilled valences. I am in-

¹ This is dealt with in various places in his *Experimental Psychology*, perhaps best on page 67. The reader may also note pages 20, 51, 67, 104, and 126 as elaborating the idea. Henri Piéron, *Principles of Experimental Psychology*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929.

debted to Frank for this concept of valences. Lewin has used the word "valences" but in a slightly different sense.²

To repeat, our elements are three. There is a growing, changing personality made up at any moment of the total of its own contributions and those of the environment. There is a cultural pattern which itself grows and changes in answer to the impress of all those personalities which make it up and in answer to a series of forces engendered precisely by the fact that it is made up of great numbers of personalities. There is a selective process occurring at the place where the pattern impinges upon the personality, which controls the material accepted by the personality on the basis of its readiness to accept—in terms of the problems which it is itself solving. The personality is molded by the environment, the environment is molded by the personality, but—for each—there is a selective protective agent that translates all material presented in terms of the stage of solution of the problems which are being worked out.

It is for this reason that the sociologists' description of the environment is as empty as is the psychiatrists' description of the personality. The study and "cure" of the individual hundreds or thousands of miles from his natural milieu is just as parochial as are the amazing statistical tables of changes in this or that sociological function. The important thing is rather what the personality *means* to the environment and what the elements of the cultural pattern *mean* to the personality—all of this in terms of tensions that have been set up out of countless similar meanings in the past.

If a realistic view of the personality shows it to be molded

² L. K. Frank, The Management of Tensions, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, p. 705, March 1928. The idea is perhaps better expressed in the article by K. Lewin, Environmental Forces, in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, C. A. Murchison, editor, 2d ed., Worcester, Clark University Press, 1931, p. 596.

by the cultural pattern about it, what purposive adjustments need to be made in the various social institutions—what can be done about the cultural pattern? How, and to what extent, the personality molds the cultural pattern to suit its needs we cannot answer. Because the cultural pattern is made up of people, it seems inconceivable that they cannot mold it as they will—indeed, this growing personal realization of the dynamic influence which one is to have in determining the structure of the future pattern is perhaps the outstanding challenge to education and to the individual today. The earlier unquestioning acceptance of a divine disposition of the structure of the institutions is apparently now changing. The effects of social institutions upon the personality—those ways in which the cultural pattern in one or another way affects the working out of the individual's problem—are of only academic importance unless we can in one way or another alter the environment to meet the needs that appear.

Moreover, we seem in actuality at the moment to be going through such changes in our philosophy and institutions as are involved in the development of an individual-centered culture. To understand what this means, we must recall that all cultures of any complexity and persistence possess certain "centering-points" in terms of which the entire patterns can be understood.

For instance, the world has witnessed God-centered cultures—or, in fact, periods in many cultural developments during which they have been God-centered. In these the position and importance of the personality are measured on the basis of its service and usefulness to God. Its own development is measured in such terms; its contribution to the community on the same basis. Life, death, importance in the social scale—all these are colored and to a great extent controlled by the con-

ception that the only matter that counts is service to a personal God. To die in this service places the individual at the pinnacle of social importance and the point of fullest realization of the potentialities of individual development. The various social institutions are given the immutable blessing of this God and in turn are considered as having a right to existence and permanence only in so far as they serve Him.

But God-centered cultures, fixed as they are for any specific group or era, show marked individuality. This leads one to suspect that on a magnificent scale something has happened which we earlier described—the expression in the religious life (as though this were now the ordinate and abscissa) of all of the hopes, ambitions, and goals of any particular group. It is as though this were a point of reference—of giving meaning to life—rather than a directing factor. But any crystallization of a cultural pattern about a formula very soon gathers dynamic factors itself—to control, to act conservatively, to demand rather than give service.

Similarly there have been from time to time family-centered cultures. Here the point of primary importance is the continuance and furtherance of the Family as a social institution—and the individual is expected to fit into that need. Nor is the demand lightly made. Rather more is it a crude, frank statement to the individual that his salvation rests very largely on the extent to which he is a producing and constructive member of the family group.

There is high possibility that the origin of such a pattern, again, lay in the conception that only through such a structure could the basic needs of each individual be most adequately met. But, as we said of the God-centered culture, there is always this factor to be recognized: the social institution (no matter how amenable at its origin to individual needs)

becomes a driving force with its own powerful momentum of tradition and in protecting its own stability it soon loses sight of the individual needs for which it was created.

There have likewise been state-centered cultures. Here the individual's sense of "completeness" and service and his position of importance and worth in the community are measured in terms of his contribution to the welfare, or rather stability, of the State. In such a pattern as feudalism, possibly many of its most sincere and able proponents conceived its existence as, by and large, developing and protecting individuals in a better way than could any other culture. This was not an effort to erase the importance of the individual, but rather the establishment of lines of reference to which all the known phenomena could be oriented. That the system which gave meaning to society and perhaps the best answer to the individual's needs came to develop power and continuity in its own right, that the "lords protector" were soon to command rather than serve, that their development superseded in importance that of the individuals for whom the system may have been created—all this arose from the basic human trait of forever giving life itself to what are but the symbols of life.

In this same vein we can look upon the period which many think is now coming to a close in this country as a profit-centered culture. Such a definition of the present era is possible—that it is one in which each individual has his place in the scheme of things on the basis of what he contributes to the economic order. So much of our legislation has been based upon the profits which might accrue—so many of our outstanding educational and social welfare institutions are the proud symbols of that which profit could bestow. We even hear the Depression discussed in terms of a dislocation of the financial structure (despite the fact that the most super-

ficial perusal of *Recent Social Trends in the United States* discloses such a conglomeration of fundamental social tensions as make one wonder why our present efforts at social re-evaluation did not occur earlier).

There are signs of change. For some years we have been groping in vague and uncertain ways towards an individual-centered culture, towards a new orientation of our social outlook, which makes the individual personality the point of reference. We take it, for instance, that the mental hygiene movement, which from 1906 has spread in one form or another like wildfire, would have had an entirely different history if a large number of people had not been increasingly wondering what State, Industry, the Family, and so on, were doing to the personalities which were being squeezed into their mold. Again, one sees change occurring rather dramatically in the School. True, the child-centered school may perpetrate quite as many and serious crimes as does the curriculum-centered school. This is not the point here—though it is one which we shall have to face frankly in the ensuing chapters. Without regard to “good” or “evil” there is evidence of new orientation. This is, without question, occurring in the Family today. Decreasing attention is paid to what the child contributes to the Family, and there is widespread inquiry as to what the Family and particularly its adult members are doing to the child. We have been slower in asking these questions about the other institutions but even in the Church and Industry ministers and employers are today seriously considering their programs in the light of the needs of the individuals concerned. Certain formal religious groups are making heroic efforts to discover why people are not turning to them in such a crisis as the present—and so are definitely asking what part the Church plays in meeting the growth needs of the individual. Certainly one cannot escape

the changing attitude as it appears in Industry—at least as reflected in the newspapers which, in 1930, discussed overproduction as vehemently as today they discuss what the old and new order of things mean in the personality development of individuals.³

For good or for evil, we are slowly developing new lines of reference for the structure of our cultural pattern. We are asking less what one's service to God means to God, what one's service to the State means to the State, than what these mean to the individual himself. Nor is this to be confused with anarchy—with chaos—with unbridled license. It is well within the range of possibility that we shall swing back to as orthodox a pattern of religious conformity as has ever been experienced but, to put it schematically, this will be because careful study shows that this is what the individual needs rather than because it is what God needs. Our schools may dispense the three R's as rigidly as ever was true in the past—but they will still be child-centered if the type of training is chosen because the child's needs have first been studied.

Does this lead us around the dreary circle back to where we were before? Will the State, the Family, the School, in this period of change, show themselves necessary to the development of the individual and again climb upon his back to an unassailable position? Here, it seems, lies the real problem. A restive people have questioned now the sanction of everything that is traditional. They ask unabashed what the age-old crystallizations mean to the fulfillment of their own lives. Because they have practically no knowledge of themselves

³ This is a hard statement to prove in terms of space given and clear content. The reader will be interested that the *New York Times Index* carried the term "Depression" from 1930 through 1933. Its complete entry was

Depression—

See Business—general conditions; economic conditions, world. We have suspected (but can't statistically prove) that the complete disappearance of this heading after 1933, though the Depression was certainly still a

and their needs they are easy prey for the first demagogue who appears. That a philosophy is abroad that is individual-centered is beyond any question. That it is negative in the sense that it is in rebellion, rather than positively armed with knowledge, is beyond question. That it will crystallize about the first promise of a new goal seems evident in the current news. That this crystallization will rapidly gather strength and develop dynamic, compelling, sanctioned power in its own right, is the undisputed testimony of history.

These are the compelling reasons for the fact-finding procedures which we have advocated in this volume. The individual is actually living in a cultural pattern. The most painstaking study of each person *in vitro* will not lead us to the goal. Each aspect of the cultural pattern must be seen in terms of what it means to the growing individual in it; each individual must be studied in terms of what he is looking for and receiving from the pattern about him. Oddly enough, an individual-centered culture actually has no concern with the problems of individuals as such. It is concerned only with the problems of people living with others. If one cuts out a square inch of paper from this page the words on the excised part are without meaning. The rest of the printed page loses much of its meaning. It is this conception of meaning as arising only from the individual flowing into the pattern and the pattern similarly into him, that we consider essential in an individual-centered culture.

An individual-centered philosophy focuses its interest upon the personality, but as it does this, it is led out into the entire cultural pattern. This is not so much because the personality is discovered to be in a cultural pattern of some sort, as because the cultural pattern is discovered existing in the

most engrossing topic, is a measure of the spread of interest over into the less tangible and less easily indexed problems of human adjustment.

personality—idiomatic, as that personality has fused with it, but only to be understood if it is seen as coming from the environment. Thus as we focus with increasing meticulousness and intensity upon the personality we find that it leads us to ever-widening horizons.

In other words. Whatever is the relationship of the cultural pattern to the personality has always interested people. It is of particular import at the present time because of a sudden and recent questioning of traditional relationships. That an individual-centered culture is developing seems highly probable; that its flowering is a matter of generations or even centuries seems possible; that it shall not fall into the hands of persuasive demagogues seems important. That this demands the immediate dissipation of the wall that exists between the biological and the social sciences (and their artist cousins) is imperative. Any other course will court defeat for a challenging, inspired venture.

If the content of the personality is affected by the cultural pattern and if through changes in the pattern we have the easiest approach to changing the personality, certain implications follow. Sectors of the cultural pattern can be changed; they have been and are being changed. This implies a procedure which may be simply set forth though it might be long and tedious of execution. The first step is to discover, by use of the casual breakdown, what the cultural pattern in its various phases means to the individual and his growth. As more is known of the imprint which these various sectors make upon the personality, the door is open for conscious social alteration—in part as a check upon the earlier findings, in part to bring about those more “favorable” elements which we desire.

What then is the practical delimitation of these sectors?

We have followed the somewhat artificial lines of the so-called "social institutions."

Actually there are no such things as social institutions. The term represents only convenient generalizations of sets of variegated phenomena. Industry, on inspection, turns out to be a large number of quite different industries; the School, a congeries of groups at marked variance with one another. The assumption of a number of distinct and unitary social institutions is permissible only if there are powerful and compelling practical considerations to outweigh the theoretical arguments against such a division. These practical considerations seem to exist in the "homogeneity" which runs through what we popularly think of as the social institutions. This homogeneity is seen in traditional purpose, in personnel, and in vocabulary.

Perhaps the element of traditional purpose is more apparent than real. Yet it is of great practical force. For instance, schools are expected to give "academic" education to children. One admits that some schools have added many other interests, that some even loudly deny that they are interested at all in academic education. Moreover there are countless other ways, outside the School, of giving "academic" training to the child. Yet within and without the School there is the expectancy that its main task is that of giving such training to the child. The newer methods are looked upon not so much as "new" as that they are more efficient modes of instilling the old. Much the same may be said of the Church—that, accepting a wide variation in technique and proximate aims, there remains the basic tradition that here is a formulated group which has to do with man's contact with super-human forces. With the Church, as with the School, efforts at the establishment of formulae which

are entirely satisfactory to each sub-group lack success. Obviously, in this paragraph one is not considering what an institution does contribute to the personality but only what it is expected to contribute or is thought of as contributing.

This homogeneity of traditional purpose has two important meanings. In the development of the personality as it works out its problems there is here implied "what we can count on." Whatever the technique of academic instruction will be for the future, its locus of operation one expects to be in the schools; whatever the balance of supply and demand, the care of the problem is thought of as being in the hands of the leaders of Industry. This implies socially responsible groups able to project their efforts through formalized institutional set-ups. Any program of social reform must look upon this as a point of high practical value. But there is the other side—that it is this same crystallization of traditional purpose that, through cultural lag, prevents progress (or rather change). Alterations in the contributions to the personality will be hard to obtain—and will be difficult to see when obtained. In many communities the church may be no other than a center for the building of a gymnasium and clubs for children; in many others, a means of an individual's establishment of social caste. These important functions have scant hearing in court because of the general acceptance of a more basic function for the Church and the equally general custom of looking upon new developments in the light of and as aids to the more traditional function.

Within these institutional divisions there is an equally dynamic homogeneity of personnel. Not that there is absence of marked differences between ministers, or lawyers, or school teachers. Yet, in a task to be done, it must be considerably easier to address all lawyers than all persons aged thirty-five or all with IQ's of 120. Regardless of personalities there are,

within any professional group, factors of mutual security, identification, and the like that submerge the individual differences. This is exemplified in the various organizations which are built up within these professional groups. An individual-centered world requires a certain capacity for organization and operation through and with the aid of social units. This is presented, so far as personnel is concerned, in the various professional groups better than in any other groupings. There is a higher degree of homogeneity in racial groups but in a pattern which is heroically striving in formal and informal ways to eradicate these racial lines such a division does not seem feasible. Much the same may be said of social caste—that it has powerful factors of personnel homogeneity but that this is an impractical mode of approach in our own pattern. One thinks slightly differently of the possible personnel homogeneity of neighborhood groups. Facility of transportation has broken the solidarity of the neighborhood in favor of metropolitan areas and has brought markedly dissimilar individuals into the same locality. One envisages many advantages to the reawakening of the “neighborhood spirit” and to a development that would turn to such a group for social reform but this seems distinctly against the general trend of our pattern. Thus we return to the personnel groups within the formalized “social institutions” as the most available responsible homogeneous groups with which to work, admitting the while the marked individual differences that exist within them.

For these groups there is one more cementing—and indeed energizing—factor which may be termed a homogeneity of vocabulary. As the members of any professional group come up through their period of training (obviously this is less true of the Family than of the other institutions) they largely absorb a quite specialized vocabulary which has developed

about the social institution which is in each case involved. Indeed, this is so true that one of the difficulties in mutual understanding today is that groups from different disciplines and institutions may be found expressing the same thing with such different words that they seem as far apart as the poles.

It is not sufficient that we try, however hard, to go on merely altering individuals. The purely psychiatric procedure is not only an inefficient mode of dealing with the problem but a rather futile flight from the reality of the task. We would suspect that no very real forward steps can be taken until certain pressures of the cultural pattern have been relieved.

Our goal requires that we know in what ways the pattern presses upon the individual and that we have practical modes at hand for the indicated necessary alterations. The formal social institutions represent the best point of attack. To them belongs already a certain cohesive acceptance of responsibility; around them already have clustered certain homogeneities of operative procedure. We shall, then, devote Chapters X to XVII to a consideration of several sectors of the total pattern, and the rest of this chapter to an outline of the pertinent material for each of these later chapters.

Of each social institution an individual-centered culture makes certain demands, for each it has certain implications. These will be considered as implications for "research," for "therapy" of the individual, and for "purposeful alteration of the institution" itself. To orient the reader it seems valid to use the analogy of the study of a disease which includes research into the causes of the disease, assay of practical and available modes of curing an affected individual, and projection of environmental changes to lower the incidence of the disease. In other words, we must press the study of the extent to which the cultural pattern has molded the personality and

its modes of doing so. We must evaluate the extent to which the "professionals" in each institution may be turned to and used in either reinforcing or correcting the pressures unearthed in "research." We must learn what changes might be made (or are being made) in the environment to the end of altering pressures upon the personality (conscious social planning). Research in the narrow sense of the word is of course involved in each of the three sectors. It will not always be possible to draw a clear line between these three aspects of our problem.

Research (the term "search for meanings" is used in the following chapters to escape the implications of the narrow use of the word "research") in our field means inquiry into the relationship between individuals and a particular sector of the cultural pattern—into the extent to which one affects the other. The locus of this search (or "research") is always the point of impingement of the two elements—the individual acting in a social situation, the individual reacting to the stimulus of this contact with a social institution. Certain analyses⁴ must lie back of this but they are fruitless unless oriented to the integrated phenomena of behavior. Conduct always involves a final common pathway; the mere fact that there is this expression is itself an imperative to integration. (Conduct is synthetic rather than analytic.) Every sort of conflict may precede the deed but the active expression involves some (even if at times slight) ordering of the various components. In some similar fashion (as best one can outside

⁴ For instance, this volume has no quarrel with whatever exotic analyses of the unconscious a group might wish to make—in fact, we believe that these analyses are necessary for complete study. This volume, however, stresses that an individual-centered culture is interested in these analyses only to the extent that they in any way throw light upon John's reaction to his teacher today in school. Similarly there are many necessary analyses of the history and trends of the school but these have meaning to an individual-centered philosophy only as they throw light upon (and integrate themselves around) the understanding of the teacher's or principal's treatment of John in school today.

one's own field) we have tried to show that the practical unit of the cultural pattern is the impingement of a social institution upon individuals. Here again must there be the support of analyses (see note 4 above) and of an understanding of broader integrations lying back of this. But one finally seeks some sort of integrated operation.

When people live they have the impression that they do so as operating units and that they meet equally dynamic units of the environment. Research can certainly address itself to such a realistic goal and remain "scientific"—whatever is truly a phenomenon may be a tool or subject of research. It may seem that because the institution impinges upon the individual very largely through other individuals, the subject of study should be the conduct of a person when in relationship to one other person (the so-called one-to-one relationship). This indeed we have accepted in the following chapters, in discussing the purveyors or personal instruments of a social institution as well as the institution itself.

The implications for research (or for the "search for meanings"), then, are for each institution what it means to the individual—what it contributes to the total final product which is the personality. They involve the methods by which this pressure of each institution exerts itself, and the pressures of the individual upon these institutions. The material to be studied is the conduct of persons in adjusting themselves to these institutions, particularly as the conduct and ruminations of the casual breakdown reveal it to us.

There are implications, too, for therapy—for the amelioration of those unhappinesses and tensions which individuals today show in their contact with the social institutions. For an individual-centered world these implications are really the "assay of the institution's available resources" or "assay of current assets and liabilities" in a program of conscious so-

cial planning. The recent dramatic interest in this field on the part of psychiatrists has tended to hide the fact that the world in general has been busily engaged in trying to change individuals and institutions for a very long time. However, these implications for therapy cannot be understood without some clearer picture of the role of the psychiatrist in this therapeutic endeavor.

The Kraepelinian was largely interested in description but he dabbled in therapy—at least, he attempted to remove those factors of culture pressure which most obviously were disturbing the personality balance. The psychoanalysts and that interesting hybrid group which term themselves “dynamic” and pick here and there of what they wish (without incurring the odium of clearly following through any one system) have been vigorously interested in therapy. There have arisen a number of more or less complicated therapeutic techniques administered by the psychiatrist and, in a somewhat diluted manner, by the psychiatric social worker. The earlier interest in only the markedly abnormal has extended to the conditions thought to be prodromal to these more serious states, but has never grown beyond the realm of clinical psychiatry. Thus “therapy” to the psychiatrist has up to now meant treatment of the individual and meant treatment through one or another more or less stereotyped technique.

However, as a physician who is interested in the conduct of people, it is reasonable that the psychiatrist should bring to the field of conduct the medical man’s point of view. The physician is not interested in physical phenomena as such, but in what they indicate as to more fundamental processes. A temperature, a headache, a sore foot are symptoms—in the sense that to him they are the natural, expected result of the working out of those disease processes in which he is really interested. Often he welcomes the high fever or other equally

uncomfortable symptoms as signs that his patient "is putting up a good fight."

(The physician himself has not always been true to the medical point of view. Early in this century he developed a large group of "antipyretics"—drugs which lowered fever. These have been largely given up. This did not come from their failure to perform their task. They, in fact, did away with the fever. Unfortunately they also did away with the patient. It is normal for healthy individuals in the presence of serious threats from certain organisms, to have fever. Moreover, the extent of the fever is one of the physician's best guides as to what is happening and what he should do. The moral of this venture, in relation to the field of conduct disorders, seems too tragically apparent to require statement.)

Virchow's dictum is that what we see as illness represents the normal reaction of the normal body to abnormal conditions.⁵ Our view is that the psychiatrist has before him the challenge of bringing this point of view to the field of conduct which means that he teaches it to all those who are in contact with people. This is no more than that the stealing, the lying, the truancy be seen as "normal reactions of normal people to abnormal conditions." This is no more than that the severity of the conduct disorder is often the measure of the child's promise of recovery—or at least of his capacity to struggle against the various difficulties that have presented themselves to him. There are probably unusually vulnerable or distorted personalities as there are inherently fragile or poorly constructed physical constitutions. That is, the whole onus of conduct disorders is not upon the environment any more than is the burden of actual progressive physical disease

⁵ Rudolph Virchow (1821–1902). This, and the more fundamental dictum that the laws working in disease are not different from those in operation in health, first appeared in his *Cellular-Pathologie* (1858).

entirely upon the presence or absence of a certain micro-organism.

This view fundamentally alters the psychiatrist's part in the field of therapy. He is no longer only a person to bring certain techniques to bear but a person who "looks at things in a certain way." He is no longer the purveyor of magic, but one who champions a point of view as old probably as the human race. He goes to certain classrooms, families, clinics, or courts to see individuals magnificently employing this medical point of view—seeing lying or truancy or what not as indications of the child's effort at meeting some deeper and more serious trouble. This is an effort at understanding what conduct means, rather than what conduct is.

Thus for the amelioration of environmental pressures it is necessary that the individuals who shape each institution shall see conduct as a symptom, as a necessary sequel of the pressure which the institution is placing upon the individual. The therapeutic agents must be those who are naturally about the child, the parents, the school teacher, the clergyman, the policeman. The psychiatrist is a catalytic agent—fostering in every way he can the growth of this medical point of view. Every one has this point of view at times; some persons have it practically all the time. If everyone always thought of the conduct of children in the light of the pressures of the pattern upon them, then there would be an individual-centered culture and the psychiatrist's task would be well nigh over.⁶ This, we feel, defines the goals of mental hygiene—the spread throughout the community of what already exists in part, and in parts of it; the spread of a way of looking at conduct with an interest in why things happen instead of in what things happen.

⁶ Except, obviously, for his role as "clinical psychiatrist." For a more com-

The future of therapy, then, does not lie in the multiplying of ever more refined techniques to be administered by ever more specialized technicians, but, rather in those procedures which will lead the Family, the School, and other social institutions and their vicars to this "medical" view of the conduct of people. It looks to modes of selecting and training these vicars which will insure that they are sensitized to this way of viewing their task. It depends upon the recognition by these vicars of the fact that the "cure" stands patently before them, if they but accept the necessity of altering pressures rather than merely trying to eliminate the distressing conduct.

There are, too, for each institution implications as to those changes and amendments which might be lumped under the term "conscious social planning." This will be of two sorts. In such a group as the Family, for instance, it seems true (see Chapter VII) that there is a widespread, though quite disorganized, change occurring in the bases of authority. That this is consciously planned is certain; that in rather hit-or-miss fashion it is being worked out independently in each family is equally evident. In the School, however, there are now occurring very definite changes consciously planned to meet the needs of the child and equally consciously organized and simultaneously carried out at many points. In discussing these implications for social change we will not go beyond illustration of what these changes might be. Actually they will be determined from day to day and year to year by the emerging events (largely by the data which Society obtains from its "search for meanings").

One other analogy from medicine seems fair here (although it cannot be pressed too far—remaining valuable to us only in the general sweep of its meaning). The sanitary control of

typhoid fever has gone through three definite stages. Not so long ago the typhoid patient was segregated. It was hoped that he would recover but chiefly it was hoped that no others would contract the disease from him. With the discovery of the cause of typhoid a second stage was entered—one of clearing up whatever immediate source of infection had appeared from the fact that one person had contracted the disease. Thus there was still segregation but, with this, prevention through early diagnosis—that is, early diagnosis by means of the new bacteriological discoveries made it possible to prevent further spread of the trouble by guarding the environmental foci of infection. (This stage has nicely been termed that of the “prevention of further trouble.”) Then the third stage arrived—which we might call that of “true” prevention—in which the reservoirs and dairies, the milieux in which typhoid arises, were watched. Segregation of the individual case or carrier of infection is becoming increasingly less important because there is practically no more typhoid fever. Prevention through early diagnosis has practically disappeared—partly for the same reason and partly because it was found an inefficient method in comparison with that of the third stage. True prevention is not interested in typhoid fever—but only in the management of those physical and social situations which might conceivably give rise to the disease.⁷

Psychiatry, too, has been interested in segregation. Beginning around 1910 there developed rapidly a program of prevention through early diagnosis—and even today a large fraction of the clinic developments in this country are based upon the notion that by studying and correcting the minor

⁷ Obviously the problem of typhoid carriers makes our description of the third stage too sweeping and of its preoccupation, too one-sided. We believe that in general the analogy stands as a clear one.

deviations of childhood, more serious later developments can be obviated.⁸ But what we call the "implications for conscious social planning" are implications for those changes in the cultural pattern which shall lessen the likelihood of the appearance of conduct disorders—true prevention. This last is mental hygiene; it is not clinical psychiatry even in its most refined form. It has learned all that it knows from actual conduct disorders. However, it has no more specific interest in conduct disorders than has the public health officer in typhoid fever.

In brief, we have come to suspect that there is no line of sharp demarcation between the personality and the cultural pattern in which it lives. We have tried to show that there is occurring at the present time a shift in social philosophy towards the establishment of an individual-centered world. These premises—they are the obverse, each of the other—hold very definite implications for the cultural pattern. They point to the need of research as to how the pattern affects the personality; of an evaluation of those who deal with people and particularly those with specific responsibilities within their respective institutions; and of an effort to understand what may be done to mold social institutions to lessened pressures and tensions upon the personality. In the following chapters we shall relate our material on each institution to these three phases of the problem, under the headings "The search for meanings," "Current assets and liabilities," and "The outlook for change." The reader may feel that we somewhat artificially labor these three divisions of the material and ideas. An individual-centered culture has three distinct tasks and the divisions of these chapters are meant to

⁸ The analogy of typhoid fever meets a slight snag here. In typhoid fever we protect *others* from contracting the disease, in mental work we prevent *other* difficulties in the same individual. In both instances, "prevention through early diagnosis" is never anything more than prevention of *further* trouble.

prevent our losing sight of precisely this fact. There are enormous gaps in necessary knowledge and these are indicated. To disregard the gaps would relax our attention to the *job to be done* which happens, in this instance, to very much outweigh the fragmentary illustrative contributions which are made here.

CHAPTER TEN

The Family

THE ESSENTIAL question about the Family (or any of the other institutions) is whether, in the event of its sudden complete disappearance, it would be rebuilt in something like its present forms. Is this formalized constellation answering certain very definite human needs—and is there no other group which is answering these needs?¹ The forces of cultural lag will perhaps always operate to prevent an answer to this question since they endow a pattern with that which it *used* to convey and the people living under it with fear as to radical change. This makes necessary as careful and well checked a theoretical formulation as possible—one that probably cannot ever be subject to experimental check-up in any further way than is implied in the changes that naturally appear in partial alterations of patterns.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

The mounting divorce rate, the rapid growth in the work of family courts, and much data from various social agencies all seem to indicate disintegration in the family pattern. However, as we view in the present chapter all those forces which are, and for some time have been, operating to disrupt and disorganize this group the outstanding fact appears not to be its rapid break but rather the tenacity with which it

¹ The immediate answer is "Let us try in some area or large group to get along without the accustomed family structure." This is not a fair experiment as it would be affected during its process by the experiences in other parts of the world.

is holding to its earlier forms. The factor of cultural lag requires us to be tentative about regarding this as proof that this social constellation answers needs which are met by no other group.

A fresh effort to understand the Family seems necessary because of the present chaos of our views as to the place which the family pattern has in the life of its individual members. During the middle of the last century comparative and historical studies gave the first indication that the family group as then organized was not of divine origin. A surprised people found that other family patterns had existed long and with apparent success. Since then the economic and social values of the Family as it exists today have been subject to increasing doubts, and a group that earlier had rather academically questioned the eternal bases more recently has looked upon the family structure with an amused tolerance. With the development, however, of the psychoanalytic movement the family grouping has assumed the proportions of a serious menace. If one takes out of maladjustment, as this school knows it, those factors dependent upon parental identification, maternal rejection, and sibling rivalry, there is little left. It would seem that the personal relationships built within the family structure carry—precisely due to their intimacy—loads of emotional stress which outweigh any possible advantages. Thus the Family is not simply questioned as to its divine origin, not simply viewed with amusement as the passing immaturity of a growing race, but seen as the most subtly powerful of all those shackles which hold the free spirit of man. Nor are we at the place where we can prove any of these conceptions as wrong.

We shall, however, attempt to sketch the lines which research into the validity of these views should follow. They should trace out the fundamental "needs" of the personality

—the basic problems which it has to work out—and seek to discover whether the family pattern is meeting these needs and is presenting, in apparently as efficient a way as could any other institution, the set-up for doing this. By way of illustration we outline our own progress in this direction.

The reader will remember (Chapter VII) that for the individual there is a Family and that perhaps its dynamic quality springs largely from the fact that for each individual the difference between his concept of the Family and his experience with his own family is enough to assure his feeling that he is different from others. While there is a thread of likeness that runs through all these pictures, the Family varies enough in structure so that a simple verbal definition cannot adequately cover it. One must recognize here the marked changes that the years bring. (The family with no children is entirely different in its outlook and its influence from that with one, etc.) The concept varies in another way—from year to year it drifts to new levels. The child today pictures a family in which no clothes are made, nor bread baked. He pretty generally pictures the small family whereas one hundred years ago he would undoubtedly have intimately included the uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents. Thus while one may accept the existence of a highly realistic and dynamic concept of the Family which changes little from child to child, an accurate simple definition of what it *means* is extremely difficult. The first task of research therefore is to find whether there is any mode about which these definitions cluster, what that mode is, and in what directions it tends to shift.

Apparently the family provides to the child the feeling of security—of knowing who he is—of some sort of orientation in the general scheme of things (Chapter V). Moreover, the

family set-up seems peculiarly constructed to fill this function—at least, more easily than can any other institution we have at the present time. We have discussed² the two other possibilities which present themselves. One is the caste system which apparently fulfills this need as well or better than does our Family. Very possibly (one knows really nothing about it) it does not exact its toll of personal identifications and entanglements as does the Family. The other is—as we earlier indicated—the religious life and its formalized institution, the Church. Without question this has long been of great importance in meeting the belongingness needs of individuals but it can scarcely enter the child's life during those earliest years that are so important for this satisfaction. We find it difficult to escape the value and need of social modes of strengthening belongingness factors but these are certainly ripened for expression in the biological processes of pregnancy.

The authority problems of the child comprise, in part, his adjustment to "personal authority" (Chapter IV). Age, possession, and "love" (idiomatic relationship) are all among the validators of personal authority. Nor can one escape authority—escape the fact that in the world in which he grows and lives there are numerous forces which transcend the power and arena of any one individual. The adjustment of individuals to all those demands made on the basis of "I know better because I am older" seems to have its simplest place for development in the family. We realize the hazard involved in the many parents who say that they are older when they do not act as though they were; but this interesting bit of behavior is not confined to parents. Much human tragedy has come from parental use of possession—but we have not felt too hopeless about changing this. The use that

² Chapter V, pages 98 ff.

parents make of possession to force the child to do what they wish they had done (rather than what meets the child's own personality needs) comes very largely out of ignorance. Our clinic experience is that most parents are ready to meet the child's needs as soon as they recognize the myopia that had led them to think that their goals were the child's goals.

Authority through "love," control by idiomatic relationship, is not so easily dismissed. The stresses involved in all that has been demanded through "don't you love me?" are among the most difficult to which man has had to adjust himself. In fact the effort of persons to disentangle the belongingness (the security) of love from the authority of love has occupied a fair part of every life and many a book for generations. One can accept all this and at the same time query whether there is any better set-up than the family group as we know it for working out these problems.

One other group that has seriously tried to meet this issue—namely, the School—is giving it up as rapidly as it can. The earlier tendency of the teacher to be just a "second mother to the children," to rule what were *her* children through the admonition that she was *their* teacher, is being replaced in every forward-looking system by the recognition of the use of social authority—the control of numbers, the compulsion of federation. Every formulation of religion has tried to meet this issue—infinite love and supreme authority have vied here through the ages. Perhaps persons could turn here for a solution of this relationship.

To what extent each individual needs protected competition and just how long this period should be, is uncertain. For most children today the family provides this experience for two to five years—and there is some indication that this is a needed experience. Certainly those least able to meet the

rigors of destructive, or social, competition continue the family pattern in their play life, choosing companions several years older or younger than themselves so as to maintain the parent-child relationship rather than entering a child-child competition. Within the family the parents are primarily interested in what the child *can* do. When the child goes on to the street the play life is based on what he *cannot* do. Each game is chosen on one's own best ability and the Achilles' heel of each other one. And this continues throughout life: within the family group the competition is protected, while in the social group the competition is destructive.

Here research has the task of determining just when, for each child, there comes the time that protected competition is a detriment. Such an analysis must also be tentative in view of the psychoanalytic formulations of family rivalry and rejection, which suggest that many family members, too, are interested in what children can't do rather than in what they can do. Actually in the clinic or in the home, mothers chiefly give children tasks which they can do, and "show them off." Whether this is a genuine, "simple" reaction, or a surface reaction inspired by guilt feelings over a rejection, or a more self-centered seeing of the child as really the mother who must be shown off to advantage, comes to the same thing as far as this early period of tasks which are not damaging to the morale is concerned. (We may also add that, without detailed studies such as Levy has made,³ our own material shows a large amount of maternal rejection, but that this is often first a rejection of an undesirable trait which rejection "spreads" to the entire personality, rather than a primary rejection of the total situation which particularizes upon some

³ As, for instance, David M. Levy, Relation of Maternal Overprotection to School Grades, *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, vol. 3, p. 26, January 1933.

trait. In view of the care and thoroughness of Levy's work we somewhat mistrust our findings.)

The child also has in his family life the most important of his "academic" experiences. In his first few years not only has he developed all the ground work for his space and color perception, and so on, but also he has become conditioned to the whole process of symbolization. The schools have failed to recognize that all the learning processes of the child in the symbolic field—language, for instance—have been started in the family period. There is a wide literature about the influence of family tensions on learning processes *during* school life, but nothing on how these factors control the all-important initial steps in academic progress. (One might except Adler's—rather "intuitive"—claim that overprotected children turn out to be better in language while those less protected become better in the mathematical field.)⁴ What research along such lines might show as to the importance of the family constellation in early academic experiences, in the entire start which the child gets in the process of symbolization, no one knows.

The Family as we know it is of great importance in determining the child's attitude about sex. One does not need to follow a prevalent vogue of ascribing all human ills to sexual maladjustment to accept the high importance of this matter in the development and happiness of adult life. The child presents questions of sex at times when most parents find it more than usually difficult to discuss the matter without implications of wrong in the child's inquiries. We say that this

⁴ Alfred Adler's observation, to be more exact, was that overprotected children are poor in arithmetic. David Levy studied and reported (*loc. cit.*) on the more extended statement as made in the text here.

ought not to be so—valiantly declare that parents ought to discuss matters of sex freely with the child. The fact is that they do not do this and clinic practice does not indicate that they soon will. One of the real family difficulties is that rather often the child's questions arise during the period of another pregnancy when the family is already physically, if not psychologically, considerably disturbed. If (by any stretch of imagination) a child could grow up in a sexless environment for its first seven or eight years—in a situation where the immediate adults were not themselves rather sincerely working through the various problems of their sexual lives⁵—would it not then be at least possible that it would grow into adult life with chances for a more objective sort of education and thus for a healthier attitude about sex than is now in general the case? In other words, research must explore the extent to which the circumstances of family life of necessity introduce the subject of sex under conditions unfavorable to the development of the child's best attitude on the subject.

For the child the family period is rather of necessity the time for training in the basic physical habits. There is considerable evidence that the parent is, of all persons, the one in the poorest position to give habit training. In the parent-child relationship the deepest of emotional issues are involved—fitting oddly into the problem of habit-training which demands of the child as small an amount of emotional strain as any experience within his whole development. In children's wards in hospitals or in kindergartens there is ample evidence of the ease with which habit-training can be given

⁵ This of course raises a point that I have discussed for long hours with many parents and it is impossible to pursue all its implications here. I only wish to point out that the existence of an unresolved and perplexing problem in the child's environment may have a lasting effect upon the child's own attitude.

when the authority problems of the parent-child relationship⁶ are not also involved. The dilemma of the teacher or nurse who later becomes a mother and finds herself (for her own children) no better equipped in the habit-training problems than is any other, leads to an amazed sort of chagrin which would amuse us here at the clinic were it not so tragic. What research will lead us to, whether, in the family, habit-training can be carried on objectively (without the encumbrance of authority relationships), to what extent this seriously affects the growing personality—these are questions for the future.

Perhaps the outstanding hazard involved in the family relationship lies in the extent to which the child is bent to the needs of the parents.⁶ Already in adolescence, or before, we meet those failures and disappointments which begin at their very inception to mold what our children must live. The girl who is a drudge must be assured a butterfly daughter; the man who didn't go to college, this experience for his son. What in the years of youth we plan and dream for our children, grows stronger as the years pass until—when we become parents—it becomes an imperious urge that the next generation live as we wish that we had lived, accomplish what we had hoped ourselves to do.⁷ What there is for research here is in question—we already know the terrific pressure placed upon children out of the childhood days of their parents—and the problem is probably today largely one for therapy or reconstruction.

The preceding paragraphs are meant to be illustrative of fields for research as to what the Family provides for the child. In the subsequent paragraphs we will briefly consider in the same illustrative way what is essentially the obverse of

⁶ The constant, hampering family problem of "Who's going to win?"

this—namely, certain of these problems from the parent's point of view.

If the child must learn with some grace to bend his life to the power of age, possession, and the authority of the affectional tie, so must the parent learn to use these forces properly. It is a bit disconcerting to the child to find added to the fear and panic of his own temper tantrum another similar parental display. Nor is the self-discipline in this matter of maintaining poise anywhere as difficult as is that demanded of the adult in giving him the power of possession. Our lives so definitely demand other solutions than we have made that the possession of a child is a temptation beyond almost anyone's power to withstand. And if the family offers in its demands for self-control, in its demands for giving to those who are little and helpless a right to their own lives, an opportunity for personality growth and development unparalleled elsewhere, it also magnificently challenges to clear thinking. Because there is no knottier problem than that presented in the clear separation in living relationships between the security and belongingness aspects of the love tie and the authority demands in it. These are important accretions to the personality as we see it—nor is it easy to see how they could be developed to their fullest extent in any other institution than the Family in some such form as we know it.

Indicating in this way certain implications for research that are mapped out by the parent-child relationships, we should similarly illustrate areas of research for the parent-parent relationship. We refrain from this partly because we are attempting only to indicate the kind of thing in research which our basic hypothesis demands, and partly because our own contacts with the adult field have been relatively so meager. There is, too, another important field that we do not in-

investigate—that involving the “hanger-on.” Here one refers to that miscellaneous group that is a last remnant of the great or extended family—aunts, uncles, grandparents, and the like, living in or near the home. Each of this group ministers to the child’s needs through the family structure, each receives from its dynamic attributes something for personal development. Does their rapidly developing independence from the family place a heavier “load” upon the parents? What has the removal of the maiden aunt done to her contribution to the child’s sense of belongingness and to the intra-family authority issues? And there border on this problem somewhat similar questions as to nurse, governess, cook, maid, what-not. The contribution of this miscellaneous group of intimate outsiders to the child’s growth has received scant attention. It is an important group. Our own data are too scattering for any worth-while statement.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

We have here to consider the qualifications (and readiness) of parents for meeting stresses and difficulties of the sort that have been discussed in the preceding section. This involves an estimate of the assets and debits of parents as therapeutic agents—together with some discussion of the general technique of their task. Obviously this involves research, and our somewhat brusque appropriation of that word for the previous section may seem artificial to the reader.

One hears much today of the lack of preparation of parents for their task, of the fact that this alone of the professions is without adequate training and that problems of emotional immaturity and personality maladjustment tend to make parents befuddled bunglers at life’s most important task. One hears that while it is apparently an unfortunate biological necessity that children shall have mothers and fathers, it is

the glory of our present civilization that there is a growing group of experts who can take over the more intricate task of rearing. In actually balancing the specific advantages which parents have over against definite disadvantages we note the following:

There is certainly nothing inherent in parenthood which qualifies one technically for the task. The one outstanding advantage is the "naturalness" of the situation—those who are close to the child should by all means be the ones to carry through the task of rearing it. We are going through a preliminary stage of the use of clinics and child study groups for learning about children and their family problems. However, no psychiatric program is sound which does not contemplate that those who naturally surround the child shall carry through the necessary training. There will perhaps always be a few very unusual situations requiring that the child be seen and worked with by others but in general it is the task of the clinic to educate the parent to such a point that it shall never have to see the child.

On the other hand, there are certain very definite reasons for feeling the parent to be the least suitable individual for the proper rearing of the child.

The first of these is that the parent, in any family situation, always has "something at stake." Problems in the family for parents, just as problems in the school for teachers or in the church for ministers, involve authority relationships which becloud the issue. Thus a parent does not treat the child's lie as such, but rather in the light of what it means in the parent-child relationship. In view of this, perhaps conduct disorders can never be treated objectively within the institution affected, by the professional group responsible for and to that institution.⁷ The use of the psychiatrist in these fam-

⁷ However, in Chapter III we delineated a type of clinic set-up that serves (at least in our generation) to meet this difficulty.

ily problems is often simply a mechanism of meeting the situation through the introduction of an outsider who can make a decision without entailing the responsibility of what this means in the structure of a long series of personal relationships. (Note here that his contribution is objectivity rather than any specific technique.)

And because family members have something at stake and because they continue to live together, they build up of necessity an explanation or a formula that covers their relationships. Each new difficulty or achievement is seen, not as something on its own merits, but in relation to this fundamental formula. A great many parents come to the clinic asking for advice but in reality looking for an official stamp of approval upon the solution they have already given to the problem. We are suspicious that in a great deal of the present-day education of parents through magazine and lecture the pupils take away only that which fits what they earlier believed.⁸ Workers in child guidance clinics are supposed to be experts in the art of living—but an expert is one with experience and there is no person, on this basis, who is not an expert in living. Living, after all, is all that anyone has ever done. Those who are vitally interested in teaching and training parents have the task of developing a technique that admits the great variability in families at the same time that it prevents the solution of every new event on the basis of each family's preconceived formula. "Johnny is the image of his father" may sweep through years of every sort of behavior and relationship, brushing each little scrap of life into the same pile. When people live together so long and so intimately as do family members there must be formulae of relationship set-

⁸ At least we have found this to be the case in a number of years' experience in checking on the results of a very extensive lecture program.

up—otherwise all is chaos. This rarely allows family members to see a problem clearly on its own merits.

That is, as we have said, parents cannot raise children with the same degree of objectivity that they possess when making experiments in the natural sciences—nor indeed with the same clear vision with which they view their neighbors' problems. We wonder that our neighbors are so blind to the evident faults in their procedures—and would be startled to realize that they look similarly upon us. No one can be objective about the things that one really cares for; those affectional ties which do not blur one's vision are scarcely worth the name. The call to objectivity which is abroad today very probably means a better consumption of spinach, a better regulated retiring-hour for children, calm and well-poised language and action—but is this not selling a birthright for a mess of pottage?

In other words, the personal relationships in the family condition the purely personal relationships throughout life. They are loaded with affection and carry the burden of giving to each a *place*—a sense of belonging, a meaning to the process of arriving and being. And just because of this, there is the toll that family relationships cannot be objective, that events in the family cannot be seen objectively, that the dramatic power of that which is really worth while must distort anything which comes near it. We hear much of a science of parenthood. Perhaps science will enter this field—to describe as is the way of science, to rob of meaning as is the way of science. There will be healthier bodies, more even tempers, less delinquency—but it will nevertheless be hard on the children. That which parents give that is important makes rather a mess of that which they give that is unimportant.

If the parent-child relationship itself sets up hurdles, there

are certain other hazards which show themselves in the technique of the child-rearing task. Five of these, as we see them in clinic practice, are outstanding.

The first is the parents' unwillingness to experiment. We psychiatrists have not been free from blame here. We build our guidance clinics with the philosophy that an earlier consultation would have obviated the present distressing difficulty, we advertise that "insanity is preventable"—in all this giving to the parent the notion that there is a right path if only he will follow it. In the physical field there is considerable willingness to experiment. Thus in the weaning of children parents know that if they go too slowly the child will not gain weight and that if they go too fast there will be uncomfortable gastric phenomena—and, without question, a great many parents experiment rather freely as long as they remain between these two danger signals. In the field of personality the task before us is twofold. First, we must continue to mark out as best we can those signs in the child's personality and conduct indicating that he is off to the right or to the left of the road (clinical psychiatry). Second, we must encourage parents to experiment within these limits and thus free them from the heavy load of feeling that there is somewhere a magic formula which makes it unnecessary to consider at each step "how this works in view of all of the present conditions" (mental hygiene).⁹

Another hazard is close to the first—the insatiable search for absolutes. Parents rebel against the unescapable fact that every judgment, every action has in it both good and bad, radical elements and conservative elements. The proper decisions in rearing children are those in which what is "good" largely outbalances what is "bad"—neither can be entirely

⁹ For some elaboration of the distinction between clinical psychiatry and mental hygiene, see Chapter XIII, page 320.

ruled out of any important step. Any situation demands love or sternness or protection or dominance or freedom or something else—*up to a certain point*. In this paragraph we say that that point is never 100 per cent. In the previous paragraph we said that its approximate percentage must be found by experiment. This search for absolutes is not confined to parents. Its results show sharply in family life because of the intimacy that exists there but were the rearing of children in the hands of others there would be this same difficulty.

A third difficulty is lack of faith in the child. Parenthood demands sacrifice—indeed this element has pretty much preoccupied most of our literature on the subject. As we see parents they interpret sacrifice, to a large extent, as involving those things which they do for their children—the multitudinous duties and plans demanded. But the true sacrifice of parenthood does not lie in what is done for children so much as in what adults are willing not to do for them. There is need, not only in the family but among all those who handle children, for a greater faith in the child's ability to work out his own problems. From many of the problems of habit-training up to the adult years the child is far more able to take matters into his own hands than we usually allow. The clinic and the court see many children who have been led along the road of life until in sheer desperation they snatch themselves away to run in any direction—so long as it challenges their own decision and responsibility for consequences.

A fourth difficulty we dealt with in some detail in Chapter VII—the concentration of interest in the child due to the shift in the preoccupations of adult members of the family. As the time and energy earlier spent in the mechanics of living have lessened so as to increase the time occupied in the relationships of living, there has been an overweening interest in everything which the child does, and a marked increase

in the regulation of his life. We only say here that in the ordinary cadence of the child there are many steps that are transitory and evanescent in any implication other than that they lead naturally to the next steps. As we study and emphasize these particular steps, we tend to distort and disrupt the cadence.

One more problem inherent in the family situation is the reluctance to recognize that life (and particularly adolescence) is a process of translation. There is practically universal acceptance now of the view that during the early years of childhood (perhaps even in only the first five or six) the child receives from the adults whatever of the heritage of the past he is to receive. In similar fashion we have rather uniformly guessed (without really knowing) that, by and large, serious emotional and personality changes are not determined after twenty. What of the past is to be translated into what is to be given to the future, and what the nature of that translation will be are matters largely decided during childhood. In what ways do children translate? Some never translate—they prefer life “in the original,” clinging to parents and parent-substitutes through the rest of life. The great majority make a very literal translation, surprising the world with their shocking activities during adolescence and later becoming the settled, conservative balance-wheel of the group. This group cuts its capers during adolescence when that is the mode—and is demurely prim when the era calls for that. There are a few who make a free translation—the chronic rebels—those souls who on occasion add brilliantly to our culture but who are for the most part cranks, hoboes, criminals, any who are far enough from the mode to seem to misfit the pattern. In each generation there are a very few who make what we would call a good translation, taking what is old and using its richness and tradition in relating it to the new conditions which present themselves.

For the adult it is extremely difficult to let the child do this translating. He calls children "good" who do as he says—and is not ready to work with those who "do not cooperate." We point out once more that the fear that the adult has for the child's new ventures and the desire that the adult has to correct his own mistakes in the life of the child are two barriers—apparently almost insurmountable—to the technique which demands that the child be free to do his own translating.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

What will happen to the Family over the next two or three generations? No one knows. Two very important trends are to be seen at present. The first of these is a general and insistent questioning of its *ex cathedra* origin, with a rapidly growing demand that its continuance be justified on the basis of its service to definite human needs—and of its serving these to better advantage than any other institutional constellation. In just the combination of persons who compose the Family there are, inherently, a number of definite and real disadvantages. As these are more clearly understood it will seriously be asked whether the advantages outweigh them. The second of these trends is the magically sudden unloading by the Family of all its "functions." Its role as a protector for the results of sexual intimacy is being rapidly made unnecessary through the spread of contraceptive information and devices. One guesses that there is somewhere near as much extra-marital sexual intercourse in this country today as has occurred in any civilized group. The rearing and teaching of children, the cooking of food and making of clothes, the support of the aged and other relatives—all these things are being taken over by other agencies with great rapidity.

We have guessed that the Family will continue. The bar-

nacles that have been collecting through all these ages about the strong and solid keel of the affectional ties are being rapidly—and a bit unceremoniously—removed. It is difficult for us to see what can replace the Family in its contributions of security or belongingness to the child and to the adult. It is equally easy to see it as the best means of giving to the child his experiences with personal authority. The growing realization that its other functions had hung like parasites upon this strong structure can be counted only as a net gain.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The School

ONE OF the more regrettable factors in the development of "mental hygiene" has been its attitude towards the School. True, the psychiatrist has shown much interest in unusual personality problems appearing there. That the school is a way of living, that as a part of the child's life it is one of the most important, easily molded, and productive of his aides, he has not generally recognized. The school set-up has been looked upon as a source of problems rather than as a means of preventing them. The reason for this lies somewhat in the school system itself. Its regimentation has without question created many problems for individual personalities. Its insistence upon unmarried women as teachers presents also a very sizable hazard.

The majority of schools are still so bound to the importance of the academic curriculum that they miss entirely their opportunity to add richly to the child's emotional development. Within these same schools, however, there are individuals who are carrying on the finest kind of mental hygiene program. But it is not alone at this personal level that the psychiatrist is challenged to cooperate rather than condemn. In such a step as the Newark system has taken of considering the first three school years as those in which the institution is to study the child, of taking the stand that a year in a school-room must be so much a year of progress in learning to live with other people that "failure" (in the sense of a year empty of development) is practically impossible, one sees that there

are just as rich possibilities at the institutional as at the personal level.

Rather than seeking out such experiences, strengthening them, and urging extension of this point of view, it has been the tendency of the mental hygiene group to advocate the development of new types of schools. This has certain advantages. The nursery school, for instance, is far freer than the regular public school to experiment in the schoolroom as a laboratory of life. Any radical change is admittedly simpler outside a crystallized social institution.

However, in so far as mental hygiene represents a way of looking at things, a philosophy of life (rather than a refined clinical psychiatry)¹ it is quite as available to the teacher, the principal, and other school officials as it is to the psychiatrist. To the extent that mental hygiene has a social responsibility it must cooperate with the School in fostering these attitudes and this philosophy. Wholesale condemnation of an institution which actually for ten years controls and molds half the child's waking hours would seem humorous were it not so tragically futile.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

Research into what the school experience means to the child has scarcely been begun. The school people themselves have mountains of material of every statistical sort upon what the school *ought* to mean but the equally ponderous mass of truancy, "failure," and individual dissatisfaction shows how utterly unrealistic this dehumanized material is. We illustrate in this section the sort of topics that we think demand research and give some of our own tentative conclusions as ex-

¹ See Chapter XV, pages 373 ff.

amples of the type of result that might come from such studies.

The school, in keeping with the meaning of the word "educate," leads the child out of the family experience. We will not consider here our data on what the school means to any particular child—important as is this question. The fact that to one it means "academic" curriculum, to another a place to be teased, to another defeat, to another companionship, belongs much more to the practice than to the theory of mental hygiene. Nor will we more than mention briefly the fact that many children meet the essentials of the school experience one, two, or three years before they first enter the schoolroom, and that others are slower in making the adjustment, so that the kindergarten, first-grade, and second-grade teachers often have to continue for some time what is essentially the family pattern. In other words, each of the following three considerations of the relationship of the school to the growth of the personality applies to the child in general and is subject to wide individual variation.

Schematically put, the child develops adequacy in the school as he develops security in family life. The teacher is (or should be) much more interested in *what* the child is than in *who* he is. Further, the child is now more of a determining participant—he has a greater part in developing his adequacy than he earlier had in establishing his security. (This is not always true, as many teachers are more interested in giving adequacy to children than many mothers are in giving security.)

Security and adequacy differ in their diffusion. Every clinic knows the individual child who, once completely aware of the fundamental love of the parents, seems to sail along rather comfortably in spite of drunkenness and poverty in

the home, or wretched set-ups in the school. That is, security once firmly established in the family spreads itself through or is a solid foundation under everything else that the child does. Adequacy, on the other hand, can be established in any one of the child's adjustments—and it “remains” in that adjustment to be turned to when the child needs it. Thus he may be a second-rater in school, teased on the street, a poor athlete—but if he is the champion checker player in the community he goes through all these experiences with a strength borne of “wait ’til they come to checkers.” Adequacy does not demand triumph throughout life—indeed, it recognizes that life is to a very large extent a rather drab and monotonous affair. It is precisely this that allows the teacher to give adequacy to a child through some small special function in the room—a task that brings the glow that “*here* I am important.” The wise teacher has long since learned to give each child some niche of importance in the federation of the schoolroom. To this the child turns in time of trouble. But this is not the security or belongingness that he gets from the family—which represents more a fundamental, pervasive attitude of at-ease-ness with the world.

Teachers are, or should be, interested in the contributions or achievements of the child whereas parents are interested in the relationships of the child. If the mother is sent for to discuss John's shortcomings in arithmetic or reading she may never herself get beyond the statement that “he's my Johnny.” Each—mother and teacher—considers the other blind, and will do so as long as they fail to see that they are, as it were, discussing two different children. That interesting specimen—the teacher who is “just like another mother” to her children—will be discussed later.²

² See page 284.

The child is "led out" pretty completely within the first two or three years of the school period. We would suppose that as the schools recognize this and other inflection points of emotional development they will tend to think of critical grades into which their best teachers would go. These might possibly be the first (leading the child out of the psychological set-up of the family), the sixth (early adolescence) and the eleventh or twelfth (vocational adjustment). The final selection of critical points would obviously rest upon further research.

Also in authority relationships the school leads out, educates, the child from one psychological situation into another. The school represents the first organized institution where the child learns to adjust himself to what the group demands—though obviously many children have had informal contacts with this experience earlier.

We reiterate that older children (particularly adolescents) are not rebels. Indeed, our experience is that they more slavishly follow authority than do their younger siblings. But now the validator is "what everybody is doing," what the acclaimed person is doing, what the hero is doing.

On this basis the teacher becomes, as it were, a sort of umpire as the child feels his way into the dominance and protection of the group. We are very certain that the child wants this experience. Children and adults receive great strength and reassurance from being lost in the group. They have a feeling of loneliness, of being undressed, of being at the mercy of their environments when they are not given this experience of being gathered up in the group. Admittedly the so-called "progressive education" group has stressed the child's individuality and its ventures have apparently been successful. However they have dealt in general with a favored

group of teachers and pupils. Our experience would indicate that it is probably best for the school to mean for all children a healthy adjustment to the authority of numbers.

This many schools are recognizing. Only a generation ago students were exhorted to their best efforts on a parent-child basis. "When you are as old as I, you will be glad that you studied." But now a subtler psychology obtains. One cannot be an athletic hero who is not a good student; widely advertised polls indicate that the majority prefer Phi Beta Kappa keys to varsity letters. There is also, certainly in many of our primary schools, a growing realization that control and guidance should be more and more through the group and that the child can learn in the school to use and obey numbers.

Clinical psychiatry (masquerading as "mental hygiene") has done little more than criticize the stratifying of the pupil. It has seen the individual lost in his school grade, and his school grade lost in the mechanical state-made curriculum. We have been too slow to recognize that, as it educates him from the implications of the family pattern, the school means, to the individual, adjustment to the power and security of these social forces.

We have said⁸ that development within the family is carried on always with an eye to what the child can do. Society is interested in what the person cannot do—rugged individualism means rugged competition. Although there has been recently an interest in building down from governmental authority a pattern of protected competition, the fact remains that still today most individuals succeed through a conquering sort of competition against others.

It often does not sit well with teachers to point out that the school offers the child's first real experience with destructive

⁸ See Chapter X, page 259.

competition. The easy answer is to admit that there is a great deal of protected competition in the schools—that a large number of teachers for one reason or another have definitely parental attitudes in their work. The less palatable reply is that one-fourth of the children are retarded in large school systems. If one recognizes all those advances which a six-year-old makes in living in the schoolroom for one year, then his “failure” because he cannot read seems rather an overweening interest in what he cannot do. Or if, in a large school system, children who are thirteen years of age in physique, social adjustment, play life, and sexual maturity are graded with ten-year-olds because they cannot do decimals or name the explorers—there must be the same conclusion!

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

What are the preparation and adequacy of the child and teacher for the sort of experience which research shows the school life to be? What are the assets and liabilities of the actors in this particular drama—the resources available to the task to be done? To answer these questions we must think of the school experience as a series of interpersonal relationships which make contributions to the growing personality.

Not that the academic curriculum can be disregarded; nor that the American public will easily allow “learning” to be relegated to the position of handmaiden to the emotional development of the child. Our whole pattern is built on the belief that success is highly correlated with academic knowledge. For every social ill our answer has been “more knowledge.” At unusual expense we have built various classes and schools to give non-academic training—to find that the public will use these only for those who prove themselves unable to meet the requirements of the academic curriculum. (This

"negative" sorting of children for our more expensive types of educational procedure is one of the oddest phenomena in our entire school structure. How long will we use Stanford Binet tests or tests of vocational aptitude for children who do not belong in the academic classes rather than for children who belong in these special classes!) From the first-grade teacher to the professor in the last year of professional school there is the plea that there is no time for excursions into the field of emotional growth, because the academic demands ("what they must know") of the next higher level leave no time for other interests.⁴

The school's interest in academic achievement has further support in a widely accepted belief that knowledge must be "cold"—that it is precisely the task of the school to develop objective reasoning devoid of the blur which emotions give to intellectual operations. This view is built upon certain interesting fallacies. The first of these is that the intellect and the emotions are two separate entities capable of warring upon one another—a sophisticated version of the primitive belief in the warring of good and bad spirits within us. The second is that (on the basis of experiments on guinea pigs) learning is a function of the force and repetition with which

⁴ The normal schools spend their major time in preparing students to teach "academic" material—and both teachers and parents ask seriously how children can learn the necessary material without the teacher's assistance. As a matter of fact, however, the children are in large part educating themselves today—so far as academic content goes. Of a class of thirty the usual teacher is practically entirely busied with some five outstanding in intellectual, personality, or social virtues and some five or more outstanding in low intelligence, wiggleness, or mischief. The group between floats along, to a large extent educating itself. One finds proof of this when a class goes into junior high school, for instance, where the shake-up of the new situation brings members of this middle group to such a clinic as ours. Because they have been polite, have washed behind their ears, have made no trouble, their academic needs and progress have hitherto been far more a matter of conjecture than of knowledge. Of our last fifty referrals four have been these rather colorless seventh-grade children who came to us for truancy. None belonged beyond fourth grade in "academic" achievement.

the material to be learned is presented. But actually the receptiveness or readiness of the individual for any material is quite as much a function of the emotional as of the intellectual aspects of the personality. One perceives only that to which he chooses (can afford) to attend. The third fallacy is that the school experience is a preparation for life rather than life itself. Whether we will or no, the school experience is one of actually living with other individuals—a period charged with emotional tensions, in spite of all that has been written and said to the contrary.

The schools themselves are slowly accepting this newer point of view. For some time educators have been repeating the slogan that they are interested in the method rather than the content of learning—in living rather than their “academic” subjects. There are several reasons for this: the number of children in school who are not academically minded has been increasing; high school and college graduation have come to be used as symbols of social position rather than as goals of academic achievement; and there is a rapidly growing public interest in “mental health.” What is meant by “mental health” we will discuss later in this chapter, noting here only the growing realization that we live by what we feel rather than by what we know.

So far as the academic curriculum is concerned this raises a question that probably demands further study. The schools have been interested to know how large an amount of academic knowledge could be given to children. The really more pressing question is how little of it will permit the individual to live comfortably with others at his chosen level and will also meet the demands of the welfare of the group. If the academic curriculum is to be used as an aid to the more fundamental task of leading children out from the family experience, there is no limit placed upon those who wish to pursue

its course as far as possible; it is, however, necessary to define as carefully as we can the things in academic knowledge that are essential to all. On the other side, the view that this emotional development is so important that the intellectual advancement of the child might well be practically disregarded is as false as is that interested solely in intellectual achievement.

Is the child in coming to school ready for the experiences in interpersonal relationship which he will meet there?

The answer to this question depends upon which of two assumptions is made. The first views with fear the lure of emotional immaturity which lulls the child with its inviting comfort and protection; it holds that the individual should be "led out from" the family at the earliest possible moment. The second is that steps in maturing can only be taken when the individual has "had his fill" of earlier steps—so that the child is ready for school when, by and large, he has met the issues of Chapter X. The matter is not one of chronological age—but of the solution of certain problems. Some mothers seem able to give a complete sense of security and belongingness with one clasp to the bosom, others take years, others never give it. And these same marked differences hold for the other adjustments of the family pattern.

The problem is not as simple as this because there are certain ripening processes which make a five-year-old child different from a four-year-old child regardless of the stage of completion of the family contribution.

How measure the readiness of the child for the nursery school, which is his first step away from the family? Some nursery schools are simply sublimated day-nurseries, parking places for the children of parents who have other interests. For such the child is never ready unless one is to say that the

child is always well rid of such parents and that nursery school is no worse than any other situation. Other nursery schools follow the theory mentioned above that the child must be hurried through the stages of emotional weaning lest he remain too comfortably in one. Our own view that each stage must be fully met before the next is experienced would mean that for such a school the child is never ready. A few extremely interesting nursery schools are simply trying in all frankness to help the mother with her task—giving her a chance, for instance, to see that her children are no worse than are others. This meets an important need in a large number of families. In general it is dangerous to lead the child out of the family experience until it has received the contribution which that constellation makes. The modes of determining more exactly what that contribution should be and what are the signs of its being completely given, must be worked out by research.

(We ought to have a comparative study of our own situation with that of a hundred and fifty years ago, when the family's contribution was very largely maintained throughout the first twenty years of the child's life. Whether this allowed the family to take a longer time to its task, whether it represented an increased amount of emotional immaturity in adults, whether, because of unassailed security over a long period, it represented in adults more freedom to become emotionally mature, or whether the family managed to construct in its neighborhood its own socializing experiences for the child, I suppose we shall never know.)

The criterion that the school uses in determining the readiness of the child is chiefly "intelligence," which we guess to be the least important factor. The apparent ease with which one can measure it has done much to recommend it to a stratified institution. The schools use it, they say, because

it measures symbolic thinking, in which they are largely interested. But actually the child has taken his greatest step in symbolic thinking long before he ever goes to school.

We do not know enough to state the proper criteria of readiness for school but we can suggest their content in the following illustrations:

Chronological age

The age of the children with whom the child freely plays in competition

The length of the span of attention⁵

The "age of games." There is a considerable amount of material as to the growing complexity of the child's own culture as shown in the games he plays and is interested in

Maturity of psycho-motor mechanisms and interests as shown in drawing, crayon work, etc.

The extent of dependence upon adults as a task is gradually made more difficult

These illustrate means by which one measures the readiness of the child for a new experience by measuring the adequacy with which the previous contributions have been experienced.

If the things which the family should have provided are lacking, can the school supply them?

"Mothering" on the part of the teacher is not infrequent. Many teachers play this role because it is politic to do so—because the taxpayers want a continuance in the school of the family constellation. Many others do so because they do not realize that education is precisely the process of leading out the child from the implications of the family pattern. These

⁵ We have wondered what it means that the Kuhlman tests, which are largely based on the span of attention, so highly correlate with the Stanford Binet. Either the span of attention is a function of "intelligence" or, more likely, in most children the various functions develop along at about the same rate.

two groups are relatively easy to change. There is however, unfortunately, a third group of teachers who in the poverty of their own security satisfactions seize upon the children to build those relationships which are obviously so welcome to all adults. Those children who have been satisfactorily mothered at home throw off this protectiveness (to be punished for this rejection and thus with some frequency to become the "sore thumbs" of the group). Children who from inherent or physical reasons will never grow up seize upon this teacher-mothering just as they will later seize upon the minister, the employer, or the political boss as parent-substitutes. There are possibly others who are definitely retarded in their emotional development through this overprotection by the teacher. —

There are, also, those teachers of the first three grades who, without really assuming the parent role, recognize that the school experience is a weaning experience and that the child must at first be slowly led out from what the family means. This is not to confuse the teacher with the parent but to recognize clearly the fundamental qualitative difference between the psychological setting of the home and of the school; and that there is the artist's task of weaning the child from the one to the other.

However, the answer to the question whether the school, in place of the family, can provide security, quittance with personal authority, protected competition, would be unequivocally "no." Social engineering must strengthen the family in what it gives to the child—not feverishly try to build substitutes. If an outraged group points out the miracles of modern psychiatry, the answer is that solid progress will come only when we more clearly face what we cannot do. A child who is lame we provide for as such—and propagandize as best we can against the same afflictions for others. A child who has

not had what the family constellation alone can give we must provide for as such—and propagandize against the same affliction for others. This is not pessimism. It is rather an attempt in an individual-centered culture to map those places at which the personality meets certain issues. Our goal is to develop each institution to the point of really carrying through its task (whatever careful research shall show that task to be) rather than to follow the false trail of substitutes.

And what of the adequacy (or readiness) of the teacher? The answer involves the needs of all human beings as they were reviewed in Chapter V, along with a catalogue of those hazards which seem peculiar to the teaching profession. There is no implication that these hazards are any greater in number or difficulty than those in any other group or profession.

Mental health, as earlier pointed out, is not merely the absence of mental illness. Clinical psychiatry may warn us not to be emotionally immature but mental hygiene must give a more positive statement as to what constitutes emotional maturity. The elements of mental health will probably delimit themselves through the method of minima which has been so useful in the field of physical health. This starts with the question, "Are there certain things which we must look for each day to provide?" Actually there might be unlooked-for blessings—or even unwarranted ones. That is not the question here any more than it is a question how much in excess of the minimum food essentials is provided each day. We know that we must have at least certain vitamins, certain salts and calories. The following paragraphs illustrate such possible minima.

The first essential that every human being looks for is security (see Chapters IV and V)—that unassailable situation where he has a place because of "who" he is. It seems a ne-

cessity that every adult should have close proximity through visit, letter, or actual habitation, with one or more persons from whom he would get this sense of security. Many teachers are unmarried and live at home during their teaching period; others are married; others manage to continue these "who" relationships in one way or another through their professional careers. To demand that all teachers marry would not answer the question but there can be little doubt that the statutory exclusion of those who presumably have established these "who" relationships through marriage is a serious hazard to the mental health of the group.

The second is that healthy personal adjustment involves a mild degree of extraversion, just as healthy social adjustment involves introversion. This is nothing beyond the statement that it is more healthy to live in the world as it actually is than in that which one wished existed—that individuals should live in and face reality (see Chapter V).

We are fully aware⁶ of the difficulty in any careful delimitation of introversion and extraversion. Our earlier conclusion that these are the emphasized ends of a continuous series, however, still allows the use of the two terms in ordinary practice. We understand that the claim has been made that there is a much higher fraction of introverted individuals among those who have taught twenty years than among those who have taught two years (a practically understandable statement in spite of the theoretical difficulty in distinguishing the two types). Our view would be that if such is the case the important matter is not so much that the profession of teaching is an introverting one as that the more extraverted individuals have been in the meantime "drained off" into marriage. However, there do exist in the total situation of the classroom certain hazards towards introversion. Within the classroom

⁶ See Chapter V, page 110.

itself (as Wickman has shown)⁷ the teacher considers the extraverted children as the problem ones. This last seems one of the most disturbing factors in this whole situation—that no matter how healthy the extravert, he is not a particularly comfortable person in the classroom—he is too bouncy. Though changes are occurring, as the matter now stands the teaching profession in the main offers a peculiar hazard towards introversion as certainly a majority of teachers go through a considerable period each day of that form of self-constraint, even-temperedness, symbolic expression, which are part of the adjustment to social living but which all belong to what we earlier termed traumatic introversion.

The third essential is that of a healthy relationship to the group. This is a paradoxical relationship, the haunting desire not to be odd, peculiar, different—the sharp insistence that in reality one is different. With a pain in the abdomen there is immediate relief from the doctor's naming it "appendicitis"—after all, that might happen to anyone. But after the operation how we equally need to know that ours was the longest, the shortest, the easiest to get out, the hardest—we don't care the detail as long as it makes us different from any one else! This paradox of life—this fact that in everything a person says or does appears the craving to be the follower, doing what others do, living as they live, lost in the crowd and, with it all, the wish for one little corner of life where one is the leader, is different, is individual—expresses one of the outstanding and basic conflicts of all individuals. Those who are in every way leaders are quite as lonely and unhappy as are those beaten souls who are in every way followers.

This paradox is obviously met in the development of a hobby—so that for the most part each one does what everyone

⁷ E. K. Wickman, *Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes*, New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1928.

else does, earns his living as others do, but has a little corner of his own peculiar interest that gives him the feeling that he is different from others. We have frequently questioned whether teachers are any less likely to develop these hobbies than are any other group. That there is in this matter particular hazard for this profession we have no evidence.

Next may be mentioned the need for integration of the personality. This is the need for a certain ability to stand alone—a certain completeness that means that while we build our house among others it is so built that it will stand even if they go (see Chapter V). We have said that parents, accepting responsibility for weaning the child emotionally as well as physically, must also wean themselves from the child. This integration of the adult life—so that it does not *need* the child to live out its unanswered hopes and its unattained goals—is difficult of attainment but one of the most pressing demands of mental health.

From this point of view the teaching profession offers very definite hazards to mental health. The teacher as an adult is presented year in and out with groups of individuals who not only in age but in their position in the situation, invite dependence upon her. It is extremely difficult to wean ourselves from those who depend upon us. The teacher is asked to drill her charges in enormous amounts of academic work. When the school changes its goals, when it becomes interested in how children live together rather than in what academic knowledge they can attain, there is no reason why the teacher will find the process of her own weaning more difficult than any other professional person. As long, however, as the amount of academic knowledge to be given increases while the number of pupils not “academically minded” also increases, there is here a very definite hazard in what is already one of the most difficult of adult adjustments.

Finally, there is the need for success.⁸ By "success" we do not mean fame or notoriety. Nor is success bound up in financial gain or acclaim. Rather does it come to one in those moments when in the particular situation "nobody else would do." It is only in this analysis that we can understand the lives of certain groups of people—the happiness of the harassed mother of a large family in the midst of crowding, poverty, or sickness, faced with new pregnancies and the whole catalogue of social ills. We forget that such a woman often has opportunities for success which can never come to her "more advantaged" sister—because of the many situations in the family when "nobody else would do." Success may come in relation to but one other person; it may not come every day. But it is desirable that each day provide the possibility that some situation shall arise where for the moment some part of the world calls upon one because it seems unable to call on any one else.

Here again there seem to be special hazards in the teaching profession. To the extent that there is a rather stereotyped curriculum to be given year after year, the opportunity for those new ventures which obviously favor success-giving situations is lessened. Moreover, the teacher of today is too much on the defensive to allow her these experiences easily. For some unaccountable reason school systems have built over her an imposing framework of supervision. The "critical assistance" of the supervisor has an unfortunate tendency towards an emphasis on criticism.⁹ There is a second threat that places the teacher on the defensive and this, oddly, has

⁸ Success is, as it were, a special, personal, and highly dramatic form of what we have called adequacy in discussing the need of the child, that is satisfied by the school experience (page 275 of this chapter).

⁹ It may be objected that what I say about supervision is not generally applicable. But I let the statement stand because I believe it is true in most instances and because it has the support of many school people whose judgment I trust.

come from the progressive education movement itself. The American public likes what is "progressive" and each new set of tricks must be squeezed and molded into "progressive education" by the harassed teacher who knows that her job is safe as long as she is not old-fashioned in her language. The various grotesqueries, the various new techniques, that pass for progressive education would be interesting museum material. Nor can one do anything but sympathize with the teacher in this situation. One also questions whether tenure does not play its part here. No study has been made of teachers—but for other individuals we know that when a period of intense scrutiny and uncertainty is followed by one in which essentially a life position is offered, something of venture, something of the urge for the new and untried, is lost.

We have done no more than outline the sort of approach that should be made to the subject of mental health. Further study might increase, decrease, or alter the catalogue of necessities. But we believe that school systems must cease their interest in the age and academic preparation of the school teacher to turn to the question of the extent to which her life and previous development indicate her ability to withstand the peculiar mental hazards which present themselves in her profession. Actually this involves the development of a scheme of teacher selection rather than the continuance of the present interest in teacher training. Teachers are, of course, selected today but they are selected on the basis of academic achievement, courses taken, and grades attained.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

An important step in reorienting school and teacher to the needs of the child is, as we have just seen, the stressing of teacher selection rather than teacher training. A good many

of the necessities for the teacher can be judged with a high degree of accuracy either before the teacher enters normal school or at least during the early years of her training there. No great forward steps can be taken until the present regulations of the normal schools are changed in such a way that individuals will graduate not merely on the basis of their academic achievement. It is odd that these training schools are open to any citizen of the country who happens to have an adequate IQ. The change to be desired would involve in the first place a much more complete understanding of the total life of the individual who seeks to enter normal school. It might, for instance, be said that no individual would be accepted who did not show a healthy and satisfying play relationship with other young people of her own age. It is possible that the existence of hobbies would be demanded. It certainly would be thought necessary that she should have had an adequate family experience in her childhood.

The teaching of "mental hygiene" in the normal school itself should be in the hands of those rare artists who know how to make the lessons of the problem child shed light upon the fundamental needs and drives of the person who is studying that child. That is, every normal school graduate should be emotionally adaptable to the adjustment problems of the schoolroom and should have a mental hygiene point of view—which means seeing her own and others' conduct as efforts at solving problems.

We would not however teach much about "the problem child" and his manifestations in the schoolroom during the normal school period. We doubt the extent to which a person can be taught about those things which she has not experienced. It would be fairly simple to arrange that every teacher, during the summer just previous to and as a prerequisite to

"tenure,"¹⁰ should receive instruction regarding the problems of maladjusted children. This would have given the teacher enough practical classroom experience with problem children, and would prevent her from seeing an intricate problem in every child in the room. At the same time training would not be delayed to the point where the teacher had already crystallized her philosophy of life and of teaching. This would not preclude teacher training in the later years, but it would make a great point of teacher selection early in normal school and would stress a critical period of training at this early stage.

As far as the child is concerned this reorientation of the school will be around the recognition that the school experience is something which touches the whole life and social adjustment of the child rather than only his academic achievement. We would also conjecture that the school will see that its task is to educate the child away from the psychological implications of family life.

¹⁰ The permanent contract which is given after two years (in most states) of actual teaching. The granting of tenure with the third contract is already a step of some moment to the contracting parties and could naturally be given this added importance.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Recreation

“RECREATION” SCARCELY meets those attributes of a social institution that characterize the Church, the School, or the Family. There is, however, a rapidly growing group of professional workers who minister to the recreational needs of the personality—and this group is rapidly attaining a homogeneity of purpose, vocabulary, and training. Various commercial ventures in meeting the recreational needs are of vast size and coherent structure. Moreover, the needs of the personality in this sector of life have seemed to us unique enough to demand separate treatment. Certainly this whole group is well enough integrated (even today) to act responsibly and with considerable unity in response to the needs of an individual-centered culture. It is these considerations that have impelled us to consider this field as of parity with those more classically termed the “social institutions.”

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

One of the problems of the personality which call for study is the relative value for leisure time (time not occupied directly or indirectly with the mechanics of making a living) of recreation in comparison with rest or relaxation. In this country we have felt that refreshment comes from doing “something else” with quite the same vigor and energy with which we carry through our regular labors. Here are two distinctly different pictures—the European park on a Sunday full of quiet picnickers, the American equally crowded with

earnest athletes—and their meaning to the personality is not well understood. At the present time our school and recreational groups are rather feverishly at work teaching foreign-born and second-generation children that refreshment comes from altered direction rather than from diminution of energetic effort.

Another field for exploration is what specialization means to recreation. In Chapters V and VI the question arose whether there must be satisfaction or pleasure in one's work or whether one might with equal or greater health perform an automatic and mechanical job in order to make it possible to live more vigorously through one's recreational life at another time. As the latter has become more and more the prevailing pattern, we have been faced with a new problem. In separating that which we enjoy from that which is productive work, we have carried over into our pleasures the perfectionist philosophy which is so necessary for our work. In reality, recreation should imply doing what we enjoy doing, what we like to do—a "release" of something we wish to express. Due to our cultural tradition that what is worth doing is worth doing well, these releases suffer from the inhibition that they cannot be undertaken unless they can be done well—the freedom to do something for the sake of doing it has been pretty well crushed out. Seen as a problem for the school, we do not prepare people for leisure time simply by teaching them "fads and frills." It is quite as possible to get relaxation from translating Latin as from carving soap. A release primarily measures itself against the individual's desire, and when a desire of long standing is expressed, there is satisfaction in the actual expression. Neither perfection of the result nor competition with others is the goal. The "fads and frills" of school may be the backbone of a leisure-time program but

they will not be true recreation so long as children are as grimly seeking perfect marks in metal work or orchestra or football as in the three R's. In other words, if our pattern is to separate work from play as it has done, the school probably has the task of teaching the child that some things are to be done as well as possible and that other things are to be done "for the fun of it." This would involve not denial of a perfectionist philosophy but rather the child's realization that there must also be freedom to do things for the pleasure of doing. A recreational program must fundamentally recognize that the important thing is the attitude of mind with which the thing is done. One need but visit a schoolroom today to see that children paint, build, draw as they did not in a previous generation. Fine as these new activities are, we are not ready to assay their place in the future until we know the extent to which the school has, through them, simply enlarged its perfectionist philosophy to take in an ever widening area of a child's personality.

Research should teach us more of the effect of this specialization on the personality. It is, however, already possible to say that the specialization that has occurred means that the schools have the task of developing two different attitudes about occupation.

Another task for research to determine—whether recreation is itself an integrating experience—is distinct from the problem just stated and perhaps points in another direction. Is a release—because the fundamental drive is emotional at the same time that the other aspects of the personality are brought into play—something which must involve the entire individual? Certainly our specialization has separated off a great deal of gainful employment as involving only a part of the personality (witness Edna's statement, page 134, that it is

"only them that thinks that loses their fingers"). The professional fields and those of academic preferment are equally imperious in their demands for the submergence of normal elements of the personality. The doctor trains himself for years to view objectively what others cannot comfortably look upon. The lawyer trains himself to argue vigorously what the individual would consider unjust. The mathematician blithely works with the square root of minus one when the individual knows that such cannot exist. The business man? One wonders in looking back over our period of rugged individualism whether in business itself there has not been a code dictated by competition which the individual—the person—dislikes to look upon. It is perhaps true that in our recreational life we can bring into play the entire integrated personality as we cannot elsewhere—and it is perhaps true that this is precisely the reason that we gain such refreshment in the most wholehearted undertaking of recreation. Here, for once perhaps, we do what we wish and, for once, do not have to set apart a section of the personality to say or do these things which the total integer does not understand or cannot associate with. This is one of the points at which there appears the difference between programs of recreation and those of physical education. The latter illustrates again the specialization that has invaded our industrial and professional life—physical exercise emphasized regardless of its relationship to the rest of the personality. Regimented gymnastics of the body are quite as interesting to view as are regimented gymnastics of the mind—but they are not the total personality either at work or at play.

The problem for investigation is this—is it possible to give adequate and satisfying expression to a desire without involving the total integrated personality? Can a healthy "release" be specialized? These are questions of basic importance

to a recreational program. Earlier in this chapter we discussed the possibility of specializing recreation itself. Perhaps that is not possible, perhaps we shall see recreation as the real integrator, allowing specialization elsewhere in the cycle of life precisely because the personality has found in recreation periods of healthy integrated living.

So far recreation has appeared as one of the ways of living—as expressing a certain relationship between the personality and the world about. We next ask how far the play life can be used as a factor in training the emotions. The cortex of the brain acts as an inhibiting agent upon the older part of the brain in the latter's stirring of certain visceral activities and, at the same time, to start up certain reactions of the skeletal muscles proper to the emotion. As one comes up in the scale of animal life or as the child grows older, the inhibiting functions of the cortex increase. Also, one of the tasks in training children is to bring under control the skeletal expressions going with emotions. Cannon has shown that if the response of the skeletal muscle is lessened in an emotion of given intensity the visceral reaction is lessened.¹ Were the matter as simple as this our problems in the training of emotion would be simple. The clinical evidence seems very much to be that where the inhibitions of the cortex thus manage indirectly to lessen the intensity of the visceral response, the latter lasts for a longer time. No clinician could accept the simple statement that inhibition from the cortex operates upon the visceral system without residues in the latter in the way of prolonged or compensatory activities. This develops the widest possible field for the draining off

¹ Walter B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, New York, Appleton, 2d ed., 1929, p. 264.

of the visceral responses to emotion in socially acceptable channels. And this is precisely what occurs in much of the play life of individuals. What does the coach do other than train his charges to express anger and aggression in socially acceptable ways? The boxer in his training does not attempt to inhibit the visceral responses to emotion so much as he tries to drain these off into acceptable channels. In spite of Cannon's brilliant work there is still an enormous amount to be learned as to what happens in the viscera as the cortex indirectly inhibits their reaction to emotional situations. As we know better the visceral responses of individuals to the various emotions we will more and more use the play life to train these patterns to express themselves in socially acceptable form.

The therapeutic value of recreation for certain more or less maladjusted individuals needs also to be studied. A great deal has already been done in the way of socializing the shy child. There is the further interesting and important problem of providing further outlets for success for children who, in the prevailing pattern, are increasingly regimented in a school set-up that allows of very little leeway in grade and mark placement. As we have indicated earlier, the chance for a child to have successful leadership in some line is of outstanding importance in the preservation or establishment of mental health. The use of an increasing number of outlets in recreation and the study of which of these are particularly applicable to children with one or another handicap is important.

Finally, there is that whole field of knowledge which Piaget has opened up, of the character of the children's culture as

shown in their setting up and following the rules of games.² Obviously in an individual-centered culture all such knowledge as to what the individual is searching for in the pattern (the play pattern) which with a certain amount of freedom he himself builds, is of transcending importance.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

To what extent are individuals ready for an efficient use of recreational facilities and outlets? What assets and liabilities are found in the existing leadership of recreation?

For recreation how much training or education is required of the individual? Obviously recreational experiences in the sense of "releases" need no educational preparation. They attain their satisfaction in their actual accomplishment and require training only if one seeks perfection in the result. Thus far, the problem is much more one of providing opportunities for expression than one of training the individual. Certain experimenters (Runnells in Maplewood) in leisure-time activities where free opportunity was given to adults to carry through whatever they wished to do, with no compulsion to do a perfect piece of work, have found people going into these experiences wholeheartedly and with no need for "education."³ The fact that adults have very largely turned to commercial forms of recreation which are in no sense releases may be argued as showing that adults need to be educated to the proper forms and use of recreation. We have thought that this was not so—feeling that the great use of commercial forms of recreation came largely from the simple fact of our failure to provide other facilities.

² J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932.

³ Ross O. Runnells and Mildred L. Fisher, *Progressive Education for Adults*, *Progressive Education*, vol. 11, p. 280, April-May 1934.

With increasing urbanization those elements of self-sufficiency which are necessary if individuals are to find adequate resources for recreation within themselves are disappearing. Certainly a fair part of the hold which the commercial recreations have is dependent upon their being crowd phenomena. The universal American question, "Where shall we go tonight?" involves not only some activity different from the day's labor but also an activity shared with many other people. We will never go far with a recreational program built upon releases until we have been able in our pattern somewhere to give to individuals more sense of comfort in working or playing alone.

A third problem is raised by the necessity of an entirely new adjustment to the content of many of our recreational activities. Until recently the enjoyment of music was involved in large part with the experience of production. A great many people like to sing or play an instrument, having the feeling that in doing so they are "releasing" desires. With the development of the radio and earlier modes of reproduction, we have been faced with the necessity of learning how to use what earlier we had to produce. Here personal expression has been definitely eliminated from the recreational experience, but products of high quality are accessible. This has been true, through museums, in the field of painting and sculpture and, through commercial development, in the field of athletics. That is, one must now ask whether many fields to which we have in the past turned for recreation are to fall into the hands only of the able, with the consequent building of other outlets for true recreational activity. (We are aware that museums have had the experience that bringing works of fine art into a community increases the production of works of art in the community. We would still question whether the drive from this source is not one of copying the

great rather than the release of the desire to express oneself through art.) The basic question still stands: if it is true that recreation comes in the attitude with which one does certain things (not the attitude which he has about the final product) then we are presented with a serious problem in the rapid encroachment into the lives of most persons of near-perfect products in fields which have classically been those of our recreation.

These seem to us the chief problems involving the adequacy or preparation of persons in general for the proper development of recreational experiences.

What of the readiness of the recreational leaders?⁴ We must recognize that today there exists a large and probably highly efficient informal group of these leaders. Wherever a person collects about himself a neighborhood group "for a game of old cat" recreational experiences begin to be institutionalized. These informal groups may have in them the untrammelled spontaneity of each individual's desire to play or they may be regimented by the martinet. So far as the former situation obtains it is obviously our task to do no more than catch and strengthen this type of leadership. Here, it seems to us, lies the most sincere and serious problem in recreational development. Just as in the field of the school, the problem is not one of developing a polished set of techniques but of eliciting and strengthening these highly desirable informal elements which already exist. An institutional structure is probably required—but its policy must be that of nurturing rather than of regimentation.

(We can illustrate the point in the field of physical educa-

⁴ The experience is nearly the same for the enjoyers of recreation (just discussed) as for the organizers of recreation (discussed in the following paragraphs). I have therefore not attempted to distinguish between the two groups.

tion. To a great many persons recreation means only physical activity—wrongly, because recreation comes from any form of activity that is carried out with a certain attitude. The group that believed that physical exercise and recreation were the same thing very naturally proceeded to produce what must be perfect programs of recreation because they were perfect programs of physical exercise! Here the heavy hand of regimentation means that one sees groups—running sometimes into thousands—trained to carry through in unison exercises of the highest value to the body. This is again a primary interest in perfection of result. It is no criticism of physical education in this country to say that it has nothing to do with recreation. We will never solve our leisure-time problems by adding new fields for perfection of results. There is a further fallacy involved here in the supposition that the activities of the skeletal muscles control the emotions. The James-Lange theory of the origin of the emotions is apparently no longer tenable—we are not going to give individuals an airy lightness of personality by imposing upon them certain graceful dances. Physical education is an example of what can happen when a group with a set of techniques—which are admirable for that for which they were meant—impose these techniques upon a recreational program. If one were to find exactly how a perfect child played perfectly and then to make a second child do the same thing—this would not be play. Recreation is in the spirit with which a thing is done, not in the accomplishment itself.)

Here, then, for the recreational leader lies his gravest danger. He is coming into the field with the backing of thoroughly formalized institutions. He is to use the park or school playground—and there are few such organized public functions which do not demand “results.” It is precisely this emphasis on “results” which makes us a people so utterly unpre-

pared for leisure time. We don't know how not to work. Those who are furthering the recreational interests in this country today have before them perhaps the most challenging crusade of any—that of getting the public to support a program that absolutely must not have “results.” The cry today on every hand is for preparation for leisure time. It touches perhaps the greatest of our needs. The danger is that the program will be simply one of widening the number of activities and phases of persons' lives over which will be raised the whip of results—the driving slogan that what is worth doing is worth doing well.

What of the technique of operation? It seems probable that a recreational program must remain sensitive to the various needs of the individual. One says “probable” because we are by no means certain today of the extent to which the recreational needs of individuals differ. One of the emerging findings in the work of the psychiatrist is that to a considerable extent the fundamental drives and needs of people are the same. A “release” comes when there is opportunity actually to do something which the individual has desired to do but which the circumstances of the pattern have hitherto blocked. It is very much our own belief that the nature of these releases is highly individual. The experience desired is probably extremely individual in its origin (the psychiatric school in general looking for its source in various childhood identifications, the psychologists in general feeling that it is based upon what are the individual's capabilities). Even if for the sake of argument we accept an hypothesis that these fundamental desires are originally the same for all people, then there are enough individualizing elements in the factors preventing the expression of these to mean that the final needs are highly individualistic.

It seems probable also that the recreational program should remain sensitive to the neighborhood spirit. The objection may be raised that the neighborhood is disappearing—not to return—that specializations and facilities of communication are rapidly taking this pattern out of our lives. This is true but, as we pointed out earlier, man is apparently able to adjust comfortably to change—it is rapidity in change which is the disturbing factor. Thus we can accept the future disappearance of the neighborhood in our pattern at the same time that, for the present, we welcome any activity that tends to keep it intact.

Because the urge to play, the emotional factor in release, seems to have more in common for all people than vocational or social stratification can offer, it is possible that the recreational program might be at least a temporary cementing factor for the neighborhood. If the neighborhood is to disappear as a spiritually united group, this is obviously not a final goal for the recreational group. However so long as recreation employs the roped-off block, the school, or the school playground, its program can do much to retard the speed with which the neighborhood spirit is today disappearing. The School itself might do this also if it were to lessen its intense interest in the academic curriculum. Today it stratifies persons far too much for such a program.

The recreational program must be sensitive to racial needs and backgrounds. Here again is a step for the present. Groups which have been moving in great numbers into this country have been pounced upon with a vigorous and not-to-be-denied Americanization program. That knowledge of our language and customs is important in establishing economic position must be admitted. With this, however, has gone too much effort at clearing away all vestiges of the rich cultural contributions of these groups. This has meant loss to all con-

cerned; our own culture has been by so much robbed of a rich tributary, the immigrant has been thrown into the turmoil of the conflict between the old and new patterns.

Possibly the recreational program has the answer for this difficulty. Through the continuance of various activities of the racial stocks from which these groups have come—such a program allows for a continuance of the contributions of these groups without involving the threat to economic status that appears in failure to Americanize in the field of competition. That is, a recreational program can provide releases in a field where there is “nothing at stake.”

To what extent these three fields of interest can be kept within the present general field of “recreation” without any one of them losing full expression is difficult to say. Primarily the technical task before the recreational group is an individual one—allowing for releases in a pattern which to a very large extent molds the individual from the first to its own ways of expression. In addition to this, there are two pressing but probably temporary problems in which the recreational program can be of the greatest assistance. These both involve to a large extent group activity and interests. Whether these can be developed without loss to the basic technical job is a question but certainly here is a real demand which must, if possible, be met.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

In spite of the danger of predicting something which cannot be foreseen, one may point out four very definite trends in recreation as a sector of the cultural pattern. Which ones will predominate no one knows.

The first trend is that of presenting to children a great number of new things to do. Very much of the rationale back

of the "fads and frills" of the public school curriculum is this notion of introducing children to a wide variety of new interests. As we have noted earlier, the goal for these subjects is unfortunately the same as for the more classical group—perfection of performance. Yet a new task—particularly if it be one considerably different from that involved in the matter of making a living—is itself a very real invitation to a change in attitude, and the change makes for recreation. The recreational program of the future may, then, mean no more than a markedly expanded introduction of children to new interests. While it would appear to the psychiatrist that this would in no way meet the recreational demands of individuals, so many people believe in it that it may be important among future developments.

The second trend involves, in our classical use of the word, further education. There are two ways in which this trend is developing but both would look upon leisure time as a period for somewhat formalized programs in giving a better understanding of life and its problems. While both have been used during leisure time and are supported as possible leisure-time activities, they are actually rather grimly preoccupied with a better preparation for life's activities.

Very largely in England, but to some extent in this country, the plan of providing further education in the classics has been developed. This might be expressed as learning of life through learning how other ages have lived it. Where tried, this has apparently been very successful with a fairly large group. The fundamental philosophy here is that expressed in our own public school system—the belief that the study of what life was will tell us more about what life is. Nor can one deny its probable truth—the sameness of the basic problems of all people is appalling. This approach may lead to an objectivity that cannot be attained in studying one's own prob-

lems or even those of one's own cultural pattern. Yet it seems that this use of leisure time is more a fortifying of life's struggle than a surcease from it. There are, it is true, some individuals who enjoy this type of study—those academically minded souls who turn to certain experiences of which they did not have enough in their school careers. With these persons the implications are quite different—here are elements of recreation as a release mechanism. In spite of the growth of this movement it presents dangers to a recreation program demanding activity in which the perfection of the goal is entirely secondary to the pleasure there is in carrying through the operation.

Another form of education (E. C. Lindeman's brilliant work) has been tried in this country—the study of life with the student's own life as a textbook.⁵ One's experiences may be lacking in orderly exposition of the problems of life but this is more than compensated for by their reality. If one accepts again the essential sameness in the fundamental problems of all people, then a person understands all life if he understands his own. This the analysts have beautifully traded on, giving the analyzed individual insight into the problems of all through giving him insight into a great deal of his own life. Group work of this sort is challenging but seems full of pitfalls. Our experience is that people are not at the place where in groups they are willing to discuss the intimate details and motives of their lives, nor is an effort at understanding motives anything but dangerous unless we get at *real* motives. Under outstanding leadership this form of self-analysis and appraisal might be of the greatest value, but otherwise it presents the danger that always accompanies pretense which is not seen as such. There is the possibility

⁵ E. C. Lindeman, *Meaning of Adult Education*, New York, New Republic, 1926. Particularly the chapter "In Terms of Method."

that such groups may use case material through which the leader will bring out the basic problems of the group members—for each to see for himself. This seems to offer the advantage of realism along with an objectivity that is impossible in discussing one's own life.

In either case it is difficult to accept such studies as elements in a recreation program. It is true that people understand all too little those drives in life that are back of the surface phenomena. If we understood these drives we would be more efficient citizens—perhaps happier ones. In an individual-centered culture this sort of knowledge seems necessary. All this may be said at the same time that we think of our task for leisure time as that of doing “less important” things. For a nation that in conquering nature has had to make use of every minute and every energy there is now the necessity of learning how not to work rather than how to work more efficiently, how to use rather than how to make, how to measure life in other terms than “results.”

We put more faith in the trend that looks upon recreation and the use of leisure time as an opportunity for “releases,” discussed earlier. This conception of the use of leisure time means the releasing of tensions through provision, first of all, of a situation in which persons do what they wish regardless of the perfection of the results.

Leadership in this approach is difficult: people who know how to do no more than provide the opportunity for others to do what they desire, are rare. But it seems to us that this sort of leadership can be taught to a fair number of people. From what has been previously said it must be obvious that this plan more than any of the others must provide the personality with what it should get from its recreational or leisure-time experience.

Finally we ask whether we shall in time develop and give

social sanction to a leisure class. Perhaps it is only in this way that caste can be given to such leisure-time activities as have been discussed in this chapter. As long as ours is a pattern in which only the useful person has a place, can we ever really escape trying to be useful in our leisure time? Is it just a matter of chance that those European patterns in which people seem to take their leisure comfortably are ones in which there is a leisure class—while we rush hither and yon straining every muscle to occupy the minutes when we are not producing? A leisure class has elsewhere largely been patron to the arts but we doubt that this is its real contribution. As a group—and as one among the highest of social stations—it gives status and position to the doing of things in which no stake is involved. Until this sort of thing is made “proper” we rather doubt that a recreational program can be freely built or can freely contribute its richest boon to the personality.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Law and Order

THE FIELD of law and order is one of peculiar interest to the student of personality. The fact of delinquency or crime is sufficiently dramatized to throw much light upon the ways of ordinary folk. Moreover this capacity for inviting the lime-light has long since focused the interest of Society upon the lawbreaker and what he costs. (And for the same reason probably Society will always feel sure that the criminal is more expensive than is the inefficient or the docile follower of any demagogue.) Moreover, our oldest and best known clinics for maladjusted children have been closely tied to the institutions of law and order.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

While research must cover, far beyond anything so far done, all that law and order means to the personalities which it touches, we present in this section illustrations only of those aspects peculiarly interesting to the mental hygienist.

The Juvenile Court sees many casual breakdowns. As we said in Chapter III, we accept the fact that the child haled into court tells what he feels (under the stress of the situation) that the Family or other social institution means to him, rather than (perhaps) what they do really mean to him. Thus the casual breakdown gives us "hunch" material only, but for the present this is of the highest importance.

Some casual breakdowns come into the adult courts—how many we will not know until there is a more thoroughgoing clinical program associated with these courts. However, we

look chiefly in the Juvenile Court for this group—particularly in areas where the court has a policy of opening its services to the earlier and less acute delinquencies. Many of us working with the courts have become so accustomed to their attitude and procedure that we fail to weigh sufficiently the “shock” that a first court experience means to the child. This whole constellation of experiences has an emotional value that lifts the situation to the level of penetrating assay.

The courts have traditionally interested themselves in the protection rather than in the understanding of life, in the preservation rather than the meaning of property. If fifty cents is stolen the law is interested in the return of the money and in extracting “fifty cents worth of terror from the child.” To say that the Juvenile Court no longer has this attitude is wrong, although in the case of many juvenile court judges the change from an interest in acts to one in actors has magnificently occurred. To what extent the court as such can afford to see the child as a casual breakdown—can use the delinquency as the door to understanding what the home, the school, industry, life itself, mean to children, is a question. Without shadow of doubt here lies the richest of our research material, the ready-made dramatization of the stresses of life. Either in the court itself or in closely associated agencies we find the real backbone of our material for the shaping of an individual-centered world.

Research¹ in this field must develop a clear outline of the implications to the personality of the legal approach. So much has been said of the closer cooperation between the judge and the psychiatrist that the antithesis between their

¹ In this chapter and in Chapter XV (Medicine) I have made a somewhat different approach to the “search for meanings” than elsewhere. What I am after is not the meaning of law and order and of medicine to the individual but the meaning of the legal attitude and of illness.

points of view must be shown. Both ways of viewing the same problem are necessary and the Juvenile Court judge who "follows one hundred per cent the recommendations of the psychiatrist" is as lacking in understanding as the one who has nothing to do with the psychiatrist.

Law and order—the legal attitude—is, and must be, interested in facts as facts. It is necessary in each case that Society should determine what has happened. The psychiatrist—the physician—is interested in facts as symptoms. He wants to know what the facts mean. Society treats grand larceny as a very different matter than petty larceny—stealing \$50 is a far more serious offense than stealing \$49.99. To the physician—the psychiatrist—stealing ten cents might be a symptom of a far more insistent and insidious difficulty than taking five hundred dollars. Society, through the law, has claimed an interest in intent. Actually, however, it has assorted "intent" into a number of "grades" and in each case it finds as best it can to what particular classification the specimen at hand belongs.

Nor does the matter stop here. To the physician often the more violent and apparently distressing symptoms are no more than welcome indicators that the patient is reacting to difficulty in a healthy way. What physician but has hoped for the restless high fever that means that "he's putting up a good fight!" The legal attitude measures importance on the yardstick of size—that of the psychiatrist, on the scale of the extent to which it means quittance with some problem. Truancy, for example, is often the first sensible act in a situation involving the forcing of a child through an impossible school situation. The forces of law and order punish truancy with the same solemn insistence that they would put ice on the thermometer to assure themselves that the day was not uncomfortably hot.

But a problem is not solved by merely following new gods. For the safety and security of Society, facts must be dealt with as facts. Delinquency threatens the solidarity and security of Society and in this light primarily it must be treated. However, the Juvenile Court, within these limits of its responsibility, is able to vary widely its attitude towards a given situation and its treatment of it on the basis of the medical (psychiatric) findings and recommendations. The Juvenile Court is also able through such findings to further the common knowledge of what the social institutions actually mean to children. It is through this sort of research, and this alone, that we will make any real progress in conscious social planning for the future.

The second basic difference is that the lawyer is interested in fixing the blame while the physician is interested in treatment. Perhaps when people live together this matter of finding the guilty one when trouble is about, is an absolute essential. Certainly the veriest child markedly assuages his grief if he can but proclaim that it was somebody else's "fault." All of our forces of law and order spend much of time and energy in ferreting out the guilty parties—and it must necessarily be so.

The physician, on the other hand, treats the child's cold none the less because the child had failed to obey directions as to rubbers or overcoat. The psychiatrist has brought this medical attitude to the field of the conduct disorders—steering his course much more by what are the constructive ways of meeting the present situation than by what is the evidence of who was at fault. (Actually many fall short of this. Indeed, unfortunately many among us spend far more time in fixing the fault upon the parent or teacher than did ever law and order in fixing it upon the child.)

The legal attitude towards the personality rests upon the

assumption that the individual is free to choose his own conduct—an assumption which naturally leads to the necessity, for the safety of Society, of assigning guilt to delinquent acts. Here again it is our belief that the Court's point of view should not be usurped by any other approach. That the Court should be thoroughly sensitized to the therapeutic problems involved goes without saying. But that it should abandon its prime function of fixing guilt seems only blindness to its social responsibility.

Perhaps the third difference is nothing but a restatement on a more fundamental level of the first two. It is that the Court views an act from the point of view of Society, whereas the psychiatrist sees it from that of the individual. A poor boy in high school, financially unable to interest the girls in his various claims, finds for his perfectly normal desire a perfect answer in stealing a parked automobile for a joy ride. On the one hand, it is footless to punish this boy for finding a satisfactory solution for a very fundamental human need. It seems much more reasonable to find for him through some club activity or position that leadership which brings the acclaim of the girls whose hearts he seeks. The psychiatrist thinks of the stealing of the automobile as a useful indicator that something has to be done for this boy—and this he proceeds to do. On the other hand, it is just as necessary to recognize the rights of owners that their investments in automobiles be protected. To "treat" the stealing of an automobile by an elaborate program of interesting club activities scarcely meets this. There may be times when the psychiatrist feels that punishment (in the sense of the unpleasantness that follows certain behavior) is necessary. His judgment is entirely controlled by the development needs of the child. Equally the court must use punishment—but on the basis of the needs of Society—as prevention of further acts of the sort involved.

There is such a wide literature on the purpose and efficacy of punishment that further discussion here would be ridiculous—though obviously the effect of punishment upon the personality is one of the very sincere questions for research in the establishment of an individual-centered culture. This much, however, we cannot resist. One of the more startling of Healy's findings, and others of us have come to the same conclusion, is that at the time just preceding a delinquency the matter of the punishment which might be involved does not enter the child's mind.² This striking fact has been used to support in part the thesis that punishment is not a deterrent to delinquency. There is, however, ample evidence in our children that punishment is a marked deterrent in getting "close to" delinquency. Certain delinquencies are without premeditation but in large fraction the delinquents have a prodromal period of going with certain boys, playing with certain ideas, frequenting certain areas. That this type of activity leads to deeds which lead to punishment, very potently acts upon the minds of a large number of children.

If in illustrating the research that must be done as to the attitude of law and order towards the personality we have stated our own findings that the legal and medical points of view are in antagonism, this is not to be taken as necessitating a sharp clash of interests over each child. When one-half of the world believed that the sun went round the earth and the rest that the earth revolved about the sun, the deepest and most important of philosophical and theological questions were involved. However, both groups got up in the morning at the same time. We all live better than our creeds. Life blurs issues and realistically deals with situations which theory makes grotesque by its very logic. So it is that the

² Particularly stressed in *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct* (William Healy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1917) but the idea appears in much of Healy's writing.

Clinic and the Court live in fair peace—and that the personality of the delinquent is not in actuality torn asunder by the theoretical stresses. There are, however, certain practical considerations that cannot be passed by.

There are, for instance, no two communities in which the relationship between the Clinic and the Court are the same. In certain situations clinics are merely ornaments. The Court gladly receives diagnoses—somewhat magnificent modes of describing what it already knew. In other places, it is the Clinic which the Court proudly proclaims as its complete guide. These are the extremes. In either, the total situation of the delinquency gets short shrift. Actually the two agencies are antagonistic—antagonistic in philosophy, in responsibility, and in mode of approach. (Further, the two agencies probably attract to their leadership quite opposite types of personality—the one the individualist, the rebel, the non-conformist; the other the socially minded, the conformist.) Out of the clash of these two points of view come certain adjustments which are probably compromises. In this clash it is unquestionably better that the Court and its point of view have the final and definite decision in its hands. Abrogation by the Court of its social responsibility to an agency with an essentially antagonistic view sounds very scientific and very modern, but to us it seems rather a betrayal of trust.

One other practical consideration. Between these two philosophies and in the closest of relationships to the delinquent stands one of our oddest anomalies—the probation officer. He is at once expected to mellow the Court's decisions with the psychiatric point of view and to translate into a workable legal program the highly individualistic recommendations and plans of the Clinic. As agent of the Court his brush strokes might be bold and unquestioning; as agent of a new social philosophy his fine and intricate lines are not so defi-

nite; only the artist can combine these. There are probation officers who are doing just this—and doing it well. Their job is a hard one and probably most strategic in the entire institution of law and order. We shall return to this point in discussing assets and liabilities.

If the forces of law and order press upon the individual both by formally codifying the inhibitions which Society places upon his actions and by dealing in one way or another with his failure to adjust to these inhibitions, the attitude of the Law towards crime and delinquency is of the highest importance. And once that attitude is determined, its effect upon the personality is an important subject of research.

We bring this up because of the somewhat startling fact that neither Society nor the Law is primarily interested in the prevention or reduction of crime or delinquency. The construction of an expensive and ponderous mechanism to do something which Society is not interested in doing, is a picturesque anomaly. The subject has been so thoroughly covered (particularly by Pound and more recently by Michael and Adler)³ that we make the briefest of recapitulations here.

The Law has been, over the last two centuries, interested primarily in the preservation of certain human rights, and the detection, measurement, and punishment of crime have been made (almost without exception) secondary to the effort to exalt and preserve these individual human rights. Even the wave, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of harsh and certain punishment of all crimes receded not because it failed to accomplish its purpose but because, one might say, it worked too well and Society revolted against its

³ Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law*, Boston, Marshall Jones, 1921, p. 103 and following; Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, *Crime, Law and Social Science*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1933.

infringement upon individual rights. The more recent change from an interest in the Rights of Man over to one stressing the interests of Society may tend towards a more effective attitude to crime prevention and detection but again this will be but a secondary result.

For we cannot claim to be really interested in the prevention of crime. Long since we have known its high correlation with poverty, crowding, and broken families. Yet these are the natural results of a certain economic structure which we have chosen to support. We are not really interested in the detection of crime. We know the way to more efficient detection but, because it would disrupt our ingrained policy of local police appointment and operation, we prefer not to employ it. As Pound has so beautifully shown,⁴ we know the way to far more efficient prosecution and punishment—but are so much more vitally interested in the preservation of human rights that we will not follow it. (One is tempted to an analogy. It would seem a truism that Society is interested in the prevention of killing. Did we not spend billions and devote every energy to stopping a war that was killing our young men? But the automobile kills and maims at about the same rate. Yet we exhort and spend now—to stimulate the building of more automobiles—setting a higher value on the right of the individual to make and have an automobile, a higher value upon what the automobile means to our economic and social structure, than we do on human life.) Obviously this places every individual within the institution of law and order in the impossible position of being employed to do something which really commands only the secondary interest of the community that employs him. In other words, Society will do what it can to block the efforts of its servants if in carrying out their sworn duty they seriously affect its

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

more primary interests. Research must recognize that the forces of law and order are unable to address themselves primarily to the actual problem of crime in the field of prevention, prosecution, or cure.

Despite this fundamental difficulty the courts (and all the other elements of this institution) do, of course, address themselves to the problem of crime. Research must measure the effect of a marked change in the philosophy of the courts over the last two generations—a change that has had interesting parallels in the medical profession. These all involve a changing relationship of law and order to the individual.

In Chapter IX (pages 250 ff.) we used the history of typhoid fever to suggest three stages of medical philosophy: segregation, early diagnosis, and true prevention. Psychiatry still largely depends upon segregation, though the last generation has seen marked forward steps in prevention through early diagnosis. The child guidance movement proclaims that highly expert ability brought to bear upon the very earliest of symptoms obviates further difficulty. This movement had much of its impetus in the vision of Clifford Beers' book⁵ and work, and has been termed Mental Hygiene. Rather is it the highest refinement of clinical psychiatry and it is properly thus termed so long as the object of study is the "deviate"—no matter how minute the maladjustment might appear to be. We see ahead a new development that seeks to produce change through altering the personality but looks upon this alteration as most easily and effectively brought about through changing the environment. Thus the goal of mental hygiene (in direct opposition to clinical psychiatry which seeks to adjust the individual to the reality which is

⁵ Clifford Whittingham Beers, *A Mind That Found Itself, An Autobiography*, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 8th ed., 1935.

about him, as we shall explain in Chapter XV) is an individual-centered world. Its interests are, paradoxically, primarily in the institutions because it is they and their forces which so much form the personality. If our interest in typhoid fever is now centered in those situations and conditions which give rise to the disease, so is our interest in mental hygiene centered in the milieu which develops the stresses in the personality.

Certainly the first, in a practical clinical way, really to press the matter of prevention through early diagnosis was Healy, who in 1909 in Chicago began studying adolescents on the theory that by understanding and curing their delinquencies crime could be lessened.⁶ Guidance clinics (later established) soon found, however, that the adolescent was already firmly conditioned by earlier experiences. The work with younger children progressed favorably until Thom taught us that the period of habit-training was that at which alone a clean slate could be found.⁷ Further work, however, proved that the real difficulties in the habit-training period were long since clearly defined in the lives of the adults involved. This has led to a program of training for parenthood—so that obviously we have chased ourselves around to the point at which Healy started. Any program which simply tries to get at a problem *earlier* will not ever, in the field of conduct disorders, find that point where its subject matter has not long since been determined by previous conditioning. The problems of the young are no simpler than those of the old—the difference is in the location of their source.⁸

Psychiatrists interested in prevention through early diag-

⁶ William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1915.

⁷ D. A. Thom, *Everyday Problems of the Everyday Child*, New York, Appleton, 1927.

⁸ I have attempted to clarify this point further in *The Responsibility of Psychiatry to the Field of Education*, *The Educational Record*, vol. 18, p. 12, January 1937.

nosis found themselves forever approaching the normal in their clients but still carrying the incubus of being thought of as dealing with only "queer" people. To be rid of this disconcerting situation an appeal was made to the slogan that "all people, after all, are queer." This attainment of respectability through calling each one a deviate may represent a fundamental and important truth. Its use to disguise psychiatry's past seems only further to becloud the fundamental issue between clinical psychiatry and mental hygiene.

As to law and order, the philosophy of segregation is still very comfortably in the saddle. One suspects that this is true even of the development of probation. Certainly a great many are put on probation solely because the courts do not know what else to do in the situation. However, the development of the Juvenile Court was a definite step towards prevention through early diagnosis. In general the Court has met the same difficulty as has the Clinic—it has found that no matter how early it attacks the problem there already exist determining factors about the child which make real "cure" extremely difficult. Every Juvenile Court that looks upon its work with fair criticism knows the appalling percentage of its "failures"—and knows that one of the important reasons for this is that it is doing nothing about the school, home, church, and living pattern which were the ready soil for the difficulty.

We say then that law and order must take the third step. Its officers must use the Court and its trappings to interpret to Society the real meaning of those social conditions—unwholesome living, regimented school experience, poverty-stricken play, and so on—which today stand in the way of true prevention. The time will come when both Court and Clinic will use the study of the casual breakdown (the de-

linquent) as the doorway to an understanding and alteration of the total social milieu.

There is a difficulty here in that while the Juvenile Court has our richest material from the casual breakdown, there is unquestionably involved for the child an emotional stress that tends seriously to distort his own judgment as to the situation. Most delinquencies involve authority situations which mean that often a number of persons have something at stake. Perhaps as we turn to the less serious delinquencies some of this will disappear. At present the child, as well as parents, school officials, and the police, have often too much "self-respect" to maintain to make the data worth while. There is the further difficulty that the delinquency itself often seriously overshadows any of the important factors involved in the study of the child. An illegitimately pregnant girl has much to worry about other than the questions raised in the twelve- or fourteen-year tests for intelligence!

The answer is not easy. Actually the study of the casual breakdown is but the first step of the approach to the question as to the effect of the social institutions upon the personality. There are, further, two courses open to the court—either one would certainly lessen the distortion that at present comes from the importance of the court appearance. It is possible that as the Juvenile Court crystallizes into a more institutional type of social machinery, the School and the Home will become better sensitized to handling the lesser delinquencies and will be the agencies to which we shall turn for our knowledge (as to the casual breakdown). Since the treatment of children's difficulties should be as far as possible in the hands of those who naturally surround the child this would be a step in the right direction. The other course

(which is used by some courts) is that of making a study of the situation at the time of trouble and then planning later studies to be made of those children who are placed on probation. This allows of a comparative assay and to a considerable extent avoids distortion in the use of the casual breakdown. It must be repeated that while children often have been in difficulty a number of times before they are brought to the Juvenile Court, it is our experience that the court appearance is, for most of them, near enough to the first difficulty and sharp enough in its emotional content to make them casual breakdowns.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

In assaying the qualifications of the institutions and personnel of law and order for such tasks as more and more clearly show themselves necessary, it would be logical to begin with those who first come in contact with the child—namely, the police. This should be followed by the Juvenile Court, the probation officer, and the correctional institution. This order we have changed somewhat—to take them up in relation to their closeness (up to the present time) to the psychiatric clinic. This somewhat simplifies the presentation. It must be obvious that our thesis would look to the police officer as the most important agent of law and order—perhaps a similar chapter written a generation from now could start with him!

First as to the Juvenile Court. In actual practice there is no such thing. We have called the establishment of the Juvenile Court the first step in a new relationship between the law and the personality (Chapter I—interest in the actor rather than the act). As such it has not yet crystallized. There are

not even Juvenile Courts in this country. Actually we have a fairly large number of juvenile court judges—and the institutions over which they preside reflect entirely the varied abilities and prejudices of these judges. How long this condition will last no one knows. In conformity with our prevailing way of doing things, the Juvenile Court will in time crystallize into a formal institution (somewhat better than the average of what we have now) and the judge will become more and more controlled by fixed requirements and standards. The venture, the challenge, the very lack of prescribed pathways which have on occasion brought to this Court the finest individuals in the country—these will be gone. In general, however, this leveling process will be one of advance—representing more thorough understanding for more children than now obtains.

We have already discussed in this chapter the variability in the relationship of the Court to the Clinic. Here, at present, is everything from complete dependence to equally imperative independence. A court is at liberty today to take whatever stand in this matter it wishes. We indicated that the most feasible position is that of the Court's recognition of essential differences between its philosophy and that of other agencies and its acceptance of the responsibility, where there is conflict, of basing treatment on its own philosophy.

As to the judge himself the point of view of this volume would lead us to but two qualifications. These would be over and beyond the ordinary "statistical" requirements of academic background and knowledge. The first is that he should be definitely a person of legal training rather than either primarily an educator or a social worker. In the Court two fundamentally different points of view must clash. We are certain that the protection of Society's interests must have precedence. The judge who integrates the knowledge of every

contributing social agency into his decisions is the wise artisan who uses many tools. The judge who does no more than give official approval to the recommendations of other agencies is the poor workman dazzled by the glitter of his implements. The second requirement is that the "set" of the judge is that of one interested in what law *means* rather than in what law *is*. For the criminal or delinquent the law *lives*—it does something to him, it operates, it wreaks vengeance upon him, or in some dreadful way never lets him beyond its sensitive tentacles. Or inexorably it stifles. At any rate (Healy first so clearly showed it—and there have been others), delinquency and crime, and law, and the Court—all these things have *meaning* to the person before them and are seen by that person only in the light of this meaning which his own life and experiences have given to them. The judge who is not acutely sensitive to the fact that the way the child before him looks at everything in the whole procedure (from earliest delinquency to final disposition) is different from his own way of looking at such things—is not a good judge. This is not to excuse the child—but to understand him.

Of the proceedings of the Court itself, again we say but little. The Court faces a serious dilemma in dealing with practically every delinquency which comes before it. On the one hand is the danger that the procedures of investigation, detention, and court appearance lay too heavy a hand upon a fragile structure, the child. If this is claimed as much better than the earlier situation which took these children into adult courts the answer is that the Juvenile Court is now in many areas handling children and "delinquencies" which would otherwise have gone into no court at all. Many delinquencies are of a flimsy sort—they and all about them would disappear in thin air if left alone. With the Court's

growing interest in the less serious forms of misconduct (so-called "pre-delinquent acts"), this danger grows. One thinks here of that great group of minor difficulties which the children themselves repent more bitterly than could any one else, which are kept alive and given new strength through our interest in doing good case work on them.

But this is only half of the dilemma. The very impression of the whole court procedure serves a valuable purpose for other children and their problems. Without question the "shock" of the court appearance is of marked therapeutic value in certain situations. Nor should it be forgotten in discussing the value of detention that for certain children the very seriousness of the whole situation leads to self-assay and to an evaluation of the total situation which is of the highest importance.

The answer to this dilemma is theoretically simple. One need only say that the police and others who feed the Court must be sharply sensitized to what this experience is going to mean to the child. This has nothing to do with Society's measurement of the severity of the delinquent act. The length of time over which the delinquencies have been occurring and their frequency are probably of considerable importance. The personality of the child and his attitude towards the Court are other important factors. Actually, the chances are that the Court will proceed largely as it has—of necessity in some cases serving to do no more than keep alive a matter much better dropped, in other cases by the very importance of the whole procedure serving as the first agency to bring the child face to face with himself and his problem.

In all the machinery of law and order there is nowhere a queerer cog than the probation officer. Given a theoretically

impossible task, he is oddly enough doing a pretty good job. Just where he can finally fit into the total picture is a serious question.

Probation is used by the courts very widely as an escape from an unpleasant task. Faced with a situation about which "something must be done" and assuring himself that there is nothing very serious about probation, the judge finds such a sentence an increasingly tempting way out. It would be interesting to free probation officers for a five-year period from responsibility for those for whom nothing can be done, those for whom nothing is expected to be done, and those turned over to probation by a defaulting Court.

Nor is his impossible hodge-podge of cases the greatest of the probation officer's difficulties. We have shown earlier in this chapter the diametrical opposition between the medical and the legal points of view in dealing with persons in difficulty. The probation officer is seriously and effectively attempting to develop the very best type of social work. The fact that he is a servant of the Court constantly intrudes upon his efforts. The fact that it can be said today that probation is "social work with the punch of the law" shows the impossible plight of the probation officer.

The two answers to this dilemma would belong among the indications for future change were it not that at present they are here and there being made. One answer is that probation should strengthen its alliance with social work, using it to wean the Court from its present attitude. This involves viewing delinquency or even crime as an educational rather than a legal problem. Today there are situations in which the probation officer is doing quite as outstanding a piece of work with the judge as with his probationers. The other answer is that probation separate itself from the legal entanglements

of the Court. This cannot occur as long as the courts use probation as a mild form of punishment. It means that the Court shall recommend probation only for those who can be changed or helped by good social case work. This would, for once, give to the probation officer the work for which he is training himself and would bring to clear issue the difference between the educational and the penal aspects of the Courts' decisions. Until such an event the probation officer will continue to do the best that one can who serves two masters.

If the probation officer has these troubles in his relationship to the Court, he has no less difficulty in his relationship to his client. Ostensibly employed to prevent crime, the officer finds that his employer (Society) has many other far more pressing interests. One of two courses is open to him. Realizing that his efforts at controlling recidivism are of only secondary interest to Society he may rapidly develop the cynicism that comes from constant defeat of high ideals. Then he is not a fit companion either for himself or for his clients. Or he may copy his employer to the extent that he too loses any primary interest in the actual number or extent of delinquencies which his client commits—to rest his interest only in the development of the total personality of the delinquent. If Society bends the Common Law and its administration to the interests of Society⁹ may not the probation officer forget delinquency and crime in the interest in the development of his client as an individual? Towards this goal many probation officers are turning. We have termed the relationship “constructive, or dynamic, friendship” because it is a friendship relationship which has in it a certain goal to be attained or worked towards. Here we touch upon a technical problem to

⁹ Roscoe Pound, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 ff. The entire chapter, The Rights of Englishmen and the Rights of Man, is stimulating and valuable reading.

which further attention will be given in our discussion of social work. Concerning this constructive friendship as it affects the probation officer we would say four things:

The goal of this friendship is not easy to define. In terms of the law it means living in peace and comfort with the statute books. In general social terms it means living so as to contribute something to the well-being and happiness of others. In terms of the client's individual life it is a matter of developing some sort of reasonable balance between the probationer's needs (and capacities) and the environmental opportunities for their expression. Which one or ones of these goals are to occupy the officer's efforts is for him to choose in each particular case.

The method of constructive friendship involves first a complete survey of the situation in hand. The knowledge on which such an understanding is based will be discussed in Chapter XIV on social work.

The method further involves the realization that a dynamic friendship changes both friends. Those of us (teacher, social worker, psychiatrist, judge) who "help" others forget that a personal relationship in which we ourselves do not grow has produced little if any change in the client. Pound¹⁰ records that Von Hoffding tells the story of the little girl who asked her mother if God made the whole world in six days. Upon the mother's reply that He did, the child asked "Well, then, what is He doing now?" Von Hoffding says that the correct answer is that "He is sitting for His portrait to the metaphysicians." Too many of us are sitting for our portraits—accepting "professional training" as the last experience in the way of change which we need. Some time in our case conferences we may come to the point of asking how far a client has changed us! That admittedly disconcerting consideration

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

would tell more than all our present tricky "evaluations" whether anything really had happened.

The method further involves the recognition of the cadence of the client. Perhaps here social work will make its next real strides. We know quite a little about goals. We have, even, some adequately satisfactory knowledge as to the steps to those goals. We woefully lack recognition of each individual's cadence in arriving at these goals. It seems probable that failure to recognize the "speed at which the thing is to be done" is one of the outstanding factors in our "unsatisfactory cases."

We have little to say of the policeman despite the fact that of all the personnel of law and order he alone can be a natural and accepted part of the child's daily life. So much has been said of the political fetters of the police that we scarcely dare to venture the opinion that this is not an important matter. We are much more disturbed over his specialization—over the development in his work of so many highly technical tasks that the patrolman who knows the children and the incipient gangs of the street is rapidly disappearing. With a few outstanding exceptions the community is not using the police to make the first, natural, close contact of law and order with the child. The spontaneous play life of the child on the street is watched in friendly fashion by no other person. Yet it is precisely at this point that happiness or defeat crystallizes itself into groups of carefree mischief or bitter retaliation. For some queer reason we put our money and trust into those persons in any social institution who have the least to do with the individuals whom that institution touches. Our great legal structure is no more to the child than the policeman on the beat. Until in its fullest meaning we realize this, the finest courts, probation offices, and institutions are no

more than glorified street sweepers, busily engaged in clearing away the *débris* of life.

The institutions which we have for maladjusted children have, too, been caught in a queer quirk of social philosophy.¹¹ Following a sudden interest in their development during the last century they have made remarkable material progress. Better buildings, extension of the cottage plan, better trained personnel—all these amount now to an enormous capital investment in our institutional machinery. In the meantime the various social agencies have been working heart and soul for the development of other means of caring for the maladjusted. The best agencies pride themselves now that institutional placement is not made “until absolutely everything else has been tried.” This we term a negative or sociological classification—the use of an institution because there is nothing else to do for the child, or because no other safe or acceptable social situation is available. There have been two results. We are developing more and more expensive institutions for poorer and poorer material. Also, institutions do not get children until they have been pawed over by every other available agency. And we solemnly shake our heads because the results of institutional care are so poor!

The institution should be seen from the point of view of its fitness for the treatment of certain psychological conditions. One such, to illustrate, is the short span of attention in social adjustments. Success here rests upon the fact that the regimen of the institution provides in its regularity of routine the control over actions and plan which is now beyond the child's own span. We suggest this as an example of a psychological classification for institutional placement. Ob-

¹¹ The following comments apply particularly to institutions in the North and East of the United States.

viously, research might disclose other or better bases of classification. The important matter is that we learn more about what the regularity and control of institutional life may mean—and that individuals needing that type of treatment be sent there without futile experimentation. The wholesale condemnation of institutional placement is, of course, utterly wrong—though it could be no more nonsensical than our present method of choosing this type of placement when there is nothing else to choose!

Institutions are and will be used by a frightened Society that thus seeks to correct its mistakes—or rather to hide them. This sociological classification will be a long time dying. The objection would moreover be raised, for instance, to the illustration used in the previous paragraph that so long as institutional routine is substituted for individual attention span, the latter will never develop as it should. This is but an example of the objection that is raised to all institutional placement (for any type of client), namely, that the institutional pattern is so different from that of the general social stream that the individual who makes a good adjustment in the former is, precisely because of that, one who cannot make a good social adjustment because in the institution he has no opportunity to learn how to do so. Those who obtain good records by obedience and ability to fit into routine are the last to fit into situations where adjustment problems are their own responsibility.

Which brings up the whole subject of parole. This is a weaning process—one of the hardest and most complicated. How long we will continue to load parole officers with absolutely impossible case loads and be satisfied with none too high qualifications for these officers, depends upon how long we continue to coat our negative institutional policy with the glitter of the money we spend.

Why do institutions proclaim their marvelous high record of "successes"? Why do we spend time and money to show their appallingly high percentage of "failures"? Used when all else fails—for individuals who have long been told that institutional placement would be the last resort (who therefore know themselves as failures)—happy amazement should greet anyone with hardihood of spirit to adjust after that experience!

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

As in the previous chapters, we hesitate to say here more than that reorientation will occur, as it is now occurring, and that it will be guided, first, by better understanding of what law and order mean to the personality and, second, by better understanding of the psychological implications of the functions of its various agents and agencies.

As the interests of society rather than the rights of man more and more dominate the interpretation of the common law, the psychiatrist will watch with breathless interest. The steps are too technically legal for this volume. Yet, as we earlier pointed out, this trend is one of the significant indications that we move to an individual-centered culture.

Meanwhile there will be, as there have been, fervid programs for the prevention of delinquency and crime. Of these, from the point of view of an individual-centered culture, we can say:

That to Society there is nothing particularly distressing about crime or delinquency. It is even possible that a considerable amount of delinquency is inherent in any pattern. Those responsible for the social order will see in these breakdowns, if they are wise, the pressures which are being placed upon all persons. Recidivism, on the other hand, appears as

the most sensitive indicator of social inefficiency and becomes the critical point of attack.

That the present-day preventive programs which involve some form of popular education (as various "character building" programs in the schools) on a rather extensive scale seem futile, as there is really so little known of the personal and institutional pressures upon the individual. By all means let us pity, fear, punish, or cure the delinquent—but mostly let us learn from him!

That psychiatric clinics as they are now generally known are not likely to lower materially delinquency or crime rates. They tend too much to tell us how *other* people live and think. It will be only as they translate the casual breakdown into terms of our own living and our own pressures upon him that their work will have dynamic social value. As society acts upon such indications of existing pressures, delinquency and crime rates will fall.

That programs of efficient and relentless suppression always have their place. Like corporal punishment of the child, they effectively answer the need to "do something about it"—and save society the much more difficult task of setting its own house in order. The courts and police may well build strong walls against politics and sentimental pity—but these too frequently also shut out understanding. A Scotland Yard in this country will lower the rate of certain particularly dramatic crimes, but no piece of machinery, no matter how finely conceived, will counteract the effect of the way in which we all live and of the profit-centered culture in producing the great army who are our delinquents and criminals. As long as children are victims of niggardly space and broken homes, of ill-kept faith, of adventure in a pattern that does not allow it, yearnings in a pattern that provides no an-

swer—for so long will the machinery of law and order satisfy the needs only of those who set it up.

Neither criminal nor delinquent is antisocial. There are few if any human activities that involve social (group) activity more than do these. Our task is to fit the criminal not into society but into a different society.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Social Work

THE FIELD of social work occupies a unique position among the social institutions. While it meets the criteria of homogeneities of tradition, personnel, and vocabulary it sets itself apart in three rather distinct ways.

It appears, on first sight, not so old as the other institutions—though actually its function has been carried on by human beings ever since people were first living together. It is to be admitted, however, that its development of a separate group of professional workers is recent.

Whereas other institutions have a primary function independent of the individual's welfare and relate only to that part of the individual's life that touches their province, the function of social work has been to assist the individual to make an adjustment to the total environment. How long this position can be maintained is a question. For instance, one notes with great interest the recent efforts made to crystallize the entire group about the issue of security. It is possible that we are being privileged to see the genesis of another major social institution. It is possible that at earlier times each one of the present institutions dealt with the "whole adjustment" of individuals only to find this position so difficult to maintain that it propped itself up or solidified itself by ministering to "one of the needs of all people." Possibly the personality-to-personality relationship of social work cannot withstand the rising tide of agency organization and available techniques—meaning that the field must identify itself with but a certain aspect of life. This will indeed legitimize so-

cial work but we suspect that it will but make the way for some other rather amorphous group which will deal with the entire adjustment problem until it in turn strengthens its position and deadens its usefulness by a similar crystallization.

Finally (tied up with the previous consideration) social work remains today a distinctly less conservative force in the cultural pattern than is any of the other institutions. At such time as it crystallizes itself about one of the needs of persons (for instance, "security" in its ordinary sense rather than in the restricted sense of belongingness), its trends will rapidly and distinctly become less radical than now.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

In questioning what the field of social work means to the personality there appears first of all the need for research into the place which this institution has in our total cultural fabric. Its various elements have been established on so opportunistic a basis and its growth has been so subject to the whims of popular demand and support that "research into the part that the field of social work plays in the development of the individual" must rather be research into "what part it might play."

Whereas the primary function of social work was earlier considered to be the giving of material relief, as its scope has widened and as our concepts of what the personality is (see Chapter I) have grown, it has come to realize that a redistribution of material goods is not enough. Certainly, in the matter of material well-being the poor never had more of the things formerly looked upon as accessible only to the rich than in the years just preceding the present Depression. Yet history will look back upon that well-fed period as one of high crime and delinquency rates with little thought for so-

cial responsibility. Admittedly it was a period of great difficulty in adjustment to the shifting bases of changing conditions and ideals. Nevertheless the twenties fell far short of proving the economic theory of happiness—that our personal and social ills could be solved by mere possessions. We can scarce be proud of a high standard of living until this involves what one does with what one has. A social philosophy preoccupied with externals could interest itself in the dispensing of money just as it could in the acts of crime or delinquency. But as we have integrated the latter into their personality implications so much, and have come to think of what money does to people, we have become more interested in changing the attitudes of people than in changing their material possessions. Social work therefore begins to be thought of as a matter of personality interacting with personality. However, the exigencies of the Depression developed a tendency to separate so-called “relief” cases from “service” cases (as though the giving of one dollar did not always involve “service”) which marks the retracing of long-fought and hard-won progress.

The function, then, of social work is that of assisting people to adjust in the world that is about them. Material relief will be given, partly because this is a humane necessity, partly because it often makes for a contact that would otherwise be impossible. The crux of the matter, however, is that with the great strides that mechanical invention has made there are new, startling, and serious problems in personality adjustment. The social worker must help people to adjust to these new problems but this is to be done by building attitudes that have in themselves strength. That is, the problem is probably one of adjusting people to change rather than to some particular change. This is no more than a restatement of what we have called adjustment to the individual-centered

world. It is a matter of aiding the individual to adjust to the world that he finds through helping him to interpret that environment in terms of what it means to his growth and development.

To what extent is it for the social worker a matter of active attempt at manipulation of the environment in view of the fact and with the fact in view that it so definitely molds the personality? The final answer to this question awaits more knowledge. We venture here to suggest that this further inquiry may bring clearly to focus some such situation as the following: that social work shall not be primarily interested in actual manipulative procedures; that out of the personality-to-personality relationship spoken of above there will be a constant stream of data emerging as to what the cultural pattern means to the individual. Indeed the social worker now has this information in great volume tucked away in her records. Social work has signally failed to date to vivify the picture of what the various elements of the cultural pattern *are doing to* the persons within it—though these data, ready made, pour into the social worker's office each day.

We guess, then, that a search for the meanings of social work will discover a twofold goal. One is a cold, detached, and impartial assay of the meaning of the various social pressures upon the individual. The data resulting from such assay will be given to Society to do with as it will (though probably many persons within the field of social work will be constantly attempting to act upon the findings as we indicated in the introduction to this chapter). The other is the building up of a warm, mutually developing client-worker relationship in which each in his or her own way is seeking a bearable answer to the problems of adjustment.

Study of this relationship which the social worker has with

the client is important, for on this knowledge depends the social worker's technique. There is a changing concept of the function of the social worker. She, along with the rest of the world, is no longer so much interested in what people do, as in why they do it (interest, again, in the relationships rather than the mechanics of living). She no longer so much wishes to make people act differently as to develop understanding as to why they act as they do. At the same time, she realizes that their motives are after all the same as her own. Her relationship with the client, instead of providing an opportunity to push and coax the individual towards a fixed goal, becomes the opportunity to work out with him the solution of problems which concern them both—the problems of life itself. This presents a difficulty. Will the social worker be able to maintain the objectivity which has been her cherished goal? Will she be able to keep the situation free from her own problems, conscious or unconscious? Research possibly will discover that objectivity may remain (and be developed) in the field of the worker's assay of the cultural pressures upon the client, but will disappear as the worker and client mutually struggle to resolve their problems.

However, if the social worker thus abandons the vantage point of adviser and expert in the way of living, a special obstacle presents itself. There is no question that many of our "uncooperative" clients are no more than those who feel themselves rightly quite as experienced as the so-called expert. The client may feel some hesitancy to place himself under the guidance of a person who is herself at sea as to the solution of life's problems. Two answers present themselves. The client can be brought to feel that in these matters we are all at sea, that the problems of all people of all sorts are much the same and call for a solution—a change in the constella-

tion of the problem factors involved—the working out of which is life. And secondly, if the social worker is better trained (than now) in the social sciences, she will be recognized by the client as having the peculiar value of bringing to their common problems a very special type of knowledge and point of view.

It we are to orient ourselves to the meaning of the whole field of social work and to the meanings involved in the worker-client relationship, so must we hope to know what the client's adjustment involves—at least in terms of *what the worker will have to know about him*. This knowledge will be of at least four sorts.

There must be statistical knowledge of the client—an assay of his possibilities and limitations. The present somewhat rigid grouping of individuals on the basis of their reaction to the "intelligence tests" is an excellent example of this type of knowledge.

There must be directional knowledge—the relation of what the client is to what he was. Almost any statistical or "static" picture drawn may actually mean the earliest stages of deterioration or part of a struggle towards a better goal.

There must be knowledge as to the forces back of these data and trends observed. How powerful are the drives back of what shows on the surface? We are only beginning to learn even our approach to this sort of knowledge—and owe to dynamic psychology whatever has been done. The child who pilfers money at home because he has never been taught property rights is a decidedly different matter, so far as doing anything about it is concerned, from the one who is doing exactly the same thing as a punishment to parents who have been inconsiderate enough to bring into the household a

younger brother. The variety and strength of the mental mechanisms back of those things which we do are of mere academic interest in explaining why we do certain things; they are of the most serious import in determining the ease with which we can alter our conduct.

Finally, there is necessary the knowledge of the cadence or tempo of the client's life. Individuals seem to have their own "ripening rates"—not only are there marked differences in the rate with which individuals arrive at certain goals, but also (we have thought from our material) for each individual this rate remains somewhat the same.

A large number of case histories which we ourselves see give the first and third types of information (mistakenly giving both as static knowledge). About none of these four divisions do we know much, but we know the least about the second and fourth. Particularly in the matter of the fourth (cadence) we feel that our own failures have been due less to faulty planning than to failure to gauge correctly the speed with which our clients should be carried to those goals.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

How ready and how qualified is the social worker to carry on such a task as the search for meanings will slowly unfold hers to be?

One must recognize two groups of social workers—the relatively small group of professionally trained individuals and the group that includes the entire body politic.¹ For what person is not involved in assisting others to solve life situa-

¹ The reader may object that this inclusion of all persons immediately robs social work of any claim to a place as a social institution. Theoretically this is true. Actually there has been recently such an overwhelming and disturbing contribution from the body politic that it would lack realism to ignore this change in attitude.

tions? One of the most interesting developments of the Depression has been the sudden and extended shift of the major burden of the professional group over to the other group.

In considering the professional social worker of today one must first recognize the changes that agency organizations have undergone in the last century. There have been six stages in this development; many localities are still largely at the first stage and others are trailing along at various other levels.

We need not go back very far to find social work a person-to-person affair. The "case history" was intensely realistic; it had been gathered through years of friendship or knowledge. The service and material rendered were measured rather more by the needs (either of friendship or self-satisfaction) of the giver than by those of the recipient. The next step was that of parochial organization where the parish or the lodge represented a strong emotional tie between the giver and the recipient but where nevertheless an organization intervened with a third person, the professional social worker, acting as the middleman. Then came the organization of the private agency. Here for the first time an impersonal group was intruded between the giver and the recipient. As was to be expected this agency had to carry the traditions of the earlier steps, and the professional social worker of the private agency is even today sadly trammled by the implications of the earlier person-to-person situation.

While during this development there were, too, a number of public agencies these certainly up until the Depression had either been small or had for the most part not commanded the respect of the social work field in general. The three stages through which we have swept rapidly in the last six years—the municipal, the state, and then the federal agencies

for social work—have been looked upon by many as emergency measures. Rather do they seem to be but rapid encroachments upon what was the goal of the last century's trend—the development of the farthest possible distance between the giver and the recipient. This is important less as an administrative and money-procuring mechanism than because it freed the social worker from the implications and demands of the first stages in this process, that is, the emphasis has changed so that now the needs of the recipient predominate rather than the preoccupations of the giver. More expert knowledge, more efficient distribution of mental and physical resources, and a certain queer impersonality can flourish in such a set-up which is perhaps the only one that will allow for the full professional training and work of the social worker. Whether this also will eventually involve an increasing stereotype in her techniques remains to be seen.

Moreover, in considering the professional social worker of today, one must recognize that her attitudes and equipment have not kept pace with these organization changes and the four major problems that have resulted.

(1) "Good case work" was the goal and pinnacle of pre-Depression social work and it is grasped for now as that to which we must cling if we are not to be lost. Under the impetus of psychiatric pressure it has become chiefly preoccupied with intrapersonal mechanisms. We would feel that very probably there will be a return to a form of good case work which will however be far more sensitive to sociological elements in each situation. For the present and for some time to come, however, the need is for the development of techniques of a less expensive and intensive sort. Nor is this an unmixed evil—demanding a more realistic and honest study of conduct (on the level of the impingement of the personality upon

the cultural pattern) than we have had. Case work of a more individual or of a more sociological sort will spread from this with real security in the future.

(2) There is evidence of an inability on the part of the whole cultural pattern to adjust to a new situation. We have made this country what it is through hard work; so true is this that we scarce know what to do with ourselves if we cannot work. We recognize the economic necessity of producing what is needed (and more). However we have an ingrained feeling that one should not receive more than he has worked for, while at the same time we say that a major task before social workers today is that of helping people to adjust to leisure time. The dilemma is shown in the intense activity of social workers in supporting old-age pensions—without realizing that this removes one of the really great incentives to work—while with equal fervor demanding “work” rather than “relief” measures. Do we continue to believe that salvation lies only in work and duty?

(3) Today we note a tendency for the individual to transfer dependence for safety from personal to corporate fields. The earlier pattern both in this country and Europe was that of providing for one's future or old age through personal husbanding of savings. During the last generation particularly there has been a rapid change over to dependence upon corporate (impersonal) interests for this form of security. Many of us have not sufficiently recognized that the greatest blow of the present crisis was not the actual loss of money but rather the realization that corporate husbandry of resources was apparently no more reliable than individual watchfulness for the future. The social worker has met this issue in her support of such legislation as will restore the client's confidence in impersonal (Federal Government) guarantees of economic security. Obviously it is the thesis of this volume that

it is rather the task of social work to indicate the problem presented in this paragraph than to align itself actively with one of its possible solutions.

(4) There has been a general failure at the present time to meet a new demand and challenge. Actually we are presenting no program today for those who are on the threshold of career. Youth in America may have before it, as we often magnificently say, a future such as never has before presented itself. New problems demand and reward constructive initiative. Actually this will be for the few. It is not fair to ask of the field of social work that it carry the burden of a new economic order; it is fair to say that for it and the school lies the task of teaching to young people that in the way they live and think and do is the future pattern. And similarly fair to ask it to translate to Society the meaning of its measures (or lack of measures) for youth. The social worker, more than anyone, can explain the environment to the client, for the latter comes, open-armed, in trouble seeking knowledge; she, above anyone, can interpret to Society the meaning of its pressures, for she constantly deals with the casual breakdown. Here is Society's rich field of research ready-made where social work will get real data on the meaning rather than the extent of unemployment, on the meaning rather than the growth of the Civilian Conservation Corps movement. (It is not mere chance that the psychiatrists see the problems of their clients as family problems. When they, too, move into this youth field they may find problems of making a living quite as primary as are those of family adjustment.) The field represented by the age-group of sixteen to twenty-five lies before us practically unexplored. The family agencies have not touched it, the children's agencies have not touched it. The psychiatric clinic has left it severely alone. Whether or no a Youth Movement magnificently and impatiently takes mat-

ters into its own hands does not for one moment depend upon what we adults do for youth—but whether (through the data assembled by the social worker) we know the meaning to young people of what we are doing.

Beyond this group of professional workers is that greater aggregation of social workers—the entire body politic. Here again we go no further than to illustrate the assay of this group through attempting some discussion of its recent trends.

During the last five years there has been a rapidly growing awareness on the part of all people of the problem of the personality in difficulty. The Depression has been terribly catholic in its effect—the good and the bad, the efficient and inefficient have felt its heavy hand but it has tended to throw the less able out of the ranks of the employed. There have been few organizations which, in reducing costs, have not dropped first those who were producing the least in relation to their wage.

As practically the entire burden has become one for tax support there has appeared—as never before in general view—the magnitude of the problem. Up to 1929 there were so many devious and indirect ways in which the citizen was paying the cost of the retarded child in school, the dependent child, the delinquent, the various forms of mental breakdown, that few, if any, had any conception of the extent to which great profits were being eaten up by the very groups whose need was produced by these same profits.

The second point as to the general body politic is that this greater sensitization to its problems of dependency and maladjustment has been so far largely in terms of irritation of a personal sort against the dependent group. Here possibly we in the professional field of social work are dealing only with

our own failure to translate the misfit in any terms other than those of expense. Perhaps this is the only way in which he can be translated. Yet it would seem possible that the great burden of this group could be made the guide to show the blind folly of a profit-centered culture. As the casual breakdown is making the magnificent contribution of leading us to a better social structure, so on a grand scale will the expense, the irritation and tragedy of these years contribute more to our growth in socio-economic structure than did ever our comfortable period of the twenties.

The third important thing that has been happening to the body politic has been its change in attitude about individual emotional problems. Through various channels of information the more advantaged groups have come more and more to realize that emotional problems exist in their own groups quite as much as elsewhere. Groups (for instance, in Essex County) which ten years ago vigorously shunned the "stigma" of psychiatric study (intriguing, but needed only by the poor and wretched) now seek this form of consultation eagerly, claiming that they should be the first considered. Slowly there grows the conviction that, deeper than the distribution of material goods, there are for all the same fundamental emotional problems to work out. As this conviction grows it must have the most profound effect upon the general public's attitude towards social work.

Finally we must recognize the extent to which in informal and formal ways the non-professional group has had thrust upon it the actual technical aspects of social work. This has occurred in two ways.

A number of family groups have been caring for relatives or close friends, often bringing them under their roofs. At first flush this appears as a partial return to the earlier picture of the extended family. As the tie is so purely an economic one

this is probably not the case. However, for the field of social work one cannot deny the great importance of the fact that a very large number of people are now in the most intimate contact with the problem of helping, in financial and spiritual ways, others who are in distress.

Also there have been recruited into the professional field of social work thousands of persons from the non-professional group. What the effect of this will be upon the professional social worker and her training no one would dare guess. Actually today certainly the major part of social work is being carried on by those with so little training that they must be classed as of the non-professional group. Their work probably runs all the way from an excellent job to the poorest kind of political trading. To the extent that they are intelligent and trained in other fields they present a serious problem to the professional worker who has already vested interests of great magnitude. Three possibilities present themselves: (1) Perhaps this is an emergency only and means that soon the field will be turned back to the technical and professionally trained worker. This seems improbable. (2) Perhaps in fevered haste this group can be given the same sort of training that the professional group has. In view of the numbers involved and the time and money required in such training, this too seems improbable. (3) Perhaps this group will more or less influence the attitude and training of the professional worker—a possibility of great interest. Already the professional social worker has built a very fair structure of techniques. These she has not the time to pass on to the new worker who must to a very large extent be content to develop attitudes about the clients who come to her.

Through this volume we have separated the techniques of the psychiatrist (clinical psychiatry) from the attitudes of the psychiatrist (mental hygiene). Assuming that there are such at-

titudes in the field of social work—such, for instance, as accepting that each action of the client is a natural and expected (even demanded) sequela of events that have gone before—two things may be said. First, through proper selection of personnel, attitudes of the right sort need be given little more than a chance to show themselves. This represents a shorter and simpler training problem by far than one which would involve the teaching of technique. Second, such a program might very materially affect the present technical training of social workers. The schoolteacher, long since lost in the morass of the technical material which she had to teach, has had a difficult struggle in ridding herself of this incubus to be free to develop the proper attitudes of the schoolroom. The social worker has been rapidly following in her steps and it may well be the greatest contribution of the group coming in from the non-professional field that it forces her back to attitude-release as the most important part of her preparation for social work.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

It is obviously difficult to predict the coming changes in social work. Certain of these seem to be foreshadowed in recent developments; certain others seem to be so indispensable to an individual-centered culture as to demand statement here even though in actuality we find no promise of their immediate appearance.

There are emerging new insights. The most dramatic of these is the growing realization of the cost of each of those who is in one way or another a social misfit. In earlier days there was the general belief that a person who worked for wages was supporting himself. There was little recognition

that an inadequate personality was none the less expensive to society just because some philanthropic soul would "hire" him for a wage. Perhaps the Depression has developed some problems of dependency; but more than that it has exhibited to society a load which it was previously carrying and which it did not recognize simply because of the free flow of money and its extensive profits. (We see the Depression here as showing the existence of a problem rather than creating a problem. There were exceptions: even before 1929 society had recognized that it was cheaper to pay a widow a stipend and have her hold her family together than to let her "support her family," thus allowing the children to run the streets and only add further expense. The illustration here obviously deals with problems of social rather than personal inadequacy. However, the principle is the same and one looks with great hope to the present situation which without question means that society is facing the problem of individual inadequacy more frankly than it ever has.) We can recognize that there is still an insistent call to provide work for everyone at the same time that we recognize that there is a slowly growing realization that the problem is not one of providing work for a million people but of providing work for a million people whom Industry would probably not want to employ. This sharpened recognition of the expense of the misfit and of the inadequate we think will continue and that it represents one of the basic considerations of social work (on the part of either the professional or the non-professional worker) in the future.

There is some growth in the recognition of the need of developing in all people the widest degree of tolerance. One can see the world only through his own eyes—it is really never more than what he thinks it is or wishes it to be. Nor can one

escape this situation. Thus by "tolerance" one means willingness to see and accept that each other person sees the world through his own eyes. Tolerance is not so much the acceptance of another's views or attitude towards the world (which is impossible) nor this "objectivity" which has been the newest god of social work (which is equally impossible) as it is the recognition that every other person is quite as biased as am I—the recognition that each has a right to that individuality arising from its own peculiar heritage and molded by its own experiences in triumph and defeat. What new worlds are conquered when we realize that in all our human relationships we are not really what we are but only what people out of their own lives are sure that we are! And how the irritations and misunderstandings will melt away when we realize that others are really others instead of merely projections of our own needs and hopes!

Finally, there is some new insight into what is the true brotherhood of man. This is a brotherhood based not on duty to help those in trouble, nor on the satisfaction that is so deeply imbedded in the fact that it is more pleasant to give than to receive, but on the realization that the basic problems of life are the same for rich and poor, intelligent and not, for those of whatever cultural background. So long as this is not realized the non-professional group in smug self-satisfaction will hand out dollars and the professional groups will with equal futility hand out ever more polished techniques. It is when we recognize that all are threading their way through the maze—that he who helps and he who is helped are equally seeking what neither has found—that a fundamentally sound basis for social work has been laid. Obviously, from this point of view the shift in monetary burden over to the taxpayer which (purely from that angle) makes

each person in the community responsible for his share in the "social work" of that community, is a very considerable step in the right direction.

Beyond these new insights there will be many adjustments of a more technical nature. These will change with new conditions and can be little discussed here. At the moment two matters press themselves.

The first is that of the training of the professional worker. At the present time she is pretty much mired in the intricacies of "good case work." If the considerations of this volume are of any value the social worker will be chosen on the basis of her personality, but her professional training will be largely in the basic sciences of psychology and sociology (which, we take it, are but two facets of the same body of knowledge and assumption). She and the client will then become two individuals seeking to solve certain problems—of help to each other only because their training gives them different views as to the same facts. Because of the social worker's training she will be able to interpret the stresses and problems in terms of those fundamental social changes which the client does not recognize.

The second is that there must be adequate provision for research, for which we ourselves look to the private agency. It has seemed obvious to us that the private social agency will continue. There are a number of reasons for this, not the least of which is the very strong factor of cultural lag. This raises the serious question of the relationship of the private to the rapidly growing and increasingly important public agency. Certain bases of relationships have seemed to us to be fundamentally unsound. The division of case load between private and public agency on the basis of "service" as against "relief" is utterly unsound as it represents just that

taking apart of people from which the social worker was so definitely beginning to get away. Another division, that the private agency take the "more difficult" cases, is similarly unsound. There is, in addition, the difficulty that when we say to the worker of the public agency that she cannot handle the "more difficult" cases we have shown a lack of faith in her which serves to undermine all her work. One also hears that the private agency is to handle that type of client who is loath to approach the public agency. The public schools are but one of a great number of public agencies who have already answered this challenge. The problem here is the improvement of the public agency rather than blocking its path by staking off a group "too good" for its work. There is finally the long-standing attempt to make the private agency a pace-making agency. But the public agencies are already attempting to build pacemaking groups within themselves. Here again nothing is gained in setting up what would be a barrier to this step.

For social work, research, as we conceive it, is an absolute essential. Opportunistically having to meet an overwhelming set of individual and social problems, the social worker has never "caught up" with the difficulties surrounding her task. She was not ready for the Depression—nor will she be any more forehanded in post-Depression problems. (Nor is this said in pointed criticism, as apparently no one else was any more prepared for these phenomena than she.) Problems long since matured, and which could have been seen long ago if we had but chosen, dump themselves into her lap for immediate solution—the peasant in the industrial center, the mother or wife at the factory. And there are new problems beginning now to shape which need study before they engulf us. If steam brought countless millions to pack themselves in cities and to trail a hundred of our most serious

problems, so can we see that the decentralizing forces of electricity and chemical power are similarly to bring their trail of the most difficult of social adjustments.

Families in cities are undoubtedly beginning to be affected by those recent changes in the machinery which demand "maintenance" rather than "production" workers. The earlier types of machines which did one job and could produce only at the rate that the operative worked, are being replaced by machines "which combine two or more operations and in which feed, speed, and traverse are all under the control of one operating position."² The older machines placed a premium on the individual equipped to do repetitive tasks, the new machines demand highly intelligent and skilled mechanics. Because this new type of machine is rapidly developing, because for better or for worse it must seriously affect the training and permanency-in-position of the new generation, because it will involve the dislocation of many industrial workers, we need to understand it. And we do not understand it. If we were to place the families caught in this change (which is now occurring only in certain industries) in the hands of the private agencies in, let us say, five cities, we would have in ten years an understanding of an emerging problem that would prevent us from being merely street-sweepers busying ourselves only with débris.

In any given locality, for example, let us suppose that the private agency is equipped to handle one out of every twenty of the total load going to the social work agencies. We are suggesting here that the load shall be divided so that the private agency shall take those individuals representing some particular emerging problem. This makes the division socio-

² The reader will find this and much other exciting data as to the Machine Tool Show (Cleveland, September 1935) in *Mechanical Engineering*, vol. 57, pages 653-656, October 1935.

logical rather than on any of the bases mentioned earlier. It preserves the private agency. It fails to set up any of the invidious comparisons that are all too prevalent today and all too maiming. And it provides for the development in social work of an answer to its present one outstanding deficiency—a set of data for future support. Only in such a way may social work cease to be a hand-to-mouth affair.

Such an arrangement allows the continuation of the private agency. It allows for an expansion or contraction of the private agency pretty much on the basis of available funds. Because research work done on five families, if it is carefully done, is somewhere near as valuable as that done on thirty families if the problem in each instance is the same. It represents a way in which the private agency can go on doing an outstanding piece of work with little regard for the money that is involved. It represents about the only way that we can escape the difficulty which faced the community chests even long before 1929—that of having the importance of their work pretty largely measured in the size of their budgets. At the same time it means that social work will begin for the first time to develop data that are essentially of research value; without this we doubt that social work as a profession can attain the dignity it seeks. Finally it would mean that in ten or fifteen years the problems which we have to face would be met with considerably more certain knowledge than we have at the present time. We admit of course that we cannot always predict the problems of fifteen years hence. This situation has been met in the medical profession where a considerable amount of earlier research is now of no value as new pieces of data show that its ordinates were not correct ones. On the other hand, all great professions have built their standing about this possession of research knowledge and it is essential to the field of social work as well.

Social work stands at the crossroads. Because it alone of the social institutions ministers to all aspects of the individual's adjustment it is yet free to see and develop its twofold task. This, in short, we have seen as its contribution to the social order in terms of a constant stream of valid information as to what the pressures of the various institutional structures mean to the individual; and as its contribution to the client in terms of a living through of the problems of adjustment in which worker and client alike share in the dangers and triumphs of the quest. The other road, the easier because it soon assures a glittering sort of "legitimacy," leads to an identification of social work with one of the needs of all people (as, for instance, with financial security). If social work crystallizes about such a "need," it will gain strength and its personnel will rapidly grow in prestige. Its value as a source of research material (what the pattern is doing to people) will disappear because it will no longer be a disinterested member of the institutional group; and its value to the client will seriously shrink as it becomes itself so confused as to what is the personality and what is one of the personality's needs.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Medicine

THERE IS every invitation to follow the psychiatric groups in urging an increase of the physician's sensitization to the mental problems involved in illness, though here again, as in the case of social work, there is danger that a professional group may be tricked by a gaudy display of techniques into feeling that these can replace the attitudes which need to be developed. As time goes on, there will also be a slowly gathering group of reliable and generally accepted technical psychiatric procedures which will find their way to the rest of the medical profession in quite the same way that the nutritional defenses against rickets have passed from the exclusive guardianship of the pediatrician to become the property of all parents.

This chapter outlines certain attitudes, already existent within the medical profession (at some points fully flowered, at others only the sproutless seed) which in an individual-centered culture would be developed to their fullest extent. Perhaps, somewhat fortuitously, a certain number of technical procedures will prove themselves so safe and generally applicable as to be useful to a large and varied group.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

An individual-centered world must know (1) what illness means to the patient and (2) what the relationship of the patient to the physician is. These things we do not know. Here at the clinic the casual breakdown has given us certain

hunches as to what research into these fields might show and this material is given in this section purely as illustrative of the kind of results which eventually will be attained.

From a mental hygiene point of view the physician is not so much interested in what conduct means to him as in what it means to the patient. We need to inquire what illness means to the patient as well as what it is or what it means to the physician.

One sees, for instance, physical illness as becoming itself the dominating factor in the life of the individual—bending to its needs his every interest and social adjustment. I saw a twelve-year-old, befreckled, friendly lad for whom a birth injury had produced a withered, small, and considerably deformed left arm and hand. We had a long and friendly time before we came to a matter that allowed me in a natural way to speak of this hand. "Oh, nobody knows about that, I always keep it in my pocket." Here was a boy who romped about with others, made his social contacts, went to school and church—but who really, after all, wasn't a boy but rather a hand that must be forever hidden, a hand with a boy attached, a hand which was never forgotten in his measurement of his whole personality, his family, his community, his county, and state.

The assumption can be made (and accepted as possible) that this was of the child's choosing—that, for a purpose, he sought to interpret everything in life in terms of this defect. However, it seems to us more realistic to say that the child could not escape the heavy burden of its meaning in all his social adjustment. Nor are such situations rare. Both in children and adults the physician or the family often manages to pick out and emphasize some particular physical difficulty or

illness to the point that it entirely controls the patient's whole mental life and social adjustment.

At the other extreme are those physical conditions which, as it were, the individual seizes upon for his own use—or, indeed, even seems to construct to gain his ends. There is today a wide literature on the neuroses, informing the medical profession that a high fraction of their patients are consciously or unconsciously using the apparent illness to gain some particular goal in social adjustment. The psychiatric group might better follow the view that every form of physical illness should be interpreted by the physician in terms of what it means to the individual, and that one of the possible meanings is that the illness is a handy tool in the personality's search for certain attainments. A child of eight finds herself struggling along in the fourth grade because of the overweening interest that her parents have in her academic achievement. She develops a neurosis—a form of severe nausea, of vomiting that shows itself on school mornings and is otherwise absent. This has been termed unconscious malin-gering—certainly the only conscious reaction is that of extreme discomfort and equally without question the whole reaction is beyond conscious control. Yet it is purposive and both the nature of the symptom and its cure show that the origin is mental rather than in any primary poisoning of the body. That the nervous system in some devious way manages a chemical change which brings on the nausea (as would be the mechanism in a more typical “physical” attack) is altogether possible. The fact remains that the primary factor here is an effort on the part of the personality to use physical illness as a satisfactory solution to an otherwise intolerable situation.

Investigators will continue (as over the last generation) to

find a more gorgeous flowering of research in this field than in other aspects of the relation of illness to the personality. Without going too far in this direction, it may certainly be said that we are as yet far from recognizing the extent to which physical illness is developed, maintained, and used by the personality as one of its tools in adjusting to the environment which is around it.

Between these two extremes, illness means many other things to individuals. At times it seems to parallel or symbolize the entire personality adjustment. Various difficulties of speech belong here. Thus we say that a person is struck dumb with amazement or stammers his thanks. One thinks of many cases of stammering as excellent pictures or symbols of some more general factor of maladjustment. The same situation appears often in the physical condition of the tuberculous patient. Tuberculosis can be held in check under conditions of poverty and crowding if there is proper interest in healthy living on the part of the patient. Thus the physical condition of such a patient is frequently an accurate indicator to the physician of the entire arrangement of the patient's life. If he is entirely thoughtless of the future in meeting each present desire, if he is tawdry and unkempt in his whole general approach to life, the physical condition immediately shows it. An improvement in the physical condition is again an excellent indicator of the attitude which the individual has towards the total life adjustment. The functional heart conditions are also acutely sensitive to the general regimen of the patient's life.

If the objection is raised that these same conditions are at times used by patients as means of making certain social adjustments—or that at times they sweep the individual off his feet—this is precisely the point that we have been attempting to make. What on the surface appear to be the same con-

ditions may have entirely different meanings to two different patients or to the same patient on two different occasions. If in an individual-centered culture the important matter to the lawyer will be what stealing means to the child, or to the teacher what truancy means to the child, then too the physician will be primarily interested in what the illness means to the total personality development of the patient.

Without question research in this field will expose many shades of meaning between those given here. In our own work with children we have found tentatively that their ailments and difficulties can be divided in a number of different ways—each of considerable assistance in understanding and working with some aspect of the patients' general adjustment problems. The particular division made here accepts two general classes of important physical defects. In the first we place those physical conditions which of themselves produce reactions and conduct that is distasteful to organized society. Here may be lumped all those various poisonings which, through producing a more or less generalized neuritis, lead to restlessness, a short span of attention, and early fatigue. Here the school physician has done his best work although there should be a widening of his vision to cover poisonings from the dysfunction of the glands of internal secretion. The list of such conditions is a long one (teeth, tonsils, constipation, mastoids, fatigue) but they all lead to the final common pathway of a pesky sort of restlessness. Nor are we as far as we should be in the proper treatment of this situation. Such poisoned children are still placed in the front of the classroom that the critical eyes of their classmates may quell the disturbance—and those more sensible ones who truant under such treatment are solemnly and sedately treated as delinquents by the Juvenile Court. Yet in general one feels that in this sector recognition by layman and physician alike moves

on rapidly and, for the present, with fair adequacy. (This heading, of course, also includes diseases which through eroding effects cause lassitude, diseases which through acute crises keep the patient in bed, etc.)

Among the physical difficulties which do not in this direct way produce conduct disorders there are again two groups—those which act to curtail directly the activity of the child and those which, without “actual” effect upon him, markedly affect his adjustment through making him feel different from other children.

In the first of these groups we place such things as various cardiac disturbances, spinal curvatures, deafness, and blindness. Blindness, interestingly enough, shows itself so devastating an affair that teasing on the part of other children is practically unknown. Partial deafness, on the other hand, not only leads to teasing but early produces in children those queer, detached, semi-paranoid mental pictures which apparently of necessity come in an individual who is in contact with only half of what is said. Some of our most stubborn delinquency problems are those of boys with sufficiently serious heart lesions so that they cannot play actively. When such a boy appears superficially to be in good health but constantly has to announce that “Mother won’t let me play this, or that,” he opens himself to the severest of social disapproval and the consequent necessity of finding some other way of establishing leadership. Generalization in this field is a dangerous pastime (actual children are terribly careless of our carefully rounded pronouncements); yet we dare to say that in general children with one or another of this type of difficulty present the picture of youngsters who “do not have enough to do.” Anyone at all familiar with children knows

the restless, insatiable drive towards getting into any convenient sort of trouble, that appears in the child who apparently has more available energy than he can safely employ.

These difficulties may be very clearly differentiated from those which do not curtail the scope of the child's activity but do set him apart from other children in making him feel different from them. Here are various oddities of appearance, unusual stature, birthmarks, benign skin conditions. One of the best examples of the difference between these difficulties and those just discussed appears in strabismus. Where the two eyes are just a little out of correct convergence the child suffers headaches and tensions as he constantly battles to bring the two images into one. The brows are knitted and the restless, irritable conduct bedevils both mother and teacher. But there is no social significance to this beyond the irritability. The child markedly cross-eyed, on the other hand, soon learns to disregard one of the images so that actually he sees approximately as well as the normal child—and this without tension for himself. This child is soon derisively nick-named for a defect which is, in its own name, of the slightest importance. Similarly, the Hindu proverb "Beware of the low ant hill" (it always contains a snake) examples the worldwide recognition of the personality problems of the little man. Daring again to generalize we find that these children enter every sort of compensatory activity in an effort at "drawing a red herring across the trail" to hide or draw attention from what a trick of fate has done to them.

We know little enough about this whole range of phenomena. If we seem to be opening no new field, if many physicians have long since viewed their tasks in the light of the meaning of illness to the patient, we reiterate that the

place of the psychiatrist in a mental hygiene program is to act as a catalytic agent for the advancement of a certain attitude rather than as the purveyor of new attitudes or of definite techniques. Those who are to do the task—those who naturally surround the child rather than those who rather artificially see him in the clinic—already show these attitudes to a greater or less degree. Because they are attitudes markedly strengthened in the training of the psychiatrist he has a peculiar mandate to foster them generally.

And another field in which research is needed is the meaning of the one-to-one relationship which exists between the physician and his patient.

This requires some statement as to the importance (regardless of our present field) of the exploration of the one-to-one relationship. It enters into the considerations of every other chapter of this volume and is discussed here largely as illustrative of its application elsewhere. In the contact of the personality with the social pattern about it, obviously the working out of relationships with but one other person represents the simplest of the possible combinations. There are a great number of these one-to-one relationships, each "loaded" with its own peculiar social connotations. The husband-wife relationship is person to person plus sex plus the social institution of marriage; the buyer-seller relationship is person to person plus the entire economic complex. That is, the one-to-one relationship is never simply person to person unless one accepts "person" as always carrying a member-role load of large proportions.

So far as the relation of physician and patient goes, there can be no question, first, that this particular personal relationship is of great importance in understanding the general principles involved in the one-to-one relationships and, sec-

ond, that it is of just as real importance in the progress of the patient's illness. Physicians have long since recognized the latter point although the recent era of specialization has done much to nullify it. One finds today a large number of specialists who have a physician-eye or a physician-heart relationship rather than a physician-patient relationship.

What is this relationship of patient and physician? The important matters of rapport, of positive and negative transference, of the physician as father-substitute, of active and passive attitudes on the part of the doctor—these points have been attacked seriously by the psychoanalytic group. Nor is it any criticism of the great light which this group has thrown upon the effect of these relationships upon the progress of the treatment to say that there is great need for the rigorous testing of their own and other possible assumptions. Why, for instance, is it that the psychoanalytic hypothesis so definitely demands the negative transference as a weaning process, when the medical profession has practiced apparently with some success these many years with no thought of it? What a marked change will come in the entire management and success of therapy when the physician asks why certain patients are resistive to his treatment and advice—instead of being merely irritated over this “unreasonable” conduct!

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

The resources for effective therapy may be divided into a number of sections. We consider in turn the roles of the physician, the nurse, the medical social worker, and the psychiatrist.

Various medical schools have for some time been interested in the adequacy of the physician in his professional relation

to problems of personality, so that we content ourselves with a few pertinent considerations.

One is tempted to criticize the basic attitudes upon which all present medical training rests. The medical student is given four years of intensive learning of facts. The development of reflective thinking, the time for this, the urge to this are all lacking. This is not the problem of "proper coordination" of courses, but of the lack anywhere of a chance to assimilate the facts of these years into the pattern of the individual's life—to think of them in terms of what they all *mean*. Even present interest in premedical training is one of insistence upon more data of a certain sort rather than a more reflective type of thinking. There is, of course, a question whether the physician need be the philosopher—perchance his recent specialization means a definite limitation of his interests to those of the high-grade technician. Yet the point of view in which we are now interested demands the habit of reflective thinking. If emphasis is to be shifted from what diseases are to what they mean in the total personality adjustment—if, for instance, we are to become more interested in children than in the diseases of children—then there must first be something in the medical training beyond the endless absorption of facts.

That is, it is not enough merely to add more psychiatry to the curriculum. Clinical psychiatry can be quite innocent of reflective thinking, can be made no more than a dosage of facts. If the physician is to view illness not merely as a series of physical symptoms but as a part of a personality's functioning in a real world, as an answer to problems and again in itself a new problem, then the data which he learns recede in importance as there grows the emphasis upon what these data mean in the whole drama of life. Can this attitude be inculcated? Possibly the habit of reflective thinking cannot

be taught, but rather exists in certain persons, to be allowed to grow and flower rather than to be imposed from without. Perhaps then we must turn more and more to the selection of those who are to study medicine rather than maintaining our present preoccupation with training. Selection already occurs, but it is based largely on marks in academic work, "habits of diligence," and the like.

We turn with even more interest to the consideration of the nurse in this situation. She is in the peculiar position of being associated with crises, as is the doctor, at the same time that she is met far more "naturally" by the families which she serves. Family groups dress physically for the physician—and they dress mentally also. Thus while the nurse is in a position involving very considerable authority, and patients accept her advice, she sees persons as they actually live—which the physician does not. Moreover the nurse is going rapidly into one or another form of public health work—with schools, industry, and other agencies more specifically interested in the general problems of the prevention of disease. She is entering fields where she can do truly preventive work of great value—at the time that she is a "natural" part of the picture. We have persistently stressed our feeling that the molding of the personality is—and must be—in the hands of those who are most closely in contact with the persons involved. Evidently in such a program the nurse is of far more importance than is the physician.

Does this involve an interest in selection of those to enter the training schools rather than the training of nurses in this field? Shall we more and more look for mental health and certain types of attitudes? Very probably yes—but there are not today adequate data to give a clear answer. Our own work in Essex County has so far not carried us beyond a somewhat

extensive training program during the hospital course. The points of this seem valid even admitting that later they will probably be strongly fortified by a program of selection. Three elements in this training are of especial interest.

The first is that of demonstrating that illness must be seen only in relationship to the total adjustment of the personality. This is not easy—the nurse can go no further on this venture than the doctor goes and it is footless to carry her into the realm of the *meaning* of illness until the physician has seen its importance. Moreover, the nurse's training is still a mass of particulars—there is perhaps no other professional field which is so cluttered with techniques as hers.

The second is summed up in teaching to nurses the basic principles involved in habit-training. Nor is this a small field; on the contrary, it is the arena, as it were, where the whole of the family drama works itself out. We have not formed a definite opinion whether the nurse should be taught all the fundamental problems of acceptance and rejection in the family (which are of primary importance in the habit-training field) or whether she should learn only those mechanical and “superficial” techniques of regularity in time and a dispassionate approach which certainly clear up a very large fraction of habit problems. So far in our own training program, we have attempted to teach only the latter. Here the nurse has a large and important field, as she has the ear of many parents who are reluctant to go to the physician until the problem has become serious beyond easy handling.

Finally it has seemed possible to train the nurse to detect the early signs of tension by which individuals—especially children—show the presence of difficulty in their social adjustments. Thus the teacher often realizes that *something* is the matter with a child—though to discover what that may be is often a tedious problem. There is much that we ourselves

do not know as to what these earliest signs are—Healy and others have gone back to truancy and to other petty delinquencies but the child's own story almost invariably shows that these were in turn preceded by stress and difficulty.¹

The question whether the nurse can ever play a significant role in a mental hygiene program is somewhat perplexing. Its answer rests upon which of two assumptions as to the development of conduct disorders shall finally prove the more correct. These assumptions are set out in this paragraph with our own tentative appraisal of their value. According to one view, conduct disorders are envisaged as small difficulties which in time grow like a rolling snowball. Case histories illustrating this always go back to some particular statement or event which produced small conflict—conflict which grew rapidly as time went on, gradually encroaching upon the youngster's entire mental life. The opposite view is that the fundamental difficulty lies in deep-seated and often full-blown attitudes within the child about life or people—attitudes expressing themselves in relatively simple ways at first, due to the immaturity of the child, but showing themselves in ever better integrated and more insistent activities as the child grows. In other words, the overt problem may depend upon its own increasing complexity (one view), or simply upon the increasing social demands which the child meets in growing older (the other view). The availability of the nurse as a therapist in the field of conduct disorders seems obviously to depend upon the acceptance of the first of these assumptions. This assumption cannot, however, go unchallenged. The more we know of family interrelationships, the more we suspect that time does not aggravate a problem so much as it

¹ *The Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies* (Boston, Judge Baker Foundation, 1923) show this beautifully but the same idea may be found in the many case studies which appear in the writings of William Healy.

changes the locus of its symptoms. It is as though growing up involved a sort of personalization of stresses—an individual “assumption of the load.” This view accepts an individual’s problems as no simpler for him as a child than they are for him in later years—though, as he grows older, they are localized in his own conduct rather than in the attitudes and drives of those about him. If this is the correct view (and we ourselves tend to feel that it is) we must use the nurse as one merely highly sensitized to the presence of problems or we must give her much more training in those deeper currents of family life of which the driftwood of habit and conduct problems are merely the indicators. In the first alternative we equip the nurse with knowledge of the earliest signs of the child’s failure to adjust comfortably to the stresses of environment and hope that with this knowledge and that of the simpler techniques involved in straightening up these difficulties she may make important progress in the prevention of more serious trouble in at least those situations not involving extensive intrapersonal problems.

In other words, on the basis of our experience to date, the nurse will work much more in the field of “prevention through early diagnosis” than in that of “true prevention.”

The medical social worker presents a difficult problem, the genesis of which may be laid at the door of the physician. These social workers were forced to interpret their work at a time when the doctors had no real conception of what their contribution might be. The result has frequently been that the worker is a sort of sublimated clerk largely occupied with the question whether the family can pay for its hospital service or whether there are adequate home facilities for the after-hospital treatment of the patient. Actually, however, the patient’s environment is forever thrusting its drives, its needs,

and its lacks into the whole problem of the present illness; this is something which the physician must realize, and which no one is better situated to teach him than the medical social worker.

Such teaching is not a simple task. The medical social worker stands in the same relation to the medical profession as does the probation officer to the courts—as an individual operating under a social philosophy totally different from that of those with whom she has to work. With a sort of irresponsible sophistry she may try to meet both points of view; or she may give in to the physician's parochial individualism to become a handy person about the hospital; or she may use her position to educate the medical group slowly to the fact that persons are more than bundles of interesting viscera, that they bring to the operating table all the triumph and defeat, the magnificence or tawdry cheapness of their streets and neighborhoods. Challenging as is this last possibility we have to remember that the doctor is not accustomed to being given lessons in his own field. Moreover, patients look up to this omniscience in the physician and are as quick as he to resent intrusion into his field. That the task is not impossible is evidenced by what the visiting teacher has been able to accomplish in many schools—and by what the probation officer on occasion has been able to do with the philosophy of the Court.

And in all of this, what of the psychiatrist? He has, it seems to us, two distinct functions—that of clinical psychiatrist and that of mental hygienist.

The clinical psychiatrist deals not only with the frank psychoses but also, as his knowledge and techniques improve, with the earlier and more finely shaded symptoms of impending mental or social breakdown. He is always interested in "queer" or unusual situations—and spreads the scope of his

operations to the extent that he can demonstrate to the public that everyone is a little bit queer. Until it can be proven (if it can) that all mental deviations are dependent in very considerable measure upon the pressure of the cultural pattern upon the individual, there will be a very real and valuable field for the clinical psychiatrist. Even with such a demonstration, there would yet remain the considerable task of assisting in every possible way the individuals who succumb to these environmental pressures.

On the other hand, we see mental hygiene as an entirely different venture. It must be apparent from what has gone before that while this movement has very largely been in the hands of psychiatrists and while its philosophy is closely allied to what we conceive to be the medical point of view (the questioning of what an act means rather than what it is), there is no special reason why many other disciplines might not claim leadership. Indeed we have indicated throughout this book that mental hygiene is simply a matter of fostering and developing certain attitudes which are present or potential in most, if not all, people. It is not so much a matter of the psychiatrist's entry into the field of education or social work or recreation, as it is of eliciting in each of these fields a way of considering its problems that is essentially medical.

The question of the proprietary rights of psychiatry in this field has been bitterly fought. This much is to be said: that while mental hygiene is a field as wide as that of human relations, the actual material that comes to a "mental hygiene clinic" belongs to or closely borders on the material of clinical psychiatry. It has been the material of the clinical psychiatrist (our old friend "the casual breakdown") that has thrown the greatest light upon the problems of mental hygiene. That is, the clinical psychiatrist who has a mental hygiene point of

view is in a peculiarly strategic position in the mental hygiene program.

But if one sees the advantages of the psychiatrist in heading this development, he must see as clearly the disadvantages of using the clinic indiscriminately in furthering it. Mental hygiene does not have the same boundaries or limits as a mental hygiene clinic, no matter how widely drawn the clinic's techniques or how gilded its vocabulary. The practice of mental hygiene is in the hands of every individual who in any way touches another.

Beyond this, there are certain definite handicaps to mental hygiene in the clinic itself. No clinic has yet been devised which does not present itself as an unnatural and unusual experience to the child. Once he is at our door, we befriend him and place him at his ease if possible, but the clinic and its people never represent any less than new persons to whom the child has to make adjustment. That is, it is extremely difficult to bring the child to the clinic and set up this new set of relationships without creating new confusions in his mind. To the extent that this central or pivotal group is using members of various institutions—family, school, playground—for diagnosis and treatment, for such understanding of basic difficulties that children need not find their way to the clinic, it escapes the unnatural and confusing elements of the in-clinic service.

There is the added difficulty that the mere entrance of the clinic or any of its members into a situation immediately changes the entire picture through centering interest on matters that least of all need this emphasis. This is best illustrated in the rural area, but to a smaller degree the same considerations apply everywhere. In the rural area (as we have seen it in Essex County) the mere appearance of a strange automo-

bile at one's door draws every sort of question. The visit of the social worker in this way defeats its own purpose, inevitably bringing neighborhood "interest" that emphasizes and distorts what should be kept at the level of the natural. Similarly the child's or parents' visit to the clinic. One is appalled at the number of outstandingly fine clinic contacts with a child that have been turned to travesties, or worse, when the family and neighbors have pawed them over later as matters of gossipy interest. So many parents greet one with "Of course, when John came home we asked him all about how he liked it and all the things the doctor had asked him!"

One further hazard: at least up to the present time there has been a tendency to use the psychiatric clinic only for the "more serious" cases. Thus many children come to the clinic already conditioned as to failure. Children know, in some indefinable way, that the fact of their coming means that somehow or other they are special problems. For weeks or months the child has heard that "If this doesn't clear up we are going to talk with a psychiatrist," and his visit means primarily that "it hasn't cleared up."

These various considerations largely define the position of the psychiatrist. Perhaps always a certain number of cases will involve such complicated mechanisms as to require highly expert handling. Unfortunately it is also probable that precisely these cases will be thoroughly worked over by various agencies before the psychiatrist is brought into the situation. Perhaps in the future we shall be able to mark off certain syndromes which can, in their earliest stages, be recognized as of sufficient severity to demand highly specialized techniques. However, for the major part, the psychiatrist's place in the community will be that of a catalytic agent. This would lead to an "ideal" situation in which the psychiatrist would rarely see the child but would be able through personal and com-

munity education to ameliorate cultural tensions so as to curtail conduct disorders at those first deviating points where apparently (for many, if not for all children) they can be taken care of by those who actually are about the child.

This does not set up the psychiatrist as a magician—but rather emphasizes the tremendous importance of shifting the actual work with the child over to those who naturally surround it. To those who fear that such a program would entirely vitiate the psychiatrist's value because he would never see the clinical material which is so necessary to the realism of his work, we offer the assurance that even with the most assiduous efforts it will be long before this "ideal" stage is reached. The intermediate step, one that is at present practical, is that the psychiatrist shall see those referred to him, and shall do for their cure the best that he can—but that he shall always think primarily of using what they teach him in educating the community to the mental hygiene approach to all of its problems. For instance, writing back to the referring agency such a report as illuminates the problem involved is a feasible and practical method of strengthening the mental hygiene point of view in the agency. Properly done, it means that the agency need not again be forced to appeal this type of situation to the psychiatrist. The pitfalls in such a program in no sense compare with the ineptitude of setting up a new agency for the problems which should be handled by those naturally near to the child and which, in fact, for countless generations have been so handled.

This places upon the psychiatrist a burden which is none too easy. He becomes now one to teach and train the community which provides the child's environment, rather than a specialist in a branch of medicine. His task is almost completely that of community education. His patients are simply case material to be used in this educative process. Everyone

has within him the psychiatric or medical point of view. The tolerance, the patience, and the faith in other individuals' ability to work out their own problems which, according to Anna Freud, are the cornerstone of psychiatry² exist in everyone. The psychiatrist has no responsibility to produce these attitudes in people, though it must be said that he has recently shown a tendency to assume that he is about the only person in the community who has them. He has to be a sociologist, that is true. He must be deeply interested in every form of child, adult, and community education. Still he is essentially an individual who is helping the community in solving its problems rather than one who is to handle these problems himself.

We cannot tell what will be the development of the medical profession in the future. However, for this group (more than for any other) we have found ourselves tempted to indicate at every step what would seem to be the next moves. Actually, of course, reorientation will depend upon the data established through research. But present trends in the medical schools point to the possibility that the physician of the future will be more interested in children than in the diseases of children, more interested in people than in their illnesses. That is, the future physician will recognize that he cannot understand the illness unless he sees the whole personality which has the illness, and "personality," as we understand it, includes the environment of which it again is only a part. What one means by "environment"—what further reaches of human interest, striving, and eternal laws this involves—no one can at the moment say. In saying that the personality is

² Stated by Anna Freud during a conversation with Dr. Bronson Crothers and given by him to the author in a personal communication. However, the reader will find the spirit of this statement amply illustrated in Anna Freud, *Introduction to Psycho-analysis for Teachers*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1931.

only a section of its environment we have not stated the ultimate. There is no step that has validity except that it leads to a further step; we leave it here because of our frank inability to see what that next step might imply.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Church

THE IMPLICATIONS for research in the Church are full of theoretical interest but fail somewhat miserably in their practical bearing because of certain difficulties outlined in the following paragraphs. There is no place in all human adjustments where the difference between attitudes and techniques shows more clearly than here.

For, we take it, the feeling an individual has that he is but a part of some whole which follows certain laws is practically universal. This acceptance of an inclusive order is based on various premises for various people. It may be found in some form at the root of pretty nearly every worth-while thing that man has accomplished. In this respect a unity holds us all, as each orients his actions to this ultimate propriety, orderliness, or feeling of at-one-ness.

But individuals have forever been attempting to express this attitude to others in some way—by word or song or rite. There have been countless techniques built, formulae made, in effort at expression. As the attitude has inspired the best that man has done, so he has bitterly fought over the techniques—themselves the source of devastating wars and the bitterest hatreds. In no other sphere are people so fundamentally bound together in the ultimate feeling tone and yet so completely driven apart as they try to express this basic attitude. In Chapter XVIII (page 408) we shall try to distinguish what we call life from the symbols of life. Nowhere is this distinction clearer than in the religious life.

So words trick us—and because we use words here, we too

are caught in this eternal struggle to separate religion from the expression of religion. It is only fair to our thesis to point out our own disability through words to express adequately the fundamental problems involved here. This is why we begin with misgivings as to the actual goals which this chapter could reach.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

Yet as best we can, we must turn to research to discover what religion and its expression mean to people—what contribution, from the point of view of an individual-centered culture, they are in the final sum of the personality. Nor has this yet been done. There is material without end on what religion and the church ought to mean to people. There is also a vast amount of biographical material from those who have long been in or have long been out of this contact with religious institutions. We have little faith in such material as the critical questions are overlain with every sort of compensatory and defense mechanism. Here, as elsewhere, we must undertake the two-stage process indicated elsewhere—the use of the casual breakdown to gather the hunch material and the subsequent checking of this material by whatever method seems indicated. The use of questionnaires in this second stage is very possibly of the greatest value, though perhaps for no other institution is the present use of this method so full of the pitfalls of obtaining merely that for which one is looking.

The plea for the development of “clinics” within the Church—groups responsible administratively to the church as a social institution but completely individual in their point of attack (Chapter III, pages 49 ff.)—is no criticism of a growing clinic movement within the Church today dealing with

the perplexities of parishioners. In this existing machinery there is an effort to bring clinical service to the aid of the Church in its more tangled problems—rather than an attempt at an assay of what this entire experience actually means to those going through it (this is clinical psychiatry rather than mental hygiene). The sort of clinic now developing in which the minister is merely discovering which of his various problems represent definite mental pathology has its place of importance but is by no means to be confused with the study of the casual breakdown. These clinics serve to relieve the minister of some very disquieting problems but they are not attacking the fundamental psychological questions which are today facing the Church.

The study of the casual breakdown (which here means the individual who “truants” from church,¹ who has been going regularly and now changes this habit) might be carried on by the psychiatrist (see Chapter XV, page 374) though the important matter is only that the searcher be someone with no stake in the situation. (The minister is no more able to work with the casual breakdown within the church, than the teacher with the casual breakdown in the school, or the psychiatrist within his own family.) Just as the truant was an early object of interest in the school and this interest has now shifted to those “lesser” difficulties which precede truancy, so here it seems probable that a study beginning with those who are showing breaks in their church attendance would move towards less pronounced crises. In view of what the truant has taught us about our educational program it seems worth while to apply the same approach to the organization of our

¹ Obviously mere church attendance does not in itself answer the questions raised in this chapter. The use of the method of the casual breakdown must be simply a doorway into the whole field of the religious needs of people. The point in this chapter is simply that this larger inquiry must be built upon the realistic data that come from what are perhaps rather minor events.

religious life. (The objection to the analogy, that persons do not have to go to church whereas they do have to go to school, is valid only to the extent that a few casual breakdowns might "refuse" to talk over their attitudes towards the church. Actually the concept of the casual breakdown covers individuals who are changing their habit patterns in any field. It is further to be noted that "recalcitrant" casual breakdowns have appeared in all the other institutions and that we have learned little or nothing from them.)

If a rather informal situation is set up in which those who are beginning to break from regular church observances (or those who begin them) may talk over what the whole affair means to them, what shall we learn? We shall get only leads for further study and it will take years to get even these leads. Just as elsewhere, we illustrate in the following paragraphs the sort of material which might come, using scattered material of our own as our source.

As for what "going to church" first means to the child only two things are to be said—and these go little beyond acknowledgment of ignorance.

Most children enter the church or religious school because they are put there and because in their pattern it is what people do. In many communities this cultural compulsion is certainly as strong as that which drives the child to school. This of itself works very strongly against the possibility of an objective view of a breakdown in these relationships. More than this, if one asks a young child why he started these observances, the only answer one gets is that he was supposed to do so or that he accompanied some friend. This limits what we can do in this field as compared, for instance, with industry, where we can ask the individual why he wants a job and what sort of job he wishes. Choice in entering some experience is as enlightening (or more so) as is choice in leaving

it. (While first communion and "joining the church" occur somewhat later, they are practically never fresh experiences, being conditioned by some previous years of attendance upon lesser observances.)

It seems reasonable that there is some relationship in our pattern between an individual's dependence upon the religious tie or solace and the general nature of his family experiences. There are so many ways that the church relationships parallel the family picture that it seems impossible to escape this assumption. Just what effect, satisfactory or otherwise, family experiences have upon church affiliation, no one knows—but any study of the individual's readiness for the latter experience will certainly include a study of his family life. Children with unhappy family experiences possibly earlier and more deeply find succour in religious experiences such as assurance that God watches over them. Or, just as possibly, the child with adequate family experience early looks to the religious pattern as continuing what there would otherwise be such serious question of losing. We have seen material of both sorts.

In the religious concepts individuals largely meet their security needs (see Chapter V, pages 95 ff.), and there are certainly large factors of family symbolism here. Note that God cares for people (as do parents) because of who they are—regardless of riches, social position, or IQ. Here then is a haven of safety—a place where there is position simply because persons are persons—a more permanent carrying on of those things the Family has given. On this basis it might be assumed that in social patterns which give position through caste, the religious patterns would place less stress upon family symbols. (This seems true in certain oriental countries. Conversely, it seems more than coincidence that our own Negro group, when it was always being threatened with the

breaking up of family ties in slavery, should have developed so vivid a family picture in its religious life.)

Religious experiences tend markedly to be introverting in character (again see Chapter V, pages 109 ff., particularly our distinction there between inherent and traumatic introversion). The religious life is often looked to as an escape from the rigors of reality. One is to approach God in detachment from the rest of the world, expecting through prayer and faith to cope with those elements of reality which are otherwise too difficult. The very marked development of symbolism (particularly in the highly ritualistic services) meets the needs of the introverted type of personality. In certain churches, for instance, there are extensive parts of the service which are rich in age-old meaning and yet quite without reason to the parishioners who devoutly take part in them. The development at one time or another of the "church militant" movement may be conceived of as an effort at extraverting the religious activities of individuals.

One may see also in the religious experience the development of some quittance with what we have termed extrahuman authority (see Chapter IV, page 87). Certainly man has largely solved his relationship with death, space, time, all the unreasonable (extrarational) elements of life through his religious concepts. The rural child (and adult) forever discusses the weather, floods, lightning, and other natural disasters—all these forces are of real terror to him. This is not true of city children. True, the city child has to face the problem of death (obviously children have little conception of its irrevocability), but the weather and the vagaries of nature are merely varying degrees of nuisance to him. In view of this it is interesting that all the great religious philosophies have developed among rural people. The suburban (rather than the urban) areas are today the heart of the support of our

church organization. The city child tells me that the radio, the movie, and their ilk are far more imminent and impelling phenomena than are "any of the things God has done" for him. (Obviously the radio, or any other such phenomenon, is as much beyond understanding or control as lightning but the child thinks that he can control it when the pressing of a button does what he wishes done—and it is this subjective aspect which is the important thing. When I ask a child what makes the radio go, he replies, "I turn a knob"; if I ask what makes lightning flash, he replies, "I don't know.")

Many of our children look to their religious affiliation as defining their relationship to large social groups. The Jewish child without question identifies his religious experiences with a belongingness to a race. Protestantism is individual in its philosophy (though it has, over and over, swung towards the submergence of the individual in the group—only to have new protestors arise). Catholicism, on the other hand, stresses the complete disappearance of the walls defining the individual as he is lost in the Church. There is in this latter a certain gain of great power through the loss of all individuality that answers a basic need of certain types of personality. The stereotypy of ritual, the concept of gaining all by losing all, the submergence of the limited personality in the inclusiveness of creed—this, again, is one of the things which the religious experience may mean to people.

The inadequacy of such an assay of the elements involved is the result of our dense ignorance, on a clinical basis, of just what part the religious experiences play in the development of the personality. At no other point do tradition and custom so becloud the issues. In each of our successive cultural changes the Church has rather successfully identified itself with the more permanent and secure elements (here in the

sense of institutional structure) of the pattern. One cannot find a point in history when its picture of individuals has not been associated with them as they ought to be rather than as they are. What it actually means to individuals, why they so largely join, why there is apparently so definite a tendency to enter the Church at one of the two periods of sexual adjustment (adolescence and the climacteric), what are the relationships of this experience to the all-important determinants of family experience—these and many similar questions await the light that a study of the casual breakdown will, we believe, throw upon them.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

In the meantime as research is carried on, can changes be made within certain churches to meet the needs that are revealed—as has happened in the school? The Church has adjusted its form and tendency (in the past) to every sort of altered circumstance in the political field. Can it not similarly afford to make fundamental changes to meet the personality needs of its members?

We inquire briefly into the qualifications of the minister for leadership in such developments. (There is no question here as to his preparation for ministering to the needs of his parishioners in those ways tradition has molded.)

An individual enters the ministry to carry a certain doctrine to others, and questioning the value of this whole venture raises issues too sharp to allow of cool consideration. Not but what there is sincere and searching questioning on the part of many ministers: there are many who welcome every honest query. There still remains the stumbling block of the parishioner's question as to the minister's objectivity. If we have found the teacher hampered in discussing issues with

children because she has so much at stake, then is this all the more difficult in the minister-parishioner relationship.

As the minister represents a relatively crystallized institution his tendency is to think of persons much more in terms of what they ought to be than what they are. As he represents goals to be attained, the image of what we wish we were, this is probably a necessary position—but it nevertheless seriously hampers facing what people really are. And what the parishioner thinks the minister's interest to be transcends in importance what it really is. The study of the casual breakdown must be free to follow (untrammelled by wish for what might be) wherever the crisis leads. But this is impossible where any one of those involved is dominated too strongly by some traditional picture of the way things ought to be.

Even granting the undesirability of an overdependence upon academic achievement, it is yet notable that the academic requirements for entering the ministry have changed little over the last generation. As other professional groups have so seriously raised their requirements and as even the commercial groups are representing constantly higher academic achievement, it seems fair to say that the ministry is having an increasingly difficult time in challenging the ablest and best young men to enter its field. It is no belittlement of the spirit and ability of the outstanding ministers of today to say that, considering the entire group, other disciplines and professions have a better educational background for carrying through the sort of task envisaged here.

It would be unfair to leave the matter entirely in this way. The Church has recognized new problems and certain of the theological schools have taken steps towards meeting them. Whether in time these steps will considerably change the minister himself or whether auxiliary, assisting individuals, able to specialize in one or another aspect of church work,

will be grouped around him, one does not know. The more recent trends have been in the latter direction. This may mean that there will be a group in the Church well prepared to carry on the kind of clinical procedure pictured above.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

If the various social institutions are to readjust themselves on the basis of what research and actual therapeutic efforts indicate, then the task is extremely difficult for the Church because of its present internal conflicts. For in every church today there is the intense struggle between fundamentalist and modernist; there is no minister today who is not tried to the uttermost by the task of bringing these two spirited chargers into an effective team. In every church there is the struggle between those who feel that the institution exists for what it can give the individual and those who look upon the individual as existing to support and justify that for which the institution stands. The State, the Family, the School have all resigned claim to an irrevocable, unchanging character as they have increasingly accepted the view that they exist to add constructively to the personalities of their members. The Church, however, presents the difficulty that at least for a great many individuals it is the one social institution in which the individual not only is lost but in which he gains his strength precisely from the fact of this "disappearance" of individuality.

It is perhaps just these perplexities which will make a new emphasis inevitable. Caught up in its own entanglements, perhaps the Church will be freed for progress only by this new necessity of meeting the needs of personality growth. Of what will or can come, we dare say little now; even what should come is unknown until we face more frankly what the religious experience means to the developing personality.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Industry

AS INDUSTRIES in countless variation press themselves forward, it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of Industry. There has been little research into the meaning of this aspect of life to those whom it touches. A frequent comment on man's industrial adjustment is that with the practical disappearance of artisanship there is a marked decrease in the satisfaction which the individual gets from the work itself and its product. Whether individuals ever really enjoyed their productions cannot be answered—but certainly today many persons work merely to earn money with which to buy satisfaction. Research into this "substitute" period in which work is done that there may be satisfaction in the non-working periods must follow again the method of the casual breakdown. The best example of the casual breakdown in industry is the worker who, still employed, is having a period of a few days of definitely decreased production. It has been demonstrated in a few concerns¹ that these individuals are ready to discuss the situation with some person whom they do not associate too closely with the employer. The physician has a certain advantage here in that the feeling has been firmly built up that material given to him is not further retailed. We insist again that this investigating personnel must be an integral part of the organization and in a position to suggest administrative alterations. Obviously less valuable examples of the casual breakdown are those who have recently obtained or lost a position.

¹ Notably the Western Electric. See Chapter III, page 60, note 8.

Certain of the problems involved have already come to our attention and are offered here as illustrative of the sort of thing which research may show up.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGS

There has been a marked increase in automatic types of individual processes in many industries. Elton Mayo has already shown that over a period of many months the worker suffers considerable difficulty and conflict in submerging complicated processes to a level of unconscious automatism—following which there is a period of high-plateau production until the disturbing period of the climacteric.² But we know nothing of the nature of the conscious phantasy that goes on meanwhile. Is it rich or impoverished? Is it affected or not by the near presence of persons of the opposite sex? In an experience which for many hours of each day seems close to that which happens in dementia precox (continued and futile phantasy blocked from any sort of expression) why do these workers, apparently, show no disproportionately high incidence of this form of mental breakdown? To what extent is this phantasy carried over into actual events after work hours (how much of it is playful) or how much, on the other hand, is a draining off of impulses which would otherwise perhaps drive the individual to disturbing and unacceptable activities?

Conversely, does the industrial worker, with an increasing amount of leisure time, find that his experiences in the factory control and determine the content of his leisure-time period? Does the phantasy life growing out of automatic processes condition leisure-time activity? Does the specialization that forces the worker to earn his money at some task

² Elton Mayo, *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1933.

that gives no returns in direct satisfaction color the leisure-time period? In other words, if persons use their leisure time for consuming alcohol or rushing about the country at break-neck speed how much are we to "blame" their lack of culture or how much the conditions under which they earn their living?³

Such a clinic as our own cannot answer these questions (often as they have been raised by our material!) because we see only those who have fallen too far into some sort of mal-adjustment. How many individuals go through such experiences in industry without any overt break with the social order or, indeed, without any deleterious effect, we have not the slightest idea. For instance, our own material seems to indicate definitely that the phantasy during these automatic periods has a high sexual content and that it leads to a sort of "catching-up" process of unusual sexual interest and activity during the period off work—but our findings are "loaded" by the fact that the individuals studied came to a clinic associated with the courts and social agencies. The usual clinic for vocational adjustment within the industry is equally limited as a source of information on this point, as it is interested largely in barring low-grade material from employment and in stepping up efficiency.

Another aspect of the general problem is that those who cannot dissociate their working habits from their conscious life by making the former automatic suffer in production or, worse, in actual physical impairment. No research would be

³ This may be illustrated in a current problem. There is widespread criticism of the "passive attitude" of persons "on the dole." The enervating effects of receiving money without having to work for it are decried by industrialists (and, one is sorry to say, the social workers have rather uncritically chimed in on the same note). It seems to have occurred to no one that this "lack of a feeling of personal responsibility" might as well be due to earlier insistent training of precisely this sort in the American economic and industrial structure, as to the dole.

complete that did not delimit the types that more easily accept automatization than others, and that failed to study the processes through which other types must go in accepting an all too difficult adjustment to this splitting process. Nor is this latter problem confined to the machine operative. With increasing administrative organization the place of any individual is more and more determined by his ability to get in step with the organization. If large corporations pride themselves that "it takes about three years to make an X company man," what happens to the individual beyond the changing of his own cadence and initiative to meet the tempo of the company? All sorts of guesses have been made in answer to this and similar questions, but they have been constructed by those who *feel* rather than *think* about the whole matter. For instance, unaccustomed as we are to automatization and to stratification of opportunity, there is no evidence that either does not leave the personality free to attain heights in the fields of artistic interests or of the affectional life that were not possible in a pattern that consumed so much of the mental life in the mechanics of making a living.

What does stratification of opportunity do to the imagination of the young worker? What does it mean that our books for boys no longer depict the meteoric rise of the worthy office boy? Has this disappearance of fantastic dreams of progress gone, too, from the older workers—and at what price?

The individual today has little experience with the sources or even the immediately preceding steps in production of anything which he has or uses. This is peculiarly true of a great number of industrial workers who carry through some particular task with absolutely no conception of its place or importance in the final product. What does this do to one's sense of responsibility for a job well done—or to one's satisfaction in production? Some concerns as a matter of routine

have been showing all their workers the entire process of manufacture and the part that each played in it. This has always resulted in a lessening of errors, which may (or may not) be a partial answer to the question. The narrowness of each one's task may be of importance—but we guess that the key factor is that the worker loses any sense of relationship between his life and work and the life and work of those others whom he thinks of as "also earning a living here" rather than as collaborators in a finished product. Of course we see many of these younger workers, and we are forever amazed at their utter lack of any conception of (or interest in!) the part which their task plays in the total factory or product picture. Here again we see man faced with the absolutely new experience of having no relations of intimacy with those who are physically so close to him.

The family pattern is deeply imbedded in us all. At school we see the teacher in the light of a mother; when democracy tries to wean us from father-dependency we eagerly turn to the party boss for orders and support; in the church we again seek to continue the family concepts. Does the industrial worker similarly look for the family pattern in his work, and if so, does he find it? The question demands answer at two levels.

There is, in the first place, a definite tendency to make parental substitutes of the industrial concerns themselves. Workmen's compensation, various forms of industrial insurance, and definitely paternalistic policies, all conspire to inform the employee that "as long as he is at all a good boy his every need will be cared for." Many of these moves have been dictated by the worker's helplessness now that the factors of artisanship have been taken from his work. Yet, for whatever reason, there is developing rapidly a parent-child relationship here.

Secondly, is the foreman or inspector in any way looked upon by the worker as a parent-substitute? Unable to answer this, we can at least report that a great many of the workers whom we have seen feel that the inspector must carry the burden of any faults in their work. (They lose money if their work is improperly done but beyond this they leave the responsibility for the accuracy of their work, in the most care-free way possible, in the hands of the person who will check it over.) If the foreman or inspector stands as a parent, he must mean a severe and demanding rather than a loving and protecting one. This entire question of the relationship of factory structure to the family pattern is probably of the most important nature but we know nothing of its actualities.

With the increasing size of industrial plants there has also come a factor of impersonality that means that workers scrupulously honest in their dealings with other individuals have no such feeling of responsibility towards their employers. We cannot resist reporting our experiences here with older children who have developed very real conflicts as they have found themselves inexorably drifting into this situation of "callousness" in their relationships to their employers. Recognizing that they have responsibilities to their employers, they find at the same time that the impersonality of the organization is numbing those ethical relationships which, after all, we do very clearly build up about personal relationships. Here, for instance, is the surprise of the nineteen-year-old boy who realizes that he would not steal a dollar at the same time that he finds that he is doing "only what I have to do to get by" for his firm.⁴

⁴ This shows in queer ways at times. We saw a lad of twenty-two confused over his dismissal from work for the following cause. The pressure of production needs meant that his employing concern (a large, to him impersonal, company) demanded for a period that he pass as "satisfactory" a product which he felt sure was not so. Here the confusion was between loyalty to employer (plus "keeping his job") and loyalty to his own ethical standards.

The effect upon the worker of specialization itself is only in part known. The splitting of the work formerly done by one person into a number of different tasks, each done by a different individual who requires practically no special training, has robbed the worker of all the safety he earlier had in the possession of hard-earned knowledge that could not be easily replaced. How much this affects the employer-employee relationships in building attitudes of fear and defense, no one knows.

Nor can research escape the problem of what is now termed vocational guidance. Many concerns have set up "personnel departments." We strongly suspect that these departments are interested less in properly placing Mr. A in their employ than in shutting him out if he is poor material. One cannot criticize business for maintaining efficient doorkeepers but a thoroughgoing plan of this sort develops a floating labor group that is quite without redeeming features. It is possible that an individual-centered culture will shift its emphasis (perhaps through vocational bureaus under governmental control or supported by all the varied industries in one area) towards really finding a type of work into which each individual might fit.

A question that demands the best of our research efforts, without any guarantee where it will lead, is how much of his environment accompanies the individual as he comes to the factory. If it is true that

The streets themselves, and the façades of houses, and goods
in the windows . . .

These became part of that child who went forth . . .

then the worker just as truly brings his family with him to the factory. If the schoolteacher can understand her pupil only if she knows his family, then the employer can under-

stand the worker only if he knows his. The grotesque specialization of today that in the name of privacy and individual rights places the ban of silence upon a part of our lives certainly leads to as much inefficiency and unhappiness in the factory as it does in the schoolroom. What mechanisms we shall develop as research uncovers this irresistible flow of life's events, how the lives of persons will be known and understood rather than bureaucratically pried into, one doesn't know as yet. We can only be sure that the world which has attained an individual-centered culture will be amazed at our naïve partition of life—will recognize that all the personality goes to work just as all the personality goes to school.

One further illustration from what we have seen. To the extent that married women have entered industry, new family problems have arisen. One of these has particularly intrigued us—the marriage of young factory workers who continue with their work. Is a family a family when it lacks furniture, home, ground, has none of the symbols of family stability? It is easy to say “yes” despite the fact that for a long time this has not been true—indeed, many patterns use marriage as the important means of determining ownership of property. Is such a pair more or less stable than that encumbered and cemented by the ponderosity of common possessions? If and when children come, are they in an atmosphere of a different sort than that provided by parents who have their own possessions and cook their own meals? Our perplexity here rests upon the difficulty of separating what we cling to because it is good from what we cling to because we are accustomed to it. “Clinic families” of this sort have been very fragile—but here, again, is the selective process that we see only the casualties of life.

These, and others, will be the matters of research in a culture that is concerned with what its institutions are doing to

the growing personality. Industry itself will be foremost in this research. This will not be due to philanthropy or academic interest but will rest solidly on a realization that Industry cannot balance its books unless the psychological costs of industrial processes are considered. If the profits of a machine age are to be consumed in taxes for the criminal, the insane, the maladjusted in one way or another, Industry may either merely groan under the burden or take steps to discover what part of this cost comes from the living and working conditions of those who share the tasks of Industry. The latter would be a firm step towards social justice—for it would be frankly based on self-preservation and self-protection.

CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

For the other institutions we already had at hand certain data as to the relationship of individuals to the special sector of the environment. For Industry this is not true. We have so busily bent persons to the profit motive that essentially nothing is known of the mental processes that are involved.

Until recently, moreover, we have believed that each person (certainly each man) possessed some inherent and god-given inclination to earn his living. We have so vehemently turned from the pattern of a leisure class that the idea that a definite fraction of our population will not be gainfully employed is an unacceptable one. Thus we have no conception of what is involved in readiness for the experience of holding a job or what types of persons can perhaps be turned to something other than producing things for us to use and for profit for the manufacturer. We assume that a person of sixteen is "ready to go to work." Admittedly in this field the vocational guidance group has staked certain claims. And to some extent rightly so, because job analysis has already shown that

marked differences occur in the various demands that different processes make upon individuals. But vocational guidance has not touched the question of the readiness of the personality to face the type of problems which we have illustrated in the foregoing section. Nor can we measure the readiness of either the employer or employee for this experience until we know (what we absolutely do not know now) what the industrial experience is in terms of its stresses upon the individual.

One thing, however, may even now be said: that both employer and employee come to this experience with ingrained distrust of the other. This is inevitable in a profit-centered culture. The way out is either that both parties see more dollars saved in understanding the personality stresses involved or that we substitute, as the center of our pattern, the growth of people for the growth of profits. For the present, we must recognize that every bit of data collected on the casual breakdown in Industry will be colored by this distrust, so that very probably the clinic set-up within the industry will be limited first to seeing only those who themselves feel that they have problems which demand solution. The problem is not insurmountable as, after all, these factors of distrust are not new to the psychiatrist, who has seen them in full flower in the family-school combination. It is true, however, that they are of wider and more pressing importance in the industrial set-up.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHANGE

Throughout all this there looms large the possibility of failure in the effort to reconcile the psychiatric implications of industrial relationships with the problems of profit, costs, and competition. But there are for the present new concepts

of competition and we are even playing with new attitudes as to profit—both tending to leave us freer to see industrial organization from the point of view of the personalities of its members. Can the same be said of cost of production? That is, are we as yet at the place where Industry is ready to raise the cost of production in order to develop factory conditions which through better mental health will bring their own returns in decreased taxes? This question is being asked now by a number of industrial leaders.

Nor can we in planning a program of reorientation fail to recognize the possibility that the apparent adjustability of the employee means that what seems to us to be inimical to his health is really of no import. Perhaps in some very healthy way we are specializing life so that individuals will find it increasingly possible to work like machines at certain times in order to emancipate themselves all the more at other times from the drudgery of life. We must also face the question whether any possible amelioration of the industrial program will actually decrease the number and severity of our social misfits.

Whatever the final outcome, there is no doubt that during recent years, throughout the whole industrial fabric, there has been somewhat more thought about people and somewhat less about the profits which they produce. Suffering, and inordinate tax demands, have brought this about. Perhaps it is a passing phase, but if it is permanent it marks a right-about-face towards an individual-centered culture. But the signs do not all point in the same direction. There are some companies today which are discouraging further inventive developments in their fear of further technological unemployment. Whether their reasoning is correct or no is not the important matter for the present purpose; the thing of moment is that such a policy implies primarily an interest

in the social adjustments of people. But one may find as many other concerns which are changing their machinery so that as general conditions improve they will employ maintenance rather than producing workers—men rather than women. (Though one stands aghast at the social adjustments involved in the entrance of women into industry, one realizes that this is as nothing to the problems that will come if they are now squeezed out of gainful employment.) Just what the results of this will be is not the important question here; what is important is that there are movements within industry in which the mental health of the employee or of the larger group affected are entirely disregarded. It might be fair to say of industrialists in general that they are thinking more and more about the needs of their employees as persons, but that they are still blind to those forces (such as changes in type of machinery) which, though indirectly affecting the social order in a most fundamental way, are less readily seen or measured because they affect the individual through the social institutions rather than directly.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Education for Change

THE PATTERN about us is changing rapidly. The acceleration of this change has increased over the last fifty years and there is no reason to suppose that the rate of acceleration will lessen at least in the near future. That we have not adjusted ourselves to these new problems seems evident in the various manifestations of maladjustment that come to the clinic and the court. Everywhere the old is being questioned, everywhere the new is hailed, but with that timid question, "What will it be?" Our children will live their adulthood in a pattern very different from ours, as their youth now has many basic problems that we knew nothing of. That there will be new inventions which will raise fundamental problems in human relations is probable; that we have not as yet made comfortable adjustments to the major inventions of the last one hundred years (such as the discovery of steam for power and then of gasoline for power) is certain. For these coming changes in the pattern, what shall be our preparation, our education, of today's child? There are three possibilities.

The first of these is that we definitely turn our back upon change. Roughly eight out of each ten persons today would solve all social problems by going back to the "good old times." If we but had the family that was, or the church that was, or the feeling of individual responsibility that was, all would be well. Perhaps all through the ages most people have met change by regressing (or trying to regress) to earlier conditions. If we are to accept Rank's hypothesis of the power of the birth trauma then, obviously, there is no one of us who

has not this insistent desire to "get back to safety."¹ We would suppose that this solution for our children (to rebuild a cultural pattern that we look back to as free from present uncertainties) is looked to more commonly in rural than in urban situations. To go back is to be timid. To go back is impossible. For "conscious social planning" this is a possibility that is not a possibility.

The second alternative is to predict the socio-economic pattern of the future as wisely as we can and attempt to train our children accordingly. This many are doing. For instance, we feel certain that adults of the next generation will have more leisure time than we and consequently we are feverishly trying to prepare children better for meeting this situation. Parents, school administrators, and others are busily engaged in this mortgaging of the child's future, a process not to be discarded just so long as we know what that future is to be. For our predecessors this was a relatively safe procedure as the pattern changes were not marked from generation to generation. But actually there is no one today who can give more than the wildest guess as to the family, school, and industrial problems that will be placed before our children. For such a long time adults have felt their responsibility to prepare children for what would be their future that in our present uncertainties the first impulse is to make every possible effort at predicting what that future might be. But the task seems impossible.

The third possibility is that of educating children for change. This is not congenial to institutions—for they always represent what the race has attained. As enough people arrive at a given point a "marker" is set so that, as it were, the group will not slip back of that. These markers are our institutions. They are dynamic only in this conservative and security-giv-

¹ Otto Rank, *The Trauma of Birth*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929.

ing sense—we know that we have gone “at least so far.” However, individuals within the institutions can educate for change, and of the three possibilities this has the most promise from theoretical and practical points of view.

There are several possible ways of preparing people to meet change. The first is to train them always to want something different—a philosophy that progress is change and that value lies only in turning away from the old. The second is to teach that change is so inevitable and impelling that there is “nothing that can be done about it.” The method would be to exhibit the swinging weather vane to the child—to point out that this represents the situation of the human being today. A very fair fraction of the determinists of today are pressing this “it could not have been helped” philosophy. Perhaps they are right. The third is to teach of change in relationship to goals—to educate the individual to measure the new in terms of what he is striving for, and to feel that he has some conscious effective role in change. In a period of rapid change there must be “partial goals”—those for which one will strive for five years, for instance, with recognition that at the close of that period a new assay must be made and perhaps new goals set up, ones more in conformity with the new conditions.

The first two of these possible adaptations to change are negative: the goal in the first is simply that it will not be like the previous one; in the second there is no goal beyond acceptance of there being no goal. We can, and do, pick out of the environment that which contributes to the way in which we are trying to solve our problems. To teach children to be adaptable to change is to teach them that there will be frequent audits of what they might do about their problems in terms of what they can do about them. Much of the tragedy of life comes, not from faulty goals, but from the dynamic

power of individual goals which have remained fixed in a situation so changed that they cannot be attained. To teach people to be adaptable to change is to teach them to take out of change what fits their needs, to relinquish goals that new conditions have made it impossible to attain.

Our own generation has been hampered by the fact that it was confidently prepared for one sort of cultural pattern and found that another was developing. If we could efficiently teach all children to meet change in a healthy way then we would look upon a new generation equipped to meet whatever happened to come its way.

There are six ways in which through formal or informal means we can teach children to adjust to change in relationship to conscious goals. We shall speak entirely of children as this is the only field in which we have any right to speak, though what we say would probably apply to adults as well.

We can teach that childhood is life rather than merely a preparation for life. Children, in the family and the school-room, are living, are working through problems of human relationships, have a definite cultural pattern about them, just as much as adults. Children still are kept quiet for long hours in school—not because human relations are devoid of speech or movement, but because childhood is thought of as having no value in itself. What financial and spiritual deprivations are undergone in the name of a life that is “around the corner”! A definition of work (in distinction from play) is that its returns are deferred. The attractive sound of “deferred returns” has led us far astray; from the psychologists’ point of view there really isn’t any such thing. For work that we do there are always both immediate and future results—and this is true for play. The notion that if the immediate results are pleasant or real, somehow the future ones will be tainted or

less rugged is one that fails to recognize that the best way to learn to live is to live.

This involves an institutional reorganization that is already occurring here and there. The schoolroom is in many instances becoming a place in which people live together—with academic knowledge used (as with us adults) only as an instrument of the enrichment of love and jealousy, loyalty and rebellion, aggression and dependence. The family, too, is a federation. Each member, it is true, has his peculiar contribution—but if life is any the less rich for one than for another, less full of joy or sorrow, there is impoverished preparation for life. We talk much of preparation for parenthood, and here, again, preparation most richly lies in the fullest meeting of the child's needs as a child rather than as one who will some day be an adult. It is our responsibility to show children that those things which are "worth while" are actually worth while in themselves, not in terms of so-called "deferred returns." Have we ourselves so little faith or joy in hard work or sacrifice or honesty that we need to coax the child to them by some will-o'-the-wisp?

The second way to help children to adjust to change is to teach them to be more able to live with themselves and to be less dependent on outside resources. We have been an industrial group—because we could make blankets or automobiles with machinery we have come to feel that we could make people happy with machinery. That community is considered "well organized" that can provide some organized, supervised activity for the child for each minute of the day. Generations that had to manufacture their own play are replaced by those in which this is externally provided or controlled.

This philosophy has extended far into our social planning where, again, machinery is our answer to every ill. If we have

delinquency we will provide a juvenile court, if we still have delinquency we will provide more probation officers, if there is still trouble we confer endlessly as to how to improve our machinery.

For example, when we asked three hundred teachers how to educate children for an adulthood of more leisure than ours, giving plenty of time for reflective thinking for the answer, in more than 98 per cent of the replies the answer comprised a list of new things for the child to do. We had one such paper with forty-two suggestions which we had not seen before. Over a number of years of this experiment, less than 2 per cent of the teachers have thought of a leisure-time activity as another way of doing something, as involving a point of view about life. For so long as there is this bondage to things, to machinery, individuals will be pretty helpless in the sea of change.

One has to live in a world of real things and of other people—these give richnesses to life that are otherwise impossible. We are not contemplating the life of the hermit. We are trying to say that he most richly lives with others who has first found that he can live with himself.

Our responsibility is then to give less regulation, less supervision, more opportunity for the child to make his own work and his own play. Out of this comes lessened present production and lessened slavish dependence upon what others can provide. Mainly this is a problem for social planning but interestingly enough mere money plays an important role, as we have seen over the last five years. The sheer lack of funds (during the Depression) has driven many of our families back upon their own resources and while we see adults irritable and on edge in this experience, there is perhaps compensation in a younger generation growing up to be less dependent on mechanical resources.

The third step is to teach children the difference between life and what are but the symbols of life. This statement is not easily clarified. It is relatively easy to point out what are the symbols of life; to say what is life itself is to answer what no one has answered up to now. One can accept this impasse, and at the same time recognize that we peculiarly live in a period of inability to distinguish life from its symbols.

An immediate example presents itself from the school. Certainly there was an earlier time when grades and marks were simply easy symbols of the child's stage of achievement. Who would question today that these symbols have become to most children the realities? We parents, we teachers have done our task so well that it is the rule rather than the exception that the twelve-year-old child does what his report card demands rather than what his intellectual curiosity demands. Money presents another example. It is difficult for us to realize that but a hundred years ago money was only a symbol of goods. One of the disturbing trends of these intervening years has been this development of money into something which is sought for itself, which itself is endowed with reality. One might in this way travel the gamut of our pattern—citing automobile, street address, position, possessions thought of as happiness, achievement, or contentment, because they may symbolize happiness, achievement, or contentment. The outstanding example lies in our verbalization. Early in life generalization must, and does, replace multiplying experiences. And generalization requires verbalization. The artistry of life lies in the balance between symbol and that for which it stands which allows one to use the former freely without ever forgetting that it simply stands for something. But our culture refuses freedom to the individual in this matter. One of its most insistent queries is how soon in life words replace realities. Children are admitted to school on this basis, school

progress is built about language ability, and preeminence is given to verbalization in testing intelligence. We have had much to say about the non-verbal modes of communication—those facile, universal modes of telling to others those things which defy words. These psycho-motor tensions are not adequate for our complex civilization. We cannot escape symbolization. Nor are we sure of those *real* values of life which might unfailingly serve everyone.

But we can go a considerable way. We can make persistent efforts to lessen the importance of marks and grades. We can make persistent efforts to exhibit in the other phases of life what are merely its symbols. We not only can, we must, do these things. The problems which our children will face will be poorly met by a group that cannot make these distinctions. We have those of our own generation to prove this. We do not know whether the time will come when we can point out what is real life. We suspect that this is a highly idiomatic affair—that perhaps generalization here is as artificial as it is in any other phase of our problems. Nor is this our only difficulty. Symbolization is for many an escape from that which it is impossible to face. As we build walls of armor about our bodies—painting and furbishing them to show what we would be—so there are many who cannot afford to look behind their marks, their street number, to what they really are. We can't escape symbols—often in sheer kindness they hide from us what we cannot afford to see. But we can know them for what they are and in a world that is built for the happiness and growth of personalities it is necessary that we teach children more clearly which are merely the symbols, and which are the things they really want and need.

Again, we can teach children to fear neither the new nor the old. This is not easy, as is shown by the fact that the so-

lution which more than four out of each five persons have to a new problem is that it be erased, taken away, made to disappear.

We must prevent children from being afraid of the new. Clinic practice leads one to feel that this is largely the task of the family since apparently children are conditioned to fear the new very early in life. We see many children who have been warned against every experiment. They must be careful of strange dogs and of germs on their own pets; they must not climb on chairs or cross the street. This form of conditioning is perhaps of the greatest importance in developing a fear of new experiences. We may be wrong—possibly each person is fundamentally in his make-up conservative. Yet clinical data demand our statement that much can be done in the home and early years of school to give children a joy in trying new ventures. Many families and many schoolrooms do precisely this thing; we are asking here only a wider institutional development of something which is actually in operation. Nor is this paragraph to be taken as supporting an interesting outburst of the last ten years—the losing sight of every other aspect of the child's development in urging him to unbridled experimentation. To lose life or limb that one's parents might proclaim proudly their ability to keep a hands-off policy seems to be again the fruit of our most inveterate error—the scaling of everything in life to the measure of one issue.

And we must prevent children from being afraid of the old. Just as the great majority of people are afraid of what is new just because it is new so do a few hastily grasp it for the same reason. Nor is the source of this situation easy to understand. One again accepts the possibility that the condition is inherent. Perhaps the nervous system of some persons absolutely demands change, movement, new things and places. Or this attitude may be dependent upon certain

chemical or hormone changes; adolescence is a period of breaking from what is parental and what the parents stand for, from that which is old and traditional. Just as extreme emotional immaturity (continuance of the period of dependence) prevents the individual from accepting what is new, so emotional immaturity of a less marked degree (continuance of the period of adolescent narcissism) may prevent him from accepting what is old. Our clinic experience, however, is that neither of these factors is of as much importance as the role of the parents and teachers in the child's early life. Many children whom we see have every reason for distrusting the old. A child with some justice feels that the value of the general state-of-things can be measured on the basis of what parents it has given him. Where for several of the impressionable years whatever is old and established means to the child hypocrisy, pain, and tragedy—well may he turn from it.

We have said that the task is not easy. To the extent that unhealthy attitudes about whatever is new or old are inherent in the biological make-up, it is difficult to see that anything can be done. To the extent that they are dependent on emotional immaturity we are in the hands of those who are having so serious a time trying to determine the relative importance of glandular disorder and unwise handling on the part of the parents. But in one direction a vista of real promise stretches before us. Those of us who handle young children should give the child (within the limits of serious danger) the feeling of our joy and thrill in his trial of the new. We should also present proof to the child through the way we live our own lives that the old and traditional has worth. What we complain of, he will complain of. What inspires little faith in us will not command his loyalty (one thinks of the number of parents who ask for help in getting their children to Sunday school when they themselves do not go to

church). Whatever has scarred us and made us bitter, he will turn away from.

The fifth way to help children adjust to change depends upon Society's ability to learn assiduously from the problem child. We can teach all children with understanding only if we do this.

The problem child—this stone which we reject—has had an odd career. It is not so long ago that we pitied him. The humanitarian movement of the last century and in large part all social welfare work for children were built out of sympathy for the unfortunate. Probably the major part of work with children today is still on this basis. At the beginning of the century a new note was brought into this work. Those whom we pitied we began to see as a menace. The delinquent was now translated into a social liability. The sore spots of our social life were shown to be sources of great cost and infection to others. The doctrine that the weak and sick should be left untouched now met evidence that as the weak succumbed they took the strong with them. A growing fraction of the support for every form of social work has been on the basis that it pays, that it is a form of insurance. This transfer of philanthropy from the realm of salvation for the soul to that of salvation for the pocketbook has probably been a forward step. It is at least in the direction of realism and has been part of a movement towards making our social engineering "practical."

But, for some, this maladjusted individual whom first we pitied and then we feared has developed a new meaning. If one subtracts from the forward-looking changes in the schools those which owe their introduction to the truant, there isn't much that is left. It is the rebel who teaches change because he dramatizes life—he throws its characters into relief. It is

the rebel (the casual breakdown) who teaches change because he tells us what life means to people; he alone gives a picture of the tensions which the institutions place upon the personality. As has been said, it has been the problem child who has shown us the problems of the child. The fact is that our therapy must always be oriented to what the maladjusted are telling us of Family, School, penal measures, Industry, the Church, etc. We must continue what we are starting, to make the stone that was rejected the cornerstone of our new social philosophy—to have the vision to follow those whom we pitied and then feared. This is the great contribution of the misfit.

Finally, we may weave into our whole social philosophy, and into our treatment of each individual, a realistic and practical conception of what the personality is. We shall accomplish little in social therapy unless we direct our efforts towards the personality. And this means seeing the personality as the personalized, dramatized synthesis of the whole social structure. We can have no objection to the most intense preoccupation with the personality as we become more and more certain that this but leads out again to the structure and function of the whole social order. Those who glibly discuss the personality in culture must finally fuse the two, as already we have fused body and mind or past experience and present existence.

And what will there be of conscious social planning? Nobody knows. Today there is indication that on every hand there is a more or less definite trend towards some reorganization of all social institutions in the light of their potential contribution to the richness and happiness of the individual life. How long this will continue no one knows. It can't go

much further with safety until research has shown us more of the lines it should follow.

This much, however, may be said of the total social structure. If the personality is as much the result of the dynamic elements of its cultural pattern as it is of its own past life then psychiatry must know that cultural pattern as it knows the patient's life. If psychiatry has set out to improve the lives of young children so that they shall not lead to devastating adult experiences and problems, then too it must resolutely set its face to the alteration of the cultural pattern. The road is long, we are just at its beginning—but any view less complete is futile. Nor is the task so much one of omniscience as it is of recognizing that throughout this whole pattern are already those who know more than we psychiatrists and who will do yeoman's work in the task as there comes into being the philosophy of an individual-centered world, of a world in which events and institutions are seen in the light of what they mean to the lives of people.

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